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# **BRITISH IDENTITY AND MUSLIM INTEGRATION**

by

**COSIMA EGGERS**

In partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

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**Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies**

**Faculty of Social Sciences**

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10 APR 2000

## Abstract

This thesis focuses on British identity in the context of Muslim integration into British society. It is an interdisciplinary study of English, Welsh, Scottish and Muslim identity.

The first section comprises an overview of psychological, social psychological and sociological concepts of identity. It provides an insight into classical essentialist theories and recent studies on Muslim minority identity, as well as the most recent interdisciplinary construct of an identity model. Furthermore, the contemporary 'post-modern' notion of fragmented identities is discussed. The chapter concludes with a detailed description of the methodology used in this study.

In the second section British identity is analysed using British history to determine objects of identity that have evolved in the past and interviews to determine national identity at present. British history offers a variety of examples of how ethnically and culturally defined peoples were integrated into British society over centuries and how social crises have been resolved. Interviews with English, Welsh and Scottish respondents are analysed to determine the current perception of Britishness and ethnic identity.

In the third section Muslim identity is studied by means of analysing interviews conducted with Muslims in England, Wales and Scotland. A case study on the identity of Yemenis in Cardiff, with members of the first, second and third generations serves as an example of how the second and third generations have already integrated into British society. The investigation of South Asian Muslims in Britain focuses on the difference of identity development between the first and the second generations. It is an analysis of how young Muslims cope with the tension created by the two different cultures within which they have to assert themselves.

Dedicated to my parents and my grandmother for their love and support,  
and in memory of Prof. DDr. Charlotte Teuber and Günter Jullmann.



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The material contained in this thesis is the author's own work and has not been submitted for a degree in this or any other university.

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## Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet system in the east and large-scale immigration to west European countries has opened an agenda, which was considered to have been closed with the end of the Second World War. The old and new presence of ethnic and religious minorities in European nation states forces eastern and western societies to reassess their concepts of community, citizenship and national identity.

While the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked the end of the physical and ideological division between Eastern and Western Europe, the *fatwa* issued by Ayatollah Khomeini in the same year, calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie, came to symbolise new potential divisions in the midst of European cities.<sup>1</sup> With the end of the Cold War, the notion of Islam posing a new threat to the West has become rather popular. Thus this perception of Islam is leading to the marginalisation of Muslims throughout the Western World.

It is the aim of this thesis to reach beyond such stigmatisation and to understand Islam in Europe as a challenge to reassess the question of ethnic, national and religious identity in the light of Muslim integration in the framework of a west European nation state: The United Kingdom.

## Identifying the Problem

Although Muslim settlement in Britain can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, it was the need for cheap labour to fuel the thriving British economy during the late 1940's and 1950's which brought the first wave of labour immigrants from other continents to this country. The majority of labour migrants of Muslim background originate from the Indian subcontinent.

While migration from the West Indies started in the late 1940's, South Asian immigration took off with the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947 and the construction of the Mangla Dam during the 1960's.

In Britain, the economic decline during the late 1950's reduced the need for labour migrants and growing public concern with large-scale immigration of 'coloureds' led to the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962. The prospect of legislative restrictions on entry for citizens of British colonies and member countries of the Commonwealth in turn provoked a sudden rise in immigration during 1961 and 1962.

However, the Immigration Act did allow for the reunification of families. Wives and children came to Britain to join their men folk and subsequently introduced the institutionalisation of their religion and native culture. Both the host community and the minority communities, which prior to

the arrival of their dependants were predominantly composed of men, were faced with the task of providing for the social, cultural and religious needs of the second generation.

Although the Muslim minorities flourished, they grew into rather secluded communities. One essential feature of the Muslim communities, which also weakened their position in dealing with local authorities, was the lack of unity. The Muslim communities in Britain continuously had to struggle in order to achieve a compromise with regard to provisions made by wider society for their cultural and religious needs. Especially in the education and health sectors the host community seemed rather reluctant to accommodate their requests.

Until today the Muslim community is segmented into cultural, religious and social groups, which to a large extent have established their separate organisations and institutions. Consequently it is a gross generalisation to speak of 'the Muslim community' as such. However, the attempt to overcome difference and to unify on the grounds of religious principles can be observed among the young Muslim generation.

The Salman Rushdie affair has shown that wide reaching support in defence of Islam can be obtained. This does not mean that all British Muslims were in favour of the 'book burning incident' in Bradford or the *fatwa* issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Rather, Muslims from various cultural backgrounds and Islamic movements were motivated to join the campaign for the protection of Islam by the blasphemy law. Unfortunately



the support sought from the Muslim world backfired on the Muslim communities in Britain and in the rest of Western Europe. Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence against a British citizen, for a book that had been written and published in the United Kingdom, hardened the position of the British government and produced a proclamation of solidarity throughout Europe. The Rushdie affair intensified Western fear that members of Muslim minorities could become subject to political manipulation from abroad and came to symbolise the cleavage between Islamic and Western secular values.

In Europe the common belief prevailed that progressive modernisation of society might lead to the decline of emotional, descent-oriented and collective attachments. Consequently it was expected that both native and immigrant ethnic identity would erode, once identification with personal progress within society and with the perpetuation of that society as such had taken place. As a matter of fact the opposite seems to be true. Hondrich demonstrated that both latent descent-oriented and collective feelings, which by nature are not chosen, gain significance with the accumulation of attachments that are consciously and rationally chosen.<sup>2</sup> Within the most industrialised and advanced European countries ethnic and cultural identities are reasserted and immigrant minorities tend to create self-sufficient, withdrawn communities. This process does not only complicate the integration of minorities, but also threatens to accelerate the vicious circle of mutual rejection.



However, different ethnic minorities have produced social tensions to varying degrees during their integration process. For example, both Chinese and South Asian communities aim to maintain their cultural and social heritage, live according to a strict moral code, and tend to foster the cohesion among their own minority community. Nevertheless the integration of Muslim minorities into British society seems to occur with far more friction than the integration of other minorities.

### Focus of Study

This observation leads to a series of questions:

- Why is there a stronger tension between wider society and the Muslim communities?
- How has Muslim identity developed in a Western secular democracy?
- Into what kind of society do we expect the minorities to integrate?
- What constitutes British identity (with special reference to its adaptability by immigrants)?

The integration of a minority is a two way process. Labour immigrants to west European countries were expected to live temporarily in their host societies, therefore it has not been anticipated that large numbers would settle. Consequently no provisions had been made for their integration and accommodation of cultural needs. In general, the host communities expected the immigrants to make the effort to integrate and, if possible, to assimilate. As a result, immigrants searched for the support of their own kind to cope with the economic pressures, especially once their sometimes

very large families came to join them. In Britain, in particular, immigrant minorities were left to their own devices.

The development of ethno-cultural communities and the assertion of ethnic and religious identities have practically produced a multicultural communal society in Britain. This development has in turn been encouraged by British politics, which legally and financially fosters the institutionalisation of ethnic identities and the building of community organisation.<sup>3</sup> Without doubt Britain is perpetuating the 'culture of difference' which is deeply rooted in its political tradition. In the past the United Kingdom had to accommodate Welsh, Scottish, Irish and English identities and to form a sense of unity by creating an allegiance to the British nation. Today, British identity and unity is being threatened by increasing nationalism and society seems to fragment into ethno-cultural communities. At this point the following questions arise:

- What has traditionally marked British identity? What does British identity entail today? And what is to become of it in the future?
- Why is British society falling back onto its ethno-cultural roots at this stage of social development?
- Is the assertion of ethno-cultural identities among minority communities an indication for a similar development in wider society?
- And is the fragmentation of society a symptom of modernity?

The social developments in the United Kingdom show that society is not only struggling to integrate immigrant minorities but also to maintain

social cohesion among the indigenous population as such. As mentioned above, integration is a two way process, which demands a thorough analysis of social processes among the immigrant community as well as among wider society.

This thesis will focus on the identity development of both Muslim minorities and British society. Theories on identity provide an insight into individual as well as collective attachments to culture, language, nation-states, political parties, etc., and explain assertions of ethnic belonging. Both individual and collective identity are integral parts of an integration process and determine the degree of cohesion among society.

Identification as well as integration processes have an emotional and a rational moment. Therefore both processes can be rationally controlled at an individual and a collective level. Problems related to integration are not of a biological nature but a question of how resulting conflicts are rationalised. Historic continental examples show very clearly that the consolidation into political systems have been acts of conscious and rational decisions. In 1707, the Scots agreed on the Act of Union due to economic advantages despite ethnic difference. Thus economic, political and social developments influence identification and integration.

The identity development of Muslim minorities is the product of their economic and social status as well as the social processes within wider society. Consequently British society is equally subject to the analysis of this

thesis in order to gain a better understanding of Muslim minority identity and their integration process.

## The Structure

This thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, 'Theory and Methodology', terms used through out this theses are defined and theories on identity, integration and prejudice are discussed. Further more the hypotheses, which evolved throughout research, are formulated and the methodology of the fieldwork is described in detail. Part two focuses on British identity, which entails a discussion of history in the light of national identity development and the evaluation of interviews with English, Scottish and Welsh subjects. In the third part Muslim identity development in England, Scotland and Wales will be analysed in detail, on the grounds of evaluated interviews, so that conclusions can be drawn about the development of Muslim minority identity in Britain and how the process of integration will proceed.

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<sup>1</sup> G. Kepel, *Allah in the West*, Cambridge, 1997, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> K. O. Hondrich, 'Die Nicht-Hintergebarkeit von Wir-Gefühlen', in: W. Heitmeyer, and R. Dollase (eds), *Die bedrängte Toleranz*, Frankfurt/Main, 1996, pp.100-101. And N. Wilterdink, 'Nationalitäten in alltäglichen Gegen- und Miteinander, Nationale Identität in einer Internationalen Organisation', in: R. Blomert, H. Kuzmics, A. Treibel (eds), *Transformationen des Wir-Gefühls*, Frankfurt/Main, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> G. Kepel, op. cit, p.101.

## **PART I**

### **Theory and Methodology**



## 1. Theory and Methodology

Identity comprises a system of social beliefs, social roles, values, emotions, and has both a personal and social dimension. It is an essential agent, which determines attitudes, actions and an individual's psychological and emotional well being. The development of identity is intrinsically social and is determined by external and internal processes. Identity influences the decision-making process and provides a frame of reference for social and political orientation. It is a key element for social bonds and a prerogative for the development of personal and collective responsibility.

Identity (LL *identitas*, sameness) is the feeling of sameness with one's self, and is the core of one's personality. The verb 'to identify', to be emotionally in sympathy with a particular 'object'<sup>1</sup>, is the active feature of identity. To identify with a particular object, is to feel a sense of sameness with the essence of this object. Thus identity, the feeling of sameness with one's self is an internal process, whereas identifications relate the individual to its environment. The personal and social elements of identity evolve through interaction with the environment and are subjected to life-long evolution and revaluation.

As identity is influenced by and influences every aspect of human life, theorists have conceptualised and focused on various aspects of human identity. The first part of this chapter discusses identity from the perspective of psychology, social psychology and sociology to introduce the most



important theories employed to support the arguments of this thesis. This will provide a framework for defining the identity concept in this study. Erikson, Marcia and Weinreich have been chosen to illustrate the psychological approach. Mead, Strauss, Tajfel and Hutnik are the social psychological and Goffman, Krappmann and Modood the sociological theorists referred to in detail. The pioneers of identity research will be discussed in depth for a simple reason: whilst present social theorists focus on particular identity components or stages of identity development, early theorists sought to produce an all encompassing model that attempted to consider every stage of development. Although their models may lack depth, they generate awareness for the influences on the development of identity. The studies of Marcia, Weinreich, Hutnik and Modood on ethnic minority identity have been chosen to illustrate how contemporary theorists from different fields approach the study of minority identity. They have shown that increasing social complexity demands increasing interdisciplinary awareness. The findings of these theorists are indispensable for the understanding of identity development among Muslim minorities in Britain. Nevertheless this study seeks to understand the socio-economic and historic factors which contribute to the identity development of both British society and Muslim minorities. Therefore this study is taking a broad approach to identity in the light of recent findings.

The second part of this chapter will discuss the hypotheses and aspects of identity, with special reference to Breakwell's model of identity. Her model is based on an interdisciplinary approach and focuses on mechanisms of coping with threatened identities. This perspective is of particular value in

the light of the ever increasing pace of socio-economic change that constantly forces the modern individual to reassess their identifications, which poses a challenge to identity development.

In the third part of this chapter the methodology and fieldwork will be described.

### 1.1. Theories and Studies on Identity

The concept of identity is deeply rooted in philosophy. Throughout the centuries philosophers have tried to analyse the nature of the self and personal identity. Descartes' conclusion: *cogito, ergo sum*, is probably the most famous assertion of self-knowledge in the history of human thought. The Cartesian concept of a singular and unvarying self has become the foundation of Western philosophy of, and scientific research on, the human mind. This does not imply that the notion of unity and continuity of the self has remained uncontested. Contrary to Descartes (1596-1650), Hume (1711-1776) did not support the idea of the self as a united whole, unchangeable throughout time. For Hume the self was composed of the mind and its contents. New knowledge and impressions change the contents of the mind and consequently the self is no longer the same. Hume believed that the continuity of the self is imagined and therefore the identity ascribed to the mind of man is fictitious. Although Kant (1724-1804) agreed with Hume that the self cannot perceive itself directly, he argued that the self can perceive events. Based on the assumption that perception is an event, the self can perceive its own action and thus gain indirect self-

knowledge. Kant differentiates between the 'phenomenal self' and the 'noumenal self'. The latter is the unconscious real self, which cannot be directly perceived by anyone, while the 'phenomenal self' is the self that we become aware of. The moments of self-awareness provide knowledge regarding the unity of the self. As this unity is not inherent, but created, Kant referred to it as the synthetic unity of apperception.

The controversy over the unity and continuity of the self and its identity has regained actuality among post-modern theorists. However, prior to the contemporary discourse on the fragmentation of identities, the most important theories on identity will be outlined.

The modern concept of identity was developed within American social psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Based on the work of James, Mead, Strauss and Goffman, identity was conceptualised in the context of social organisation. Thus identity develops in interaction with the environment, based on reciprocal expectations of particular behaviour.

In the field of psychoanalysis it was primarily Erik H. Erikson, who laid the foundations for identity research. Within this tradition identity was analysed in terms of its psychodynamic function. However, psychoanalysts and psychologists formulate their theories on the grounds of clinical data, which do not encompass wider social and cultural relationships.



### 1.1.1. The Psychological Approach

In psychology, identity research originates in the psychology of personality development. Erik Erikson suggested that Freud incidentally introduced the term 'identity'. In an address to the society of B'nai B'rith Freud tried to explain the nature of his personal link to Judaism as "... die klare Bewusstheit der inneren Identität".<sup>2</sup> That is based not on religion or culture but on deep feelings of communality and common mental as well as inner constructions. The context of Freud's psychosocial reference to the 'inner identity' suggests that the inner identity comprises a unique set of values, which evolved through the particular history of his people.<sup>3</sup>

In his psychoanalytical theory on personality, Freud mentioned briefly the process of 'identification' in relation to his conceptualisation of the superego, ego and id. According to Freud it is the superego that is largely a derivative of identifications, constructed during the oedipal phase. However, Freud never defined thorough concepts of identity and identification.

#### 1.1.1.1. Erikson's Concept of Identity Crisis

Erik Erikson was the first to develop a detailed concept of identity in clinical literature. As an ego psychoanalyst and student of Freud, his research was directed towards an elaborate description of the ego and related personality processes with particular focus on development during childhood and

adolescence. Erikson formulated a scheme of life cycle development<sup>4</sup>, which outlines the ego growth and the change of individual need and capability. This is paralleled by the change of societal demands, during the successive stages across an individual's life span. Although identity formation during adulthood and mature age are part of the scheme, Erikson paid particular attention to the developmental phase of adolescence. According to Erikson adolescence is the concluding stage of childhood, during which childhood identifications are synthesised to form a new kind of identity achieved in interaction and competition with one's contemporaries. It is also the stage at which identity formation has its normative crisis, sometimes expressed by rebellion and the rejection of parental values.

Erik Erikson derived his theories on identity from three main sources: 1) the autobiographies of extraordinary individuals (such as George Bernard Shaw), 2) pathology and 3) studies of personality development in children. In defining identity he differentiates between the concept of personal identity and that of ego identity.

The conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous observations: the perception of the selfsameness and continuity of one's existence in time and space and the perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity.<sup>5</sup>

While the concept of personal identity describes the basic mechanisms involved in knowing that one has a coherent identity, ego identity is related to the ego quality of this existence. Hence, ego identity

... in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of the fact that there is a self-sameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods, the *style of one's individuality*, and that this style coincides with the sameness and continuity of one's *meaning for significant others* in the immediate community.<sup>6</sup>

The ego's most important psychological function is to synthesise childhood identifications with new experiences and to balance the power between the post-pubertal id, the superego and the often unrealistic ego-ideal. The ego must also construct an ego identity, which is structured by an ideological world image, promising continuity in the foreseeable future. Therefore the loss of personal selfsameness and historical continuity is an expression of a loss of ego identity.<sup>7</sup>

Identity formation is a process of increasing differentiation and takes place on all levels of mental functioning. The process 'begins' once the infant realises that it is a separate entity and no longer a part of its mother. From then on the individual's identity will continue to evolve throughout his or her lifetime. Erikson suggests a schedule which entails interjection, identification, and identity formation as three steps by which the ego expands its functional capacity. *Interjection* is the primitive 'incorporation' of another's image. During infancy and early childhood, this mechanism allows the child to develop a sense of self-feeling. The successful integration of this process depends on satisfactory mutuality between mothering adult and mothered child. *Identification* is the mechanism by which the individual learns to comprehend the hierarchy of roles within the family. It enables the child to develop expectations of its role in the future. Identifications are constructed during childhood, usually with aspects of the people that affect the child the most. However, according to Erikson, the



process of identification ends with adolescence, when *identity formation* begins.<sup>8</sup>

Adolescence is the most formative phase of identity formation. The psychological task during this stage of development is the formation of a coherent identity. This comprises assimilated childhood identifications, correct assessment of personal ability and development of intimacy. It is noteworthy that the coherent identity that should emerge at the end of adolescence is not a mere sum of childhood identifications. It is rather a synthesis of earlier identifications, forming a new and unique *Gestalt*.

At this stage resistance against authority and those who represent traditional values is part of the process. Moral, religious and political values, which up to this stage the child's super-ego has adopted unquestioned from the parents, are then re-evaluated and sometimes abandoned. During adolescence the recognition of the environment, especially of same-aged peers, becomes more important as part of the individual's self-definition. Erikson referred to this process as the psychosocial identity, which is complementary to the personal identity and is built by role relationships. Therefore inner ego synthesis and establishing oneself within the social environment produces a coherent identity.

The social demand on the adolescent to define his or her future by choosing a career, a life partner and an ideology, combined with the re-evaluation of previous identifications, creates a situation of instability and may lead to a crisis of identity. Those individuals, who wish to delay adult commitments,

create a psychosocial moratorium to gain more time to define their choices 'for life'. The psychosocial moratorium is a socially sanctioned period for free role experimentation, a phase of prolonged adolescence, during which the individual can find a unique niche in society. How an individual masters their identity crisis decisively determines later life. For an individual to develop a healthy sense of identity, society must reinforce the integration of the individual in the societal system and encourage the ego to expand and to test its boundaries.

The danger that accompanies this phase, is identity diffusion. Young people suffering from an identity crisis may over-identify with groups or cliques that enrich their interaction with symbols, coded language, specific dress, music and rituals. Such identity anchors usually gain importance when no other values have been found to take their place. During a crisis of identity the adolescent searches for guidance. It is during this time when the individual is looking for idols and ideas that s/he is most vulnerable to radical ideology.

If an individual is unable to master his or her identity crisis, one of the pathological expressions of this failure would be a crisis of intimacy. For Erikson intimacy not only meant sexual intimacy, but also the capacity to engage in mutual psychological intimacy. The inability to develop intimate relationships leads to the choice of highly stereotyped interpersonal relations during adulthood. A deep sense of isolation creates what Erikson calls, distantiation. Distantiation entails the readiness to protect one's social circle by emphasising small differences to demarcate boundaries between

those who do and do not belong. As adolescents these individuals can become extremely intolerant. To perpetuate group identity, the obvious communal traits have to be protected by excluding all that is different. Such intolerance and group protectionism are obvious defence mechanisms against identity diffusion. However, it can be exploited by politics and can become a dangerous weapon against a defined 'other'.<sup>9</sup>

Further clinical problems relating to identity crisis are diffusion of time perspective and industry and the choice of a negative identity altogether. The diffusion of time perspective consists of "a sense of great urgency and yet also of a loss of consideration for time as a dimension of living"<sup>10</sup>. The individual may feel concurrently baby-like and extremely old. Activity is slowed down and falling asleep as well as getting up the next morning to face the daily tasks becomes a burden for the young person. The wish to die has even been expressed by some of Erikson's patients, however it rarely becomes an actual identity choice in itself.

Diffusion of industry regularly accompanies severe identity confusion. It expresses itself as an acute upset in one's sense of workmanship. The inability to concentrate on work, compensated for by a preoccupation with self-destructive one-sided activities, are symptoms, which Erikson observed among his patients.<sup>11</sup>

The choice of a negative identity can sometimes serve as a compensation for the loss of a sense of coherent identity. An individual who opts for a negative identity, develops a hostile attitude towards the desirable roles that



family and community offer. This reaction is a defence mechanism against excessive idealistic demands by over ambitious parents, which the individual feels that s/he cannot fulfil.<sup>12</sup> The psychological motive underlying the development of a negative identity is: If I can't be perfect at being good, then I will be perfect at being bad.

With regard to identity formation among ethnic minorities, Erikson<sup>13</sup> suggested that the problems relating to identity crisis during adolescence originate in the doubt of ethnic dignity. An individual can respond to this problem by adopting either extreme of behaviour, being antisocial, aggressive and destructive or prosocial, heroic and creative. The positive approach, is a desperate attempt to gain acknowledgement for one's individuality and to encourage people to look beyond the colour of skin.

When parents demonstrate to their children that they themselves have lost confidence in their ethnic identity, the sense of inferiority will be stored as a 'value' by the individual's super-ego and causes a premature identity crisis that can emerge as early as at the age of three or four years. Pathological denial of appropriate ethnic identification and self-hatred result from this crisis. The adolescent may express an identity crisis by surrendering to the perceptions and prejudice of society and thus adopt a negative identity. Vandalism, drug addiction, withdrawal, tempers and dropping out of school are signs of such a negative identity. If positive qualities are not recognised and find no acknowledgement in the environment, the individual will attempt to be good at being bad by adopting the prejudicially defined role.<sup>14</sup>

Although Erikson was the first psychoanalyst to develop an extended theory on identity formation throughout a human lifecycle, he admitted using the term identity with many different connotations. He referred to it as a conscious sense of individual uniqueness, but also as an unconscious striving of continuity or alternatively as solidarity with a group's ideals.<sup>15</sup> This made it very difficult to apply Erikson's theoretical construct of identity in clinical research.

#### 1.1.1.2. Marcia and the Identity Status Approach

Marcia's research on ego identity development is based on the identity status approach. This approach has been derived from Erikson's fifth stage of psychological development, which occurs during late adolescence.<sup>16</sup> The identity status approach is based on the assumption that any adolescent emerging from an identity crisis can be categorised into different modes of identity formation, referred to as the four identity statuses. The ultimate status of an adolescent's identity development is that of *identity achievement*. The individual successfully defines his or her commitments, after exploring and investigating putative alternatives. It was found that identity achievers have a higher capability than others to engage in intimate relationships and are most advanced in terms of their ego development.

The second status is that of the *moratorium*. The individual tries to prolong the period of exploration, to gain time to define potential commitments. The subjects of that category were found to be overtly anxious and most sensitive with regard to interpersonal relationships. An

ambivalent relationship with parents and a tendency to either rebel or behave submissively were further traits found among individuals of this category. When an adolescent holds on to childhood-based values and has not yet explored the adult world, then the third status applies, *foreclosure*. Those subjects concerned continue to dwell in a sheltered family life and have close relationships with their parents. Other relationships they engage in tend to be superficial and stereotyped. Such individuals adopt authoritarian values and are cognitively rigid.

*Identity diffusion* is the status attributed to an individual who is unable to define any direction in life and is retarded in his or her identity development. Individuals of this category feel isolated and rejected by their families, particularly from the parent of the same sex. They display the lowest levels of cognitive, moral and ego development and the environment can easily manipulate the self-esteem of such subjects.<sup>17</sup>

In order to categorise individuals into the four identity statuses Marcia used semi-standardised and semi-structured interviewing methods. This method is sufficiently flexible to adjust to the different and sometimes changing social conditions of the interviewee and allows the interviewer to ask probing questions. Marcia outlined six aspects of identity development, which he derived from his own identity status research and that of others.

1. Based on Erikson's theory "*Identity formation occurs within a sequence of developmental stages*"<sup>18</sup>. Marcia assumed that the style of identity, which does not entail content, and future psychosocial modes of



development, can be predicted from the outcome of previous psychosocial stages. This is given that the nature of resolution of each psychosocial stage determines to a great extent the style of resolution of those stages that follow.

2. An individual is not usually aware of his or her identity until contradictory experiences create a 'crisis'. Given that *"Identity is a psychological structure - a process with a slow rate of change"*<sup>19</sup>, the individual is expected to modify the identity structure, so that the new experience can be accommodated.
  
3. A mature identity cannot be formed until late adolescence because only then are the necessary cognitive, social and psychological conditions given for it to occur. This does not necessarily mean that an individual will achieve identity during late adolescence or that new contradictory experiences will not cause new identity crises throughout later life. However, the successful resolution of identity during adolescence in its full configuration will allow the individual to cope with future crises of identity and initiate a cycle of Moratorium - Achievement - Moratorium - Achievement, to guarantee a positive identity formation throughout adulthood. If an individual has not achieved identity during late adolescence, then disequilibrating events may initiate a crisis during early adulthood. If that is not the case then it will become rather difficult for an individual, e.g. with a severe identity diffusion, to achieve full identity configuration, unless s/he has an

environment that provides self-affirming support, which the parents refused to give.<sup>20</sup>

4. *The initial identity formation at late adolescence may be the result of either a sum or a synthesis of childhood identifications, social appraisals, unique abilities and needs, psychological givens, and positive and negative results of social experimentation.*<sup>21</sup>

Identity as a sum of childhood identifications is the result of family prescribed ideology and occupational choice. The individual did not have the opportunity to make his or her own choices in such matters, so that identity just 'happens' as the adolescent gradually becomes aware of it. In contrast, an identity based on ego synthetic processes is best formed when the individual is encouraged by his or her environment to make independent decisions for the future. Thus many individuals have an identity, although only some have a self-constructed identity.

5. Conclusions about an individual's identity were previously drawn from the most frequent identity status assigned to each interview content area (e.g. occupation, religion, sexuality, etc.). For example, it is possible for an individual to be assigned to *moratorium* in one area and an identity achiever in another. If an individual was revealed to be an identity achiever in the majority of the interview content areas, then s/he was rated as such. However, Marcia suggests that the results obtained from this method reflect the nature of the underlying structure of identity, rather than the nature of identity itself.<sup>22</sup>

6. *Identity is always changing, but after adolescence it does so at a progressively slower rate.*<sup>23</sup>

#### 1.1.1.2.1. Summary

Identity research in the field of psychology is predominantly based on Erikson's theory. It focuses on the psychological prerequisites and mechanisms underlying identity formation. The majority of the research on identity concentrates on identity development during childhood and adolescence. This is because radical changes occur less frequently in later life and that identity formation during adulthood is a slower process that is more difficult to analyse. However, more research is ongoing on identity development of women<sup>24</sup> and their phase of transition to motherhood<sup>25</sup>.

The essential aspects that can be isolated with regard to the psychological conceptualisation of identity formation are as follows:

1. Identity is a dynamic process, yet maintains its continuity and sameness by assimilating and accommodating new, potentially disconfirming experiences by means of ego-synthesis.
2. Identity formation takes place on all levels of mental functioning. It is predominantly a subconscious process, which one usually becomes aware of when it is in a state of crisis.
3. Identity is the product of an individual's psychological resolution of experiences made during social interaction.
4. The full configuration of identity may be formed for the first time during late adolescence. Identity crises are then most severe and their

resolution determines the nature of identity resolution during subsequent stages of the lifecycle.

5. Identity based on ego synthetic processes, is the result of a social environment, which encourages individual choice. Identity, as the mere sum of childhood identifications, is the result of a social environment that predetermines the future of an individual.
6. After adolescence identity formation takes place at a progressively slower rate.

#### **1.1.1.3. Weinreich's Study on Threatened Identities**

Peter Weinreich's study investigates the process of self-redefinition under circumstances that pose a threat to the identity of adolescents belonging to ethnic minorities. To do so he compared the identity development of 37 indigenous English (15 boys and 22 girls), 32 'West Indian' (14 boys and 18 girls), and 13 'Asian' (7 boys and 6 girls) adolescents from a school in Bristol. For his study Weinreich derived his definition of identity from Erikson (1958,1961) and Laing (1961) and incorporates the process of construal:

One's identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future.<sup>26</sup>

He developed two postulates with regard to the resolution of conflicted identifications and the formation of new identifications. The first states that one attempts to resolve one's conflicting identifications with others and does so by re-evaluating one's self in relation to the others within the



limitations of one's currently existing value system. The latter states that one's value system broadens as a result of further identifications with new individuals, which establishes a new context for one's self-definition. The consequent reappraisal of self and others depend on fundamental changes in one's value system.<sup>27</sup>

Weinreich further identified two sociopsychological factors that affect the socialisation of second generation ethnic minority adolescents as they become established in Britain. The first one is the nature of the intergroup relationship between the majority and minority group, and the second one is the confrontation with the differences between cultural values of distinct communities.

The classic theories on identity and culture conflict, the majority of which are based on the study of black youth in the United States, support the idea that discriminated against ethnic minorities, internalise the derogatory images the majority has of them. The offspring of ethnic minorities are viewed as individuals who are torn between two cultures that they have internalised. They are forced to come to terms with the conflicting values of both cultures.

Weinreich produced individually tailored rating sheets of bipolar constructs for his subjects (sampled as described above), based on their subjective value system to construe their perception of significant others. He found that the results did not support the discrimination/self-devaluation proposition. Discrimination on the grounds of neither 'race', nor sex results in self-

devaluation among second generation ethnic minority adolescents. On the contrary, the results demonstrated that West Indian and Asian youth rated higher in their mean self-esteem than their English counterparts. Although the English adolescents devalue Asian and West Indian adults and youth, such devaluation is not reflected by the West Indian results. Also girls from every ethnic background did not reveal any signs of low self-esteem, when compared to boys. Thus self-devaluation does not seem to be a direct consequence of discrimination, as assumed by previous studies. However, Weinreich found that girls have lower evaluations of their own sex, and of large segments of their environment without internalising this as a devaluation of the self. Girls were also found to have lower evaluations of boys. In comparison boys have a higher evaluation of their social environment and do not devalue girls.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, Weinreich investigated whether ethnic minority adolescents face conflicts in identification with others and whether any identification conflicts have an impact on their self-esteem. For this purpose Weinreich defined identification, contra-identification, and identification conflict as follows:

the extent of one's *current identification* with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other (whether 'good' or 'bad') and those of one's current self-image (me as I am now).

Here the term identification circumscribes empathetic identification, which entails the recognition of common qualities with another person. Weinreich also referred to a second meaning of identification that entails an individual's desire to become like another admired person. This process is



referred to as role model identification, or idealistic-identification as it emphasises an individual's identification with another person's qualities, which are incorporated into the individual's ideal self-image. Conversely, an individual may also identify qualities in another person that are employed to form contrasting standards. Weinreich defines this process as follows:

the extent of one's *contra-identification* with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those from which one would wish to dissociate.<sup>29</sup>

For Weinreich identification conflict constitutes the simultaneous processes of current- and contra-identifications, and therefore:

the extent of a person's *identification conflict with another* is defined as a multiplicative function of that person's current- and contra-identifications with the other.<sup>30</sup>

According to these definitions Weinreich's subjects were asked to create their own bipolar constructs of their current, past, and ideal self-image. The current construct of their self-image was then compared with the bipolar constructs previously created for the construal of significant other to determine the degree of identification with these significant others. The contra-value system is expected to correspond to the polar contrast of the positive value system derived from the construct of the ideal self-image. The contra-identification is determined by attributing contra-values to the other. Therefore the magnitude of identification conflict with others is the product of the degree of current- and contra-identification with 'others'. Weinreich interpreted a broad range of identification conflicts with 'others',

especially those conflicts where the magnitude is significant, as an analytic equivalent of Erikson's identity diffusion.<sup>31</sup>

The results of Weinreich's study show that identification conflicts with individuals of their own ethnicity were salient in nearly all of the West Indian and Asian adolescents. However, Asian youths revealed a very low level of identification conflict with their parents compared to West Indian girls. Surprisingly West Indian boys, who also exhibited a low frequency of identification conflicts with parents, had the highest proportion of conflicts with the English.

Weinreich hypothesised that this finding was a result of dual socialisation, as the first identifications made during primary socialisation with close family and members of their own cultural group are increasingly altered by the second socialisation process with members of the indigenous culture. Part-identifications and the adoption of some of the values of the indigenous population can lead to conflicts with primary identifications. Although this identity conflict is a result of growing up between two cultures, the results of this study show that it does not imply a devalued self-image and that ethnic identification conflicts vary according to both ethnicity and gender. As 'dual socialisation' results in greater identification conflicts, Weinreich assumed that youths of immigrant parentage will consequently exhibit greater degrees of 'identity diffusion' than indigenous adolescents. Weinreich found that his hypotheses held for girls, but not for boys. Weinreich interpreted the low level of identity diffusion among boys

as an expression of defensive high self-esteem. Girls may acknowledge their state of conflict more than boys who defensively deny it.

Ethnic minority youth have a positive self-evaluation despite possible threats to their identity development. Weinreich tested the intensity of ego-involvement and idealistic-identification of youth with parents, siblings, teachers, peers, and others from both the minority and majority groups, to investigate which factors enable ethnic minority youth to maintain a positive self-evaluation. He found that all the adolescents of the sample revealed less ego-involvement and idealistic-identification with teachers than with parents. All the girls exhibited less ego-involvement with both parents and teachers than boys. West Indian girls showed the lowest level of idealistic-identification with both parents and teachers and therefore seem to have the poorest orientation towards authority. In contrast Asian adolescents revealed the highest ego-involvement with parents and teachers. For all three ethnic groups their own peer group was more important than other peer groups, but for the West Indian and Asian adolescents, ethnic labelling had greater significance. The results of the West Indian youths indicated the least discrepancy between their own and other ethnic group preferences. Asian adolescents were consistent in their more positive orientation towards both Asian and English adults. With regard to siblings, all adolescents exhibited high ego-involvement with their most favoured sibling and same sex friend. Siblings are positive reference models, especially for Asian boys and English girls.<sup>32</sup>

Weinreich concluded that contrary to the discrimination/self-devaluation proposition, adolescents of immigrant parentage maintain a positive self-conception. This is because the adolescents do not draw their significant 'others' from the indigenous population, as assumed by the proposition, but from their own ethnic group. For all ethnic minority youth ethnic labelling is salient in their identities. However, for the Asian youngsters their favoured siblings and same sex friends are positive reference models and reinforce their orientation towards parents. For West Indian girls these siblings and friends compensate for a poor orientation towards parents. The devaluation of ethnic minorities among the English had no impact on the self-conceptualisation of minority adolescents, due to mutual low ego-involvement. Also 'discrimination against women' does not have an impact on the girl's self-conception. Compared to boys, girls revealed less ego-involvement with authority and adults, than with a favoured same sex friend.

West Indian girls showed little ego-involvement with authority figures. Asian adolescents exhibited most respect for authority figures, which also transcended ethnic boundaries. The antiauthoritarian orientation of the West Indian girls is interpreted as diffused orientation and identity diffusion. The stronger identification with whites among West Indian boys is an indication for the salience of identification conflict with whites. These arguments may also explain why the West Indian youth is less successful at school than Asian adolescents.<sup>33</sup>



As the ethnic minority adolescents of the Bristol sample revealed conflicting identifications, Weinreich investigated further, whether these individuals strive to redefine their identities, in order to resolve conflict. Weinreich made six suggestions concerning ethnicity and changes of self-conception.

- If any commonalty of identification conflicts exist with the primary ethnic group, then minority adolescents will attempt to resolve them by redefining themselves, particularly with regard to ethnically related issues.
- Partial identification with values of the dominant culture will be included in their ethnic redefinition.
- The re-identification of gender roles in accordance with primary and secondary identifications is essential in the redefinition of ethnic identity.
- The nature of ethnic re-definitions depend on the nature of identification with significant others and subsequent individual possibilities available to the person.
- Common elements of ethnic redefinition, based on self-chosen but shared values, provide a source of 'inner strength' and result in a new ethnic coherence.
- The indigenous population feels challenged by this process and will respond by reasserting their national identity.<sup>34</sup>

Weinreich pointed out that although it is possible to make generalisations about the importance of ethnic awareness to an ethnic group, no common outcome or uniform concept can be established with regard to the



redefinition of ethnic identity. To illustrate the first four propositions concerning self-concept change, Weinreich referred to two case studies, a West Indian boy and girl, from the Bristol sample. He found that for the Jamaican boy ethnicity was salient in his first and second construal of self-concept. He had a strong affiliation with both Jamaican girls and a white woman and he also rejected 'black boys who steal'. During the second interview, after the boy had left school, a change of self-concept became apparent. As he was expecting a baby with a white girl and had been convicted of Actual Bodily Harm, he identified more strongly with his masculinity and was more aware of gender division according to both English and Jamaican norms. His self-evaluation had deteriorated and identifications with members of the indigenous population constitute an essential part of his re-identification. The different route of ethnic identification are illustrated by the contrast of the boy's and the girl's cases. During the first interview the girl was in a state of identity crisis. She had strongly identified with white girls who went out with West Indian boys. The former she perceived as passive and good and the latter as aggressive and bad. Her own self-evaluation was rather negative during the first interview, but had improved as she had radically altered her self-image and developed a robust ideal self-image, by the second interview. She managed to reappraise herself and instead of maintaining a passive role she came to feel that she could "control English girls"<sup>35</sup>. According to the criteria of the propositions both case studies have illustrated the first three points and their comparison served as an illustration of the fourth.

Weinreich concluded that ethnic minority adolescents in Bristol perceived themselves, in many respects, like the English. They wish to be identified with various English characteristics but are conscious of their ethnic origins.

Their *Black British* or *Asian British* distinctiveness will continue to evolve through processes of further redefinitions, predicted on their attempts to resolve identification conflicts grounded in their primary ethnic identifications, but subsequently associated with people representing different cultural values.<sup>36</sup>

Although such ethnic distinctiveness is not uniform, it will become a distinctively British subculture.

#### 1.1.1.3.1. Summary

1. One's identity is the totality of one's self-construal.
2. Discrimination does not result in self-devaluation because ethnic minority adolescents search for their significant 'other' among their own group.
3. A person's identification conflict with another is a multiplicative function of that person's current- and contra-identifications with the other.
4. Almost all the ethnic minority adolescents exhibited salient conflicting identifications with representatives of their own ethnicity, which is a consequence of growing up between two cultures.
5. West Indian girls have an individualistic and antiauthoritarian orientation, while the respect for authority among Asian youth transcends ethnic boundaries.
6. Ethnic identity is not a uniform concept.

7. To resolve identification conflicts individuals change their self-concept, which entails a change in salience of ethnicity; partial identification with dominant cultural values; dialogue of gender roles across ethnic boundaries; and variable routes towards ethnic re-definitions.

### 1.1.2. The Social Psychological Approach

Social psychology was only defined around the beginning of this century. Consequently, early authors such as George H. Mead, who were previously defined as social behaviourists, were categorised as social psychologists in later years. Prior to Mead, 'sociological' theories were based on Darwin and the evolutionary conceptions. Accordingly, human interaction was based on biological stimulation and response. Mead placed that biological experience into a social context. Therefore he contributed a mental and individual dimension to human experience and built a bridge between social behaviourism and psychology.

Mead also influenced a 'school of thought', which became known as 'Symbolic Interactionism'. Herbert Blumer, introduced this term in 1937, to circumscribe a particular approach of pragmatic philosophers and social scientists alike. The difference in approach of mainstream and interactionist social psychology, is as follows. Methodologically symbolic interactionists create a theoretical framework that aims to make human social relationships generally comprehensible. This theoretical framework is then tested on individual case studies that either confirm, modify or falsify the theory. In contrast mainstream social psychologists do not accept case

studies as proof for the viability of a theory. Their methodology is more closely related to that of the natural sciences, and therefore hypotheses have to be tested by quantitative means to establish an acceptable theory.

The interactionist approach views the human being as the “prime communicating animal”<sup>37</sup>, which is able to employ shared significant symbols and is consequently capable of engaging in reflexive behaviour. Symbolic interactionism builds its theoretical framework on the human need to join into groups and to engage in social interaction, in order to secure survival and improve living conditions. To optimise interaction mutually comprehensible symbols have to be employed. Thus symbolic interactionists investigate the meanings individuals attribute to situations that occur during interaction with other people. It is assumed that an individual’s response to a situation is determined by previous experiences with similar situations. Therefore theorists aim to interpret peoples social interaction on the grounds of their biographies. Social groups are viewed by this approach, as a dynamic field. This dynamic field of social interaction is subjected to continuous change and formation as a result of human interaction.

#### **1.1.2.1. Mead and the Development of Self during Symbolic Interaction**

Mead influenced this approach by introducing the concepts of ‘mind’ and ‘self’ as forms of activity, which are products of social interaction. According to Mead the identity or (used in the same way) the self, of an individual is not yet present at birth because it can only develop in a social context. Thus



an individual's self (= identity) develops during interaction with the environment and is the product of social experience.<sup>38</sup>

Mead introduced the concept of reflexivity and the distinction between a conscious and a subconscious identity. The subconscious identity is the product of the unreflected internalisation of social norms and behaviour. However, to develop a conscious identity the individual must be capable of self-reflection by becoming an object of analyses to himself. According to Mead, an individual cannot experience himself directly by becoming a subject to himself, but indirectly by becoming an object to himself. S/he does so, by taking the attitudes of other individuals, or the generalised standpoint of the social group as a whole, towards him- or herself within the commonly shared social environment. Therefore becoming a perceived object to him- or herself as much as the other individuals are objects within the realm of his or her experience.<sup>39</sup>

For such 'self'-consciousness to occur, the symbols employed during interaction must have significance and commonly shared meanings. What Mead calls significant symbols are more than the mere stimulation of, and response to, gestures. The basic process of interaction can also be found among animals in that a gesture of a group member will cause other group members to respond and these responses are again stimuli for new responses. In the process of human interaction, gestures have to have meanings, which are shared by all the participants alike. For example, a vocal gesture gains meaning and becomes a significant symbol, if the individual has experienced in the past that it will cause the same typical



response in others as it does in him or herself. Thus the individual is able to anticipate the response of the other to his or her stimulus and can therefore mentally control this phase of interaction. Therefore the gesture or symbol has initiated both stimulus and response in the same person who introduced the stimulus. Mead referred to the exchange of significant symbols as significant communication, because the content of such communication reflects the common social experience of the individuals involved. Hence, significant communication is the precondition for anticipating the response of others in order to plan the course of interaction, which determines reflective intelligence.<sup>40</sup>

It was highlighted that the employment of significant symbols is essential for an individual to develop 'self'-consciousness. Reflective intelligence is in turn a necessary condition for the development of a conscious identity. To develop a conscious identity and subsequently resolve a crisis of identity, an individual must be able to think about his or her 'self' and in the case of an identity crisis, think about its possible sources. As consciousness is achieved through the use of significant symbols i.e. language, conscious identity is also an indirect result of significant communication. In order for an individual to think about and to reflect on his or her identity, s/he has to internalise the significant communication process to interpret his or her self. To develop a conscious identity is to reflect on one's self using the categories which were adopted through the social process of communication.<sup>41</sup> Thus a conscious identity is not an autonomous identity, as it is not based on a self that developed in independence from the social environment. The conscious identity remains embedded in the social

environment in which the individual acquired the significant communication process and the categories that determine his or her thought processes. Consequently identity crises would usually occur when an individual moves to a social environment, where the process of communication differs from that of his or her home environment.

Compared to unconscious identity, conscious identity does have a moment of relative personal freedom. The social environment solely determines the unconscious identity. It is a product of adopted social conduct, which is determined by the general pattern of organised social activity and may take on rather ritualised forms of behaviour. In contrast, the conscious identity allows the individual to step outside of this ritualised form of interaction by reflecting the aim and tactic of his or her action.<sup>42</sup>

To explain the relationship between the socially determined self and the aspect of individuality, Mead introduced the concepts of the 'I' and 'me'. The 'me' is the sum of organised sets of attitudes of others and it is the agent, which calls for the individual's responses to a specific situation. Thus the 'me' is the aspect of the self, of which an individual becomes aware, when s/he gains self-consciousness. It is always present and stores all social conventions, habits, and responses and represents the values of the group. The 'me' is "a member of the community, which represents the 'I' in the experience of the self."<sup>43</sup> The 'me' gives the 'I' its form. The 'I' is aware of the social 'me', it is the response to social situations and reaction towards the attitudes of others which the 'me' internally represents. However, the 'I' is

more or less uncertain, although it responds to the 'me' as it calls for certain action, it maintains the freedom of initiative, which the 'me' does not.<sup>44</sup>

The conversation between the 'I' and the 'me' constitute the self or the personality as it appears in social experience. For an individual to develop the ability to think and become an integral part of his or her community, s/he must be able to internalise the outer social world and adopt the rational social processes. At the same time the individual constantly changes his or her environment by reacting to social attitudes. The individual is little more than the 'me', s/he is conventional and mirrors the values of his or her environment and the slight adjustments which take place happen unconsciously. Conversely the individual has a definite personality and changes the environment by responding to organised attitudes. In this phase the 'I' is the more important aspect of the experience. Thus these two interacting aspects are the important phases of the self, which constitute identity.<sup>45</sup>

The dialectic between the 'me' and the 'I' within the self allows a person to feel sympathy for another. When an individual feels sympathy, his or her self is aroused by the attitudes of the other. S/he is then able to feel with the other person, as the attitude of the other was aroused within him or herself by his or her own attitude.

To take a distinctively human, that is, self-conscious, social attitude toward another individual, or to become aware of him as such, is to identify yourself sympathetically with him, by taking his attitude toward, and his role in, the given social situation, and by thus responding to that situation implicitly as he does or is about to do explicitly; in essentially the same way you take his attitude towards yourself in gestural conversation with him, and are thus made self-conscious.<sup>46</sup>

Thus we feel sympathy when we can identify with another person, or feel a kind of selfsameness. According to Mead the identification with another person makes us in turn more aware of our self, our own identity.

#### **1.1.2.1.1. Summary**

1. At birth no identity is present.
2. Identity is formed during interaction with the social environment. It is the ability to perceive one's life as a unity and as a part of the community.
3. A person may or may not be conscious of his or her identity. The identity remains unconscious when an individual adopts social behaviour and conventions without reflecting on the social processes involved. In contrast, a conscious identity, or self-consciousness as Mead would refer to it, is achieved when the individual thinks about his or her behaviour.
4. An individual becomes conscious of his or her identity through the language s/he acquired in social interaction, with which s/he can think about his or her self. The language is a system of significant symbols. A gesture becomes a significant symbol when the individual can anticipate the response of others to the gesture, and can therefore plan the process of interaction.
5. The human ability to gain self-consciousness is based on reflective intelligence. Reflective intelligence is the ability to postpone response in



order to act in a planned fashion. Therefore conscious identity is the result of cognitive processes.

6. Conscious identity does not develop independently from the environment, as the categories with which self-consciousness is achieved, are acquired through processes of social interaction.
7. Mead tried to resolve the contradiction between social determination and individuality by introducing the 'I' and the 'me' as aspects of the self.
8. The 'me' is determined by social conventions and values, while the 'I' is the response to social situations, it has the freedom of initiative. The conversation between the 'I' and the 'me' constitute the self - the identity.
9. An individual feels sympathy for another when the attitudes of the other are also aroused within him/her. The feeling of sympathy for another allows an individual to identify with that person and thus to gain more self-consciousness.

#### **1.1.2.2. Strauss' Concept of Status Passage**

Anselm Strauss aimed to fuse symbolic interactionism and social organisational perspectives and integrate them into social psychology. Like most social psychologists and sociologists Strauss did not approach the question of identity from the viewpoint of the structure and organisation of personality, but focused on the social processes from which identity emerges, namely the symbolic and cultural foundations of its structure. Thus Strauss aims to develop a framework for the analyses of the social and cultural influences which determine change of adult identity.

For Strauss, language is central to the discussion of identity. Alone the name of an individual can reveal significant information about both the donor and the owner. Strauss gave the example of first generation Jewish immigrants to the United States, who had Biblical names such as Isaac, Benjamin, and Ruth; however, among the third generation these names are very uncommon. The name of an individual carries the judgement of the namer and it can evoke various reactions as to how 'others' expect the individual, who received the name, to be. Individuals, who change their name voluntarily, usually do so to make particular statements about their 'new' self-image. The change of name usually marks passage, for instance when criminals serve as state witnesses and receive in return a new name and identity under the witness protection program, or ex-terrorists or revolutionists publicly bury their past by adopting different names. However, passage does not always entail burying a negative past. It can also be the expression of a change in status for example, when a bride receives the surname of her husband, or a convert wishes to signify the inner change by adopting a name, which emphasised his or her conviction. Sometimes a title is added to a name that usually indicates the membership of a status-group or a social class. Thus names also reveal qualities and classifications.<sup>47</sup>

The attribution of names to 'objects' facilitates the identification of the object. By identifying an object we classify it, or place it within a category, thus marking its boundaries. Whenever we classify, our experiences of the past and expectations of the future are employed. Our expectations are the product of consequential relations between ourselves and the object. Thus

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I' as a subject reviews the 'me' as an object, lead to new decisions and possibly to new courses of action.

Strauss suggested that the danger of dispossession essentially influences an individual's relationship with his or her environment. Individuals tend to express their self-regard and social status by acquiring particular possessions. Following a catastrophe, people who lost property, in which they had invested a lot of time and effort, are often not quite themselves any more. Also the reverse is true. When people undergo personal change, the meaning of previous possessions and relationships lose their meaning to the individual. Therefore the change of identity demands a reconstitution of human relationships, possessions and other people's regard.

Strauss did not restrict potential losses to material objects, but included the possibility of losing one's world. Here an individual is temporarily unable to evaluate or characterise an important aspect of his or her 'me'. S/he is aware of a gap between the experience of critical events and his or her understanding of them. Conventional explanations seem inadequate, which leads the individual to question the explanatory terminology that s/he was taught. When that process leads to the rejection of most of the explanations s/he once believed in, then Strauss referred to the state of this individual as alienated and as having lost his or her world. In such a situation, an individual's commitments to significant others and to him or herself have been weakened. In contrast, a person who 'knows his or her world' is able to make strong commitments, has a strong particular



conception of his or her self, and has expectations of how to respond to situations. Thus one of the prerequisites for commitment is conviction.<sup>49</sup>

Commitment entails making 'investments', that is to involve oneself with, to care for, to be concerned with, and to identify with something. In this sense 'action' is more than just a means of doing, it is a way of being. It follows that there is a link between commitments and a sense of identity. Commitment related identity becomes particularly apparent when an individual is strongly involved in a group or company with well defined goals. Others identify such an individual with his or her activities and consequently with the group itself. Some individuals may devote themselves exclusively to the realisation of group goals and are prepared to sacrifice other commitments that are also dear to them. For Strauss self-sacrifice is the ultimate expression of devotion and "signifies often the firmest of identities and the most total of commitments"<sup>50</sup>.

A less drastic, but nevertheless constant, determinant of adult identity is, according to Strauss, face-to-face interaction. Face-to-face interaction is a fluid process, during which individuals take successive stances *vis-a-vis* each other. In this process, objects and situations have to be identified and one's own identity has to be established for oneself and others. The recognition of another person's identity provides orientation for action. Both one's own identity and that of others are not always given in every situation. For example, when a known person responds in an unfamiliar or cold manner although conversation was polite, a number of questions emerge. What is going on? Have I said something wrong? Who am I in

this situation? Or is something else worrying the other? As a result this ambiguous situation will serve as motivation to take further steps in the flow of communication. In turn one's own motives are also scrutinised by others. The "placement of identities in undefined situations also involves questions of self placement"<sup>51</sup>. For Strauss the anticipation of consummations and consequences, the interpretation of a situation by interpreting past and future behaviour, were motivational statements. Motivational statements serve as a justification of any overt actions that follow. Thus individuals, the self, and the interpretation of situations, determine the structure of an act.

Strauss highlighted the fact that during face-to-face interaction errors of judgement may occur. During the process of assessing another individual's intent in a situation, a person has to avoid delusion and anxiety. The same applies to the process of self-assessment, in which an individual adopts the viewpoint of the other and of his or her self. These elements are phases through which participants move, in the course of their interaction. It follows that these phases can signify temporal changes in the relationship between the participants. Strauss does not view the interaction between two individuals as two separate actions, but as an interrelationship that constitutes singleness. Therefore a whole conversation in a developing relationship can also be considered as one phase. When such an interaction evolves into an involvement, then new complications may arise. There may be a dissonance of commitment or intensity between the two actors and consequently the phases will proceed at different paces for each individual. By moving through phases of interaction, 'self-other' involvements are also

marked by gradual movement. Such movement can be accelerated by certain events, like falling in love. Crucial events, whether positive or negative, can mark turning points in self-regard and personal identity.<sup>52</sup>

Some interactions are easy to interpret and the individual is aware of the status s/he has in this process. Yet, situations may emerge during which the status of an individual is redefined. Generally the passage from one status to another is socially controlled, individuals are sensitive to interactional cues and comply within the social rules. However, every kind of group is able to force a member into various temporary or lasting identities. Strauss referred to this process as 'status-forcing'. A person can be forced in or out of a group and his or her status can be degraded or enhanced. The strategy employed for this purpose is to induce shame in a person, by categorising an individual's actions as foolish or shameful to maximum effect. Those individuals who manipulate the status of others are either certified agents, such as judges and priests, or have certified themselves, such as a lynching mob. Status forcing usually results in the reassessment of identities. It may be triggered by satirical judgements of others or by crucial events during interaction. Even if the previous position of an individual is restored (e.g. by apology), the participating individuals and their relationships, will never be the same as when they entered interaction.

To avoid a negative status placement individuals aim to control their interactions. Sometimes others are less inclined to acknowledge an individual's presentation of his or her identity, leading him or her to doubt

whether s/he has control over the interaction process. Thus control and loss of control over interaction have an impact on self-regard and identity.

When Strauss investigated transformation of identity, he assumed that a person will essentially be the same, but can nevertheless change considerably during a lifetime. Some identity transformations tend to be fostered by institutions, whilst others take place outside of regulated spheres of influence. The most obvious transformation of adult identity occurs when critical incidents produce turning points during the onward movement of personal careers. While lesser changes (i.e. in relationships with others) may pass unnoticed, more striking shifts are recognised as 'milestones' and lead to new viewpoints and alignments. One example, which Strauss provided to illustrate institutionalised transformation, is that of conversion. When institutionalised changes take place, the path of development is foretold. Often such a forecast is received with disbelief as implications and future are not yet fully understood. Predictions are generally formulated with new vocabulary, which gradually will be adopted by the convert to provide a new context for the perception of environment. The predictions are then compared to the subsequent experiences made and as experiences confirm the predictions, the individual is able to recognise his or her transformation. Rituals that give meaning and constitute turning points in self-conception mark institutionalised paths. If self-change occurs outside of an organised sphere then individuals announce it to make a stance, blocking an unwanted return to the previous self. Turning points are usually followed by imposed or self-imposed challenges, which if passed, confirm the newly acquired status. Deliberate courting of temptation thus



tests moral and ideological transformations, as the social environment can more easily detect overt resistance than covered desire. 'Backsliding', or failure to resist temptation, results in reassessment of self-regard. In turn, when an individual is unexpectedly entrusted with new tasks and manages to handle them well, then the environment will view him from a new perspective and realignment in self-regard is due.

According to Strauss, ambivalence in self-regard occurs once an individual's personal career exceeds that of another after whom s/he had formally patterned him or herself. Overtaking a model can paralyse an individual who then returns to the status s/he departed from.

Another cause for transformation can be an experience of betrayal by a highly regarded 'object' of identification. In relation to such betrayal Strauss names three varieties of implications.

- Identification with a model involves internalisation of his or her values and motives. If the model abandoned his or her values, then the individual can continue on this path and possibly chose a new model. However, if the model had built an illusory hierarchy of values and deceived the individual, then self-hate and subsequent abandonment of the former self may be the consequence. The individual's perception of the self and self-classification is disoriented. In this case the degree of negative impact on an individual's identity depends on the extent that which major self-referential terms were destroyed.

- The second variety of betrayal Strauss described in terms of the response it elicits. An individual, who cannot rationalise how a beloved one could betray his or her values, will search for atonement. This search could entail the repetition of the very act of betrayal in order to eradicate the separating contradiction between the individual and the beloved one.
- The third form of betrayal is that of rejection. If an individual is rejected by his/her role model, then s/he will feel inadequate which in turn has a destructive impact on self-regard.<sup>53</sup>

For Strauss, every individual experiences status-passage during his or her personal career. For instance a woman will leave her family to marry and become a wife and eventually a mother. During all kinds of personal careers someone else was at this stage of development before. The support and advice of more experienced individuals provides a sense of continuity. Most experiences are rationalised by those who were there before, to prepare the newcomer for the tasks ahead. Passage involves a change of action, demeanour and language related to the new task. The passage from one status to another, or the frustration related to unwillingly remaining in a status, changes the development of identities.

Some status-passages are presupposed by periods during which an individual is coached. A coaching relationship involves mutual trust and faith, which are the foundations for identification. The pupil is inclined to model the self after the coach or some of his or her aspects. The coach

defines direction and aims, and eventually creates a new identity for the pupil. The dangers accompanying such a relationship are improper counselling, premature separation, and too strong positive or negative emotional ties, all of which can leave a pupil helpless or lead him or her into a learning crisis. In the course of coaching the trainer has to challenge old modes of thinking and doing by which s/he challenges old identities. The coach then introduces new perspectives, thus not only conveying new skills but preparing the foundation for a change in identity. At a certain stage the pupil will discover his or her own style and become more independent. Although the coach may think that s/he has control over the development of the student, the nature of coaching as a matter of fact initiates unpredictable changes of identity.

To illustrate a fundamental change of identity, namely that of dis-identification and identification, Strauss cited the example of brainwashing in China following the Cultural Revolution. In this context identity is closely related to specific group loyalties. External agents such as governments are concerned with securing the allegiance of the population, especially during phases of crises. When an individual has to cope with the existence of contradictory loyalties, such as the Japanese-Americans during the Second World War, an oath of allegiance to one of the parties can elicit a tremendous battle of conscience, as it entails the official and irrevocable burning of bridges. In China the government destroyed class loyalties by applying particular methods of 'brainwashing' on students. To achieve dis-identification with one's family and social class and to foster new identifications with country and party, students at school and university



were engaged in extensive political discussions. Apart from attending lectures and keeping diaries available for inspection, students had to participate in 'field work' to experience the true value of hard labour. Students had to witness executed punishments of landlords. When girls broke down in tears they were scolded for having too sentimental feelings for their enemies. Self-criticism was demanded and essays were assigned in which students had to report about their parents, grand-parents and friends. These essays were collected, criticised by the class, and later compared to previous essays in order to illustrate progress in development. Students were also encouraged to talk about their views on society to the rest of the class. In the course of these presentations students were introduced to new vocabulary with which they had to rename and thus re-evaluate 'objects' and events. Past actions had to be re-categorised and old motives reassessed, which forced the individual to interpret his or her reasons for past actions in a different light. Past interaction processes whereby former identities received validation were eroded to create a foundation for approved substitutes and turning points were enforced by coercing individuals into betraying their family and friends.

Strauss noted that the process of religious conversion also involves dis-identification with previous values and ways of life. Individuals undergo different stages as they change their identity. Consequently old allegiances are abandoned while new ones are formed. Those individuals who are 'lost' on the way of conversion are usually unable to return to their old selves and have to search for a new identity altogether.<sup>54</sup>



In his chapter 'Phases: Institutional and Personal' Strauss introduced the concept of temporal identity. He argued that different statuses and identities are socially scheduled and have therefore a temporal dimension. As mentioned previously, a status influences the behaviour of an individual. Thus the company manager behaves differently to his or her colleagues than he does at home where he assumes the status as a father, brother or son. A status has in turn a phase-like character. The Prime Minister, for example, should attempt to fulfil electoral pledges during the first two years in office, while in his or her final year s/he prepares for re-election. Although the status as Prime Minister does not change during the period of office years, the phases change, from proving viability to seeking maintenance in office. Therefore certain identities are temporal and the demand on the individual is to juggle different temporal placement.<sup>55</sup>

As individuals undergo change a certain degree of continuity is maintained. Individuals live with people of their own generation and different ages. Although generational differences do exist, every generation forms the next in their own image. Strauss identified three generational relations: vertical, horizontal, and diagonal. The vertical relation is obviously marked by the hierarchy of age and the horizontal one is the relation with peers. The diagonal and the horizontal relations are interesting with regard to interaction between minority groups and wider society. Not only do older generations serve as advisors due to their experience, they are also an example of how to deal with the occurrences of the 'same' time in a different way, as they are confronted with these at different stages of their lives.

A way of actively minimising identity change is to acquire a reputation. If an individual is able to make his or her abilities recognised s/he will be employed in these areas and thus avoid failure in other areas. As most group memberships are voluntary, individuals can join groups in which their potentials are recognised and withdraw from other groups where they are not fully accepted or where their weaknesses are emphasised. At the same time an individual may fail to recognise the change. Strauss pointed out that:

Awareness of significant change is a symbolic matter. A change must be deemed important before it and kindred changes can be perceived as vitally important.<sup>56</sup>

An individual makes sense of his or her past by symbolic ordering of events. In the light of an overriding purpose of life, the individual tends to interpret past action in a convincingly coherent way. Although motives change over the years, new meanings are discovered with new experiences and the diversity of past identities are reconciled in a new overall framework. Thus perceived constancy of identity is not a result of actual constant behaviour, but of interpretation.<sup>57</sup>

Strauss emphasised that for the study of identity, historical research is essential, as both personal and social histories have to be taken into consideration. Each individual is a member of a group that is a product of the past. Thus every individual is defined by a historical context. Even when individuals are ignorant of their family histories, still impacts on their identity. Examples include the numerous Americans who came to Europe during the past decade to research their family trees. Collectives,

who have newly unified, tend to invent a historical past in the image of the idealised present and future. Nationalistic movements have repeatedly illustrated this phenomenon. A further component of human history is that every generation perceives the past in new terms. Personal identity is closely related to group identity, as people's identities are built around their stance toward their historical past. Some may identify with it, some may reject it, while others may want to escape it. However, no matter which position an individual takes toward his or her historical past, it constitutes a part of his or her identity.<sup>58</sup>

#### **1.1.2.2.1 Summary**

1. Strauss investigated influences that change adult identity, but did not define identity itself.
2. For Strauss language is essential for the formation of identity. He challenged Mead by arguing that symbols do not always have the same meaning for all participants and therefore situations may frequently be ambiguous. Ambiguity is the source of innovation and creativity.
3. Identity comprises the classifications individuals make which direct the course of their actions.
4. Dispossession of property and losing one's world can change an individual's identity. The reverse is also true, where the change of identity can alter an individual's relation to property and to other people. Thus relationships have to be reconstituted.
5. Personal conviction is a presupposition for the ability to invest and commit oneself. Commitment is closely linked to identity.



6. Face-to-face interactions entail the placement of one's own identity and that of others.
7. Critical events during face-to-face interactions can lead to loss of status or force an individual into another status. Such processes as well as an individual's ability or inability to control them, change an individual's identity.
8. Conversion entails dis-identification with old values and the previous ways of life and the adaptation of new vocabulary, which both encourage the re-categorisation of past experiences.
9. An individual can adopt temporal identities during different phases of development within a status.
10. Historical research is essential for the study of identity, as every individual is defined by a historical context, which influences his or her identity.

#### **1.1.2.3. Tajfel's Concept of Social Categorisation**

In his analyses of the social psychology of minorities Henri Tajfel provided valuable insight into how internal and external factors of inter-group relations influence minority group identity. However, Tajfel maintained that all the assumptions and generalisations made in his framework cannot apply to all members of all minority groups. His aim was to define some of the problems that members of minorities have in common and possible psychological solutions available under the social conditions that these minorities live.



According to Tajfel, everyone divides their social world into social categories. It follows that a complex society can be perceived as the sum of different kinds of minority groups defined by region, profession, age, or political affiliation. Individuals are assigned or self-assigned as members of a group with common criteria, which instigates discriminatory treatment from others. These individuals then become aware of belonging to a minority group and thus develop internal group cohesion as a result. Whether or not individuals accept being placed in a low-status minority group depends upon the awareness and clarity of boundaries between the minority and the majority. Members of the majority will always find it easier to develop a positive social identity than members of a minority, as minorities are usually attributed to an inferior status.

According to Tajfel, those minority individuals who accept their inferior status exhibit a high level of self-hatred, as they desire satisfactory self-realisation but are aware of the fact that their minority status will inhibit them from achieving it. For Tajfel such self-hatred is not necessarily absorbed in the personal identity of the individual but remains part of social identity. Tajfel described two extreme ways in which individuals may respond to their acceptance of such a status. The majority of them would fall somewhere between these two extremes. On one extreme, individuals may refrain from making any social comparison with wider society, rejecting their norms and values, and reasserting their own group values or creating new groups in which values and norms are fostered to provide a sense of personal worth. Conversely, a minority group may disintegrate because it is unable to maintain its social identity within the system.

Tajfel identified three systems of belief according to which the minority group perceives itself and wider society.

Firstly, individual social mobility cannot change an individual's social membership. The criteria for categorisation are so salient that it is considered to be impossible for an individual to become an indistinguishable member of the majority.

Secondly, the assigned category is based on defining criteria, which are shared by all members of the minority and has social consequences for most members of the group, despite the fact that there are individual differences between the group members.

For the third system of beliefs, which relates to the minority's own perception of difference, Tajfel distinguished between three different types of minorities and their respective beliefs.

- Assimilative type of minority groups, such as the West Indian students<sup>59</sup> who expected to merge with other students at university. However, due to their skin colour their sense of separateness and common identity was imposed from the outside. The barriers erected by the majority did not allow these students to assimilate into their environment and forced them to become aware of a new affiliation, that of 'black consciousness'. As a result of their marginalisation these minority individuals developed separate group cohesion.
- Religious, national or ethnic groups who wish to preserve their cultural or social identity and complement the social restraints exerted by the majority by employing additional internal pressure on their members.



- Minorities that try to eradicate some of the differences and merge with wider society, provided no barriers are evident. They are aware of their cultural or social distinctiveness and even maintain some of their characteristics as they merge, but the clear boundaries that confined the group in the past were weakened. Examples of such a type of minority would be the Scots or Catholics living in England. When the attempt to merge is met with strong social and psychological opposition by the majority, then this kind of minority will develop a new consciousness of belonging and reassert their old group affiliations.

For Tajfel these group identities consist psychologically of cognitive, evaluative and emotional components. The cognitive component represents the individuals' awareness of being distinctly different from others. The evaluative components are the values assigned to the membership of this group such as social status and unfavourable judgements about their characteristics. The emotional component also consists of the emotional investments made in one's membership.<sup>60</sup>

When a minority was assigned an inferior social and psychological status its members will see no alternative other than to accept or reject it. Tajfel suggested that for those minority members who subordinate to the inferiority status, the system of inequality must be perceived as stable and legitimate. Thus the minority cannot conceive any cognitive alternatives to the existing system of intergroup relations. Those minority individuals, who are able to improve their mode of life within the existing system and are respected, tend to be perceived as exceptions to the rule by members of

the wider society. Their personal career does not affect the attitude of the majority towards their group.

Tajfel identified four processes, which are essential to intergroup relations and the social psychology of minorities, namely social categorisation, social identity, social comparison, and psychological distinctiveness. Tajfel defines social identity of an individual

as consisting of those aspects of their self-image and its evaluation which derive from membership of social groups that are salient to them; and, in turn, much of that self-image and of the values attached to it derive from comparisons with other groups which are present in the social environment.<sup>61</sup>

The comparisons involved in the formation of social identity elicit a reflection of the past, present and future of inferiority, which enforce the desire to defend one's right to self respect. Tajfel stated that all individuals seek to establish a positive social identity. As social comparison and social categorisation are the means of acquiring a social identity, an individual has to come to a favourable conclusion with regard to the social comparison made between the in-group and other social groups. To come to a positive evaluation of one's own minority group, the individuals concerned have to acknowledge and assert existing differences. Especially when the system is essentially unstable the minority will reject the *status quo*, which is to their disadvantage. When the minority individuals' evaluations of social comparison are positive they are able to develop and maintain a positive self-image and sense of social identity. To achieve an honourable and acceptable form of separateness or differentiation and to become accepted in society as equals, the minority can adopt the following strategies:



1. To try to change the values in the social system, entailing encouraging social change.
2. To develop social creativity by creating new forms of comparison by which to enhance a sense of positive social identity. For that purpose, Tajfel identified two forms of social creativity: the first is to attempt a re-evaluation of the existing group characteristics that carry an unfavourable connotation; the second is to revitalise old traditions and to give them a positive significance or create new characteristics to produce positive psychological distinctiveness.
3. To be mobile and to leave or distance oneself from the group.

Irrespective of the outcome and consequence of social comparison every individual will strive for a positive psychological distinctiveness.<sup>62</sup>

#### **1.1.2.4. Hutnik's Study on Ethnic Minority Identity**

In her study Nimmi Hutnik investigated the social identity of second generation South Asian adolescents and compared it to that of their English peers. Hutnik approaches the analyses of identity by focusing on the individuals' self-esteem, ethnic salience, and styles of cultural adaptation.

For Hutnik one fundamental aspect of social identity was the identification with one's ethnic group. However, ethnic identity only becomes salient when individuals are confronted with other ethnic groups. For members of an ethnic majority identification with their ethnic group develops naturally and without conflict, whereas for ethnic minorities this process is more

complicated, for their group usually suffers inferior status relative to the majority group.<sup>63</sup>

Experiments with black children in the United States have shown that many had internalised white values about their group. Consequently they also identified with the white group and rejected their own. Psychologists thus came to believe that this pattern of identification must have a harmful and sometimes destructive impact on the individual's level of self-esteem.

To illustrate this point Hutnik referred to Milner's research of 1975 on 'identity', 'preferences', 'stereotypes' and 'aspiration' among 100 West Indians, 100 Indians and Pakistanis, and 100 white English children aged between five and eight in Britain. These children attended multi-racial infant and junior schools in Brixton and Southall, in London. Milner used the doll and picture techniques, to elucidate the children's identity. The children were asked to attribute value judgements to both the black and white doll, to pick the preferred doll, to point out the doll which looks most like the child, parents, sisters and friends and to choose the doll which represents the family the child wants to live next door to when s/he is grown up, etc.. Milner's experiment demonstrates that Asian and West Indian children show an obvious preference for and aspirations to the white majority group. Their stereotypes about whites were positive and about their own group negative. The proportion of misidentifications with whites as an ideal identification was far less among the Asian group than among the West Indian group. In response to the question 'Which doll looks most like you?' 100 per cent of the white children, 76 per cent of the Indian and



Pakistani children and only 52 per cent of the black children made the correct choice. As far as ethnic preference is concerned all the white children, 82 per cent of the black children, and 65 per cent of the Asians would rather be white. While none of the white children had negative stereotypes about their own group, 72 per cent of the black children and 65 per cent of the Asians did. These results clearly show that Asian and black children tend to devalue their own group and show a preference for the white majority.<sup>64</sup>

Although these results fall in line with many previous and subsequent studies such as those of Clark and Clark (1947), Fox and Jordan (1973), Gitter *et al.* (1972), Gregor and McPherson (1966a), Morland (1962) and Vaughan (1964). They interpret the preference for the white stimuli and misidentification of racial category as evidence for self-rejection and self-hatred in minority group children and as prejudice in the white subjects. More recent studies show that ethnic minority children no longer opt to identify with the majority group. Davey and Mullin (1980), Epstein *et al.* (1976), Hraba and Grant (1970), Milner (1983), Rice *et al.* (1974) and Ward and Brown (1972) supported the theory that the socio-political climate of the Black Liberation Movement of the 1960s had an essential impact on the self-esteem of the black minority groups. Consequently the promotion of a black consciousness, 'Black is beautiful', encourages the trend to an own-group preference. Ward and Brown (1972) found that those children who chose the black dolls revealed higher levels of self-esteem. However, the results of Branch and Newcombe (1980), showed that children of black activist parents were more inclined to make white doll preferences than children of less

activist parents. Nevertheless, studies made by Gaskell and Smith (1981), Loudon (1978a,b), Porter and Washington (1979), Rosenberg (1965) and Williams-Burns (1980) show that there is little difference between black and white self-esteem.<sup>65</sup>

In the light of these findings Hutnik (1991) investigated minority identity of second generation South Asian youth. In eleven in-depth interviews with second generation Asians, Hutnik tried to determine the intensity of her subjects' ties to their country of ethnic origin and of their inter-ethnic relations. Questions referring to friendships with white and South Asian youth revealed that the majority of the South Asians had close friends among white youth and six out of eleven claimed to have a higher proportion of white than Asian friends. As far as projections for future brides and bridegrooms are concerned, there was a general preference for British born Asians as potential partners.<sup>66</sup>

As previous studies on ethnic minority identity showed that a high percentage of coloured children manifested self-hatred and denial of their ethnic origin, Hutnik posed an undisguised and very direct question about their ethnic identity: Do you sometimes wish that you were white? The majority responded with 'no' to this question, although three replied with 'yes'. Their reasons were very pragmatic and related to the advantages and liberties white youth enjoy.

Hutnik's investigation on how the youngsters describe their position in society revealed a high level of assimilation of some individuals, while



others showed a high level of dissociation. In turn some felt different from the white community but at the same time felt that they fit into and belonged to both. All in all Hutnik came to the conclusion that

...many of them had achieved a healthy level of adjustment without a loss of their ethnic identity ... and achieved a creative synthesis of the two, sometimes very disparate, cultures.<sup>67</sup>

The youngsters consider Britain as their home although more than half of them had experienced some form of racially motivated verbal abuse.

To elicit more detailed information about the identity components of her 34 English native, 44 South Asian (originating from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and 32 Afro-Caribbean (originating from Africa but having lived over many generations in the West Indies before entering Britain) subjects, Hutnik used a modification of the Twenty Statements Test (TST).<sup>68</sup> The average age of her subjects was 14.6 years old and only 18 were born outside of Britain. The subjects were drawn from two schools in Oxford and two schools in Birmingham.<sup>69</sup> The results of this test showed that race and nationality were not as salient as inter-personal style, physical self, psychic style and competence. So the response of the minority individuals was similar to that of their English peers in so far as their impact on their environment and the other sex were more important. Hutnik concluded from these identity profiles:

- (1) that there is no 'racial' or particularly 'ethnic' personality profile that is typical of any of the three ethnic groups studied here; and
- (2) that although nationality and race are mentioned by some South Asians and some Afro-Caribbeans, ethnicity as measured on these dimensions is by no means of overriding concern to the *whole* South Asian or *whole* Afro-Caribbean group.<sup>70</sup>

As the self-conception of these ethnic minority adolescents did not focus on ethnicity, Hutnik coded the dimensions of ethnicity, race, nationality, and religion of each individual's protocol. Subjects from all three ethnic groups were assigned to one of two mutually exclusive groups, those referring to that dimension and those who did not. For independent samples, the chi-squared ( $\chi^2$ ) test was used to analyse the data.<sup>71</sup>

The results showed that in both groups ethnicity is salient, but in different dimensions. While 55 per cent of the South Asians mentioned aspects of national identity in the positively phrased section, only 28 per cent of the Afro-Caribbeans did. For the negation 36 per cent of the South Asians differed themselves from other national groups, in contrast to only 9 per cent of Afro-Caribbeans. In comparison, the English participants showed higher national self-consciousness than the Afro-Caribbeans, leaving the Afro-Caribbeans with the lowest sense of national identity. As for religion, the second highest dimension, 62 per cent of South Asians referred to it as an aspect of self-definition, compared to 39 per cent of Afro-Caribbeans and 38 per cent of the English. In the form of negation religion was no major marker. The race dimension was most significant for the Afro-Caribbean group. Fifty-three per cent referred to their colour and 30 per cent dissociated themselves from being white. While the declaration of their race seemed important for 21 per cent of the English, only 9 per cent of the Asian participants mentioned it and 6 per cent differentiated themselves from others. These results revealed that ethnicity is more salient in each minority group than in the English group, but South Asians do not identify

themselves as being 'coloured'. The results of the chi-squared test on ideology towards other groups were non-significant, showing that members of all three groups feel free from prejudice.

Salience of ethnicity depends to a large extent on the response of wider society to the individuals. When the environment treats the individual as one of them, without referring to his/her ethnic or cultural background (no matter whether this occurs in a positive or negative way) ethnicity will no longer be salient.<sup>72</sup> Whether South Asians and the Afro-Caribbeans are intrinsically more conscious of their ethnicity, or whether ethnicity becomes more salient due to their minority status and the prejudice they experience, was addressed by Hutnik in an additional study.

It was hypothesized that assertion of national identity will occur more frequently in the self-description of the South Asian adolescents than in those of Indian adolescents, that is, for Indians in Britain nationality is a more salient dimension of the self than for Indians in India because the former belong to an ethnic minority group, with all the disadvantages this entails.<sup>73</sup>

Ninety-four students, from two different schools in India were given the same TST translated into Hindi. The two schools were chosen in such a way that the sample would reflect a similar social background and Western orientation as the British subjects. The chi-squared test was applied again, comparing each Indian school with their South Asian peers in Britain and then both Indian schools were collapsed into a single category to make new chi-squared comparisons. The results proved that the South Asian subjects in Britain mentioned nationality more frequently than their Indian counterparts. When the Indian students were compared with their English peers the chi-squared analysis revealed non-significant results. These



results support the argument that the frequency with which nationality is mentioned should be similar for both groups as they represent the majority in their own countries.<sup>74</sup>

These results seem to confirm the argument that an individual's ethnic distinctiveness becomes more salient where the majority is different. As a member of the majority one's own ethnicity ceases to be important. However, Hutnik's study of 1985<sup>75</sup> seemed to disconfirm this theory. Her results indicated that when a minority group consists of a small number of people, ethnicity is less salient than when the number of ethnic minority members is high. This may be so because the feeling of ethnic distinctiveness is avoided among a small minority group, as they lack the 'critical mass' that makes ethnicity salient.<sup>76</sup>

To determine the centrality of ethnicity to her subjects, Hutnik used the protocols of her previous study (1991) and modified the TST. The subjects had to return to their completed statements in order to tick 5 of the statements, which best describe them as a person. They then had to rank these from 1 to 5 according to the importance of the statements. By adding a positive or negative sign to the five ranked statements, the subjects were asked to identify the mentioned statements as positive or negative qualities of their person.

The results show that most frequently chosen categories were Religion (46), Inter-personal style (43), Psychic style (25), Competence (21), Abstract category (19), Nationality (18), Age (15), Ideological and belief references (14). The test



for centrality, by computing the mean assigned and the mean hierarchical rank, revealed that the categories 'Religion' and 'Nationality' were central for those who chose them. The results also showed that the hierarchical position of dimensions mentioned is no reliable index for their importance to the subject. Self-hatred could not be detected among the subjects.<sup>77</sup>

To test the centrality of ethnicity in a consonant and dissonant context another chi-squared test was made, comparing the South Asian subjects when in a majority and minority situation. The results showed that the consonant or dissonant context does not affect the centrality of ethnicity although it has an effect on its salience.

To investigate the degree of adaptation of her subjects, Hutnik chose one-hundred-and-eighteen girls from the fourth, fifth, and sixth forms of a school in Birmingham, with a mean age of 16.2 years. One girl was from Pakistan, 2.9 per cent were East African Indians, 3.9 per cent came from mixed race background, and 91.3 per cent were of Indian extraction. The religious affiliation of the subjects was a mixture of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. These subjects were asked to rate ten pairs of statements about cultural behaviour of the ethnic minority group and the majority group. The results of this study show that the majority of the Indian adolescents in this sample of cultural adaptation variables learnt to affirm both the ethnic minority and majority culture successfully. Preference for the majority group culture over the minority group culture was indicated by only 17.5 per cent of the girls.<sup>78</sup>

To investigate their self-categorisation Hutnik has undertaken a further study with the same subjects. An additional pair of bi-polar statements were added to the questionnaire to which the individuals were asked to express their level of agreement on a five-point scale, which in turn was collapsed into a three-point scale.

The results show that social self-categorisation persists although acculturation and even assimilation had already taken place. Individuals can be dissociative with regard to their social identity, while being highly acculturative with regard to their behaviour. Hutnik could not identify any significant correspondence between cultural adaptation and self-categorisation.<sup>79</sup>

Hutnik pointed to the potential conflicts related to the assimilative and the dissociative strategy of self-categorisation. The assimilative strategy produces psychological tension as the discrepancy between the individual's self-perception and the perception others have of him/her can be big. Whereas the dissociative strategy can expose the individual to recurring attack and their identity with the minority group, which suffers low status in the social hierarchy, produces another area of tension. Hutnik therefore concluded that the acculturative and the marginal strategy are more flexible. An individual using multiple ethnic labels can defend all labels equally and therefore does not have to adopt a defensive stance like individuals do who have used an assimilative or dissociative strategy. Hutnik stated that being 'under attack' is a non-issue for marginal individuals.<sup>80</sup>

In a further study Hutnik found that

Indian British adolescents rated Indians living in India (with whom they had little or no contact) very favourably. Next highest were Indians living in Britain, and least favourably rated were English people, who averaged around the neutral point of the bi-polar adjective scale presented to the subjects.<sup>81</sup>

Stereotyping has its roots in social categorisation. Social categorisation is used to organise and interpret the environment. Differentiation and categorisation of the environment enables the individual to produce a self-concept. One's own group would be positively attributed as there is a need for a positive social identity. The drive towards psychological distinctiveness results in in-group favouritism. Consequently stereotyping cannot be eliminated. To eliminate prejudice and discrimination, Hutnik suggested that multiple categories that emphasise the commonalties between groups have to be found.<sup>82</sup>

In conclusion Hutnik suggested a new model of ethnic minority identity. She supported Wallman's (1983) argument that a multiple identity is a healthy choice. For Hutnik ethnic minority identity is

not necessarily a singular, fixed, inflexible given but may be constituted of hyphenated identities that indicate varying degrees of identification with both the ethnic minority group and the majority group.<sup>83</sup>

As the traditional bi-polar model is obsolete Hutnik introduced a model which considers four strategies of self-categorisation: acculturative, dissociative, assimilative and marginal. The acculturative individual chooses a hyphenated identity such as Indian-British. The assimilative individual adopts majority group identifications, while the dissociative one

identifies entirely with the minority group. However, the marginal individual feels indifferent or does not wish to identify with either group.<sup>84</sup>

Hutnik pointed to the danger of confusing two different aspects, the consciously articulated strategy and the underlying system of beliefs, in the course of research on ethnic minority identity. Hutnik suggested that the model described above could also be applied in further research on cultural adaptation. For cultural adaptation is, to a certain extent, necessary for social survival. Therefore it develops earlier than an identity with the new environment and may not be consistent. When the individual returns to his/her minority community, the individual will behave again the way s/he is expected to. Although ethnic identity may not be salient, identifications with one's family history seem important. They are part of our personal history and identity and help determine where we are going. Thus the model takes into account that self-categorisation can be independent of styles of cultural adaptation.<sup>85</sup>

#### **1.1.2.4.1. Summary**

1. Ethnicity was not of overriding concern to neither the South Asian nor to the Afro-Caribbean group under scrutiny.
2. The Afro-Caribbeans had the lowest sense of national identity and referred to their colour most, while the South Asians revealed the strongest sense of national identity and did not seem to perceive themselves as 'coloured'.
3. Ethnic identity becomes salient in a minority situation.



4. An ethnic minority group has to be numerically preponderant to reassert their ethnic identity.
5. The majority of South Asian adolescents learnt to affirm both cultures successfully.
6. Self-categorisation, especially of the dissociative type, can persist although acculturation has taken place.
7. British-Indian adolescents categorised native Indians and the British-Indian most favourably.
8. Multiple identity is a healthy choice, as ethnic identity can encompass more than one cultural identity.

### **1.1.3. The Sociological Approach**

In contrast to all the authors mentioned above Erving Goffman investigated identity formation of stigmatised individuals. Although Goffman is a Sociologist, his concern with how an individual masters the consequences of his or her stigmatisation, places his concept of identity in the field of social psychology. Like the work of Mead, Goffman's identity research has been characterised as interactionist social psychology, as Goffman contrary to mainstream social psychology, has made the stigmatised individual object of his analyses, rather than investigating the development of attitude among the prejudiced individual.

### 1.1.3.1 Goffman's Theory of Stigmatisation

In his book titled *Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Goffman introduced the reader to the dilemma stigmatised individuals have to cope with, by placing the following shattering letter of a young girl at its beginning.

I am sixteen years old now and I dont know what to do and would appreciate it if you could tell me what to do. When I was a little girl it was not so bad because I got used to the kids on the block makeing fun of me, but now I would like to have boy friends like the other girls and go out on Saturday nites, but no boy will take me because I was born without a nose - although I am a good dancer and have a nice shape and my father buys me pretty clothes.

I sit and look at myself all day and cry. I have a big hole in the middle of my face that scares people even myself so I cant blame the boys for not wanting to take me out. My mother loves me, but she crys terrible when she looks at me.

What did I do to deserve such a terrible bad fate? Even if I did do some bad things I didn't do any before I was a year old and I was born this way. I asked Papa and he says he doesnt know, but that maybe I did something in the other world before I was born or that maybe I was being punished for his sins. I dont believe that because he is a very nice man. Ought I commit suicide?

Sincerely yours,

Desperate<sup>86</sup>

Goffman not only focused on physical attributes, but also on social categories such as unemployment, which could become object of stigmatisation.

According to Goffman society defines attributes, matching the predominant social norms, in order to facilitate the categorisation of individuals. These categories are determined by the particular social setting and allow us to engage in a routine of social intercourse because we are able to anticipate what kind of persons we are most likely to encounter. Thus a stranger is immediately assessed by his or her appearances and categorised. The stranger becomes an anticipated other with an anticipated social identity.

Hence Goffman distinguished between a virtual social identity and the actual social identity. While the former represents the normative expectations based on anticipations made and the character, that are imputed to the individual by the environment, the latter represents the category and the attributes, which the individual actually possesses.

When a stranger reveals an attribute that makes him or her deviant from the norm and causes this individual to be categorised in such a way that s/he will be looked upon as tainted, then such an attribute is referred to by Goffman as a stigma. Goffman distinguished between abhorred physical traits, defects in character, such as dishonesty or alcoholism, etc., and tribal stigma, such as race, nation, or religion. However, not every undesirable attribute is a stigma, but only those which do not match with the stereotype that was anticipated. The stigma "constitutes a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity"<sup>87</sup>, which spoils the individual's social identity when it is known about.

When the undesirable attribute of a stigmatised individual is obviously apparent or s/he is aware of the fact that it is known, then Goffman referred to this individual as discredited. A person is referred to as discreditable if s/he may assume that his or her undesirable attribute is not obviously apparent and is not yet known by those present.

To which degree stigmatised individuals become self-conscious of their undesirable attribute depends on the environment they are in. The 'normals', individuals who do not share the same stigma but do not

respond negatively to the stigmatised person, may nevertheless create an atmosphere of unease by responding with exaggerated helpfulness, or by hesitating to refer to anything related to the particular stigma when the concerned individual is present. The 'normals' develop a stigma-theory, which rationalises animosities and justifies why the particular attributes represent a threat and why certain discriminations are exercised.

The stigmatised individual in turn realises that s/he is not 'accepted' and met on 'equal grounds'. Thus the stigmatised individual holds his or her own undesirable attributes responsible for not receiving the respect s/he has anticipated on the ground of the uncontaminated aspects of his or her social identity. As a response the person can attempt to correct his or her condition directly, for example by undergoing plastic surgery, or indirectly by trying to master the particular area of activity which is limited by his or her shortcoming.

On the other hand there are those individuals who share the plight of stigma, and people, also referred to as the 'wise', among whom a stigmatised individual can relax. The 'wise' are normal people who are sympathetic with the stigmatised individuals and who are accepted among them. Usually such a relationship is initiated by the 'normals'.<sup>88</sup>

Compared to the socialisation process of discredited individuals, that of discreditable is more complex. The discreditable individual, such as an ex-mental patient, has to face the problems related to the management of disclosure of discrediting information about him/her. The information at



issue is information about an individual's permanent characteristics, conveyed by him/herself through bodily signs to those immediately present. Goffman called such reflexive and embodied information social information. The signs that are steadily available and employed in this process are referred to as symbols. Those symbols that represent the claim to prestige are status symbols, while stigma symbols, in contrast, represent signs that indicate identity discrepancy. The attempt to cast doubt on undesirable attributes by employing signs to break up the picture of an individual in a positive way, Goffman referred to as disidentifiers.

Signs are designed to convey social information. However, sometimes a sign, such as a tattoo, can be a source of pride for one, while having a negative connotation for another. Some signs can be temporary (e.g. a black eye on a female or a convict's shaven head), permanent (e.g. duelling scars) or congenital (e.g. skin colour). A further source of information is the company of an individual. The social identity of a group an individual socialises with, is frequently used as a source of information about the social identity of the particular individual, according to the motto: show me your friends and I'll tell you who you are.

Stigma management is relatively easy among passive strangers, provided the stigma is not immediately visible. Once relationships become more intimate stigma management is more stressful for the concerned individual. Often discreditable individuals, such as homosexuals, are more concerned with concealing their attribute from their closest family, although

they display it in public. There is evidence that both intimates and strangers can be put off by an individual's stigma.

In close relationships the virtual social identity is gradually replaced by the real social identity, as the environment is able to make more realistic assessments of the actual personal qualities. Thus physically handicapped individuals may try to break through superficial politeness and attempt to take conversation to a more personal level in order to make 'normals' look beyond their defect. When the social environment no longer feels uncomfortable in the presence of the stigmatised individual, then this process is referred to as a process of normalisation.<sup>89</sup>

The strategies an individual applies for the management of his or her stigma depend on the depth of relationships. At this point Goffman introduced the concept of personal identity. In long-standing relationships an individual is perceived as a unique person. Goffman ascribed three aspects to the notion of uniqueness.

1. Every individual has a 'positive mark' or 'identity peg' such as the individual's photographic image and his or her place among kin.
2. Although most facts about an individual may also apply to others, the combination of facts does not apply to any other person in the world and thus distinguishes the individual from everybody else. The information can be name-bound as well as body-bound.
3. And the core of an individual's being, is the essential aspect, which distinguishes him or her from other people.<sup>90</sup>

However, Goffman only integrated the first two aspects of uniqueness into his concept of personal identity:

positive marks or identity pegs, and the unique combination of life history items that comes to be attached to the individual with the help of these pegs for his identity<sup>91</sup>.

Most of the information about personal identity, as defined above, can be strictly documented, which limits the individual in the way s/he can present him or herself. As a result, misrepresentation of social identity is largely prohibited. The environment primarily draws upon aspects from the social identity to construct an individual's personal identity. As the discovery of a discreditable secret may destroy the reputation of an individual, s/he will attempt to conceal it. Thus the effort to conceal the stigma will in itself become an element of the individual's personal identity.

However, the concepts of social and personal identity do not give a complete picture of the individual. To complete the picture Goffman introduced the third concept of identity, namely that of ego identity. Ego identity, according to Goffman, is

the subjective sense of his own situation and his own continuity and character that an individual comes to obtain as a result of his various social experiences<sup>92</sup>.

Both social and personal identity are closely related to the way the environment perceives the individual. The analysis of social identity enables us to consider stigma, while the concept of personal identity provides an insight into information control in the course of stigma



management. In contrast ego identity is the element that reveals the feelings an individual has with regard to his or her stigma and its management. Ego identity is the product of the same material from which others construct social and personal identifications of the individual. Nevertheless, it is subjective and reflexive, and therefore flexible in terms of how the individual interprets this material.<sup>93</sup>

Stigmatised individuals frequently apply higher identity standards to themselves than they are able to conform with. The stronger the ties are, which an individual develops with normals, the stronger s/he will identify with non-stigmatised standards. The stigmatised individual tends to categorise other stigmatised people according to the severity of their stigmatised attributes and to adopt the attitudes that 'normals' have towards him or her in order to project them onto those whose stigma is more apparent or obtrusive than his or her own. The oscillation of identification becomes most apparent in the extreme forms of separation from, or affiliation with those who are worse off than s/he is. Identity ambivalence occurs when the stigmatised individual witnesses the particular behaviour of his or her own kind, from which the normals have derived their stereotypes. Although the stigmatised, who supports the norms of wider society is tied to these offenders due to his or her social and psychological identification, s/he may feel repelled by this observation. Thus the individual will turn his or her repulsion into shame and in turn become ashamed for this feeling of shame. S/he is neither able to escape from, nor to commit him or herself fully to the 'own' group, which results in a tendency towards ambivalent feelings about the own self.<sup>94</sup>



The stigmatised individual's ego identity is composed of two further aspects: the in-group and the out-group. The in-group is, according to its spokesmen, the group to which the individual naturally belongs. Sometimes professionals, who have strong in-group affiliations, tend to take a militant stance. However, the problem with militancy is that the more an individual seeks separateness, the more s/he will employ the language, style and culture of politics of wider society - the 'enemy'. Thus the in-group imposes in-group cohesion and political representation on the stigmatised member.

The out-group imposes on the stigmatised individual a kind of 'phantom acceptance' of him or herself and of his or her position in wider society. The language employed in interaction with the stigmatised is psychiatric and the expectation on the individual is that of mental hygiene. This entails a self-acceptance by him/her as a full human being, bearing his or her plight on the grounds of a coherent life philosophy and not presenting the pain of stigmatisation to the environment. Thus the fate of the stigmatised is that s/he is permanently told what to make of his or her ego identity. Wider society insists that s/he is a normal human being, but also different (of course this 'differentness' has first been conceptualised by society), which s/he has to accept. Conversely, professionals and spokesmen of his or her group engage in politics of identity and draw the individual into their group, which s/he must not neglect.<sup>95</sup>

Compared to Mead, who developed a general concept of identity that paid less attention to particular identity problems, and Erikson, who focused on the successive stages of crises during a life cycle, Goffman created a theoretical framework that allows for an analyses of particular identity problems - that of stigmatisation. While Mead granted an individual a certain degree of freedom to shape his or her identity, due to the human ability to gain identity consciousness, Goffman viewed the individual, in his or her attempt to solve identity problems, as socially determined. Goffman interpreted the behaviour of stigmatised individuals as a strategy to solve their identity problems. His concept of identity does not consider reflexive intelligence and the relationship between social determination and autonomy. Theoretically there was no need for Goffman to adopt Mead's distinction between a conscious and subconscious identity. Deviant behaviour is always interpreted as a reaction to stigmatisation and as socially determined, no matter whether the person is conscious or not conscious of his or her behaviour.

#### 1.1.3.1.1. Summary

1. Goffman's theory explained how stigmatised individuals attempt to resolve their identity problems.
2. He distinguished between three identity concepts: the social, personal, and ego identity. An individual's social identity is the product of the category ascribed and the character imputed to him or her according to his or her attributes. The personal identity constitutes an individual's identity pegs, his or her identifiable markings combined with unique life

history items. The ego identity is determined by the individual's subjective feelings about his or her situation.

3. An attribute becomes a stigma when an individual reveals an attribute during social interaction that does not correspond with the category and attributes anticipated by the environment.
4. Goffman distinguished between virtual and actual social identity. The virtual social identity is the stereotype, or category, in which the environment expects a person to fit into, according to their anticipations. The actual social identity is constituted of the actual category and attributes, which the individual can prove to possess.
5. Goffman also distinguished between discredited and discreditable individuals. The discredited are individuals who know about their stigma and who may assume that the environment knows about it. A discreditable individual does not possess a stigma that is immediately perceivable, thus the environment may not know about it.
6. Stigma management is the control of information about one's stigma. To employ symbols as disidentifiers in order to improve one's position in the desired direction is a particular strategy of stigma management.
7. An individual, who has adopted the position of wider society and observes his or her group behaving in the stereotyped manner, may exhibit identity ambivalence. S/he may feel repelled by this sight, but at the same time cannot detach him or herself from this group.



### 1.1.3.2. Krappmann's Concept of Ambiguity Tolerance

Following Habermas' discussion on symbolic interactionism, Krappmann aimed to expand on Mead's idea of a successfully developed identity consciousness. While Goffman primarily focused on spoiled identities, Krappmann's analyses was dedicated to the social conditions and the personal skills required for an individual to maintain and assert a healthy identity. According to Krappmann, an individual has to reassert his or her identity during every social interaction. A person will maintain his or her identity during interactions, if s/he can successfully present his or her 'self' without denying any discrepancies or conflicts. Thus the successful assertion of identity depends on the individual's creative ability to bring his or her personal experiences and life history to bear, and to readjust these to the conditions of every new interaction process that may emerge.

Mead interpreted human interaction as a process during which all participants communicate by means of employing significant symbols. According to Mead, the prerequisite for successful interaction is that the symbols employed have the same meaning to all participants. However, Krappmann argued that communication without any inconsistencies, with regard to the participants' common understanding of symbols, does not correspond to reality. Krappmann suggested that during every social situation individuals have ambiguous and sometimes contradictory ideas of what the symbols employed may mean. Thus Krappmann had to resolve the resulting problem of how interaction is maintained if ambiguity and



contradictions hamper the process. According to Krappmann, two skills are necessary. The individuals involved must be able to adjust to the others' expectations and the definition of particular situation, while simultaneously presenting their own expectations, needs, and definition of the situation. The interaction is successful if an individual is able to take diverging expectations into consideration while maintaining consistency and continuity. S/he should temporarily consent to a common interpretation of the situation and at the same time indicate any reservations. S/he should endeavour for a common, unambiguous orientation for interaction by presenting his or her expectation in an identifiable manner, while simultaneously indicating that a complete agreement is not possible.<sup>96</sup> All this should be part of the identity with which the individual engages in interaction and that has to be formulated anew for every interaction.

Krappmann proposed that identity is an individual's creative ability to interpret, balance and manage new situations and subsequent expectations, drawing from his or her life history and experience. A person has a healthy identity if s/he is able to present her or himself adequately in a given situation without denying any discrepancies or conflicts. Krappmann identified four skills, which are necessary to master identity assertion: 'taking role-distance', empathy, tolerance for ambiguity, and identity presentation. The first skill entails rising above given norms and expected 'role-taking' in order to make these subject to reflection and interpretation, to make choices available and to change them if necessary. An individual can internalise numerous roles, thus there is ample opportunity to take role-distance. However, whether an individual is able to reflect on norms,

although s/he has internalised them, depends on how the individual adopted these role-norms.<sup>97</sup> To take distance enables the individual to become aware that s/he is a person who can understand and interact with someone else. This ability grants the individual some freedom with regard to the expectations related to the roles and openness towards other potential social roles.

Empathy is, as defined by Krappmann, the ability to view norms, expectations and needs from the perspective of the 'other'. Although empathy is primarily a cognitive process, it is also influenced by factors such as affection.<sup>98</sup>

The skill to tolerate ambiguity entails enduring conflicting needs and contradicting expectations of roles during interaction, but nevertheless, being able to interpret one's own and the 'other's' position during this process.<sup>99</sup> Tolerance toward ambiguity is not possible without empathy.

For Krappmann, identity presentation is the general ability to bring one's identity to bear during interaction. This is the phase of identity assertion, during which the individual must present his or her identity on the grounds of the adopted expectations of the 'others'. During identity presentation the individual must make it visible to others that s/he is able to tolerate ambiguity, to feel empathy, and to take role-distance.

### 1.1.3.3. Modood's Study on Changing Ethnic Identities

Tariq Modood's study investigated the changes of ethnic identity in Britain. The five potential areas of change under scrutiny were family life and social contacts, community language, religion, marriage partners, and experiences of difference, commonalty and exclusion. The study was based on semi-structured interviews and group discussions with 74 individuals of Caribbean and South Asian origin, in Birmingham and Southall. The sample was divided into five groups. One group was of Caribbean origin and the remaining four groups were of Asian decent: Pakistani Muslims, Bangladeshi Muslims, Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus. The sample was further divided by gender and by generation. The researchers, who conducted the interviews, were members of the respective minority communities and spoke their language.

With regard to changes in family life, Modood *et al.* found that there was a radical contrast between Caribbean and South Asian families. While the Caribbean respondents had lost their extended family in the migratory process, the South Asians were partially able to maintain their community networks due to 'chain-migration'. Asian families make more demands, but also provide more support to their members. However, Modood also found that there is a significant difference in how the first and second generations of South Asians kept contact with their extended family. For the second generation the main support system was the immediate nuclear family. The extended family had far less significance with regard to value or



emotional and moral support for them than for the first generation. Work and education have become more important, so more friendships are formed around these contexts of socialisation. Nevertheless, according to the census (1991) an Asian household consists of more family members than an English or even a Caribbean would. While Asians have adapted to the traditional Western family pattern (parents and children), Caribbeans tend towards single-parent families. The majority of Caribbeans in Modood's sample also exhibited a greater readiness to choose non-Caribbean friends. Two-thirds of the second generation had close friends among non-Caribbeans and most of the first generation had non-Caribbean friends. In contrast the first generation Asians chose their friends exclusively from within their ethno-religious community and although most of the second generation had non-Asian friends, their close circle of friends were still of Asian origin.

Within the context of socialisation, individualism and racism in Britain, ethnic minority family life has its own structural dynamics and is subject to change by every successive generation. Modood *et al.* suggested that

the subjective experience of racism, including perceived racism and anticipated racism, is closely bound up with ethnic group bonds and ethnic identity; with preference for members of one's own group and with the desire to affirm one's origins and cultural heritage.<sup>100</sup>

Although ethnic identity as such is not a product of racism, the nature of its development is. Individuals who experienced racism and exclusion will inevitably racialise their ethnic identity and alter it in response to the treatment they receive.



With regard to the fate of community languages Modood *et al.* found that the first generation of Caribbeans were either bi-lingual with English and Creole or Patois, or monolingual English speakers. The majority of the interviewees reported that their facility in Creole or Patois had deteriorated and that half of them did not attribute sufficient importance to those languages in order to maintain or teach them to their children. However, the second generation Caribbeans held the view that these languages should be taught through supplementary classes at school. For them their linguistic heritage signified an integral part of their cultural identity and ethnic pride.

The languages spoken by the four South Asian groups were Punjabi, Gujarati, Urdu and Bengali or Sylheti dialect. The majority of South Asians in Britain employ an Urdu-Hindi *lingua franca* to communicate amongst each other. Compared to the Caribbeans, the first generation of Asians had to learn English as they settled in Britain. Their Asian language is important to their cultural identity and is thus a part of their children's upbringing and the main language spoken at home. Nevertheless, the Asian second generation has greater facility in English. Although most of them speak the language of their parents, far less are able to read or write it. Much like the second generation Caribbeans they supported the view that their ancestral language should be taught at school to enable them to maintain their cultural heritage. Modood *et al.* suggested that although these ethnic languages are losing their instrumental importance, their value as bearers of ethnic heritage will grow. This will be the case when ethnic minorities become aware of their cultural loss due to deteriorating

knowledge of their ancestral language and parents then increase pressure on schools to offer instructions in these languages. Thus these languages may experience a revival among members of the third and fourth generations.<sup>101</sup>

For the majority of first generation immigrants, religion is an essential source for personal values and cultural identity. The study demonstrated that both first generation Asians and Caribbeans felt that religion is important in their lives. Nevertheless, there was a distinct difference in their approach to religion and social as well as ethnic centrality of religion between the two ethnic groups. For the Caribbeans, Christianity was not a marker for ethnic distinctiveness with respect to the rest of the British population. On their arrival, Christian places of worship were available although racism within the existing institutions gradually led to the formation of separate black-led churches. The interviewees of the first generation declared that Christianity provides spiritual and moral support in times of hardship. They attended church, participated in religious activities and raised their children in their religious faith. Nevertheless, they did not expect their children to practice Christianity.

For the Asian first generation religion is more closely linked with their ethnic identity. On their arrival, places of worship and religious education for their children were not available, but had to be organised by the minority community. The Asian interviewees reported that their religion determines the routine and pattern of their lives and defines their responsibilities to their family and others. Among the Asians, religious rules determine both personal and social life of every community member.

Therefore Asian children are under more pressure to comply with these rules than their Caribbean counterparts. To Muslim interviewees conformity to religious laws was far more important than to Sikhs and Hindus.

On the whole, the accounts of the second generation indicated that the importance of religion is in decline. Among the Punjabi Sikhs, none included their religious affiliation in their immediate self-concept and although some Caribbeans were practising Christians, none of the first generation interviewees perceived Christianity as part of their ethnic identity. Compared to the Asian sample, the non-practising Christian Caribbeans did not identify or have any non-religious positive feelings for their religion, neither were they searching for an alternative. For the Asian second generation their religion enforced their ethnic pride and was perceived as part of their distinctive heritage and ethnic identity. Although only a few of them observed religious regulations (e.g. prohibition of alcohol) and most of them interpreted their religious traditions flexibly, they all wished to pass their religion on to their children. Counter to expectations, the second generation Asians did not fulfil religious duties to avoid family conflicts, but had actually incorporated them in their own ethnic identity. Also to the Muslim interviewees Islam was an integral part of their social identity and provided symbolic solidarity with other Muslims, thus enforcing ethnic pride.<sup>102</sup>

Religious and ethnic boundaries are usually maintained by in-group marriage. The study clearly showed that for the first generation of South



Asians marriage within the community is a way of securing a closely-knit family network which will support them in old age. Mixed marriages threaten their material and emotional investment in their children and dilute their cultural heritage. Asian parents, and especially Muslim parents, continue to exercise considerable control over their child's choice of marriage partner. Asian parents do not approve of mixed marriages, as this would result in a loss of face in their community, however there is a trend towards compromise within acceptable limits. The Second generation Asians hold more liberal views than their parents. Half of the Indian sample had a positive attitude towards mixed marriages, whilst only a few Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were in favour of such an idea. The majority of the Muslim interviewees intended to marry a Muslim, preferably of the same ethnic group, but feel that they should have more of a choice within these limits. However, other studies showed that these more liberal views usually give way to parental authority and many young Muslims agree to arranged marriages out of family loyalty. In contrast nearly half of the first generation Caribbeans accepted the idea of mixed marriage. Although the majority voiced concerns over the prejudice that mixed-marriage couples would face; they felt that ultimately the choice was up to the individual. The majority of the second generation held a positive view about mixed marriages, but added that the biggest obstacle was racism from the white environment.<sup>103</sup>

Modood *et al.* reflected the diversity of perceived difference and commonalty among ethnic minority individuals. Among the Caribbean respondents the predominant and positive term of self-identity was 'Black'.



While among the first generation references to their West Indian origin were more common, the second generation used hyphenated terms like Afro-Caribbeans and Black-British to describe themselves. As the Caribbean immigrants have, to a large extent, adopted British culture and attempted to integrate into wider society, the conspicuous marker of difference and cause for exclusion is their colour. Thus for some second generation interviewees the description 'Black' circumscribed all who are of different colour and suffer from racism, including South Asians. Although the Caribbean respondents were aware of the social and cultural commonalties with the white British, many did not feel that they were British. The experience of racism prevented the development of unity with the white majority.

The majority of Pakistanis of the first and second generations used the term Pakistani-British. Ethnic self-identification among South Asians has little to do with colour. Both generations pointed to Islam as their commonalty with the Bangladeshi and *vice versa*. In turn Sikhs and Hindus referred to each other as the group they had most in common with. Compared to the Caribbean interviewees, the Asian respondents pointed to cultural and religious differences among South Asians. The term Asian was mostly used to describe the community as a whole. Although most of the South Asian interviewees felt that they had nothing in common with the Caribbeans, some second generation Punjabis, who seemed to have no strong religious identity, noted that 'Black' was an important political identity. Their experience of exclusion was rather based on being a non-white minority than culturally different.

For the majority of respondents being British was based not only on the legal definition. They felt that the white population did not accept them as British and most of the Asian first generation neither felt nor wanted to be British in the extra-legal sense. As much as they perceived themselves as law-abiding citizens and appreciated the economic and educational advantages in Britain, the Asian interviewees of that generation had a stronger sense of belonging to their country of origin. Most of the second generation Asians felt that they had adopted a lot of British culture, but perceived their British identity as a problematic one. Some referred to their identity as bi-cultural and found that this double affiliation was unproblematic. However, a few second generation Asians "felt alienated from British culture which they perceived as hostile to their family-centred and religious values"<sup>104</sup>.

#### **1.1.3.3.1. Summary**

1. The extended family is most important to the Asians of the first generation. The second generation Asians derive their emotional and material support primarily from the nuclear family.
2. The experience of racism is closely bound up with ethnic group bonds and ethnic identity.
3. The second generation is usually more fluent in English than in any other language, but wishes to maintain their ancestral language as a part of their ethnic identity.

4. Whilst for the Caribbeans, Christianity is not a marker for their ethnic identity, South Asians closely associate their religion with their ethnic identity.
5. For the Muslim second generation, Islam is an integral part of both their ethnic and social identity. It enforces ethnic pride and provides symbolic solidarity with other Muslims.
6. South Asians, and especially Muslims, perceive mixed marriages as a threat to their ethnic identity; this is in contrast to the Caribbeans. The second generation Asians hold more liberal views on this topic than their parents.
7. For Caribbeans the most salient aspect of their ethnic identity is their colour, whereas for South Asians it is their culture and religion.
8. Among the second generation a hyphenated self-description prevails, indicating a trend towards a bi-cultural identity.

#### 1.1.4. Conceptualising Identity

The summary of theories and studies on identity has shown that different theorists conceptualise identity in different ways. Since Mead, many valuable contributions to the study of human identity have been made. To summarise all of them would be beyond the scope of this thesis, especially because a number of authors, including Harré and Holland, already made such an undertaking their primary objective.<sup>105</sup> The theories summarised above were selected to introduce the most essential theorists from the different traditions of thought. The studies described in detail were chosen



to illustrate how every tradition evolved and is currently employed for the study of ethnic, as well as Muslim, identity in Britain.

Glynis Breakwell produced a concept of identity linking intrapsychic and socio-political processes, merging ideas from various traditions of thought. She attempted to construct a social psychological model of identity through description of its structural components and dominant processes.<sup>106</sup> The propositions, which emerge from this model of identity, are an ideal foundation for a more specific discourse on identity, which will follow the summary.

For Breakwell<sup>107</sup>, the structure of identity

is a dynamic social product of the interaction of the capacities for memory, consciousness and organized construal which are characteristic of the biological organism with the physical and societal structures and influence processes which constitute the social context. The identity resides in psychological processes but is manifested through thought, action and affect.<sup>108</sup>

Generally speaking individuals are self-aware and monitor the status of their identity. Breakwell suggested that levels of self-awareness differ according to development and across different cultures.

Identity can be described in terms of its structure and its processes. Its structure is constituted of two planes: the content and the value dimensions. The former consists of the properties that define an individual as unique. Breakwell abandoned the distinction between social and personal identity. She suggested that this distinction is only of temporary significance until social identity is eventually incorporated into personal



identity. The content dimension encompasses both the social identity components (e.g. group membership) and the personal ones (e.g. values and attitudes). The organisation of the content dimension is flexible and adaptable to the social context. The content dimension is organised in hierarchical arrangements of elements, salience of components and degree of centrality. The value dimension is constituted of all the positive or negative values attributed to each element in the content dimension. These attributed values are subject to revision as the social value system and the individual's position in relation to it changes.

Dynamic psychological assimilation-accommodation and evaluation processes form the identity structure. New identity components are assimilated into the existing identity structure. Simultaneously, the existing structure has to be accommodated or adjusted in order to fit the new component into the structure. The new and old identity contents are then evaluated by attribution of meaning and values. Thus the interaction of the two processes allows for changes in content and value of identity. According to Breakwell, the accommodation-assimilation process can be described as a memory system, which is susceptible to biases in information recall. These biases are regulated by identity principles that define the desirable states of identity structure. In Western industrialised societies, the current principles are continuity, distinctiveness, and self-esteem. They vary in their salience over time, according to situations and development. However, the principles and the desirable states of identity structure are temporally and culturally specific, as identity is formed both within a particular social context and historical period.

The social context provides interpersonal and intergroup relationships, social-category memberships as well as the ideological milieu and system of beliefs. This generates roles, beliefs, and values, which are assimilated into the identity content and evaluated. Depending on the personal relevance, the immediacy of involvement, the extent of change, the negative impact involved and changes in the social context, result in changes in identity. Social mobility also bears a change of social influences, which inevitably has an impact on identity. Yet, identity is not solely a product of social influences. Contradictions within the ideological milieu and tensions between groups force the individual to make choices and create the freedom for an individualistic formulation of identity.

Breakwell suggested that identity is under threat when the processes of assimilation-accommodation and evaluation cannot satisfy the need for continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem. Threat can originate externally when social changes force changes in identity upon an individual and do not satisfy any of the three principles. Threat is of internal origin when an individual attempts to introduce change, in accordance with one of the principles, but discovers that such change violates one or both of the other principles.

An individual can only respond to threat once s/he is conscious of it. Breakwell defined coping strategy as: "Any activity, in thought or deed, which has as its goal the removal or modification of a threat to identity..."<sup>109</sup>. Coping strategies can be developed on the intra-psychic,

interpersonal and group/intergroup level. The intra-psychic coping strategies of deflection, acceptance and rearrangement of salience are determined by the assimilation-accommodation and evaluation processes. Deflection is the attempt to avoid any modification of the value and content dimensions. Some tactics to deflect threat would be denial, transient depersonalisation, belief in the unreality of the self, fantasy, reconstrual and reattribution. Acceptance tactics rarely entail fundamental changes in identity, but rather seek a compromise between threat and identity needs. Therefore, the most common tactics would be anticipatory restructuring, compartmentalism and compromise changes. The third strategy implies rearranging the salience of the three identity principles. If, for example, self-esteem is threatened, then one of the unthreatened principles such as distinctiveness is emphasis instead.

Depending on the kind of threat, either interpersonal strategies (isolationism, negativism, passing and compliance) or group and intergroup strategies may help to cope. Multiple group membership and group support in the form of self-help, consciousness-raising, information network and group action are ways by which an individual can bring about change within him/herself and society to fight or to cope with the threat. Coping strategies are usually derived from social-comparison and are governed by the need for cognitive consistency. Which coping strategy an individual will choose depends on the combination of factors such as the type of threat, the social context, his or her identity structure and cognitive capacity. The individual tends to maintain the chosen strategy as long as the combination of factors does not change.





Breakwell concluded that when coping strategies fail, a change of identity structure will occur. This violates the principles of continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem and thus may limit an individual's power to control such change. If then, the same threat persists, individuals may resort to extreme forms of withdrawal or suppression of self-awareness.

Breakwell's model of identity and her analysis of threat and coping strategies is of particular help with regard to the study of Muslim minority identity. Also her methodological approach is relevant for this study, as she seeks to employ an integrated set of methods, where each method provides information about a particular aspect of identity.<sup>110</sup> Before engaging in a more detailed methodological discussion it is important to emphasise that it is not the object of this thesis to create a fundamentally new concept of identity. It is rather the endeavour, like Breakwell, to merge and apply all those traditions of thought which enable a thorough analyses of the identity conflicts involved in the integration process of Muslim minorities in Britain. The following theoretical discourse on identity will point to the processes, which particularly apply to this research and to those that have previously not been discussed in this context.

This study focuses on the identity content and attached value dimensions of young adults and adults. Although human identity is constantly exposed to change and revaluation due to new experiences made, by the time the individual reached adulthood a sound frame of orientation has been established. In order to understand why the content and value dimension



of identity can evolve in different ways, important mechanisms of identity development will be included into this discourse.

Identity has a personal and a social dimension. Personal identity is based on the individual's nature of embodiment and of emotions, values, attitudes and goals, etc.. At a young age, personal identity evolves around the individual's experience with his or her biological organism. The social environment influences attitudes and the values attached to emotions and the nature of the body. As the individual grows into a social being, knowledge and experience become more significant in the way that identity is determined.<sup>111</sup> The social determinants that influence identity can be categorised into three major factors: family, economy, and the state.<sup>112</sup> The social dimension of identity is largely reflected by group membership, roles, and social interaction patterns. It is apparent that personal and social identity are inter-dependent and inter-related with each other.<sup>113</sup> Although it is justified to differ between these two dimensions, it always has to be kept in mind that identity dimensions and components (e.g. cultural, religious or ethnic identifications) form a unity. Any changes that occur along the line of one of these dimensions will influence the identity of an individual as a whole.

As mentioned above, identity is influenced by social, economic and political factors. Primarily the *family*, but also friends and acquaintances, convey values of religious, ethical and political nature as well as social norms and regulations; they serve as good or bad examples for relationships and prepare the individual for his or her social role and appropriate labour. The

*economy* determines the nature of employment available and influences an individual's social place in society. The nature of an individual's labour defines social status and sets limits to the accumulation of wealth, which shapes the self-concept. Recession can force people into unemployment and can destroy their self-esteem, while economic growth promises prosperity and encourages positive aspirations for the future. The impact of the *state* and the political culture on identity are also of fundamental importance. Different political systems, such as monarchy, democracy or dictatorship shape personal and social identity in different ways. If we analyse the historic impact of monarchy and dictatorship on identity, it may become more apparent which influence democracy has on present identity formation.

Historically, monarchies provided a solid hierarchical social structure in which values and norms were stable and of continuity. The Church dictated values and provided spiritual guidance so that people could make sense of their lives. Any structural change occurred slowly and the political ruling class remained constant. In Britain, up until the First World War, virtues such as modesty, sincerity and honesty were ranked highly in the value system. Family, society and the Church nourished an individual's super-ego (using Freud's terminology) with appropriate values, which determined social behaviour and action within an authoritarian social system. The social hierarchy of a monarchy demarcated every individual's place in society and produced a deeply rooted identity with a specific class and occupation. The career of a craftsman ranged from the apprentice to the skilled master. In other words an individual's ambition in life was



attainable and within reach. This aspect is of vital importance to the psychological wellbeing of an individual. A large discrepancy between the ideal 'self-concept' and the real 'I' generates dissatisfaction and aggression. The more coherent the ideal 'self-concept' and the reality of the 'I' are, the more coherent an individual's identity will be.

For those who suffered under this system, religion promised salvation in the after-life. Cultural identities within an empire and a monarchy are manifold. Diversity of language and plurality of tradition were natural phenomena. Firm religious orientation and class division did not give the individual much room to define an individualistic and eccentric identity. For example, a man may have been the baker of village X, the son of the master who owned the bakery, as well as husband and the father of a number of children. The social roles were limited and the individual was offered a clear frame of orientation, in which religion provided the sole explanation for the causality of the universe. The individual was part of a well-structured 'whole' which conveyed a sense of belonging and security.

The Fascist and Communist governments of the 1930's are the best examples of dictatorships. These dictatorships clearly defined who belonged to the 'in-group' and who did not. They reasserted the superiority of the in-group and emphasised the inferiority of, and hostility towards, the out-group. These dictatorships conveyed emotional and economic security. Explicit symbolism and mystical mass rituals strengthened unity and transferred masses into a state of ecstasy. In the midst of the massed, a weak and

disoriented individual had the opportunity to become part of a powerful 'whole'.

Authoritarian regimes organise society, dictate identity, manipulate the attitude towards the state; they clearly define the roles of men and women, and every individual's duties and obligations to society. Ideology strictly defines 'good' and 'bad', social and political goals, as well as identities to strive for.

Democracies, as legal frameworks, exert little constraint on identity formation. An individual has the freedom to choose (within the legal framework) group affiliations, can strive for individualistic careers, and live a lifestyle of his or her own choice. The freedom of choice, to determine one's own destiny according to the means available, is the most liberal precondition for free identity development that society has ever created.

However, the political and social structures are based on change. The political stability is constantly jeopardised by the multi-party system. Political leaders change and their weaknesses are exposed to public criticism. Modern society allows for social mobility, individuals can choose their place within society, but at the same time their lives are also subjected to the change which the strive for progress entails. Although this system provides unprecedented opportunities for the majority of the population, one's position in this society is unstable. According to Erich Fromm, the modern social system influences man in two ways: While individuals are more independent, can rely on their own judgement and critical observations,



they too become more isolated, lonely and fearful.<sup>114</sup> He suggested that especially among the middle classes, lack of security can cause neurosis.

The system neither imposes a rigid structure nor does it supply predefined values for orientation. Although democracies are based on some generally accepted principal values in order to allow for the system to function, individuals have to rely on themselves to make sense of their lives and to search for an appropriate niche in society. If a system of values and a frame of orientation are not home nurtured, society will offer little support for young adolescents in their search for identity. Young insecure individuals with no profound orientation tend to support strong leadership. It is the desire to overcome their own powerlessness in the light of increasing social and political complexity, which leads to a radical counteraction - to seek control. This contradiction - the ambivalence between the lust for power and the desire to subjugate, nurtures authoritarian systems.<sup>115</sup> The feeling of powerlessness, which is constituted by feelings of helplessness, weakness, defencelessness, ineffectiveness, inadequacy, and vulnerability, generates frustration, anger, and anxiety. Individuals may deny these weaknesses and direct their anger outwards, projecting their resentments and exasperations onto the establishment or society. The product of this lack of orientation and powerlessness are delinquencies, drug addicts (who have directed their aggression against themselves) and violent as well as racist youth groups. The freedom to choose holds many dangers, especially when the family and social environment have failed to convey a belief system to the individual, which provides orientation for future decision-making processes.

In our highly industrialised and technological society, in which the service sector provides a large proportion of the employment, we have come to accept that ability alone does not guarantee employment and success, but that we have to learn how to 'sell' our abilities. The individual is aware of the fact that s/he may not remain in the same economic sector for which s/he had originally been trained. The present economic system is in need of employees who adjust to the needs of the market and are prepared to switch from one profession to another. Different areas of employment require different qualities. Identity management is a skill and an essential tool to survive in modern mass society. The coaching and orientation that youth receive are based on the progress of careers. Graduates are trained to write an impressive *curriculum vitae* and present themselves well in interviews. Self-presentation is adjusted to the environment to which the individual seeks access. Short-lived fashions and trends determine what is 'in' and to which criteria one has to adjust to. The anonymity of today's mass society provides enough space for the manipulation of identity presentation. The frequent encounter of strangers of whom we do not know what significance they may have for us at present or in the future determines self-presentation in every-day interaction.

Whether verbal or not, our actions are the social expression of our identity.<sup>116</sup> Furthermore, while our identity determines our actions, our social interaction has in turn, an impact on our identity. As on most occasions, our actions are rationally controlled for the purpose of social, political and economic advantages or aspirations, the response we get during our interaction is the response to our successful or unsuccessful

identity management. The response is also controlled by the other, unless it is a spontaneous expression of joy or pain. Thus if our interaction has an impact on our identity and our identity management determines our interaction, then our identity will be influenced by the identity we construct for others. The combination of an anonymous society and the need to 'sell' oneself, as a flexible work force, encourages a trend towards the 'artificialisation' of identity.<sup>117</sup>

Inevitably the question emerges: if the state, the economy and the social environment have such a strong influence on identity, how free is an individual to determine his or her future and identity development? The solution to this theoretical dilemma lies in the conflicts that arise from social reality. People frequently find themselves in situations that do not satisfy their material or emotional needs. In the course of the search for personal fulfilment choices have to be made. For example, an unemployed history graduate, who wanted to become a lecturer and philosopher, chose to train as an accountant to pay off his student loan; a wife chose to divorce her husband, although she loved him, because he became a notorious gambler, faked her signature and financially bankrupted the family; or a dissatisfied emancipated activist chose to convert to Islam and married a stranger at the advice of her Sufi Sheikh. All these individuals made their own choice, which changed their lives. They all discovered hidden talents and personality traits that had not been fostered in the past. Their decisions will essentially influence their identity. It is worth noting here that in all three of these real cases the individuals were forced to make a choice due to the situations they were in. At the same time all of them had alternatives to



choose from. Consequently, the decisions that they made were based on their evaluation of their situation and self-evaluation. Identity comprises of values, attitudes and beliefs that influence the decision-making process. Yet, on many occasions decisions are preceded and followed by changes in economic or social status and in the social environment. New experiences lead to a re-evaluation of the old system of beliefs and thus can change attitudes towards past actions and future experiences.

Every individual strives for a satisfactory self-concept or identity. Most people seek to assimilate and accommodate new identifications into the existing identity structure and subsequently evaluate both old and new identifications. When actions or decisions are coherent with the existing identity, then this process is free of conflict and occurs relatively unnoticed. If actions and decisions do not fit into the self-concept, then identity conflicts complicate the process of identity formation. Once new identifications seem more promising, although they are incoherent with the existing identity, an individual can opt to re-evaluate the past as a necessary path towards the present and thus maintain a sense of continuity in the course of identity development. When re-evaluation of the past is not sufficient to incorporate new and conflicting identifications, then the individual can resolve the conflict by disidentifying<sup>118</sup> with the previous system of beliefs. This entails a re-interpretation of the past because accommodation, in other words, the adjustment of existing structures to incorporate new identifications, is not sufficient enough to maintain a sense of continuity. The past course of life is interpreted in such a way that at best, opportunities were just not there to discover the present option and at worst, the

individual was deluded and misguided, but has now found the true meaning to life. The latter interpretation is frequently found among converts and among individuals subjected to brainwashing.<sup>119</sup> However, these coping strategies apply to situations in which individuals believe that their new identifications represent positive turning points in their lives.

When a person discovers that his or her decision led to a negative turning point in his or her life or when the individual was forced into a status, which is incompatible with the existing identity, then several intra-psychic and interpersonal coping strategies are available. As mentioned above, Breakwell<sup>120</sup> offered four main interpersonal coping strategies, which are isolation, negativism, passing and compliance. With regard to the intra-psychic coping strategies she pointed to four central strategies: deflection, acceptance, re-evaluation of current identity contents and re-evaluation of prospective identity contents. These strategies can in turn be subdivided in a range of more concrete strategies. Some of the most relevant strategies will be discussed in more detail below.

Denial is a frequently employed strategy to cope with contradictions or threatening situations at the cognitive and emotional levels. Such contradictions or threats cause, what Festinger<sup>121</sup> referred to as, cognitive dissonance. As a result, individuals who hold strong personal or ideological opinions commonly reject information that contradicts their point of view. They may deny or repress the information, which would otherwise force them to question their position.



Denial as a strategy to protect one's self-esteem was also observed among children of ethnic minority groups. Coloured children, between the ages of 4 and 10 years, in the United States and in Britain were found to hold a more negative view of their own racial group and misidentified themselves as members of the white majority.<sup>122</sup> Such misidentification is a form denying one's ethnic origin. These children adopted the negative stereotypes from the attitudes wider society has towards each race.<sup>123</sup> According to Festinger<sup>124</sup>, new opinions are subjected to social testing, they are compared with the opinions of others. The process of social testing allows the individual to identify relative similarities in opinion among other individuals. When a positive self-image of a minority is negated by wider society, a minority individual has the option to either resist the adaptation of negative attitudes or to deny his or her belonging to the group. Young children lack rational arguments against negative stereotypes, they seek refuge in denying their ethnic affiliation. However, more recent studies suggested that children at the age of 9 already hold a more positive view of themselves and their peoples.<sup>125</sup> So, as a child grows older, s/he has to accept that denial is no long-term strategy to protect one's self-esteem.

Another way to cope with discontinuity and identity conflicts is to shift salience between the desire for continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem.<sup>126</sup> An identity threatening situation, in which an individual must sacrifice his or her sense of continuity and self-esteem, can thus be accepted by emphasising distinctiveness. The woman who divorced her husband, mentioned in the example above, sacrificed the continuity of her family life and felt that she had failed to protect her family, which eroded her self-



esteem. In turn she discovered new social skill, went on to further education, and improved her social status as well as her future prospects. She emphasised her increased sense of distinctiveness that subsequently boosted her self-esteem. The loss of continuity in her role as a house-wife had become less important.

A similar strategy is to focus upon a particular identity component and to inflate its value.<sup>127</sup> This strategy is found among second generation Muslim youth. Muslim youth, who have not found employment according to their expectations or who will leave university and search for employment, fear that they will not be able to make the careers they envisage because of racial discrimination and 'Islamophobia'. On many occasions, these young adults emphasise the importance of Islam in their lives. They direct their attention to the self-esteem that they gain through being a pious Muslim to protect against the anticipated loss of self-esteem in the future.

#### 1.1.5. Social Identity and Minorities

Before discussing social and group identity and their significance for minorities, it may be important to note that theories regarding ethnic identity are frequently the object of criticism. The reproach is based on the fact that Psychology and Sociology, as known today, were developed to study Western societies. Thus when ethnic minorities are investigated the methodologies and analyses are conducted from a Western perspective. Also theorists of different cultural backgrounds such as Nimmi Hutnik, Henri Tajfel, Tariq Modood and Steward Hall, were all educated by Western

institutions. They base their studies on Western schools of thought. Thus existing theories may be criticised as insufficient for the study of Muslim identity, nevertheless they are the only tools presently available to serve this study. To counter balance this deficiency more space will be provided in later chapters for Muslims to speak about their identity for themselves. First though, social identity will be discussed on theoretical grounds.

The identification with groups or a collective is generally summarised for the sake of clarity, as social identity. It encompasses social status, roles and norms, as well as ethnic, both national and cultural affiliation and group membership. Social identity, in essence, is the product of differentiation between 'us' and 'them'. Social identity can be conceived in demarcation to others. By social categorisation the individual can segment his or her social environment into his or her own group and others.<sup>128</sup> Among people who share the same norms and values, an individual experiences the reaffirmation of his or her identity, which provides emotional comfort. Therefore an essential aspect of social identity is that it provides a sense of security and protection when an individual is embedded in a group of equal minded people who acknowledge his or her social position.

When considering cultural identity, it becomes apparent that collective identities are not necessarily based on absolute commonalties, but on approximate criteria, which are sufficient to create social cohesion among groups and societies. This aspect of social identity is best explained by an argument used in logic:



If indiscriminability is a shadow of identity, the shape of the latter is distorted but recognisable in the shape of the former. The logic of identity generates a logic of approximate criteria of identity, in some way similar and in some different.<sup>129</sup>

For Williamson discriminability is a criteria for distinctness, while indiscriminability is an indication of identity, 'an approximate criterion'. However, indiscriminability is non-transitive.

It is not always the case that when *a* is indiscriminable from *b* and *b* is indiscriminable from *c* then *a* is indiscriminable from *c*, for otherwise there could not be series in which the differences between successive members are both too small to be discriminated and yet add up to a discriminable difference between the first member and the last.<sup>130</sup>

When transferring this argument to human identity, the external identification of groups or the attribution of an individual to a group is based on the indiscriminability between individuals in contrast to others. The human mind tries to isolate the approximate criteria of identity in order to categorise the environment. Thus individuals categorise the environment in order to facilitate orientation.

The 'approximate criterion of identity' implies that the ordinary observer does not have full knowledge of the identity of the 'object'. This gives credit to the imperfection of human knowledge and judgement and is partly an elucidation of the cognitive presupposition of social categorisation. Social identity is based on generalisation, social categorisation and an in-group consensus on who is 'in' and who is 'out'.

Although social identity is certainly non-transitive, as member *a* of a group is not identical with member *b* etc., the identity with specific values which unify a group can be described as indiscriminable. Every member of a group



identifies with the same values and symbols of that group, and consequently with the group itself. Yet, every member will impute their own meanings to symbols and values, as every individual assimilates them to the idiosyncrasies of their own experiences and personalities. This is best illustrated by highlighting differences in regional-cultural identities. Frequently, gross stereotypes are attributed to identities of larger social groups, which results in a faulty categorisation. When, for example, references are made to Scottish, Welsh or English identity, it is often ignored that a Highland Scot feels much stronger about his Gaelic background than a Lowland Scot, who has far more in common with the northern English due to trade and intermarriage. Also an Englishman from the Northeast may feel that he has a lot more in common with a Lowland Scot than with an Englishman from the South, yet this doesn't mean that a Highland Scot could identify with an Englishman from the Northeast. Collectives are internally divided, thus it depends on against whom identities are compared in order to determine the difference between groups and to understand when certain group or collective identities become more salient. Anthony Cohen suggested that "the boundary as the community's public face is symbolically simple; but, as the object of internal discourse, it is symbolically complex".<sup>131</sup>

It has to be emphasised that an individual can identify with a variety of groups. He may identify with a group that is defined by class, a particular fashion, its support for a particular football team or political party, etc.. With all such groups an individual may share some common symbols, values, interests and goals. Each group affiliation may satisfy a different

cognitive or emotional need. At the same time this individual is able to develop a broader collective identity, such as a national or ethnic identity, which encompasses people with whom s/he would otherwise have very little in common on a day to day basis. This is the point where the line between sameness and difference becomes blurred and identities begin to overlap. A collective identity, which encompasses a large social group, is based on minimal common denominators. The salience of collective and group identities usually depend on the social environment in which they are stimulated. While the British identity of a Briton is not consciously present on a day to day basis in the UK, it will become salient when this individual moves abroad.

A collective is not simply the sum of various social groups, which would rather be an indication for the fragmentation of a society than for its unity. Identity is manifold, as identifications take place in many different forms. While embodied differences such as gender or skin colour are obvious visual markers, it is far more difficult to determine the precise criteria for cultural boundaries of communities. Anthony Cohen suggested that people 'construct' their communities symbolically. Within the community's social discourse, meanings can be fabricated and almost any perceived difference between 'us' and 'them' can be transformed into symbolic markers for boundaries. The semantics of these symbols purposely remain vague in order to be generally accepted. Community members can consequently interpret them according to their needs.<sup>132</sup> Thus these boundaries derive from an imagined communality which finds a real expression in interaction with the 'others'. Cohen pointed out that communal cultural identity does



not always reflect in the way in which individuals behave or do things, but rather in the way they think about the community, its symbols and culture. He referred to communal identity as a "masking symbol"<sup>133</sup>, which is presented to the outside world in such a way that it represents what the members think that it is or what they want it to be. Individuals living at the cultural boundaries of their community have the most precise definition of what their cultural identity is, as they are most aware of the distinction between 'them' and 'us'. Consequently nationalism is found to be the strongest in regions close to national borders.

As the construction of symbolic commonalties among large societies is far more impersonal than among smaller communities, individuals search for attachments to groups which are more ascertainable and in which its members can develop interpersonal ties. Such small communities or groups are far more specific in their definition of shared identity. The human, as a social being seeks inclusion and group support. Although various individuals experience marginalisation for different reasons, these people aspire to compensate such exclusion by forming new groups in order to create social and emotional security. Thus identity also becomes comprehensible in the form of social attachments.

The most obvious marker for the development of group identity is ethnicity. Contrary to the common argument that the reassertion of ethnic identities is a consequence of modernisation, Hondrich suggested that it is an accompanying phenomenon of social modernisation processes. He argued that latent origin-related attachments<sup>134</sup> gain significance with the



accumulation of rational and individual future-oriented attachments.<sup>135</sup> Origin-related attachments (e.g. to family and ethnic community) are not chosen. As individuals make choices, such as to move to another country or decide on a particular occupational career, new chosen attachments are established. However, chosen attachments may fail, cause disappointment or can lead to experiences of rejection. In this case the individual can fall back on the origin-related attachments, which cannot be lost and therefore provide security and protection. Once a number of chosen attachments accumulate, no matter whether they were positive or not, they tend to cancel each other's impact. Lack of time and the mere quantity of attachments allow for only the most recent ones to remain significant. The more chosen attachments an individual accumulates, the less significant they become in relation to origin-oriented attachments. The latter have the advantage of lasting influence, as they accompanied the individual from the beginning. Their scope is more far reaching and the individual cannot lose or detach himself from them.<sup>136</sup>

This phenomenon becomes most apparent among ethnic minorities. Members of ethnic minorities strive for acceptance by wider society as much as every other individual does. For example, West Indian students expressed their disillusion in *Disappointed Guests*<sup>137</sup> after numerous efforts to integrate into university life and to mix with English students. An increasing number of members of ethnic minorities succeed in higher education, but do not receive adequate employment afterwards. Their attempt to integrate and to participate in building society is frequently rejected. Chosen attachments lead to disappointment and aspired identities

cannot be realised. The majority seek refuge in their community and fall back onto their ethnic identity.

In general minority identity becomes most apparent in the realm of group and social identity. It is within inter-group dynamics that identity may be threatened or that strategies are developed to protect, bolster and perpetuate identity. For example, the cultural and religious identity of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims become more salient during contact with wider society, as public discern of Islam reflects on social interaction. By fostering their religious and cultural identity within the family and community they seek to protect their heritage. The creation of numerous organisations, of which the majority operate as social, informational, religious and educational networks or pressure groups, serve this objective.

Individuals have several intra-psychic strategies available to build and passively protect their identity. However, groups are more efficient in maintaining identity as well as minimising and eradicating external threats. Pressure groups are formed to concentrate the power of a 'minority' in order to promote the interest of these people in a more powerful environment. Such groups seek to influence legislation in their own interest and to affect public opinion by lobbying or propaganda.<sup>138</sup>

Minorities, Tajfel suggested, adopt several strategies to maintain a positive self-image and sense of social identity, which have similarities with strategies applied by pressure groups. Before pressure groups are able to influence legislation, they seek to re-evaluate unfavourable connotations



attributed to existing group characteristics, revitalise old traditions with a positive significance or create new characteristics to produce a more positive public image. In essence, pressure groups try to change the values within the social system to become acknowledged by society as equals.

As groups have more power to promote interests, their activity and success fosters a feeling of self-worth. Group Action aims to counter stigmatisation and prejudice among society and the political elite. By promoting a positive self-image *via* mass media, the attempt is made to alleviate the stigma and to protect minority identity. In order to make it easier for wider society to acknowledge the minority group, old traditions or norms that have similarity with those of the majority or are more acceptable, are revived and attributed with positive values. Group Action has to convince both the audience in and outside the social category. However, no matter whether members of the in-group agree to the activity of their action groups or not, once the audience outside the social category revised its stereotypes of the category, minority members experience new patterns of treatment. This becomes most apparent when unwanted mistakes are made and activities backlash on the initiators. Usually, artisans and more liberal segments of society are the first to support minority groups in their effort to restructure the social value system and serve as mediators between the minority and wider society. The experience of positive change in social interaction patterns eventually strengthens minority identity. When group action fails to persuade wider society, but does convince the minority group, then the preconditions are created for a new subculture to emerge. Such a new



subculture is then destined to co-exist beside the dominant culture with limited influence on wider society.<sup>139</sup>

#### 1.1.6. The Fragmented Individual?

During the past decade theorists have observed the social, political and economic changes brought about by the process of globalisation and the subsequent impact on identity. However, change is usually accompanied by crisis. There is a general consensus that old traditions and norms are declining in order to give way to the formation of new social structures and identities. That there is a lingering 'crisis of identity' was recognised, but what it will lead to is subject of vigorous debate. Stewart Hall belongs to those theorists who support the claim that modern identities are being dislocated or fragmented. He argued that a distinctive type of structural change, which transforms modern societies, is

fragmenting the cultural landscapes of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, and nationality which gave us firm locations as social individuals. These transformations are also shifting our personal identities, undermining our sense of ourselves as integrated subjects. This loss of a stable 'sense of self' is sometimes called the dislocation or de-centring of the subject.<sup>140</sup>

The 'sense of self' is being undermined by repeated questioning and subsequent obliteration of deep rooted and generally accepted norms, which have provided orientation and guidance in the past. At the same time these norms are not yet replaced by equally immanent values, causing insecurity, destabilisation, ambivalence, and disorientation, which are typical symptoms of both collective and personal identity crises. Hall suggested that with the entrance into the post-modern era, modern society has also reached

the stage of a post-essentialist conception of identity.<sup>141</sup> Identification with one's place in the cultural environment has become more problematic due to the fragmentation of the social landscape. The post-modern subject is thus conceptualised "as having no fixed, essential or permanent identity"<sup>142</sup>. An individual's identity is transformed according to different situations and the way s/he is addressed in the cultural system.

The subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent 'self'. Within us are contradictory identities, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are continuously being shifted about.<sup>143</sup>

There is no doubt about the fact that identity formation is becoming more complex in present society, although it would be exaggerated to declare that the generally accepted notion of a unified identity, or rather that identity in a healthy state should form a unity, has become obsolete. A fragmented identity would entail a broken identity, operating in separate parts. When different identities develop in separation, it is referred to as a multiple personality syndrome by psychologists. Thus one should not make the mistake to interpret the human ability to present 'the self' in different ways according to the various social situations (well elaborated among symbolic interactionists), as a switch between different identities. It is rather a change in salience between appropriate role identifications. These identifications can sometimes be contradictory, but nevertheless coexist as long as they do not emerge simultaneously, because intra-psychic and interpersonal strategies are available to cope with threatening situation.

Unity is also not threatened if individuals reveal a history of contradictory identifications. For it solely depends on how this inconsistency is

interpreted. Buddha, for example, was a rich young man who became an ascetic, then a rich merchant and then again an ascetic. The result of these contradictory identifications was, according to Buddhists, absolute wisdom. Thus the interpretation of, and the values attributed to, the discontinuity of identifications determines whether an individual is disoriented, in crisis, or not. The most common response to past contradictory identifications is: 'it was a phase I had to go through, it was an experience'. An individual's identity is not static or has fixed structure, but can assimilate and evaluate experience. Change and adjustment are a natural part of identity formation, so it is not the change as such that creates insecurity and produces a crisis of identity.

The 'post-modern subject' does not suffer from a fragmented identity, but from disorientation. However, the analyses related to the concept of a fragmented identity recognise the presuppositions of a crisis of identity, which can be observed in present society. It is not the inadequacy of the present concepts of identity that are a problem. Certainly, due to the multiplicity of systems of meanings and cultural representations, which have become an integral part of modern society, more potential identities are offered to individuals. In addition, an accelerating pace of change pressurises the post-modern subject (as the contemporary individual is frequently referred to) to adjust. The vacuum during transition irritates and paralyses the individual. The deconstruction of knowledge and putting key concepts 'under erasure'<sup>144</sup> without superseding them with qualified alternatives, are characteristic features of 'post-modernity'. However, the deconstruction of every 'truth' and the acknowledgement of multiple



truths, as intellectual values, do not provide orientation for the struggle of day to day life.

The current desire to deconstruct generally accepted concepts of identity and especially cultural identity, derives from the dilemma that identity is constructed on the basis of, and is defined by, 'difference'. The increasing number of ethnic minorities that settle in Western nation states find it problematic to integrate into a new culture and simultaneously maintain their own. The host societies also face the problem of accepting that their culture is no longer a 'homogenous' entity, as negotiated to represent their national identity. Western societies are presently forced to cope with a cultural plurality that 'intruded' into their 'imagined and constructed homogeneity'. Never before were Western nation states confronted with 'difference' and the consequences of cultural difference on such a regular basis as during recent years.

Whenever theorists see no solution for a problem they attempt to compensate this deficiency by deconstructing old concepts and creating new terminology for increasingly vague ideas. This is not to devalue positive and well-intended attempts to create culturally all embracing concepts. It is rather an effort to prevent a conceptual denial of conflicts that arise from the social reality of difference. The social reality of such conflicts can be observed on a small scale in most Western major cities and on a large scale in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The refusal to acknowledge the nature of 'difference' and that too much 'difference' within small space can create conflict, is a danger in itself. However, it is not 'difference' as such that is a source of conflict, but the values attributed to the one who is different. Reoccurring relapses into nationalism and ethnicity are also indications that individuals seek continuity and unity of identity, even if it is only imagined.

Hondrich's theory on chosen and decent oriented attachments may be used to explain this phenomenon. He argued that when individuals lose their orientation and feel insecure because their chosen identifications have brought rejection, disappointment or resulted in failure, they retreat back into their ethnic identities. This theory indicated that an individual will rather attempt to escape the fragmentation of identity and restore a sense of unity by reviving origin-oriented identifications. This process by itself does not bear social conflict. Identity does not only entail exclusion of the 'different', but also provides the comfort of familiarity. Yet, disappointing identifications entail a reduction in self-esteem. Thus the desire to boost self-esteem by claiming superiority of one's inherited origin-oriented identifications bears the seeds of conflict. At this point 'difference' begins to receive value attributions.

Identity is such a complicated issue because it is the psychological expression of the human need to be able to place, locate and define one's distinctive 'self' within the social environment. Conversely, both personal and collective identity are subject to political and/or collective manipulation.

## 1.2. Hypotheses

Modern society is permanently subjected to rapid change, generated by the desperate urge for progress and both economic and intellectual growth. The progress of globalisation and technological innovation have increased the pace and scope of change that is unprecedented by previous epochs.<sup>145</sup> Change is unsettling, it is accompanied by the continuous re-evaluation of the past, present and aspirations of the future. Change creates disorientation, anxiety, fear and a sense of powerlessness and confusion. Disorientation and the feeling of powerlessness may encourage individuals to seek protection and guidance from charismatic leaders from within like minded groups.<sup>146</sup> The reassertion of ethnic identity among British society and immigrant minorities alike, is an indication of the search for stability and continuity.

During the last decade 'identity' has become a popular issue within public discourse, because, as Kobena Mercer rightly observed

identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty<sup>147</sup>.

Rapid social, political and economic change force Western societies to redefine their national and cultural identities, as well as their position in the international arena. The need to integrate different ethnic minorities into wider society, to counteract the progress of poverty among some social sectors, to avoid social fragmentation along the lines of class, region and



ethnicity and to foster loyalty to the state and its society will necessarily bring about a redefinition of values and a change in social structure and national identity.

Western society developed an ambivalent attitude towards faith. On the one hand observant believers are perceived as backward and potentially radical and are treated with caution. On the other an increasing number of west Europeans convert to Buddhism, Islam and more radical Christian sects. Immigrants, of a faith other than Christianity, receive little understanding from wider society for strict observance. Modood *et al.* highlighted the shift from one view of 'integration' to another, as they compared the patterns of exclusion of West Indians and South Asians.<sup>148</sup> Whilst West Indians were assimilative and yet excluded because of their colour, South Asians, and especially Muslims, seem to be marginalised due to their cultural and religious difference. It is noteworthy that Muslims in Europe, and in Britain in particular, are of more public and political concern than the Chinese, West Indians and other minorities.

After preliminary field work the following hypotheses were defined:

- *Muslim minority identity in Europe, and Britain in particular, elicits hostility and mistrust, as it impinges on the most fragile Western identity components in a time of social change.*

- *The integration of Muslim minorities into British society creates friction; both parties perceive the other as a threat to their identity and thus respond with mutual rejection.*
- *Identity entails the possibility of choice with regard to the emphasis of particular identifications. The emphasis of origin-oriented identifications such as ethnicity, culture or religion is a coping strategy in the face of disorientation and a threatened sense of self-worth.*

British identity is a very fragile yet flexible construction. It has been created to accommodate and incorporate English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish national sentiments. At present Britain is still struggling to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict and growing nationalism in Wales and Scotland is threatening the unity of the United Kingdom. At the same time, ethnic minorities from former colonies and the Commonwealth settled in Britain and introduced a new ethnic and cultural plurality that is leading to a redefinition of British identity.

In a time when 'traditional' British identity seems to 'dissolve', Muslim minorities maintain their strong cultural and religious identity amongst their communities in Britain. Their family ties are strong and extend back to their countries of origin. The majority of Muslims are reluctant to develop close ties with members of wider society and despise what Westerners would describe as the liberties of the individual, but Muslims refer to as decadence and immorality. Violence in Muslim countries and

'Islamic Fundamentalism' are the focus of Western media reports. The picture Western societies have of Islam, is that of intolerance and violent fanaticism. Terrorism against Western institutions, tourists, and secular governments in the Arab world produce mistrust against Muslim minorities in the West. The fear that Muslims lack loyalty to their country of residence and could become subjected to manipulation by Islamist movements, prevails among Western society. On these grounds, Muslims experience rejection and discrimination, which by no means facilitates the integration process.

This thesis will therefore investigate how national and religious identity determines how British Muslims and the indigenous British perceive each other and how these views affect the integration of Muslim minorities in Britain. In the context of this thesis the term integration will be defined as follows:

*A minority individual is fully integrated in wider society when s/he has acquired the native language, adopted the majority of the socio-cultural behaviours (without having to neglect his/her culture of ethnic origin) and is accepted by the native environment as a member of society.*

This definition is based on the concept of acculturation, but purposely does not include it. The term acculturation seems insufficient as it only circumscribes the efforts made by the minority individual to adopt the culture of wider society. Yet to be accepted by the native environment



implies that an effort must be made by members of wider society to integrate the minority individual and therefore introduces a mutuality with regard to the integration process. Thus this concept tries to acknowledge the fact that British born children have to a large extent acculturated, but do not necessarily feel integrated in British society.

### 1.3. Meta-Theory

At this point it is appropriate to declare from which meta-theoretical perspective this research is being approached. For the purpose of the field research, two theoretical positions have been merged: Symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. Due to its explorative nature symbolic interactionism is most coherent with qualitative research. As mentioned above symbolic interactionism is based on Mead's theoretical social psychological approach. It is the attempt to explain individual behaviour and consciousness on the grounds of social processes. These processes are structured in accordance with the principles of action and response. Such principles have been conveyed to the individual by language, which allows him or her to anticipate the responses his or her action cause within someone else. This anticipated response serves as a control mechanism for one's own action. Symbols (signs used to represent something) are cultural constructs. Every society negotiated, in the course of long term historic processes, and agreed on basic meanings for symbols that every member of society must learn. The central hypothesis of symbolic interactionism is that social interaction is strongly influenced by, and dependent on, these basic meanings of employed symbols. Symbolic interaction is to be understood as

a reciprocal behaviour of people and groups, employing common symbols and generating expectations of successive responses.

Symbolic interactionism is not related to a particular methodology. However, the examination of categories, hypotheses, data and interpretation should be approached alternately with common sense and scientific understanding. The reason being that the scientific approach to an issue alone could lead to its theoretical reconstruction detached from reality. Therefore common sense should serve as a control mechanism. The research should not be based on preconceived theoretical concepts but on exploration and inspection.

Exploration, in this context entails a flexible and reflexive approach. The researcher should check on and reflect upon results, their interrelation and methods, then improve the latter if necessary. Methods should be adapted to the situation and the researcher should adjust his or her theoretical expectations to reality. The researcher should be able to identify with the particular group under scrutiny, but also create the necessary distance to every phase of research. The intention is to create a clear picture of the research subject in order to choose appropriate concepts.

Inspection is the simultaneous analytical activity of the researcher. Empirical data are analysed with regard to their inter-relation in order to create theory. Concepts are continuously corrected in accordance with the 'real empirical world'.<sup>149</sup> Blumer<sup>150</sup> stated three methodological premises on which symbolic interactionism is based:

- People respond to the subjective meaning of a 'thing' and not to the 'thing' itself. Therefore it is not essential to explore 'what it is' but 'what people think it is'. Thus 'things' always have to be explored in the context of meanings associated with them. An 'object' receives meaning once it becomes a topic in conversation. As long as something is not incorporated into communication, no meanings are attributed to it and therefore it does not exist socially. In other words, it is irrelevant to the interaction process.
- The meaning of 'things' may be derived from social interaction. This entails that no meanings are innate, but that all meanings are conveyed during social interaction. Therefore the exploration of processes are important.
- Meanings are employed and changed during an interpretative process. Thus the meanings of definitions and symbols are not fixed, but must be acquired during interactive processes. Reality must therefore be conceived as a social construct.

In this context researchers must choose a method which enables involved subjects to interpret the given situation themselves.

The most favoured scientific theory employed by social interactionists is phenomenology. For Husserl, who developed this theoretical approach in opposition to positivism, phenomenology is the methodological foundation for all sciences and philosophy. Phenomenology seeks to conceive the essence of a 'thing', not only in its material form, but also as a conscious



manifestation. Therefore it is the researchers task to analyse the phenomenon the way it is and not the way theories picture it. Background knowledge about the topic has to be pushed aside so that it does not bias the researcher's perspective. Reality as such is not being explored, but the way individuals perceive it.

When applied, the researcher has to go through two phases of reduction. The first is to refrain from introducing one's theoretical perspective to the research process and develop a neutral attitude towards the subject, free from bias and pre-conceptualisations. It is important to make oneself aware of one's assumptions and theoretical anticipations about the research area. The second phase of reduction is the description of meanings in order to develop an understanding of the essence.

From the perspective of phenomenology the 'subject' itself cannot be directly examined, but only their verbal expression or representation in language. This is why a researcher can never be completely objective, but can only develop an unbiased attitude towards his or her subject. Observing and describing the subject from an uncritical and unbiased perspective thus create the preconditions for analyses and explanations.<sup>151</sup>

#### 1.4. Methodology

The analyses of identity and integration can be approached from the perspective of various disciplines. Identity must be understood as a psychological process that operates within a social context in relation to its historical perspective. Therefore the investigation of Muslim and British identity is best approached from an integrative stance. Fortunately, the need for an inter-disciplinary approach to identity has already become more widely accepted, in particular among social psychologists.<sup>152</sup>

The material for this thesis was drawn from three areas:

1. history,
  2. previous studies and
  3. field research.
- 
1. When focusing on Muslim and British identity, the salient identity components under scrutiny are cultural, religious and national. These three identity components will be examined in their historical context. British history and that of the Muslim minorities is therefore an important aspect of this thesis.
  2. Theories and studies on identity, which were introduced above, provide additional material and serve as a foundation for analyses and interpretation. These theories, which are of psychological, sociological and social psychological origin, will help to relate personal psychological demands to the concrete social environment, and illustrate how this inter-relationship influences integration.

3. The field research was approached from the position of symbolic interactionism, in so far that it is being recognised that meanings are being negotiated within a social context. Researching identity is effectively the search for, and analyses of, meanings that mirror the psychological reality of the interviewee. It is assumed that what respondents say is a reflection of their 'reality' and is thus a representation of their psychological world. This point of view can also be referred to as the phenomenological perspective.

In order to create a more comprehensive picture of what British and Muslim identity are, a qualitative method seemed most appropriate. Quantitative methods, such as questionnaires or surveys, are applied to determine the frequency of a certain response but provide little opportunity for the respondents to describe their 'reality' and to express their point of view. Such methods are ideal when the researcher has sufficient knowledge of the causes and consequences of a problem under scrutiny and seeks to make a representative statement about a given population. Qualitative methods do not lead to representative results, but provide a more detailed picture of the topic area, which the researcher is trying to investigate.

#### 1.4.1. Grounded Theory

Glaser and Strauss developed grounded theory<sup>153</sup> as they sought to improve the development of theory by bridging theory development and empirical research. Glaser and Strauss did not attempt to resolve this problem by improving available methods of testing theories. Instead they turned



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### 1.4.2. Interviews

Within the qualitative paradigm, participating observation is the method *par excellence*. However, qualitative interviews are becoming more acknowledged, because information can be recorded in *statu nascendi*, thus serving as documentary evidence and therefore may be proven authentic. As it is possible to compare texts and their interpretations, qualitative interviews are gradually gaining higher methodological status.<sup>157</sup>

Depending on the kind of information a researcher seeks, there are three types of interviews s/he can choose from: informational, analytical or diagnostic. While the informational interview belongs to the spectrum of quantitative methods, analytical and diagnostic interviews can be used within both the qualitative and quantitative paradigms. The informational interview is the type that journalists would use, while the diagnostic interview serves to establish well-defined characteristics, as doctors would do in conversation with their patients. The analytical interview aims to reveal motivations, beliefs and attitudes to determine the cause of a given problem.<sup>158</sup>

The different types of interviews can also differ in their standardisation. They can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. The structured interview is based on a detailed schedule, much like a questionnaire. The questions have to be both short and specific and the interviewer has to read these questions as formulated and ordered in the schedule. The responses

in a structured interview are usually short. Ideally the researcher has produced response categories so that they can immediately categorise the answers.<sup>159</sup> The advantage of the structured interview is that it takes less time, is easier to quantify and the interviewer has minimal impact on the response. The disadvantage is that this method limits what the respondent can talk about and can therefore miss important information.

The unstructured interview is not based on any predefined questions. Instead the interviewee is invited to talk about his or her experience with, or knowledge of, a particular problem in as much detail as possible. The atmosphere of the communication between the interviewer and the interviewee is informal. The advantage here is that the response is not predetermined in any way. The method is flexible and may yield a lot of information. The disadvantage is that the researcher has less control over the situation, the interview takes longer and it is virtually impossible to compare the content of these interviews. Unstructured interviews are generally used for oral history and single case studies.

The semi-structured interview seeks to merge the advantages of both the structured and unstructured interview. The investigator uses an interview schedule, with a set of questions. However, the interviewer does not have to follow a set order of questions, but is able to probe interesting areas, which arise and can follow the concerns of the respondent. Thus the advantage of the semi-structured interview is that the researcher has more control over the interview process and at the same time the method is flexible enough to



produce informative data. The disadvantage is that these interviews are more difficult to analyse.<sup>160</sup>

For this study three series of interviews have been conducted with:

- leaders of Muslim organisations (21),
- members of Muslim minorities and members of the public (160) and
- British politicians (2).

The interviews with leaders of Muslim organisations were intended to provide insight into the objectives of those who claim to represent Muslim minorities in Britain. Therefore the semi-structured informational interviewing technique was deemed the appropriate method. These interviews also provide initial orientation for which topic areas are salient among the community and seem to be important for Muslim self-conceptualisation. Twenty-one of such interviews were conducted. The organisations have been selected according to their communal importance and area of activity in various regions in Britain. These interviews were conducted in the environment of the interviewee and were taped after permission had been sought. The questions were based on a guideline that was prepared beforehand and was consistent for all interviews. Open questions were posed to give the interviewee an opportunity to raise topics of particular concern that may not have been considered by the interviewer. These semi-structured interviews were primarily intended to provide information about the organisations themselves and are not subject to analytical interpretation. The list of organisations is in appendix II and the guideline of the interviews in appendix III.

The interviews with British Muslims concerning Muslim identity in Britain and their attitudes towards Britain, as well as the interviews with native British about British identity and their attitudes towards Muslims were methodologically approached from the perspective of the grounded theory. They were intended to provide an insight into the interviewees' self-conceptualisation and their concepts of British identity in terms of culture and/or religion for comparison.

In order to develop first categories and criteria for theoretical sampling, those parts of the interviews with leaders of Muslim organisations that focused on Muslim identity and the future of Islam in Britain were used. This data provided sufficient material to create guidelines or interview schedules with open questions for further interviews. The interviews with British Muslims and natives were analytical and semi-structured. The schedule remained in essence the same for all interviews, but was been adjusted to the interests of the interviewees, the geographical area in which the interviews took place (London / Birmingham / Glasgow / Cardiff) and to the cultural background of the interviewee (Muslim / native-Welsh, etc.). The interviews took between half an hour and three hours. The interview guideline is in appendix IV.

Methodologically grounded theory relies on small samples. Therefore the analyses of data for the development of categories and theory was based on the transcription of interviews, line-by-line coding or focused coding and memo-writing. From the series of interview with leaders of Muslim

organisations only two interviews are completely transcribed due to the volume of material. These interviews were coded and categories were developed. Based on these categories the relevant parts of all the other interviews were then analytically compared by auditive means. Therefore immediate memo-writing was even more important for the improvement of the categories and the creation of mid-range theories.

The interviews with British Muslims and natives were coded and analysed according to the same strategy as previously described. Only the most valuable interviews, during which interviewees explained their feelings and thoughts in detail, are completely transcribed and the categories/improved categories were used to analyse the rest of the interviews by auditive means. The sampling of the interviews have been chosen according to the following criteria: generation, region and gender. In total one hundred and sixty individuals were interviewed of which one half are British nationals of Islamic faith and the remainder belong to the native population. The sample was divided into equal numbers of males and females. Both the male and the female samples were in turn split into two age groups; half the interviewees were aged between eighteen and thirty-five and the other half between thirty-five and sixty. The division between the age groups was important to determine generational differences in general and the difference in identity development between the first and the second generations of Muslim immigrants in particular.

The sample was divided according to regions in order to consider differences between regional identities in Britain. Forty analytical semi-structured



interviews (sampled as described above) were conducted in each of the following major cities with a high percentage of Muslim minorities: Cardiff, Glasgow, Birmingham and London.

Interviews with politicians followed an interview schedule prepared for semi-structured informational interviews. However, only Lord Tebbit CH was prepared to be interviewed. Mr O'Brien MP from the Home Office offered to respond to any questions in written form. The prepared questions were therefore summarised and posted. The summarised questions were also sent to Tony Benn MP. The response of Tony Benn MP is in appendix V.

The data from all the interviews and their qualitative analyses will be integrated into a wider historic context and not presented in the form of a report.

#### **1.4.3. Experiences and Comments**

Although researchers applying qualitative methodologies seek to neutralise the influence of interviewers as much as researchers using quantitative methods do, there are some aspects that just cannot be changed. As the author was the sole interviewer during this research, the data produced by the interviewees have to be analysed with the knowledge that these interviewees have responded to a west European woman, neither Muslim nor British. Being a non-native English speaker was an advantage in so far as I was equally alien to British Muslims and natives. Conducting these

interviews as a non-Muslim woman had both advantages and disadvantages. As a woman it was much easier to get in contact with Muslim women, especially of the first generation. Generally speaking, Muslim men did not respond to me any differently than British native men did. However, not being Muslim changed the precondition of the interviews considerably. The advantage was that Muslims seemed interested in conveying to a non-Muslim their perspective and to explain what Islam means to them. Muslims were prepared to sacrifice far more of their time for these interviews than British natives were and it seemed that they enjoyed speaking about themselves more than their native counterparts did. The disadvantages were that some Muslims may not have spoken to me as confidentially as to a Muslim and that some others felt obliged to attempt to convert me. The reduced confidentiality became most apparent as I was searching for someone to interview in the London Central Mosque and entered an office in which two men were having a conversation. One asked me what I had come for and as I explained that I wanted an interview with regard to Muslim organisations and the future of Islam in Britain, the other man exclaimed: 'Oh, sister do not worry about the future of Islam, we are working hard to get more Muslims into the country so that we have more influence. One day Britain will become Islamic!' The other then asked me whether I was a Muslima (it was not obvious because I was wearing a head scarf) and as I declared that I was not, he informed me that he had nothing to say on this topic.

In the same mosque on a different occasion I was sent to another official who, after he found out that I was not a Muslima but had studied Islam, was

aggressive and patronising towards me for not converting to Islam. No interview followed. Attempts to convert me by more subtle methods were made several times, particularly when interviewing private individuals. However, these attempts also provided a lot of insight into the religious identity of these interviewees and their responses produced interesting data.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Object' in this context, is employed as a neutral term, which may represent both animate (person) and inanimate (car) objects or even symbols (flag) and constructions of symbols (language).

<sup>2</sup> S. Freud, (1926) 'Ansprache an die Mitglieder des Vereins B'nai B'rith', *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. XVII, London, 1941, pp. 49-53, quoted by E. Erikson, 'The Problem of Ego Identity', in: M. Stein, A. J. Vidich, and D. Manning White, (eds), *Identity and Anxiety*, Glencoe, 1960, p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Erikson, op. cit, p.38.

<sup>4</sup> Find diagram of life cycle attached in appendix I.

<sup>5</sup> E. H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, London, 1968, p.50.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p.50.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 211.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p.159.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. pp. 135-6.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 169.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. pp. 170-71.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. pp. 172-76.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. pp. 295-320.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 303.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. p. 208.

<sup>16</sup> See diagram in appendix I.

<sup>17</sup> J. Marcia, 'The Identity Status Approach to the Study of Ego Identity Development', in: T. Honess, and K. Yardly (eds), *Self and Identity*, Perspectives across the Lifespan, London, 1987, pp.162-64.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 164.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 165.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 165.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 165.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 166.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p. 166.

<sup>24</sup> See S.L. Stein and L. Westwood, (1982) 'College women's attitudes toward women and identity achievement', in: *Adolescence*, 17 (68), pp. 895-9.

<sup>25</sup> See S. Rossan, 'Identity and its development in adulthood', in: T. Honess and K. Yardly (eds), *Self and Identity*, Perspectives across the Lifespan, London, 1987, pp. 304-319.

<sup>26</sup> P. Winreich, 'Emerging from Threatened Identities: Ethnicity and Gender in Redefinition of Ethnic Identity', in: G. M. Breakwell, *Threatened Identities*, New York, 1983, p. 151.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. pp. 152-153.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. pp. 153-157.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 158.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 159.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p. 160.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. pp. 162-172.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. pp. 172-174.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. pp. 175-177.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 180.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. pp. 182-3.

<sup>37</sup> Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin, *Social Psychology*, London, c1977, p. 31.



- <sup>38</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, From the Standpoint of Social Behaviorist, Chicago, 1967, p. 135.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 138.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid. pp. 42-45, 71-76.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid. pp. 136-142, 164-173.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid. pp. 221-22.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 198.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid. pp. 176-7.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid. pp. 199-200.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 300.
- <sup>47</sup> Anselm L. Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks, The Search for Identity*, California, 1969, pp. 15-17.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid. pp. 18-26.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid. pp. 31-39.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 42.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 50.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid. pp. 54-64.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid. pp. 97-100.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid. pp. 118-123.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid. pp. 124-131.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 145.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid. pp. 145-147.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid. pp. 164-176.
- <sup>59</sup> A detailed illustration of the expectations of and experiences made by West Indian students can be found in: H. Tajfel and J. Dawson (eds.), *Disappointed Guests*, London, 1965.
- <sup>60</sup> H. Tajfel, *The Social Psychology of Minorities*, London, 1978, pp. 4-6.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid. p. 14.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid. pp. 14-19. Also compare H. Tajfel, 'Human Groups & Social Categories' in: *Social Psychology*, Cambridge, 1981.
- <sup>63</sup> N. Hutnik, *Ethnic Minority Identity, A Social Psychological Perspective*, Oxford, 1991, p. 65.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid. pp 76-68.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid. pp. 68-76.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid. pp. 4-5.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid. pp. 6-7.
- <sup>68</sup> For her first study Hutnik used the TST (Kuhn and McPartland 1954), which consists of one question 'who am I?' and 20 numbered blanks. The subject is given 12 minutes to fill ten blank spaces with short statements on what they are and ten blank spaces with statements on what they are not. After the completion, biographical details were collected from the participating adolescents.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid. pp. 79-81.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid. p. 87.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid. pp. 88-89.
- <sup>72</sup> Ibid. pp. 90-91.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid. p. 92.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid. p. 94.
- <sup>75</sup> N. Hutnik, *Ethnic minority identity: The case of second generation South Asians in Britain*, unpublished D. Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985.
- <sup>76</sup> N. Hutnik, op. cit, pp. 96-97.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid. pp. 101-5.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid. pp. 124-28.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid. pp. 133-38.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid. p. 139.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 143.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid. pp. 151-52.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid. p. 157.
- <sup>84</sup> Loc. cit.
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid. p. 157-59.
- <sup>86</sup> Nathanael West, *Miss Lonelyhearts*, 1962, pp. 14-15, quoted by E. Goffman *Stigma*, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, N.J., 1963.

- <sup>87</sup> Ibid. p. 3.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid. pp. 5-30
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid. pp. 30-54
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid. p. 56.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid. p. 57.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid. p. 105.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid. p. 106.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid. pp. 106-8.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid. pp. 112-125.
- <sup>96</sup> L. Krappmann, *Soziologische Dimensionen der Identität*, Stuttgart, 1972, p. 56.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid. p. 141.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid. p. 143.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid. p. 155.
- <sup>100</sup> T. Modood, S. Beishon and S. Virdee, *Changing Ethnic Identities*, London, 1994, p. 35.
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid. pp. 36-44.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid. pp. 45-63.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid. pp. 64-80.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid. p. 119.
- <sup>105</sup> see R. Harré (eds), *Personality*, Oxford, 1976. And R. Holland, *Self and Social Context*, London, 1977.
- <sup>106</sup> G. Breakwell, *Coping with Threatened Identities*, London, 1986, p. 11.
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid. pp. 190-94.
- <sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 190.
- <sup>109</sup> Ibid. p. 192.
- <sup>110</sup> Ibid. p. 45.
- <sup>111</sup> Ibid. p. 11.
- <sup>112</sup> See P. Leonard, *Personality and Ideology: Towards a Materialist Understanding of the Individual*, London, 1984.
- <sup>113</sup> Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, London, 1996, p. 19.
- <sup>114</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe, Analytische Sozialpsychologie*, Vol. I, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 278.
- <sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 198
- <sup>116</sup> G. Breakwell, *Coping with Threatened Identities*, London, 1986, p. 43.
- <sup>117</sup> This trend should not be confused with what symbolic interactionists refer to as the social conditioning of interaction.
- <sup>118</sup> See A. Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks*, California, 1969.
- <sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 122.
- <sup>120</sup> G.M. Breakwell, op. cit, pp. 77-121.
- <sup>121</sup> L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford, 1957.
- <sup>122</sup> See D. Milner, 'Racial identification and preference in "black" British children', *European Journal of Social psychology*, 1973, 3 (3).
- <sup>123</sup> D. Milner, 'The development of ethnic attitudes', in: H. Tajfel (eds.), *The Social Dimension*, Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1984.
- <sup>124</sup> L. Festinger, op. cit.
- <sup>125</sup> G.M. Breakwell, op. cit, p. 83.
- <sup>126</sup> Ibid. p. 97.
- <sup>127</sup> Ibid. p. 101.
- <sup>128</sup> H. Tajfel, *The Social Psychology of Minorities*, London, 1978, p. 258.
- <sup>129</sup> Timothy Williamson, *Identity and Discrimination*, Oxford, 1990, p. 1.
- <sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 5.
- <sup>131</sup> Anthony Cohen, 'Of Symbols and boundaries, or does Ertie's greatcoat hold the key?', in: *Symbolising Boundaries*, 1986, p. 13.
- <sup>132</sup> Ibid. p. 17.
- <sup>133</sup> Ibid. p. 13.
- <sup>134</sup> The original term is 'Herkunftsbindungen' and has been translated by the author.
- <sup>135</sup> K. O. Hondrich, 'Die Nicht-Hintergebarkeit von Wir-Gefühlen', in: W. Heitmeyer and R. Dollase (eds), *Die bedrängte Toleranz*, Frankfurt/Main, 1996, p. 100.
- <sup>136</sup> Ibid. pp. 111-12.
- <sup>137</sup> Henri Tajfel (eds), *Disappointed Guests*, London, 1965.

- <sup>138</sup> See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1981.
- <sup>139</sup> G.M. Breakwell, op. cit, pp. 136-141.
- <sup>140</sup> Stewart Hall, 'The Question of Cultural Identity', in: *Modernity and its Futures*, Cambridge, 1992, p. 275.
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid. p. 257.
- <sup>142</sup> Ibid. p. 227.
- <sup>143</sup> Loc. cit.
- <sup>144</sup> Term used by Stuart Hall, 'Who Needs 'Identity'?', in: S. Hall and P. Du Gay, *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London, 1996, p.1.
- <sup>145</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, 1990.
- <sup>146</sup> compare E. Fromm, *Escape of Freedom*, New York, 1941.
- <sup>147</sup> Kobena Mercer, 'Welcome to the Jungle: Identity and Diversity in Postmodern Politics', in: J. Rutherford (eds), *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference*, London, 1990, p.43.
- <sup>148</sup> T. Modood, S. Beishon, and S. Virdee, *Changing Ethnic Identities*, London, p.105.
- <sup>149</sup> S. Lamnek, *Qualitative Sozialforschung*, Vol. 1, Methodologie, Weinheim, 1995, pp. 46-49.
- <sup>150</sup> H. Blumer, 'Der methodologische Standort des Symbolischen Interaktionismus', in: *Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Soziologen*, 1973, pp. 80-146, quoted by S. Lamnek *Qualitative Sozialforschung*, Vol. 1, Methodologie, Weinheim, 1995, p. 49.
- <sup>151</sup> Ibid. pp. 56-71.
- <sup>152</sup> Compare: G.M. Breakwell, op. cit, pp. 44-45.
- <sup>153</sup> B.G. Glaser and A.L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*, Chicago, 1979.
- <sup>154</sup> S. Lamnek, op. cit, pp. 111-112.
- <sup>155</sup> Ibid., pp.113-119.
- <sup>156</sup> Kathy Charmaz, 'Grounded Theory', in: J. A. Smith and R.Harré (eds), *Rethinking Methods in Psychology*, London, 1995, pp. 27-49.
- <sup>157</sup> S. Lamnek, *Qualitative Sozialforschung*, Vol. 2, Methoden und Techniken, Weinheim, 1995, p. 35.
- <sup>158</sup> Ibid. pp. 38-39.
- <sup>159</sup> Jonathan A. Smith, 'Semi-Structured Interviewing and Qualitative Analysis', in: J. A. Smith and R. Harré (eds), *Rethinking Methods in Psychology*, London, 1995, p.11.
- <sup>160</sup> S. Lamnek, op. cit, pp. 39-56.



## **PART II**

### **British Identity**

## 2. British Identity

This chapter will focus on the national identity and sense of belonging among the native British population. It seeks to investigate and to illustrate peoples' sense of Englishness, Welshness and Scottishness, as well as how these ethno-cultural identities impact British unity. The purpose of this investigation is to place Muslim integration and minority identity into a broader context. Clearly the socio-political situation of the Welsh and Scots cannot be directly compared to that of Commonwealth immigrants. However, it is important to consider what kind of a society, minorities are expected to integrate into.

In order to determine under what constraints identity and British identity evolved and which identity anchors are available for immigrant minorities, aspects of English and British history are evaluated in depth. Most social theorists argue that identity of the modern subject is now fragmented. Therefore, the focus on history seeks to provide a contrast to the present and to establish, when and under what circumstances, identity became problematic. The evolution of multiculturalism, political and religious institutions are highlighted in order to determine their importance to modern British identity, as other aspects of British history are superfluous to this thesis.

The historical studies provide a better understanding of the present and as the responses of Welsh, English and Scottish interviewees will show, the

past continues to exert subliminal influences on the present identification processes. An analysis of present English, Scottish, Welsh and British identity, based on interviews concludes this chapter.

## **2.1. The Historic Development of British Identity**

To analyse British identity so far back in history may at first sight seem distracting. However, British history bears answers to many related questions. It is the story of brutality, feuds, war and suppression, but also of an intriguing ability to incorporate, unite, concede and strive for freedom and tolerance. It is the history of a people, who have shaped democratic awareness and have advanced economic as well as social development, far beyond their own borders, as a result of both an agricultural and an industrial revolution. British history elucidates the remarkable ability of a ruling minority to maintain continuity and stability while adapting to economic and social change. The capacity to change and simultaneously maintain stability are certainly based on a conglomerate of influences, of which one is the skilful manipulation of identity. Although identity only became an issue during modernity, identity as a phenomenon did exist, nevertheless.

The investigation of British history not only allows for an analysis of British identity, but also reveals mechanisms of collective identity formation that can help identify strategies for coping with present social and economic changes. It is the aim of this chapter to review the most significant stages of British identity formation, in order to develop a better understanding of the



present, and to disclose the identity conflicts, which present youth, and especially Muslim youth, have to cope with as they seek to integrate into this society.

Identity is a difficult concept to grasp, so it has to be kept in mind that British identity, as with most national identities, is constructed of selected historic events and social or political achievements, which led to national fame or notoriety. Therefore, by focusing on various historic contributions to British identity this chapter investigates what peoples constitute the British nation state and their relationships to society and the state.

Identities are organised and defined by societies and therefore the attitudes towards central government, politics and legislation, as well as related changes, serve as indicators for what shapes British identity. It is the intention to highlight historic events such as the predominance of the Church of England, the maintenance of the monarchy and the reformation of Parliament, which contributed to identity formation and remained salient in present public discourse.

However, using history as data to determine identity is problematic. There is a danger in interpreting historic events from the present perspective and therefore introducing a bias in the selection of historic material. It is not the aim to provide an overall objective account of British history; it is rather an attempt to select historic events that were instrumental in serving as identity anchors. Under these constraints, major political and historic developments shall be examined that have forged British, i.e. English,

Welsh and Scottish identity in the past and survived to the present day. Later chapters investigate whether these identity anchors are still of any value to present British multicultural society.

## 2.2. The Psychology of Inhabiting an Island

*What are you proud of as an Englishman?*

The only thing I can think of is being an island. I think however much England is associated with Europe, however much, it is still slightly more separate than the others, because it is an island. I think there is a psychological thing about being an island. It has a very low subliminally affect on everybody.<sup>1</sup>

The psychology of inhabiting an island, and at the same time belonging to the cultural sphere of Europe, has influenced British society in the past and still does so today in a unique way. British self-actualisation has to be understood in the context of a complex relationship with continental Europe. Since the landbridge to the European continent was severed between 6000 and 5000 BC, the island has not ceased to experience immigration. Beakers (2300 BC), Celts (700 BC), Belgic Gauls (2nd century BC), Romans (55 BC), Angles, Saxons, Jutes (5th century AD), Vikings (9th century) and Normans (11th century) made Britain a multicultural society long before it became an empire.

Britain, as an island, was only conquered twice in its history, once by the Romans in 55 BC and again by the Normans in 1066. Neither managed to conquer the entire British mainland. Britain's geographical separation from the continent made it difficult for invaders to intrude. Their successful arrival was dependent on the seasons and thus only relatively small numbers of them were able cross the sea at any one time. Eventually the

invaders became assimilated with the existing population and a mixed society emerged.<sup>2</sup>

Immediate expansion was as difficult as spontaneous invasion. Consequently, Britain's inhabitants quickly developed a sense of belonging. No one crosses Britain's borders unintentionally. To leave or to enter the country is a conscious act, based on 'will' and intent. The obvious geographical manifestation of Britain's borders prohibited successive settlement by neighbours who would eventually claim British territory as 'legitimately' theirs. Britain always was a self-sufficient entity. Its geographic nature endowed Britain with an air of sovereignty, of which both Britons and neighbours seemed to be subconsciously aware (although the concept of a sovereign nation state was not coined until the 18th century). Therefore, invasion always was an apparent act of aggression and those who came did not obviously belong there. For those who did stay, settlement was concurrent with a geographical detachment from their native cultural roots and therefore a reduction of communication with the homeland. Consequently a need to integrate into the existing population became apparent. Encircled by sea the British were forced to become tolerant of each other's differences. Roy Strong described the impact of geographic isolation on British mentality as follows:

The British by nature are in love with what they regard as the security of their island and the tranquillity of life which that engenders. It explains their innate conservatism, their ability to compromise, their pragmatism as well as their quite revolutionary voyages of the mind. Island claustrophobia must also account for the great geniuses of our history, a William Shakespeare or an Isaac Newton, for example, whose minds explode beyond island confines in search for universal truth.<sup>3</sup>



Not only did their minds explore beyond island confines, the British also physically crossed the globe, driven by curiosity and in search for adventure, new land and wealth. Island claustrophobia and the circumstance that all those who settled in Britain must have been passionate and brave sailors may account for the innate urge to look beyond their own borders. This resulted in the building of one of the greatest European empires.

Geographical isolation forced the British to look inwards and to resolve the strong internal divide between the Northern and Southern moieties. The Roman, Norman and English desire to unite various tribes inhabiting the island seems to be an obvious response to this geographical circumstance. However, the internal division between the Northern and Southern zones remained a salient issue up to the present day. The harsher climate in the north does not allow for such prosperous agriculture as in the South and the Midlands. Consequently more settlement took place in the South concentrating wealth and cultural exchange in that region. Wars with, and periodic domination over, the North produced an internal drama that determined the relationship between the Scots and the English as well as the national identity of the peoples.

Isolated and surrounded by sea, native Celtic tribes were trapped in the North and South West as they retreated under Roman, Anglo-Saxon and Norman attack. The lack of opportunity to expand beyond the borders coerced conqueror and conquered into dialogue and eventually produced the Act of Union with Wales in 1536 and with Scotland in 1707. The unification of the Kingdoms was a necessary move to inhibit any alignment

between the native population and invaders. Cohabitation on limited territory forced the British to develop diplomatic instincts, the capacity to endure and the ability to protect ones identity.

In spite of a shared history and acts of parliament to unite the peoples, the strong ethnic, regional and economic divide between the Welsh, the English and the Scots always re-emerged and saliently manifested itself as respective national identities. Thus a British identity was created, not to substitute regional identities, but to incorporate and to represent them. The creation of a British identity was a vain attempt to find a common denominator to overcome difference and to transplant the political union into the people's mind. This 'supra'-national identity proved to be binding, particularly in demarcation to anyone across the sea. Frequently this sense of separateness is expressed in discussion, when Britons refer to Europe as if they do not belong to this continent themselves. Repeatedly phrases such as: 'When I travel to Europe ...', can be witnessed in conversation. Whenever inquiries are made about such forms of expression, the general response can be summed up in the statement that Britain and continental Europe are separate.

Immigrants also readily adopt this sense of separateness and uniqueness, although modern technology minimised physical separation, both through increasingly efficient and cheap travel and through telecommunications. However, the mental sense of separation remained and is well reflected by British politics toward the European Union.

Although Britain produced a distinct and proud people, a coherent sense of British identity seems to be in decline. The British people are torn between the desire to maintain self-determination and to be an active participant in building a strong Europe. This coupled with the re-emergence of national sentiments on behalf of the Scots and the Welsh and the trend towards a multicultural society, forces Britons to rethink the concept of British identity and the criteria for a United Kingdom.

### 2.3. British Identity Pre-Union

~Among medieval society identity was unproblematic. An individual's identity was to a large extent predetermined by religious norms and a rigid social hierarchy. Only as a result of drastic measures such as expulsion from the community or excommunication, due to violations of rules and regulations, would identity become an issue on an emotional rather than cognitive level. Unfortunately, medieval society produced little biographical material, as the life history of an individual was insignificant. Biographies of saints rather sought to illustrate ideal examples of a pious life than to produce precise and detailed accounts.

While little is known about the medieval individual, much can be said about the impact of the socio-economic and political developments of the time. Medieval politics laid the foundation for the British political culture of today.



### 2.3.1. The Thirteenth Century and the Development of a Political Culture

Under Plantagenet rule England was linked in economic and cultural affairs with France. The continental territory of the Angevin Empire stretched to the foot of the Pyrenees. The loss and recovery of continental territory produced regular wars between British and French up until the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Norman rule introduced a French speaking elite, which slowly replaced the Anglo-Saxon administration and the English church became more closely related to the state and tied with papal policy. Constant territorial conflict and the hereditary relationship between the French and English elite made France a favourite country of refuge for political opponents of English rulers. The feudal rule introduced by the Norman kings brought about conflict (social revolt and power struggles) and the means to settle conflict (contracts between king and subjects). The latter had substantial influence on legal awareness and perception of government among the British.

Medieval man lived within a society that was rigidly structured and an individual's identity was formed by larger institutional structures. Identity was very much fixed by birth on the grounds of lineage, gender, home and social class. Personal struggle for identity, or simply the choice between various different identity components, was largely unknown to medieval man. Self-definition was predetermined, assigned by the environment. The role of most individuals towards self-determination was passive, altered only by specific transformations such as marriage, parenthood and further age-related transitions.<sup>4</sup>

The fundamental difference between medieval and modern society is that medieval man was unaware of personal freedom and individuality. Every individual had a fixed place in society. It was inconceivable to move from one city to another, let alone to move upwards from one social class to another.

The guild system regulated personal, economic and social life. It obliged guildsmen to share sources of raw materials while keeping technical knowledge secret from those who did not belong. Medieval individuals did not view themselves as individuals but defined themselves by means of their social roles. Life was regulated in every respect and although the medieval individual was not free, s/he was embedded in a social system that was defined by the perceived will of God.<sup>5</sup>

It was accepted among feudal society that it was a God given right of the king to demand service from his subjects. At the same time he was considered responsible for his subjects and was expected to protect and to provide them with the minimum requirements to maintain their living standard. Thus exploitation took place within a system of mutual obligation that automatically set limits to the degree of exploitation possible.<sup>6</sup> The most famous settlement of such mutual rights and obligations is the Magna Carta.

The Magna Carta was drawn up under King John's rule in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. King John had lost all the French possessions by 1214. Attempts to recover Normandy failed and led to a rebellion among barons against the King. In opposition to the King, a Charter was drawn up on the basis of Henry I's



coronation charter, but reflecting the grievances of the time. At Runnymede on the Thames the barons met John on June the 15<sup>th</sup>, 1215 to draw up the Magna Carta. Although the Magna Carta is an undramatic document and largely untranslatable into modern language, its importance derives from the fact that it has the character of a contract representing an agreement between the King and the baronial parties. The concept of the community of the realm developed from this and provided the foundation for parliamentary government. The phrase 'community of the realm' then simply referred to the totality of the baronage. Eventually it acquired sophistication and the representative idea that it implies, became more significant. The Magna Carta became a part of permanent law after it was reissued by John's son. The barons included a clause that called for a committee of four barons of the twenty five, to whom any grievances could be addressed and who were to enforce the charter, which paved the way for parliamentary government in the centuries to come. If the king refused to offer remedy after sufficient consultation, then the twenty five barons may distress the king until he complied.

Under Henry III (1216-72) and Edward I (1272-1307) the concept of parliament took shape. While the formulation of parliamentary powers under the reign of Henry III were designed to limit his power, Edward fostered the concept of the *communitas regni* himself. During Edward's reign forty five parliaments were called, of which seventeen were attended by representative knights and burgesses. The gathering that Edward I called in 1295 became known as the 'Model Parliament', as it was representative of local communities and of the whole community of the realm.



The development of Parliament and its increasing power over the Crown's affairs are closely related to the king's financial dependence on taxation to subsidise war. Royal income was rarely sufficient to pay for the frequent military efforts against the Auld Alliance (France and Scotland) or to protect the throne against feuds and revolts. A large proportion of the country's wealth went to the Church, which over the centuries accumulated property inaccessible for worldly powers (The Church of England is currently one of the largest landowners in England). As a result English kings had to call upon Parliament to negotiate taxes in order to avoid baronial discontent and rebellion. If the kings of England had sufficient resources they could have ruled without calling upon Parliament. Therefore the constitutional authority that evolved out of the Crown's fiscal dependence on Parliament would not have developed during medieval times.

Religion (Catholicism) and society (feudal system) primarily formed medieval identity. Britain developed its first secular legal norms, which made the king answerable not only to God but also to the law. Although the significance of the Magna Carta only became apparent over the centuries (John got the pope to declare it invalid as soon as it was agreed upon), this document represents baronial legal self-assertion against the king. By the reign of Edward I it was part of the political culture that the king would consult his noble subjects. This arrangement produced a change in conception of, and self-conception by, the king and the baronage. The king alone no longer had the power to decide on war and peace and the growing interdependency between the king and his noble subjects made the English

king a far more mortal being compared to his French, Spanish and Russian counterparts.

Edward I conquered Wales in 1277 and unsuccessfully attempted to conquer Scotland in later years. During a Welsh rebellion five years later, Llywelen ap Gruffyd 'Prince of Wales' was killed and by 1295 the principality of Wales ceased to exist as English administration was introduced. The death of the 'Prince of Wales' and the transferral of the title to the English crown prince still arouse anger among some patriotic Welsh.<sup>7</sup>

It is surprising that the attempt to extend Norman rule to the natural borders of the island was not made by William I, or any of his immediate successors. Thus for two centuries Scotland and Wales were able to develop a strong sense of individual identity and strengthen their political and cultural independence. While the Welsh were internally divided, the Scots had a far stronger sense of collective loyalty, which combined with Edward's financial plight led to the failure of his conquest of Scotland.<sup>8</sup>

The cultural identity of medieval agrarian society was shaped by a completely different social structure than early modern or industrial society, which facilitated the incorporation of newly conquered regions and culturally different communities. A small minority formed the literate ruling classes<sup>9</sup>, made up of the aristocracy, which in England was multilingual (Edward I spoke French, Latin and English)<sup>10</sup>; the clergy (who more strongly identified with a united Christendom and Latin as the *lingua franca*)<sup>11</sup> and the military (the knights, who viewed themselves as the

defenders of Christendom and manifested this identity by going on crusades to liberate the Holy land from 'unbelievers').

The ruling classes then governed across culturally divided communities. During the thirteenth century the cultural division between the ruling classes and its subjects was enforced because the Anglo-Norman elite, which previous to Edward I were more strongly attached to the French mainland than to England, ruled over Anglo-Saxon subjects. Consequently, the relationship between ruler and subjects developed quite differently in England than it did in Wales and Scotland.

In England the 'contract' between king and subjects was introduced, whilst in the relatively small inhabitable regions of Scotland and Wales, poverty and the clan structure of both societies led to stronger ties between the ruling classes and their subjects. The old clan structures produced a different administrative system, which was deeply rooted in Welsh and Scottish society. Thus in Wales and Scotland, loyalty and identification with the ruling elite, the clergy and the political system produced a strong resistance against English rule and administration.

### **2.3.2. Social Transformation in the Sixteenth Century**

The 16<sup>th</sup> century marked the end of the Middle Ages and brought about substantial economic, social and intellectual change. By the time Henry VII began 118 years of Tudor rule in 1485, the kingdom had recovered from the demographic catastrophe of the Black Death which led to labour shortages,



low rent and high wages and thus the agricultural depression came to a close. In response to that depression Landlords converted their fallow fields into sheep runs and increased their flocks to the point that these outnumbered humans three to one. The export of raw wool gave way to the export of woollen clothes manufactured at home. By the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century the Association of London Wool Exporters, the Merchant Adventurers, controlled the London-Antwerp market. This increase in the export of wool and woollen clothes, combined with inflation due to a flood of gold and silver from the New World, produced a social and economic revolution. The centralised and coherent medieval social system slowly loosened up as individual economic initiative gained significance and a new wealthy class emerged. This growing individualism found expression in fashion, the arts, philosophy and theology. However, this newly found wealth, opportunities and the possibility of personal initiative also entailed a threat to the traditional way of life. For example, the medieval system of communal farming was destroyed as peasant farmers were evicted and the common land was divided up and fenced in. The consequences were labour surplus, land shortage, high rents and declining wages. This led to the transformation of farming techniques, an increasing gap between rich and poor and the replacement of old families by new on all levels of society. The new landed and merchant classes sought political stability, strong government and the rule of law. There was no longer a desire to support baronial feuding as during medieval time and consequently social revolution and dynastic wars were total failures under Tudor rule.

Whilst political stability was sought to ensure economic progress, class solidarity disintegrated. Although the medieval guild system had excluded outsiders it provided relative security among the craftsmen who belonged to it. The guild system prevented competition, as it forced its members to co-operate with regard to setting prices, the supply of raw material and production techniques. By the end of the Middle Ages this solidarity was slowly undermined by increased competition, which brought about a loss of security and mistrust.

As Capitalism began a new type of personality evolved. The individual's place in society was no longer secure. Monopoly of trade developed, which drove many craftsmen and small-scale tradesmen into poverty and many of the landed gentry experienced a decline in wealth. Insecurity, increased isolation and fear began to influence social relationships and human interaction.<sup>12</sup>

While the feudal system was based on co-operation and its regulations hampered competition, emerging Capitalism fostered an individualistic spirit of enterprise. The positive influence of this development was that it liberated the individual from the tutelage of the corporative system. The individual became in charge of their destiny. Risk, but also profit, allowed for economic independence and wealth, which eroded class boundaries and contributed to a transformation in personalities. Thus medieval man experienced the double-edged sword of freedom. The individual won the freedom of playing an active and independent role in the new social system, whilst that person was also free of all those attachments which have

provided security and a sense of belonging. The powerful forces of capital and market threaten the previously secure place in society. Former colleagues became competitors and life no longer took place in a predefined world. The feeling of oneness with the environment was replaced by a feeling of insignificance and helplessness. The new freedom must have produced a sense of insecurity and disorientation among medieval society.<sup>13</sup>

The decline of feudalism throughout Europe combined with a change in economy and rifts dissolved the political influence of Christendom. The teachings of Luther and Calvin met receptive audiences. Protestantism and Calvinism touched the middle classes, the poor and the farmers. The first symptoms of the social transformation to Capitalism, growing individuality, insecurity and disorientation were reflected in Luther's teachings. In reaction to the feelings of personal insignificance, doubt and fearfulness, Luther viewed the individual as a tool in the hands of God, who will only experience salvation in return for total subordination to and belief in the Creator. Luther liberated the individual from clerical authority, but simultaneously demanded total submission to God. For him belief was reflected in the acceptance of one's insignificance and in the readiness to surrender oneself to God. Psychologically the desire to subordinate and to perceive oneself as a tool in the hands of an all mighty power is an attempt to overcome doubt, helplessness and fear by becoming a part of a more powerful being and thus refusing responsibility for one's own fate.<sup>14</sup>

In England the clerical neglect of the spiritual and the preoccupation with worldly affairs created discontent with the Church and prepared the grounds



for a break with Rome. Henry VIII (1509-47) inherited a secure throne, a full treasury and a united kingdom. These preconditions were the ideal grounds in order to advance beyond medievalism and to build a 'new monarchy'. The only residue of medieval times was the independent Catholic Church and its power over the king and the properties of the Church. The teachings of Martin Luther (1483-1546) and his equivalent Thomas Bilney, a Cambridge scholar, found a receptive audience also among upper-class individuals who were no longer satisfied with the corrupt and out-dated Church.

In the 14<sup>th</sup> century John Wycliffe (died 1384), an Oxford scholar, had already proclaimed that dominium was not to be exercised mediately, through kings and popes, but immediately by anyone in God's grace. That is popes, kings and priests only receive God's grace and the power of possession, as well as of government, in return for service and not due to the hierarchical terms of feudalism. As a result Wycliffe espoused heresy in 1379 but the Lollard movement which he founded survived government attacks and continued to expand after his death. By the time of the Reformation Lollardy re-emerged once again.

The break-up of the Catholic monopoly on religious truths destroyed the single (and for Western Europe universal) model of Christian life. The Protestant and Anglican schisms undermined the universal consensus about Christian belief and introduced a choice between differing guides for living one's life. The authority of the pope was questioned and the Catholic dogma came under attack. The causal relationship between the Creator, his

representative on earth and man's place in the universe was fragmented. Who now determines dogma and ritual, the Pope, a priest or the king? A Catholic identity was no longer the one and only option. Catholic identity was subjected to scrutiny and for the first time Catholics had to justify their *Weltanschauung*, which until then they had taken for granted.

Henry VIII was never a Protestant and did not tolerate religious nonconformity, he was nevertheless dependent on the support of the 'zealous people' (the Protestant zealots). They considered the political and constitutional steps by which his divorce from Catherine of Aragon was legalised as the prelude to reformation.

In November 1529 Henry VIII called the Reformation Parliament which lasted for seven years and enacted 137 statutes. The Act of Restraint of Appeals severed the Church from Rome and in effect created the Church of England. Using this Act in 1533 Henry obtained his divorce and married Anne Boleyn in the hope that she will yield him a male heir. Henry VIII consolidated the break with Rome with the Acts of Supremacy and Treason. This Reformation was only possible with the support of the increasing number of wealthy landowners, who exerted their influence in the House of Commons. They consolidated their position of power and from that point on the land-owning classes set the political agenda until the reign of Queen Victoria.

The English Church was no longer a separate entity with a divine law which supersedes human law, but was turned into a national Church with Henry



Tudor as its Supreme Head. As a consequence of the destruction of the Catholic Church, monasteries were dissolved and their property nationalised. To gain support against papal Catholicism nationalised land was sold to the gentry ensuring that they had interest in protecting their new property against Catholic opponents. Images of the Virgin and saints were destroyed and the multi-coloured wall paintings were covered with whitewash and replaced by biblical texts. Also the mystical aspects of Catholic rituals were eroded by replacing the traditional Latin mass with services held in English.<sup>15</sup>

Henry introduced the fall of papal supremacy over the English Crown and church and equipped Parliament with the power to regulate affairs which previously were in the ecclesiastical domain. With the Church of England Henry VIII not only emancipated the English Church from papal authority, but also initiated the development towards a synthesis between Catholicism and Protestantism that was unique to Britain. It was the birth of separate religious identities, which also set new criteria for the choice of future successors to the English throne.

The liberation from papal authority and the expansion of government authority fostered self-confidence in determining society and one's own fate, supporting the capitalist need for individual innovation. Social organisation was no longer the mirror of God's will, but the product of man. This was certainly of advantage for the new merchant classes, although for the poorer segments of society this meant that God no longer determined their role in society, but the Parliament and the King. Henry established a



'new' church, but he never produced a consistent religious policy, therefore it is not surprising that on his death a region-based power struggle followed to fill this vacuum.

The duke of Northumberland ruled on behalf of the teenage Edward VI (1547-53) and subjected the Church of England to a strong Protestant influence. Mary I (1553-58) sought to return England to the Catholic fold, her attempts were bloody and produced 300 martyrs during the last three years of her reign. Mary's efforts to re-establish old traditions and norms were a vain attempt to prevent the flow of change and maintain the reassuring causal relationship between God and society.

Elizabeth I (1558-1603) was, by contrast to Mary I, the product of a fine Renaissance education. She re-established the royal supremacy, cemented her power as a 'King in Parliament' like her father did and re-severed ties with Rome. Requiring the support of the 'zely people' Elizabeth I moved her religious stance towards Protestantism. The philosophy of her reign was based upon the hierarchical assumptions of her time. Every element of creation had a divinely prescribed role to play. Although the Crown was divine and provided leadership it was a part of God's creation. Therefore the monarch decreed that the will of God was enshrined in acts of Parliament, which protected society against rebellion. However, the Queen viewed the parliament as an instrument with which to turn legislation designed by the Queen and the Privy Council into law. Thus control over the union of the Crown and parliament was possessed by the Queen.

Elizabeth I created a vigorous secular culture. Her approach to the state was that of benevolent paternalism and thus produced a deeply conservative and authoritarian society. The landed gentry were tied to the Crown by aiding them in achieving their social and financial aspirations in order to facilitate the shaping of public opinion. She attempted to control the threatening capitalists by hampering competition and simultaneously to assure a minimum standard of living for all, within a non-competitive society. The Statute of Apprentices of 1563 and the famous Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 attempted to define and control all occupations in terms of their usefulness to society and divinely ordered social distinctions, as well as to counteract poverty and unemployment. At the time spiritual salvation had priority over material wellbeing, thus maintaining the hierarchical class structure. A stable society was more important than fostering economic freedom, with a mobile society that only posed a threat.

During the reign of Elizabeth I the membership of the state soon became equated with that of the Church of England. Hence the conflicts between Mary, Queen of Scots and Elizabeth I reflect the manipulation of religious identity in their struggle for power. Spanish attempts to return England to the Catholic fold involved a rally for support among Catholics within Britain and abroad. The execution of Mary of Scotland aroused Scottish and Catholic sentiments. However, England and Protestant Europe saw Elizabeth I's great victory over the Spanish Armada in 1587 as God's judgement. Resisting the threat from Catholic Europe, Elizabeth I successfully created a united Protestant and patriotic England.<sup>16</sup>



Elizabeth I's financial difficulties, poor harvests, peasant unrest and high taxation put an end to her domination over the Parliament. The House of Commons increasingly became the instrument through which the growing politically conscious and economically dominant classes made their will heard. The spread of Puritanism among the gentry and merchant classes exposed the Queen to attack in the Commons. Demands for freedom of speech and permission to debate religious issues in Parliament pressurised the government to retreat from the paternalistic approach to issues regarding prerogative rights to regulate the economic life of the kingdom.

The Protestant and Anglican schisms introduced a choice in orientation, although the price for the freedom to choose was high, as many paid with their lives during the power struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism. Religious plurality forced individuals to justify why they believe that they are better Christians than others. Religious identity had to be based on some "inner metacriteria"<sup>17</sup> and inner conviction. It was manifested as the way children were educated and occasionally by dress code. It was also a source of insecurity, as during conflict every party claimed to have God on their side. Those who lost did not only have to cope with the defeat but were also left with doubt and the question: 'why did God desert us?'

The choice in religious affiliation and the increasing influence of merchant and land-owning classes were the first steps toward the individualisation of society. The social expansion of the new classes mirrored the economic swell. The English began to explore new markets for their wool trade. In



1588 the Muscovy Company was established to trade with Russia and around the same time the East Indian Company was founded for silk and spice trade with the Orient. Enterprise and the search for new markets were inspired by both the desires for wealth and to labour for the glory of God. The art and culture of this period reflected innovation and confidence in the future. Stately homes substituted fortresses and Shakespeare, Marlowe, Spenser and many others enriched the literary scene. Identity was no longer completely predetermined. A choice in belief and alternative options for male careers allowed more individuals to determine their lives. The socio-economic environment now allowed an individual to develop their identity. Therefore an individual's identity may become complex and problematic.

### **2.3.3. The Seventeenth Century and the Consolidation of an English Identity**

The 17<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the consolidation of English identity that developed on the basis of political and socio-economic transformations, which could no longer be resisted. The influence of the commercial society of financiers, manufacturers, merchants and tradesmen grew in the cities. In contrast the wealth of the landed nobility as well as their military power declined. Consequently vertical social mobility within towns and horizontal mobility between town and country produced a certain freedom of opportunity in English society. Social rank was no longer secured by lineage and even self-definition on the grounds of wealth did not guarantee stability, as families could rise and fall depending on the success of commercial business.<sup>18</sup> Social mobility and the increase in trade also led to

more frequent encounters between complete strangers. Thus the concept of sincerity was introduced as a new and important virtue in the sixteenth century. One's social environment was no longer constituted of well-acquainted individuals. The other person's self was uncertain therefore making "sincerity an important virtue reflected the new concern with inferring the hidden self from its acts and appearances"<sup>19</sup>. Fluidity of society was unique to England during this period in history. Intermarriage between nobility and commoners became more acceptable during the seventeenth century and the trend towards commercial investment could also be observed among the nobility. It was a time when the professional classes comprised mainly of lawyers and clergy. The clergy now married and some even founded dynasties.

From the sixteenth century onwards the emphasis on individuality increased. One essential shift toward the personal construction of identity, particularly for women, was the trend from an institutional to an individual criterion for the selection of spouses. Marriage consolidated family relations and sought to increase influence and wealth. The identity of a woman was primarily determined by the status of her father, then her husband and occasionally by the achievements of her sons. By playing an active role in the selection of her spouse, she not only had the possibility to determine her welfare but also her self-definition *via* her spouse.<sup>20</sup> Family descent became less important with respect to achievement. Hence, the use of language adapted to this change of consciousness and autobiographical writing became more popular. Words like 'self' began to appear in various compound words such as self-knowledge, self-confidence and self-

consciousness.<sup>21</sup> The old norms that previously structured society no longer applied, individuals had to find new criteria for orientation. The ability of the individual became more important than family lineage and consequently the focus on the self was the most reliable criterion for social success.

In Stuart society social climbing for the gifted was possible, therefore the demand for education increased. The Protestants, and particularly the Puritans, fostered education because their religion was directed to the literate. In the world of business there was a greater need for literate employees. Wider access to education and a growing professional and merchant classes produced a broader interest in politics and the maintenance of peace in order for the economy to prosper. The increasing wealth of the merchant class made them more self-confident in their demands on the king, whose financial situation was usually critical. Thus the power and influence of the 'demos' became irrevocably stronger.

The Thirty Year War on the continent produced a severe slump in the woollen-cloth trade in 1620. The reduction in export combined with bad harvest led to the worst depression of the first half of the century. War with Catholic Spain and France brought Charles I (1625-49) into financial difficulties. Parliament demonstrated its power by refusing to support the King in his military endeavour twice, due to which he resorted to the collection of forced loans and to billet troops under martial law in private homes. The imprisonment of five knights for refusing to pay forced loans and general discontent about the King's proceedings led Coke, Eliot and Sir



Thomas Wentworth to claim the precedent of Magna Carta in the Parliament of 1628. The Petition of Rights was established in which they demanded the consent of Parliament for the levy of taxes, no imprisonment of subjects without due cause being shown, to refrain from billeting soldiers in private homes and putting civilians under martial law. In return for the King's agreement he received financial support to fight Spain and France. Although the King quickly forgot the Petition of Rights at the time it, like the Magna Carta, came to be seen as one of the representative documents in the struggle for Human Rights.

Parliamentary concern was not limited to the problems of finance. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the support for Arminianism grew within the Anglican Church. The Arminians opposed the Puritan concept of a few 'elect', but believed in the free will of an individual. The Puritans in Parliament vividly intervened against Arminianism whose supporters were mostly Anglo-Catholics and criticised the Crown, which led to their persecution in the mid-1630's.

The strong Puritanical influence was indicative of a prevailing feeling of powerlessness and the need for clear orientation during the early modern period. Although the identification with a particular Christian schism could be problematic, God was still perceived as the undisputed Creator of the universe. Even scientists such as Isaac Newton considered their study of nature as a study of God's creation.

He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; He is not duration or space, but He endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and by

existing always and everywhere, He constitutes duration and space. .... And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to natural philosophy.<sup>22</sup>

Protestantism and Puritanism provided the basis for an increasing self-consciousness and definitely determined not just British society but also European and American societies in terms of their individualisation and economic structure. The gradual emancipation from lineage and the well-defined *Weltanschauung* of the Catholic Church was concurrent with the enhancement of a private approach to religion. As Puritans believed in Calvin's notion of 'the Elect', a predetermined fate and the value of hard work their attention was directed towards their individual spiritual and material improvement. Their approach to the Bible was literal and allowed every individual direct access to both religion and God. Calvin had also indicated that it was possible to determine whether one was among 'the Elect' and that success in one's work was one of those signs. Thus Puritan ideology not only produced hard working and economically successful communities, but also a people concerned with self-knowledge and the dangers of self-deception.<sup>23</sup>

Identity crises among adolescents were first recorded in Puritan diaries. Puritan child-rearing practice was based on discipline and the conviction that the natural self was a danger to a virtuous soul. Preference for a nuclear family was to prevent bad influence from the wider family and to facilitate the complete subjugation of children to parents. Particularly young Puritan males may have given up on themselves as their 'sinful appetites' grew. Occasionally they indulged these desires in an act of protest against community values. Disappointment, a bad consciousness or a religious

experience quickly led to the reassertion of an authoritarian personality and the re-submission to society's authoritarian ideals.<sup>24</sup>

Authoritarianism is usually the response to the fear of freedom. The belief in predetermined fate relieves from responsibility and hard work as well as a disciplined pious way of life counter balances the anarchy and chaos that prevail among society. Puritan ideology made high demands on the individual. Luther and Calvin emphasised that man is innately bad and has no control over their destiny. Only those who do not doubt and truly believe may expect salvation. Thus Puritanism also took control over thought and motivation. The middle classes, which mainly adhered to Puritanism, felt strong resentments against the exploitation through the court. One way of expressing these resentments was by developing a sense of moral and religious superiority. Such feelings suited a pious man better than resentments. Hostility and resentment were based on economic insecurity and the fear of social decline. The lack of control over social developments was reflected in Puritan ideology: fate is predetermined and the individual simply has to accept destiny. This sense of powerlessness and helplessness can also result in resentments against individual weakness. Self-humiliation and total submission to God can be viewed as the only way to overcome fear and doubt. Thus Puritans expressed their self-hatred by emphasising the weakness and sinfulness of human nature, which is potentially also their own. Protestantism and Puritanism justified resentments against society and provided the following coping strategy: moral superiority for self-assurance, hard work as an escapism and acceptance of ones fate for the sake of inner peace. It was the response to the



need of uprooted and isolated people who sought new orientation and had to develop a new relationship to an environment, which became increasingly confusing.<sup>25</sup>

To the increasing religious divide between Anglicans, Protestants and Arminians throughout the country Charles I responded with an obsessive aspiration to order and uniformity. Although James I (King James VI of Scotland prior to his succession to the English throne) proclaimed himself as King of Great Britain, trying to foster a sense of unity between England and Scotland, neither he nor his son Charles I ruled a united state. Ireland and Scotland were poor and neglected countries, deeply rooted in their traditions. This became most apparent as Charles I tried to extend legal and religious uniformity to his two other kingdoms. Whilst successful in Ireland, the Scots rebelled. The great Scottish reformer John Knox advocated a Protestantism strongly influenced by Calvinism. In Scotland the attempt to bring the Scottish Presbyterian Church into closer accord with the Anglican Church led to the Bishops' wars in 1639 and 1640.

The effort to solve this discord by military means failed and forced Charles I to call upon Parliament. This Parliament met for thirteen years and is known as the Long Parliament. Its session resulted in the impeachment of two of the King's advisors and aimed to secure its own existence by stipulating that there should be no more than three years between Parliaments and that it could not be adjourned without its own consent. The constitutional revolution continued by demanding the exclusion of all clergymen from holding secular office and all bishops from sitting in the

House of Lords. The King was reluctant to sign the bill and as the Parliament passed a Militia Ordinance without Charles I signature, he decided on a military move against Parliament. In June 1642 Nineteen Propositions were issued in which the King was called to accept the Militia Ordinance and the Parliament's approval of the King's ministers, as well as of the education and marriage of his children. Charles I refused to accept these propositions and gathered military support, triggering Civil War on August 22, 1642. Victory was that of Parliament and Charles Stuart was tried for high treason and executed (without being deposed beforehand) as a reigning king. Parliament had become so confident that they did not refrain from executing a king in power. The king was no longer perceived as a ruler with divine rights, but as responsible for his subjects and accountable for his deeds.

In 1649, one hundred and forty years before the French Revolution, the office of monarchy and the House of Lords were abolished and the Commonwealth and Free State was proclaimed. The Council of State directed a republican form of government for four years before England's first constitution, the Instrument of Government (1653) was drawn up by Major General John Lambert, with Oliver Cromwell appointed as the Lord Protector. Cromwell recognised the victory over Royalist forces and the proclamation of the Free State as the divine judgement of God. Though how to continue the rule over Britain divided Parliament. Various religious groups such as the Baptists, Quakers, Fifth Monarchists and Ranters voiced their views on how to rule England in future. The most interesting demands made the Levellers, who called for a more fair



distribution of wealth and suggested extending the right to vote to everyone except servants and beggars. Hence, democratic ideas were discussed in the seventeenth century that were not to be realised until the nineteenth and twentieth century.<sup>26</sup>

Democratic visions, such as those forwarded by Levellers, are not to be understood in terms of present day concepts. The aim was to create Christ's kingdom on earth and radical Protestant sects awaited the Second Coming. Riots followed a bad harvest and commercial slump. This civic unrest and fear led to the emergence of religious sects and religious hysteria, which dislocated society all over the Free State. As a result this period witnessed one of the greatest waves of migration to the newly founded colonies in New England. Soon sects like the Levellers were suppressed and press censorship was re-introduced.<sup>27</sup>

That a lack of clear orientation during social change can defeat an attempt to establish a new social order is well illustrated by Cromwell's Republic. Under his reign Jews were allowed to return to England and religious tolerance was extended to Puritan groups such as the Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists (but not to Catholics, Anglicans and licentious people). This did not mask the brutality by which he defeated the Scots and ended Irish revolt in 1650 and 1651. On Scotland Cromwell imposed full parliamentary union with England in 1652 which was met with hostility and generated royalist resistance in 1654.



Sympathy turned to Charles II, particularly after Cromwell had died in September 1658, and his son Richard Cromwell, who succeeded him as Lord Protector, proved too weak to maintain a permanent Puritan commonwealth. Richard Cromwell resigned as Protector, and people became tired of religious controversy and crippling taxation. In search for stability the return to monarchy seemed the safest choice to make and steps were initiated to restore it. In February 1660 General George Monck restored the Long Parliament that proceeded to implement Presbyterianism and to affirm peace with the Crown. The Long Parliament then voted to dissolve itself, as the law prescribed, in favour of the Convention Parliament that called for the return of the Stuarts, in the form of Charles II.

The inability to cope with religious pluralism in the past and the confusion and chaos it produced, led Charles II to take a rather intolerant stance. Under his reign the new Act of Uniformity (1662), Conventicle Act (1664), Five Mile Act (1665) and Test Acts of the 1670's led to a systematic marginalisation of Dissenters, i.e. Puritans, and prevented their access to professional advancement within the church, politics and education. Only in business were Puritans able to expand without restrictions, which is also an explanation for the strong link between the Calvinist ethic of Puritan theology and business, a characteristic of the age of Industrial Revolution.

The struggle for an undisputed state religion resulted in the exclusion of most other Christian sects or churches. Although religion as an institution no longer had any power over government, whichever 'ideology' prevailed and was incorporated into the Church of England, it had the power to define

social values and norms. Society at the time defined itself on religious terms, so that the religious struggle for predominance was the struggle for the power to define what people believed, which duties they accepted and how society should function. For the Roman Catholic Church the loss of this power of definition among the north-European countries led to its gradual decline.

The origin of political parties within Parliament has its origin in the polarisation between the supporters and critics of the Duke of York. All civil or military officeholders at national level were required to take the Anglican holy sacrament and to denounce the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, as stipulated by the Test Act of 1673. These regulations excluded all Catholics and Dissenters from civil and military office and resulted in the resignation of the Lord High Admiral, the Duke of York, Charles II's brother who had declared himself a Catholic. The Popish Plot enforced the anti-Catholic atmosphere, which triggered the Exclusion Controversy.

Those men, who supported the exclusion of the Duke of York from succeeding Charles II on the throne because he was a Catholic, were Dissenter critics of the royal prerogative and were referred to as Whigs. The supporters of the Duke of York and the royal prerogative were known as the Tories and were Anglicans. The Whigs failed to ensure the exclusion of James from the throne, as Charles II responded to every parliamentary effort of this concern with the dissolution of Parliament. The Exclusion Controversy was very much the birth of political parties in Parliament.



Following the Exclusion Controversy John Locke wrote *Two Treatises of Government*, which he published in 1690. In this book Locke defended the idea that a government can be changed if it no longer represents the interests of the people. Locke's argument was used later to justify the overthrow of James II (1685-88). Although James II had promised to preserve the church and state, as it was when he succeeded his brother Charles II, he soon initiated first steps to re-establish the Catholic religion. His policies were met with hostility and only after three years of reign seven Whig and Tory peers invited William of Orange to assume the throne in England.

A Convention Parliament offered the throne to William III (1689-1702) and Mary II (1689-94) under preconditions set forth in a Bill of Rights. Monarchy had now become subject to condition, as the hereditary succession was replaced by a parliamentary one. The Bill of Rights certified free speech, free elections and frequent meetings of Parliament. The consent of Parliament was prescribed for the levying of taxes and the keeping of a standing army. Although the Bill prevented the suspending and dispensing of power, sovereign power was not transferred from king to parliament. The settlement rather asserted, as the Magna Carta had done, that the king was under the law and guaranteed the rights of the nobility and the gentry against the Crown. Further legislation ensured Parliament's control over the army and permitted a freer press. By the eighteenth century it became apparent that the monarchy served the stability of the country as a



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regarded as an invented nation that was superimposed onto much older alignments and loyalties.<sup>29</sup> According to her thesis a common identity of Britishness among Scots, Welsh and English was forged by the continuing succession of wars between Britain and France. Around the eighteenth century they were at war between 1689 and 1697, and on a larger scale throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century (1702-13, 1743-48, 1756-63, 1778-83, 1793-1802) culminating with the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. The fact that Britain never had to pay for its military glory with civilian casualties and large-scale domestic destruction, as was repeatedly experienced by continental European countries, made British responses to wars more unabashedly chauvinistic. She argued that Britain's traditional Catholic enemy France, posed a long-term external threat and consequently united the mostly Protestant population within. The hostile 'other' encouraged Scots, Welsh and English to define themselves collectively against it.<sup>30</sup> As a matter of fact France had posed an external threat throughout English history, but could not become such a unifying force until the Church of England adopted an unchallenged Protestant nature and the king of England was forced to assume an 'English identity'. Only from then on, both Crown and country would view France as a 'distinctly different' enemy. France posed a threat to both home country and national interests abroad, which encouraged the Britons to temporarily omit their differences in order to build a stronger whole to oppose this threat.

In 1707 Scotland was linked to England and Wales, as the Parliament of Westminster passed the Act of Union, creating one United Kingdom by the name of Great Britain, with one Protestant ruler, one legislature and one

system of free trade. This Act of Union, like the earlier Act of Union between England and Wales in 1536, was more a union of policy than of affection.<sup>31</sup>

At one level, then, Great Britain at the beginning of the eighteenth century was like the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, both three and one, and altogether something of a mystery.<sup>32</sup>

Throughout their history and to the present day England, Scotland and Wales have maintained their ethnic, historic and linguistic differences. However, differences in Britain were not restricted to ethnicity. Scotland was divided in itself. While the Scottish Highlanders spoke Gaelic and thought of the English-speaking Scottish Lowlanders as being indistinguishable from the English, the Lowland Scots could not identify with their Highland countrymen either.<sup>33</sup> The English too, were not ethnically homogeneous. The north of England would be culturally closer to the Lowland Scots, as cross-border trade, marriage, and migration brought these people together. The same could be said of Shropshire and Herefordshire in relation to Wales. In 1707 Great Britain, as today, did not consist of three self-contained and self-conscious nations, but rather of a patchwork in which the loyalties and regional attachments were not identical with the borders of those three nations. The sense of Britishness, which emerged from these culturally diverse people, was not due to a high degree of cultural integration. It was rather a result of the British defining themselves as a unity in contrast to the French, their prime enemy. Consequently British identity was and remained to be only of secondary importance for many subjects. It grew stronger when Britain as a whole was threatened or when it seemed to be of advantage. Conversely, it lost



importance in times of peace or when local interests were in danger. Interaction with the 'other' (no matter whether this interaction took place on a one to one basis, or between groups or on a national level) makes it possible to recognise and to define the own distinct features more clearly and eventually becomes part of a self-definition, an identity.

With the Act of Union, Britain was finally defined by its natural boundary - the sea. This geographical fact was a necessity, to ensure that Scotland will not opt for James Edward Stuart, Queen Anne's (1702-1714) exiled Roman Catholic half-brother, instead of agreeing on a new Protestant dynasty from Hanover. A Catholic and independent Scotland would be a potential ally for France, which could be regarded as an enemy within the natural borders of Great Britain. An enemy, within a system or a geographically defined body, who cannot easily be physically identified, is generally perceived as a greater threat to a society. The knowledge of an enemy, who may live among society but cannot be recognised, can create collective insecurity and fear. Any fear, which cannot be attached to a specific object, underpins neurosis.

The invasion by the exiled Charles Edward Stuart in 1745 shocked British society. He was able to recruit 2,500 Highlanders and penetrated England as far south as Derby, then supported by 5,000 men. He retreated into Scotland, where his army was cut apart at Culloden in April 1746. The potential success of this invasion created concern not only among the Hanovarian royalty, but also among the merchants and creditors, as the security of their investments and the possibility of recovering what was owed to them in the

event of a civil war was at stake. If Louis XV would have committed himself to a French invasion in additional support of Charles Edward Stuart, the Jacobite army could have been successful in restoring the Stuart dynasty.<sup>34</sup> What followed the Battle of Culloden was an intense concern about Britain's internal divisions, national identities and moral corruption.

As Britain's major enemies were either Catholic or not Christian at all, Protestantism was able to become one of the most important unifying factors. British national identity did not substitute Scottish, Welsh, English or any other regional identifications, but grew alongside of these and affected the way Britons interpreted their material life and how they viewed their politics.<sup>35</sup>

The general perception that economic growth in society can only take place independently from religion did not apply to the eighteenth- and early nineteenth century Britain. The Protestant *Weltanschauung* helped individuals at the time to make sense of their lives and it gave comfort and dignity in the face of difficulty. It went together with Britain's economic experience in terms of agricultural productivity, the range and volume of its commerce, the geographical mobility of its people, the vibrancy of its towns and the ubiquity of print.<sup>36</sup> Protestantism became the frame of orientation, which allowed a collective to define itself and to differentiate itself from the 'other'. A more precise self-definition and frame of orientation determines the selective process which in turn has an impact on the interpretation of history, on political decisions and on attempts to exclude those who do not fit in. With every definition borders are created which separate one from

the 'other'. Depending on the political, ideological and economic environment these borders may or may not be penetrable.

The strong identification with Protestantism resulted in an antagonistic attitude towards the Catholic minority in Britain. From the late seventeenth century up until 1828 Catholics were openly discriminated against and viewed as potential traitors.

British Catholics were not allowed to vote and were excluded from all state offices and from both houses of Parliament. For much of the eighteenth century they were subject to punitive taxation, forbidden to possess weapons and discriminated against in terms of access to education, property rights and freedom of worship.<sup>37</sup>

Law was much more lenient towards Protestant dissenters and Scottish Presbyterians, so that they were able to penetrate almost all levels of the political system, including Parliament. In times of insecurity and especially when at war with a Catholic country, British Catholics became scapegoats for enraged neighbours. The most commonly applied slang adjective for Catholics was 'outlandish' - foreigners. The collaboration against the Catholic minority served as a powerful bond between the English, Welsh and the Scots.<sup>38</sup> The identification of a minority that served the majority as a scapegoat is the simplest method to confirm one's own identity. The mechanism usually remains the same. Here the Catholic minority represented the foreign enemy. Prejudice, hatred and all aggressions that emerged from the fear of the Catholic enemy, was projected onto the British Catholic minority. Any feelings of weakness could then be transformed into a sense of power by attacking (usually defenceless) representatives of the feared enemy.



### 2.4.1. When Identity becomes Profitable

Encouragement to adopt British identity was provided by commercial benefit. With the Act of Union in 1707, Scotland had access to all the British colonies, resulting in prosperity of most port towns that grew into large trade cities. By the 1770's not only in London, but also in Birmingham, Bristol, Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle, Norwich, Plymouth, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Paisley and many smaller towns, urban and economic growth became apparent.<sup>39</sup> Imperial employment provided jobs and opportunities for a better life abroad. Once participation in imperial enterprise was possible, the desire to protect the colonies as well as the British homeland became part of the unifying factor. France was not only a threat to religious identity, but also the biggest imperial rival and consequently was a threat to security and livelihood. Being an active patriot also seemed to be an essential step forward to full citizenship, to participate in running the state by voting or other means.<sup>40</sup> Great Britain was forged in such a way that it reflected the interests and ambitions of its different classes and nations.<sup>41</sup> England had the advantage to be able to offer economic growth for a compromise on national identity. It was easier to consolidate an identity, when being British related to an improvement of lifestyle and influence. Collective identities provide security and the feeling of strength. England's imperial success was aspired to by the Scottish. To become part of a strong and successful 'body' is natural and is part of the concept of growth. Participating in the building of Empire, to contribute as well as to profit, fostered the self-definition of being an active part of the whole. As the Scots

were not passively profiting, but actively participating in Empire building, it was in their interest to preserve and defend the fruits of their efforts.

Protestant perception that prosperity was a gift of God to the blessed, influenced their concept of freedom. The opportunity provided by the government to succeed, was viewed as one of the most important liberties. Thus Bourgeois patriots believed that individual prosperity went hand in hand with the country's good.<sup>42</sup> The economic identification with Britain was also a reflection of political integration. As a result of the Act of Union, Scotland was represented in Parliament. Although Scotland, northern England and Wales were badly under-represented, every part of the island had a representative in the House of Commons and sometimes in the House of Lords, making another step towards integration.

#### 2.4.2. Loyalty as a Precondition for Acceptance

The SevenYear War changed the British Empire. The pre-war Empire was predominantly Protestant and Anglophone (the thirteen American colonies). The post-war Empire included Quebec (with 70,000 French-Catholic inhabitants) as well as large stretches of Asia. Although the military component of the pre-war Empire was considerable, it was popularly perceived as a trading concern. Britain perceived itself as the beneficent creator of liberty-loving and commercial empire that was not raised on bloody conquest. To view every action, whether of political, social or military nature, as a blessing for the 'other' is a necessity to justify these

actions to oneself. The Seven Years War destroyed this illusion. The extended Empire demanded a redefinition of authority and responsibility.<sup>43</sup>

As it became clear by 1763 that in England and Wales, Jacobitism would no longer pose a threat because its support was marginalised. Scotland's union with the rest of Great Britain was secured and the British army was able to recruit men on a massive scale from the Scottish Highlands. What motivated these men to support the causes of Great Britain were inducements and promotions for their former chieftains. Consequently a new problem posed itself to the ruling English elite. There was no longer justification for the exclusion of Scotsmen from opportunities and high office. The new and vast Empire abroad raised expectations, but also generated anxiety as demands for political change intensified. English patriots felt threatened by Scottish ambition of empire building and intention to participate in British politics. The new political environment made it necessary to reassess the meaning of Britishness and of the implications of empire.<sup>44</sup>

The American War of Independence was a blow to British self-confidence. The British were at war with anglophone Protestants demanding independence. A large proportion of the American population were Scottish and Irish immigrants. As a result, old hostilities were revived to assure English nationalists that English primacy within the Union could not become eroded.<sup>45</sup> This antipathy against Scots mirrored the fear of the increasing power and influence acquired by Scots within Great Britain. The desire to emphasise traditional values and national identities, such as



Englishness, always re-emerges in times of threat and insecurity. Under persistent pressure from English prejudice Scots tended to support and advance their own, especially in the world of letters and in other realms of activity. Due to increased opportunities and advantage that fellow countrymen were successful enough in politics and commerce to act as influential patrons, more Scots then moved south in search of employment. Some became alienated and returned disillusioned, while others became perpetual exiles, feeling themselves too Scottish to integrate, yet now being too English to return to their homeland. In turn some were able to compromise their Scottish identity with their English environment, regarding themselves as British, but maintaining their Scottish patriotism. One very profitable niche that provided Scots with enough opportunities to make a career and accumulate wealth, was the new colonies, especially India.<sup>46</sup>

The American War of Independence led the Scots, Welsh and Irish in Britain to openly declare their loyalty. Surprisingly enough many influential Scots supported the war with America to prove their political reliability to Westminster. It was an opportunity to impress the authorities in order to receive more sympathetic attention in the future. Their loyalty to Great Britain was also a blow to the Wilkite propaganda against the Scots. Nevertheless the American Declaration of Independence in July 1776 eroded the self-esteem and imperial identity of most Englishmen. The English radicals had difficulties in reconciling their patriotism with supporting the right of the Americans to establish themselves as an independent nation.

As Americans allied themselves with France in 1778, Spain in 1779 and Holland in 1780, their position became more difficult.<sup>47</sup>

Britain's preoccupation with war gave Ireland the opportunity to acquire parliamentary independence in 1782. America's alliance with the old enemies and rivals of Great Britain and the final defeat shattered the ruling elite but also linked Scotland more to the centre than ever before. Simultaneously, the spirit of the French revolution spread throughout Europe and nurtured alienation from authority in Britain. In the 1780's criticism of the government escalated. Accelerating industrialisation and urbanisation, growing class-consciousness and demands for reform as well as war in Europe enforced this crisis. Fortunately Britain escaped revolution.

In the face of such criticism the British elite had to legitimise their authority and demonstrate that it is not a separate parasitic element in the State. Now they had to convince themselves, as well as others, that they owed their position to genuine distinction and devotion to duty, serving the public. Before the mid-eighteenth century it was common for young patrician males to receive their education at home by a private tutors and later to bypass university. Between the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century it became increasingly popular for them to receive their education at public school. At the turn of the century more than 70 per cent of English peers had been educated either at Eton, Westminster, Winchester or Harrow. The institutionalisation of education for British patricians made it possible to convey unified set values and ideas. Increased contact with

social peers fostered group identity and cemented friendships (the 'old boys' network still operates today). Discipline and patriotic duty were stressed and the emphasis on Greek and Roman ancient history and classical literature nurtured a sense for empire, bravery, war and sacrifice. The aim was to raise a patriotic British elite.<sup>48</sup>

The preoccupation with the American war brought about another trend among British patricians: the love of uniforms and a cult of heroism. The protracted warfare provided an occupation for the aristocracy, a purpose and the opportunity to prove that they were needed. Ideologically and physically they were trained and prepared for such an event. Uniforms became the visible expression of heroism, courage and patriotism. They were elegant, revealed status and were modest compared to the French fashion worn prior to that. With the French Revolution more functional male dress became popular and gradually by the early 1880's understated London tailoring dictated etiquette. Warfare also nurtured a growing aristocratic class. Bravery and military achievements were usually rewarded with a new title. After peace was secured in 1815 new civil uniforms for all senior court and government officials, as well as for Lords Lieutenant of counties in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland were produced in order to maintain the impression of a distinguished and patriotic, yet modest elite.<sup>49</sup>

After 1793, panic about an imminent French invasion opened up the question whether mass arming could backlash and supply revolutionaries with weapons that may be turned against their rulers. The war with Revolutionary France lasted from 1793 to 1815 with unprecedented costs



accumulating after Britain had barely recovered financially from the American war. Britain was desperate to avoid defeat and therefore had to invest into victory. Everything was at stake for Britain and its nobility. Territorial autonomy and the survival of the ruling elite and aristocracy were threatened. The mobilisation of British working men at the time was unprecedented and not attempted again until the First World War. By 1814, a quarter of a million men were employed in the war effort. As Napoleon's Army, intent on invading Britain, encamped along the French coastline during the winter of 1797 the government was forced to recruit on a grander scale. The decision to arm such a mass of civil population was perceived as an act of trust by these men and as a sign relaxation of the repressive attitude towards the population after the French Revolution. That this sense of trust was not abused is often seen as proof that a threat to British independence forged patriotism and a sense of unity that transcended the divisions across the social classes.<sup>50</sup>

War encouraged the development towards a meritocracy, which enriched the ruling elite with exceptional and talented men, who helped preserve the existing order, although the majority of the peerage still owed their titles to their family heritage. Due to the disaster of the American war and an interest in the industrial development, more competent traditional aristocracy revealed flexibility in admitting landless talents to their ranks and were willing to adopt an ethos and lifestyle more appropriate to the spirit of the time. The final legitimisation of the reconstructed ruling elite was the victory at Waterloo in 1815. With the victory over France, Britain was able to increase the size of its Empire considerably. The triumph at

Waterloo over-shadowed the humiliating defeat in America and at the same time prevented any eruption of republicanism in its wake. And by creating new and honourable values, such as patriotism, military heroism and a sense of duty, the new British elite managed to reaffirm its right to rule during a time of revolution.<sup>51</sup>

#### **2.4.3. The Nineteenth Century: Enlightenment, Reform and Revolution**

Social preoccupation with economic growth and political emancipation left the decline of the Protestant Church of England and Scotland to go unnoticed. The first phase of religious and moral deterioration was between the Act of Tolerance (1689) and the emergence of Methodism in 1739. Those belonging to the Anglican Church seemed to perceive their religious duties more like a ritual, whilst the aristocracy, particularly at the beginning of the eighteenth century, thought little of leading a disciplined religious life. The middle classes appeared indifferent to institutionalised religion and the working classes in the industrial areas were ignorant of any religious education. Also the Dissenters witnessed a religious deterioration, although not as drastic as that of the Church of England. It was pure conservatism rather than lively religiousness that prevented wider acceptance of deism among the clergy and intellectuals. The deists had a rational approach to religion and sought to find a rational replacement for Christianity. They rejected the divinely ordained ecclesiastical hierarchy, the divine inspiration of Scripture, miracles, incarnation and several other essential features of church Christianity. Yet beliefs in a first cause, an intelligent general providence, immortality and retribution in providence were regarded as



rationally defensible and therefore accepted.<sup>52</sup> The Christian revealed religion was nothing but a replication of the natural religion. The absolute perfection of the creation is in itself a revelation, which humans can comprehend by applying reason.<sup>53</sup>

English theologians could not isolate themselves completely from the rationalist influences of the Enlightenment. As a result of the polemics against Hobbes and the Deists, the Latitudinarians, the liberal wing of the Church of England gained importance in the eighteenth century. The Latitudinarians, who were most influenced by the Cambridge Platonists, applied themselves to the natural theology. They tried to investigate whether the natural and the revealed religions could conform with and correlate with each other. Some Latitudinarians did not only want to demonstrate that the new sciences were compatible with the Christian belief, but that the new scientific insights made significant contributions to the comprehension of what Christians believed in.<sup>54</sup> Although they opposed deism, they had an open attitude towards the new sciences, which prevented a greater number of people turning towards deism.

Advocates of the rationalist and humanist 'Enlightenment' of the eighteenth century were convinced that all problems could be solved and human society, and its individuals, could be perfected and understood by applying reason. Increasing scientific and technological achievements at the time were the foundation of their conviction. Irrational behaviour and traditional religion were considered to darken the spirit of enlightenment. The ideology of progress, one of the main pillars of bourgeois liberalism was



underpinned by the philosophical trends towards materialism and empiricism. The core of classical liberalism is a prevalent individualism. Each individual has the right to pursue their self-interest, which essentially maximises their satisfactions and minimises their dissatisfaction. Consequently social interaction is based on gaining advantages by entering 'contracts' with individuals who share the same interests. The task of politics is to settle any interference. Therefore the aim of society is to allow for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals.<sup>55</sup>

Despite the emergence of the Enlightenment and rationalism, religion was still the idiom of the people. As the repercussions of the French revolution were felt across Europe, religion experienced a new revival. In Methodism and New Dissent people hoped to find salvation. The natural sciences divorced themselves from religion when Darwin offered an alternative solution for the creation of man. The age of Enlightenment had already introduced the emancipation of the individual, acknowledging its rationality and individuality. At this point it must be added that these intellectual accomplishments bypassed the mass of the people. For the majority scientific advancement had minimal impact on their religious convictions nor did the concept of the rational individual introduce more liberties in their everyday lives. The debate of these concepts was confined to the intellectual classes and was therefore not a shared notion among the collective conscious. Identities continued to be defined in terms of regional belonging and religious norms.

Up until the twentieth century religion has been certainly the source of values and orientation for the majority of people. It provided the terms in which the environment and the world around can be defined and interpreted. For many it was, and still is, a source of strength and hope in times of despair. The de-christianisation of males in the polite and educated classes had no impact on the peasantry. It was a privilege of the educated classes to question the existing hierarchy and to believe in the religious emancipation of man. For the lower classes the hierarchical world order remained stable. Subordination to God the almighty, the king and the state laws were part of life. People grew up within the boundaries of their social ranks and their figures of identification remained constant. Depending on their social class, the individual sought to rise in status within their social boundaries. Figures of orientation and idealisation were also identified within these boundaries. For example, an apprentice may look up to the master craftsman as his figure of identification or a young lieutenant may hope to attain the quality of his captain in charge or one of his war heroes. These ideal goals were nevertheless attainable so that the relatively small discrepancy between the reality and the ideal goal did not jeopardise the harmonious development of the individuals character.

The middle classes had access to the ideas of Enlightenment, but were very much dependent on the supernatural sanction of morality as discipline and support for their social and economic progress. In the period of the Industrial Revolution new industrial settlements emerged and cities grew rapidly. The established churches were unfamiliar with the urban masses and the problems of the new proletariat. Due to lack of understanding and

neglect these new communities and classes became fairly remote from, and indifferent to, organised religion. Consequently these masses were more easily captured by the labour movements of the nineteenth century.<sup>56</sup> Industrialisation led to changes in the method of production and the working environment. Whilst in the eighteenth century the work process was to change and shape 'natural material' (such as wood or metal etc.). The craftsman or workman became superior to Nature by mastering her. By creating something new, investing his skills and creativity, he developed his individuality and maybe his ability to co-operate with others. His work was the result of creative transformation of natural materials into something new, utilising human intelligence and skills.<sup>57</sup> For a craftsman the daily tasks of work have a purpose, he was controlling the production of the product from the beginning to the end and enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing the results of his hard work in form of a final physically manifested product. Work and play as well as work and culture are strongly related.<sup>58</sup> The craftsman can identify with his product and his work, as it is an expression of his creativity and skill. Modern industrialised methods of production change the purpose of, and the idea behind, work. The industrial worker spends his whole day repeating a menial task in a passive manner. He fulfils therefore only one isolated step of a multi-step process towards a final product. He is not responsible for the final product, for its marketing and distribution. Excluded from the organisational process, the worker fulfils the same task at the same spot more or less throughout his lifetime. The machine did not substitute human workforce, but man substituted the machine. Fromm argued that the proletariat's work could be defined as the execution of tasks, which the machine cannot do by itself.



Work is no longer a purposeful activity, but has become a necessity to make a living. The workman cannot identify with the final product and he will feel increasingly alienated from his work.

The desire to feel that there is a purpose in life is rooted in every individual. When the established churches fail to provide their followers with the necessary support, they will turn to those who provide for their needs. Those who show most care and understanding for the needs and problems of their followers in times of war and economic or social crisis are religious sects and radical political groups.

As the established Catholic and Protestant Churches declined, sectarian Protestantism expanded. The increased secularisation went together with religious revivalism of a different form. During the revolutionary and Napoleonic decades systematic Protestant missionary activity became very popular. Missionary societies such as the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the interdenominational London Missionary Society (1795), the evangelical Church Missionary Society (1799), and the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804) were founded and their activities became successful. In 1790 for example, the Wesleyan Methodists could only list 59,000 members in the UK, whilst by 1850 their number had increased to ten fold. These new sects were initially apolitical and strongly conservative, searching for personal salvation by turning away from the outside world. They were anti-revolutionary in their attitude and their political activity was focused on anti-slavery, temperance agitation and foreign missions. The new sects were most appealing to those who were about to rise into the middle classes

and those about to decline into the proletariat. Both of these cases represent moments of change. Transformation and change signifies instability. Those who ascended in the social system searched for supporting values, which gave them strength to prevail in their new environment to maintain their newly won status. While those descending in the social system were searching for moral support to bear their suffering and to find a metaphysic explanation for what they could not rationalise. Amongst the poor, forms of the millenarian predictions were very popular, as the economic crisis of the post-Napoleonic period appeared to forecast a dim future. Marx referred to such sectarianism as the 'the opium of the people', yet these sects gave expression both to the discontent and the aspiration of the lower classes. By creating social, and sometimes educational and political, institutions these sects attempted to care for those, for whom the environment provided nothing.<sup>59</sup> Religion was a moral support for the middle classes and legitimised their expansion and the profits they made by providing a religious self-definition, rather than reducing their motivation to rational self-interest. No matter how immoral an action may be, man has nevertheless the desire to rationalise his action in such a way, to prove to himself and others that his motivations were based either on sound reason or common morals.<sup>60</sup> For the aristocracies, religion assured them of a degree of social stability, for pious and illiterate peoples were ready to accept their poverty if it was imposed as their destiny by God. The morality and order that religion supplies makes these people immune from the subversive effects of reason and therefore less susceptible to revolution.<sup>61</sup>



The unification of Britain, the Scientific Revolution, the evolution of a limited parliamentary monarchy and the tremendous colonial expansion during the eighteenth century turned Britain into the richest and most advanced Empire the world had ever known. After the resurgence of peace in 1815, the socio-economic and political problems that were suppressed by war, re-surfaced. The economy had been geared up for war, during which trade and agricultural productivity suffered and social unrest was intensified as three hundred thousand soldiers and sailors returned home seeking employment. Revolutionary voices called for parliamentary reform, universal male suffrage and lower taxation. Britain was at the brink of revolution from below. The depression during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the falling money-wages, heavy technological unemployment, rapid urbanisation and impoverishment fostered discontent with, and criticism of, the liberal ideology and capitalism. Liberalism was considered to have failed, as capitalism allowed the rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer, instead of maximising happiness for the greatest number of individuals. Socialists revived the old perception of man as a communal being, consequently perceiving society as man's home. According to Hobsbawm classical liberals and early modern socialists based their argument of an inevitable evolution towards a better society on the rationalism of Enlightenment, directing their arguments towards the educated influential classes, whilst Marx based his theory on the historic inevitability of a proletarian revolution.<sup>62</sup>



Britain's economic situation suddenly improved in 1820, although the government had been made aware of the fact that the parliamentary system no longer reflected the realities of a rapidly changing society.<sup>63</sup>

Discrimination against Catholics had also become obsolete. Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom by way of the Act of Union of 1800, out of fear of an impending French invasion. In order to reconcile Ireland to direct rule from Westminster, Britain had to grant the Irish population wider civil rights, although its population was predominantly Roman Catholic. If Irish Catholics were granted full citizenship then these rights could no longer be refused to the Catholic minority within Britain itself. In 1828 the Test and Corporation Acts, which excluded Roman Catholics and Dissenters from holding office, were repealed and a year later, on the grounds of Catholic Emancipation, Catholics could be elected to the Commons and Catholic peers could once again sit in the Lords. Catholic emancipation was only the beginning of reform.

The Industrial Revolution triggered rapid industrial urbanisation and produced a new social class - the working class. Rapid urbanisation tore individuals out of their 'natural' environment and produced an anonymous mass society. The urbanised masses became more receptive to new ideas as the established Churches lost their influence over them. Marx enjoyed a wide reception in a time of social-economic change and identity crisis. The standing political and social order were destabilised, the acknowledged roles and functions of the various classes were questioned and the anonymous mass became a political power. With the collective

awareness of class struggle, social identity experienced a polarisation. Marx provided a rootless and alienated working class with a powerful political identity. Bad working conditions and exploitation led to the formation of political unions and in 1831 a National Union of the Working Classes was founded.

Whig policy encouraged parliamentary reform and despite difficulties a Reform Bill was finally passed in 1832. Although the Reform Act did not change the basis of government, it did concern the introduction of the middle classes to political participation. To achieve political status the middle classes made use of working class radicals.

English patriots looked at Parliament as a crucial component of British identity and British superiority. The Reform Act of 1832 changed the electoral landscape to such an extent that in Scotland the number of voters increased thirteenfold. Taking into consideration that Austria, Denmark, Greece and Russia had no popularly elected national legislative assemblies and that in Britain a larger proportion of men could vote than in Belgium, France, the Netherlands or Spain, this Reform Act was the source of a strong national pride. Nevertheless eighty per cent of adult males and all women had no right to vote. Despite the disappointment by those who remained excluded, Great Britain was in 1832, one of the most democratic nations in Europe. Part of British patriotic ideology was the perception that Britain was a pioneer in democracy. Yet by 1865 Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Switzerland, as well as the Scandinavian countries, had implemented far more generous franchises than the United Kingdom.



Neither the Reform Act of 1867 nor of 1884 allowed for sufficient change for Britain to reach the democratic standards of eastern and western Europe up to the First World War.<sup>64</sup> Votes for women and universal manhood suffrage had to wait until 1918 and the welfare state was only fully implemented after the Second World War.

The *Zeitgeist*, which stood for progress and liberalisation, also extended to Britain's colonial subjects. Although Parliament had banned British involvement in slave trade in 1807, its sugar colonies in the West Indies still depended on slave labour. Anti-slavery became an emblem of national virtue. Love of liberty was incorporated into British identity and faith. It was a subject that did not threaten British domestic affairs and involved people of every social and political background. By abolishing slavery in the West Indian colonies Britain tried to signal its moral integrity as an imperial power. By accepting economic loss it therefore gained on the political and psychological level. The agreement of the House of Commons on abolishing the slave trade as an institution in the West Indies was preceded by mass-petitioning campaigns. To respond positively to public pressure on this subject was an opportunity to uphold the national values of both liberty and democracy and to simultaneously deflect public attention from demanding broader franchise and extensive social reforms in a time of economic crisis.<sup>65</sup>

In the mid-nineteenth century it became clear that democratisation was inevitable if social revolution was to be avoided. The short-lived Commune of Paris in 1871 and the first Russian Revolution accelerated



democratisation. The Victorian ruling classes were nevertheless reluctant to introduce universal male suffrage, but preferred to limit it. The Reform Act of 1867 and 1883 increased the electorate from 8 to 29 per cent of men over the age of twenty. In order to maintain the *status quo* the influence of the electorate was manipulated by limiting the political role of the assemblies elected by universal suffrage. Nevertheless, such manipulation could only postpone, but not prevent full democratisation. Consequently the need for political mass mobilisation emerged. Political tools such as the organisation of mass propaganda and mass parties were no longer only in the hands of the government, but also used in order to lobby the government. The increasing electorate and the development of mass media, especially the press, forced the government to take on more responsibility towards the collective.<sup>66</sup>

At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century the British government had to cope with the emergence of nationalism at home and in its colonies. Constitutions and powers of self-government had been granted to the four Australian colonies (1850), New Zealand (1852), the Cape Colony (1853) and the dominion of Canada (1867) and they were formally recognised within the Empire as self-governing Dominions in 1907. The Empire was important for the British economy as it provided raw materials, markets, destinations for migrants and employment in various fields such as administration and trade. Although Imperial defence was expensive it served its purpose. At the end of the Edwardian period over 40 per cent of world merchant shipping was British-registered and over 60 per cent of the world's shipping tonnage was constructed in British shipyards.

Between 1900 and 1914 emigration to the British colonies increased. Although the average income *per capita* of British inhabitants exceeded that of any other European country in 1900, it was estimated that only 1 per cent of the population owned 65 per cent of the wealth.<sup>67</sup>

The military setbacks of the Boer War (1899-1902) made the government more aware of the ill health of its population, as one-third of the recruits had to be rejected as unfit for military service. It was considered as a national interest to improve health conditions in order to remain competitive in the world market. In 1906, the Education Act introduced compulsory supply of school meals and the Education Act of 1907 introduced regular medical inspections. A further step towards national efficiency was the introduction of old age pensions in 1908, as well as the Children's Act of the same year that licensed personal health services for mothers and infants.<sup>68</sup>

All these steps towards state responsibility were at the same time an intrusion into the classic areas of Church and communal responsibilities. As the State took over responsibilities in the area of administration, education and social welfare, which traditionally rested with the Church, the Churches influence and ability to win people for its causes was gradually eroded and public life became increasingly secular. In the cultural field Darwinian ideas of the origin of species and both historical and moral criticism of the Bible added to the decline in influence of Christianity.

## 2.5. Islam in British India

The first British expansion in the Americas, Africa and India began in the seventeenth century. At the time the Mughal Empire (1526-1761) made India one of the richest and most powerful countries in the world. India's wealth attracted various European nations such as Portugal, England, France and Holland, who were eager to share its wealth through commerce. With the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 the fear of France as an enemy was finally removed, but they remained in commercial competition. Britain asserted itself in India and the settlement of 1818 consolidated British supremacy. The British Empire in India now became the British Empire of India.

British predominance was achieved on the grounds of a very old diplomatic strategy: *divide et impera*. The innate divisiveness of Hindu society, by political, ethnic and caste divisions, made India repeatedly vulnerable to unwelcome outsiders in the past. European powers were seen as a welcome assistance in order to defeat a rival. Thus the Marathas sought British support against the Mughals, the Nizam sought it against the Marathas and the Sikhs against the Muslims. Britain participated and on the grounds of diplomatic strategy and military superiority, took control. British attitude towards India reflected the industrial *Zeitgeist*; the colony was both market and provider of cheap raw material. By the 1830's Britain committed itself to promote the positive welfare of India by introducing Western knowledge and science, as well as by encouraging Indian participation in government,



this strategy was aimed to maintain long-term influence. By 1857 the British had established complete political control of the Indian subcontinent. Through direct rule and the help of subordinated Princes an authoritarian system of government was established.

On May 10, 1857 the Bengal army revolted at Meerut. The mutiny was triggered by Indian soldiers, who had refused to accept new cartridges that were greased with a mixture of beef and pork fat and could only be unwrapped with the aide of the teeth. However, that this military mutiny turned into a popular revolt was a response to political, economic, social and cultural 'Westernisation'. Hostility and resistance by both the old governing classes and the wider population was triggered by a number of factors. English had replaced Persian as the official language in education, increased missionary activity and interventions in the realm of Hindu customs (e.g., the prohibition of suttee and the legalisation of remarriage of Hindu widows) stirred the masses. At the same time the old governing classes refused to accept political impotence and the British decision to end the Mughal imperial title on Bahadur Shah's death.

The deposition of the Mughal emperor meant that Muslims were now a non-ruling minority, because the bulk of the population was Hindu. The relationship between the ruling Muslim elite and the Hindu population was unusual, as according to traditional Islamic doctrine polytheists must immediately convert to Islam once under Muslim rule. However, for *ahl al kitab* (people of the book such as Jews and Christians) traditional Islamic law makes an exception. They may retain their religion but do not have the

right to proselytise and have to pay extra taxes, as they are not permitted to fight in the army. For polytheists the only alternative to conversion is to accept death penalty. Thus with the conquest of India, Islam's establishment was forced to compromise on dogma because forced conversions of the massive Hindu population and the subsequent massacres would have undermined the power of the ruling Muslim minority. Therefore, Hindus were treated like *ahl al kitab* and the ruling elite remained a minority.

With the deposition of the Mughal emperor Muslim identity in India changed drastically. Muslims lost not only their prominent status, they also had to cope with living in Hindu society as a minority. Muslims now had to develop strategies for living a pious Muslim life among polytheists under a non-Muslim ruler. While their contemporaries in the Middle East were also subordinated to colonial rule, the Islamic way of life was largely protected by the social pressure of the majority. In India the Hindu majority could now occupy public space for the practice of their religious rituals and released old resentments against those who slaughtered sacred cows (such as Muslim butchers). Gilles Kepel suggested that the strategies that Indian Muslims had developed during that period to cope with the new threatening situation, reappeared as Indian Muslims settled in Britain. He identified two strategies with which Muslims responded to the events of 1857 and sought to protect community identity. The strategy to maintain religious identity was to encourage a radical separateness between the Muslim and non-Muslim society. This in turn was enforced by the political strategy of communalism.<sup>69</sup>

Communalism was promoted by the 'modernist' movement founded by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). In response to the deposition of the Mughal emperor the supporters of this group sought to participate in the political life of the British Empire, whilst maintaining Muslim identity. Contrary to the Islamic movements (to be discussed below) the endeavour of Ahmad Khan was to show that Islamic principles were not incompatible with Western modernity. For the modernists, religion was an expression of distinctiveness, although that was not a reason to reject Western influences. The first step to ensure political participation was to create an education system for an Anglophone elite to act as spokespeople of the Muslim community. As at the beginning of the twentieth century the British granted voting rights to 'natives' on the grounds of a tax qualification, these modernist elite negotiated for a separate electoral representation for Muslims. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan wanted to ensure that the Muslims in India were not marginalised. To this end Muslims were encouraged to take control of their destiny by acquiring the intellectual instruments of modernity. With the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which allowed for separate electoral colleges for Muslims and Hindus, the modernist movement was able to create the first political communalism in modern history. This secular elite acquired political leadership and unified a heterogeneous population on the grounds of religious identity. In 1947 this political communalism transmuted into the creation of Pakistan.<sup>70</sup>

Not all Muslims shared the open, and maybe opportunistic, approach of the modernists. For many, Western modernity represented a threat to Muslim identity. Islam on the subcontinent had merged with Hindu traditions over



the centuries, which led some Muslim thinkers to consider re-Islamisation and isolation as the only way to revive Islam and to protect Muslim community identity. To purify Islamic practice (i.e. to remove what has been added) and to raise the sense of self-worth of the Muslim community, thinkers such as Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, Maulana Rashid Gangohi, Maulana Muhammad Muzhar Nanautawi and Maulana Muhammad Munir Nanautawi founded the Deoband movement. All of them had fought against the British in 1857, which also links them to the more militant *Jihad* movement of Sayyid Ahmad. However, with the defeat of 1857, the *Jihad* movement refrained from any further political activity. The founders of Deoband were also connected with the leader of the Delhi reformers Shah Muhammad Ishaq, grandson of Shah Wali-allah. In the light of Mughal decline during the eighteenth century, Shah Wali-allah (1702-1763) had already then sought to develop a coherent ideology to revive and protect Islamic identity.<sup>71</sup>

Deoband *dar al-Ulum* was founded in 1867 with the aim of keeping the Muslim religious consciousness awake and providing the intellectual basis for a stronger Islamic identity. The Deobandi movement sought to build an non-Anglicised religious leadership of India's Muslims without state support. Pupils were usually from an artisan or commercial family background and they were trained to become well-educated *ulema*, who will be committed to reforming Islam and to guiding the Muslim community in solving the problems of daily life. Deoband schools spread quickly, although financially they were dependent on private donations. The Deobandis were also well received among Muslims who were not directly

involved in the educational system but wanted to be part of the movement. For the Muslim community the Deobandi *ulema* issued *fatwas* to clarify rules and regulations in accordance with the Shariah, so that believers had an orientation for how to conduct their lives among an 'ungodly' society subjected to 'ungodly' state laws.<sup>72</sup>

The deep conservatism of the Deobandis was soon combined with the belief that they alone conformed to the Sunna. They increasingly defined themselves in opposition to the ruling non-Muslims.

In the face of British power, scientific knowledge and material mastery, the *Deobandis* asserted moral superiority. They urged their followers not to wear British dress or to buy British goods. Many of the *fatwas* encouraged this attitude of moral and spiritual self-confidence. The emphasis on correct religious practice provided a means for people to express their own value in a situation where they were powerless in other areas. There was satisfaction to be gleaned from identifying themselves as morally correct, and in separating themselves from others whom they judged to be wrong.<sup>73</sup>

Ron Geaves' analytical description revealed two basic mechanisms for enforcing group identity: drawing boundaries and providing orientation to counteract powerlessness. Drawing boundaries can be done by emphasising physical differences, such as by distinct dress and/or by advocating moral superiority, which also raises self-worth and encourages members of the in-group to withdraw from the environment. These mechanisms can also be observed among the first generation immigrants, who introduced the Deobandi movement to Britain. The autonomy of the Deobandis *vis-a-vis* the Indian state allowed them to adapt to the minority status in Britain. The nature of their socio-political environment had basically remained the same, as much as their strategies to maintain community identity have.

In opposition to the Deobandi reformers Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan (1856-1921) defended the Sufi strand of Islam and the traditions that evolved through contact with Hinduism. Riza Khan and his supporters are known as the Barelwis. Their movement is the only major one in the subcontinent whose teachings are independent of the ideas of Shah Wali-allah. The Barelwis emphasise the superhuman nature of the Prophet, he was believed to be the emanation of God's light and possessed a unique knowledge of all spiritual matters. The faithful believed that the Prophet could act as their advocate in front of God and the saints who were able to perceive the light of the Prophet were attributed with the power of patronage. The Barelwi movement appealed primarily to the rural population and their aim was to encourage Muslims to devote themselves to Islam. In Britain the Barelwi tradition is widely represented among first generation immigrants. As religion and cultural traditions are strongly inter-linked, religion was frequently used to reinforce ethnic identity. Consequently, attempts by the second generation to strip Islamic practice from these cultural traditions are not well received. Furthermore, due to the quasi-divinisation of the Prophet, the Barelwis perceive a lack of respect for the Prophet even more as an insult than Muslims in general would. For them the *Satanic Verses* was an attack on their identity.<sup>74</sup>

In the first half of the twentieth century two further Islamic movements evolved that eventually established themselves in Britain: The Tabligh-i Jama'at ('The Association for the Propagation of Islam') and the Jama'at-i Islami. In the late 1920's Muhammad Ilyas founded the Tabligh-i Jama'at to inspire religious renewal among the uneducated and simple people.



Reforms amongst Muslims had priority over converting non-Muslims because only Muslims with a firm conviction and sincere intention are able to spread the message among others.<sup>75</sup> He did not feel that it was necessary to be a member of the professional *ulema* in order to be active as a missionary, but believed in the responsibility of the individual to advocate Islam to others. He himself had studied at the Islamic University at Deoband and became a Deobandi *'alim* (religious scholar). Ilyas had a very tolerant attitude towards Sufism, as he had been a Sheikh of the Sabiriyah branch of the Chishtiyah Sufi order.<sup>76</sup>

For Ilyas the identity of the community is given through strict religious observance to compensate the absence of an Islamic state. Although Ilyas considered the British to be the main opponents to Islam in India, he did not engage in political activity because he believed that religion and politics should be kept separate. Proselytism, primarily in terms of internal conversion among Muslims, cultural isolation from an 'ungodly' environment and strong pietism were considered to be more effective strategies to strengthen the Muslim community. These features facilitated migration and the adaptation to a new unislamic environment. Meanwhile the Tabligh-i transformed itself into a worldwide organisation. Its members currently preach in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the USA. This movement seeks to transcend cultural divides and to appeal to Muslim solidarity by fostering an identity with the Islamic *Ummah*.<sup>77</sup>

Explicitly political objectives were represented by the re-Islamising movement Jama'at-i Islami. This organisation was founded by the Urdu-

speaking Journalist Abul A'la Mawdudi in 1941. While the other Indian Islamic movement sought solutions for coping with the absence of an Islamic state, Mawdudi's approach implies the restoration of an Islamic state and the application of the Shariah. In 'Fundamentals of an Islamic Constitution' Mawdudi referred to the Qur'an to prove that "the authority of giving commands and the title to sovereignty is the sole prerogative of Allah"<sup>78</sup>. As God's law governs all of creation only an Islamic society submitted to the revealed law can ultimately reflect God's will. For Mawdudi and his followers Islam is a complete way of life and a total identity.

Jama'at-i Islami was founded to train committed members so that they are equipped to work towards the foundation of an Islamic state in the subcontinent. Mawdudi believed that society could only be transformed with aid of political power. The domination of Western civilisation should be tackled by the creation of an Islamic state which serves as an example to both Western and other Muslim nations. With the partition of India in 1947 Jama'at-i Islami was divided into two separate organisations. In India the Jama'at-i Islami Hind concentrated on educating the backward Muslim communities and on preserving their Islamic identity. They also engaged in *dawah* directed towards non-Muslims. The campaign to convert non-Muslims entailed two main areas of activity: in the field of education and by providing humanitarian relief in cases of natural disaster.<sup>79</sup> In Pakistan the primary objectives of the Jama'at-i Islami was to work towards a truly Islamic state. For this purpose Muslims had to be educated in Islam and protected from non-Islamic or false ideas. Members had to be found, who

had to be organised in order to spread the message of Islam and to work for a righteous human society. The organisation sought to train committed Muslims to bring about a complete change in society in accordance with the teachings of Islam. This encompassed a change in both intellectual and political leadership, for only a truly Islamic leadership can guide the State and society in agreement with the principles of Islam. However, the Jama'at-i Islami was neither able to win the support of the masses, nor of the ruling elite. It was members of the lower middle classes who were attracted to Mawdudi's attacks on the ruling elite, the clerics and the West.<sup>80</sup> "It gave them an ideology and an identity with which to fight for their place in their society."<sup>81</sup>

## 2.6. The Prelude to Identity Crisis

During the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), the age of reform, British society experienced an accumulation of developments that destabilised the traditional value-structure. The gradual emergence of the two party system, the growing self-awareness of the proletariat as a political power, the development of trade unions, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the appearance of feminists (or a more appropriate term for the time, suffragettes) collectively introduced a fragmentation of orientation among British society.

In pre-Victorian decades ideological fragmentation was limited to religious schisms that could stimulate doubt in one's religious identity and *Weltanschauung*, although it eventually settled into a *status quo*. The



ideological fragmentation of the nineteenth century was not confined to matters of belief, but also affected both the private and public sphere of the majority of the population. What made the search for orientation more complex was that a clear categorisation of peoples' positions was not possible. Suffragettes for example, could be found among both Conservatives and Liberals, women affiliated to either party would unite regarding some issues while disagreeing on others. The affiliation to one of the parties and the support of the working classes or the suffragettes were not necessarily life-long commitments. The nineteenth century introduced a variety of values (frequently attached to ideology) and orientations that forced individuals to take a stance on issues and to make decisions. Society has become politicised and identity could suddenly become problematic.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the trade union movement began to form regional and national networks and their journals spread the ideas of radical political thinkers. In 1838 Francis Place drew up the People's Charter, which contained the following six demands: universal male suffrage, annual Parliaments, the abolition of the property qualification for MPs, the payment of MPs, electoral districts of equal size and a secret ballot. During the National Convention held a year later in London and Birmingham the Charter provoked riots, which were immediately suppressed by the army. The supporters of the Charter, the Chartists, also presented huge petitions to Parliament and in 1840 the National Charter Association was formed under the aegis of Feargus O'Connor. The demonstrations and strikes organised by the Chartists achieved little. While revolutions spread in 1848 in Europe, England experienced the beginning of

a decade of prosperity. That Britain was able to successfully cope with the revolutionary atmosphere originates in the historical experience of the civil war and the extended conflicts, from which the English political system evolved.<sup>82</sup> Internal divisions among the Chartists and improved efficiency in the police force with the new railway system prevented the successful organisation of bigger revolts.<sup>83</sup>

Radical thinkers such as Marx provided a coherent ideology for the emancipation of the proletariat. Attacks against the aristocracy and concepts for the abolition of classes posed a threat to the middle and upper classes. Entrepreneurs and investors, who had been praised by the establishment as the spearheads of progress and opportunity, now had to justify themselves for exploiting the working classes. The identity of the aristocracy and the middle classes came under attack and the need for their mere existence was questioned. The Protestant *Weltanschauung*, according to which God rewards all those with prosperity who are religious, law-abiding and hard working, had simply been opposed by Marx's materialist conception of history.

Religious illusions allow people to escape from confrontation with self-alienation and the meaninglessness of life. Based on Hegel, Marx viewed human beings in modern society as alienated from themselves. This alienation occurred because the life-activity, particularly of the working classes, had taken an alien, inhuman form. Under capitalism the network of human co-operation that ideally should allow for the human powers of production to foster a self-conscious self-determination, was alienated by

dispossessing the majority of the producers and thus preventing collective self-determination. Contrary to Hegel, who sought self-fulfilment on the grounds of a new philosophical interpretation of life, Marx intended to change society rather than to reinterpret it. Therefore it was the mission of the working classes to establish a classless society in order to take rational control of the social form of production which will lead to the only true freedom: free self-activity.<sup>84</sup> By declaring that modern society experiences self-alienation, Hegel and Marx insinuated a crisis of social and individual identity. Although the concept of identity did not exist at the time, the concept of self-alienation is the antithesis of the concept of identity.

The Industrial Revolution tore the human being out of their traditional system of social co-operation. By subjecting the new form of social production to market mechanisms the industrial worker had no opportunity to identify with his activity and product as the craftsman or farmer could. Western philosophy created the foundation for the advancement of individualism in Western society. By the political and economic emancipation of the individual, educating them towards independent thinking and the liberation from suppressive authorities, the individual was supposed to experience his 'I' as the centre of his forces and activity. While only a minority were able to make this experience, individualism was nothing but a facade for all those who were unable to find their individual identity. Instead alternative identifications such as with the nation, religion, class or occupation were adopted. The most common identification would be with class.<sup>85</sup>



Even the escape into 'religious illusions', as Marx had formulated it, could no longer provide unquestioned orientation. The publication of Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859) undermined the whole metaphysical framework of Western European society. The theory of evolution forced society to see man's unique position in the universe in relative terms. Suddenly man was no longer perceived as a descendent of Adam and Eve, created in God's own image, but an ordinary animal that had evolved through the pressure of natural selection. Darwin's work affected religion, morality and politics and was quickly adopted by materialistic movements such as Communism. Roy Strong noted: "The fact that today we live largely in a world of agnostic materialism descends directly from the consequences of his work."<sup>86</sup> Although by the end of the century the doctrine on evolution was acceptable to some clergymen such as Frederick Temple Archbishop of Canterbury (1896), the conflict between science and religion was still widespread. However, most churchgoers accommodated intellectual doubt and scepticism, as religion had more of a moral and ethical value than an intellectual one.<sup>87</sup> While the progress of science began to undermine religion, the Victorians responded to the loss of faith with a stronger dedication to morality. Gertrude Himmelfarb pointed out "... that morality became, in a sense, a surrogate for religion."<sup>88</sup>

In the nineteenth century identity could no longer be taken for granted. Neither was the life history of an individual predetermined as during the Middle Ages, nor was orientation on the grounds of a coherent *Weltanschauung* necessarily God-given. Therefore it should not surprise that investigations of the human psyche began during this period of

transformation. Freud's discussion of the human drive and its repression was perceived as an attack on morality. Freud, Darwin and Marx all painfully unmasked the vain attempt of Victorians to maintain the illusion and appearance of a well-organised and virtuous society. They brought about a re-conceptualisation of human nature and an awareness of the need for social and political reform.

The need for reform was responded to in Britain before revolts turned into revolution. From the 1870's onwards more attention was directed to the channelling of the political impact of the working classes' discontent. In 1871 the Trade Union Act finally provided the unions with a clear status in law, though their power was limited to that of a pressure group. Inspired by the teachings of Karl Marx the Democratic Federation was formed in 1881, which merged with the Labour Emancipation League three years later to form the Social Democratic Federation. These intellectual groups, together with the Fabian Society (founded by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 1884) created the intellectual framework for the emergence of a new party in 1893: the Independent Labour Party. The Independent Labour Party did not seek revolution but social reform.

The government adjusted to the need for reform. In 1857, judicial divorce became possible, the Married Women's Property Act gave women some power over their own property and by the 1880's women could go to university. In 1870, the government introduced the Education Act, which for the first time stipulated compulsory education for all children until the age of ten. Amongst the working classes (a term accepted by 1850) the

Education Act was not well received, as they stood to lose an additional source of income. Additionally, the government extended the franchise so that by 1885 two thirds of males could vote. The political system, that of the Crown and the Houses of Lords and Commons, which supported the rule of the elite, now had to appeal to a different kind of society. Therefore political parties had to develop political programmes to win a mass electorate.<sup>89</sup>

The destabilisation of the traditional social structure and hierarchy as well as the introduction of secular ideology was counter balanced by three factors: political and social reforms (as described above), the success of the Empire and the adjustment of the monarchy to the rise of the middle classes. The political power of the Crown had turned into a passive one. However, Queen Victoria managed to turn the monarchy into a unifying symbol by representing both Imperial and domestic virtues. Under Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (1868 and 1874-80) a glamorous image of Empire and monarchy was encouraged and in 1876 Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India. In 1890 she reigned over four hundred million people. The age of the superpower had arrived, nearly every European nation sought to establish a colonial empire and a strong identification with empire had developed. It was a deliberate move to build up pageantry and splendour of the Crown as an escapism from the grey world created by the Industrial Revolution. Victoria's Golden Jubilee in 1887 and her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 were celebrated with magnificent carriage processions through London. The mass circulation of newspapers enforced the popularity of such spectacles and the railways and trams enabled people to travel to London in order to participate at such events.<sup>90</sup>



It was during the reign of Queen Victoria that the monarchy developed into a symbol of identification, representing supremacy and unity. The Empire offered opportunity, new markets and was a source for raw materials. The industrialisation of Britain and the Empire allowed Victorian society to believe in unlimited progress and virtues such as self-discipline, work, responsibility, perseverance and honesty; virtues that were reproduced by Margaret Thatcher in her election campaign of 1983.<sup>91</sup> The belief in progress and the growth of the nation superseded intellectual doubt and social tension; it nurtured identity and patriotism.

Patriotism and nationalism frequently serve as a source of individual and collective identity. With regard to Britain, nationalism is a difficult concept to discuss. Wales, Scotland and Ireland have maintained a strong sense of national identity, whilst the repeated British experience of conflict, especially war with Napoleonic France, developed a sense of unity amongst the inhabitants of the British Isles. The tradition of imperial expansion took place in a British framework blurring English identity. Therefore English patriotism is frequently expressed in British terms, while the Welsh and Scots continue to emphasise their ethnic and cultural identity. In contrast to the romantic nationalism of ethnically defined nations that erupted throughout Europe during the mid-nineteenth century, British identity was built on the preservation of political continuity and constructed around the institutions of the Crown, Parliament and the rule of law.<sup>92</sup> This concept has survived until the present day according to which Britishness serves as an umbrella identity for native and immigrant ethnic minorities.

Most Englishmen perceived Britain as predominantly English because the core of British polity, the symbols of Crown, Parliament and Empire were seen as English. England did not press for English definitions of identity. Assertion of English nationalism was unnecessary as English identity was based on the presumption of English superiority. Scotland and Wales were always aware of the English dominance within the British framework. Yet, Scottish nationalism is rather based on national character than on national history. Scotland has a clear national identity, but until 1914 there was no reason to regret the Act of Union. The Scots had pioneered the great industrial revolution and successfully participated in the empire-building. In comparison, Welsh nationalism is based on linguistic and intrinsically cultural distinctiveness. However, despite the fact that the Welsh also had their share in British Imperialism, Wales did not have the institutional basis for the separateness they sought. Therefore their nationalist movements did not seek the same degree of exclusion from the British political system as their Irish counter-parts did.<sup>93</sup>

British national identity was constructed around subjection to the Crown and Empire. The common cultural reference within the British framework was the English culture. Gellner noted that the industrialisation and urbanisation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries diluted cultural boundaries that made it easier to manufacture a national culture with the creation of the nation state. The national culture is characterised by cultural features of the ethnic groups that held sufficient power to define the national culture according to their heritage. While national culture, with

which citizens should identify, has to be specific enough to demarcate the population from 'others', it still has to be flexible enough to encompass the differences amongst the population that do exist. The emphasis is consequently on common historical experiences to enforce communality. With industrialisation a standardised education became a necessity to ensure a common system of communication. Thus education had to be centrally organised, enabling governments to convey the same values, understanding of history and sense of communality to the whole population. Gellner suggested that it is "nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round"<sup>94</sup>. English nationalism therefore expresses itself in the standardisation, homogenisation and centralisation of culture, rather than in an exclusive ethnic oriented nationalism. The standardisation of culture and education is an attempt to overcome ethnic differences, to consolidate society and to promote the efficiency of the national economy, which consequently facilitates the legitimisation of politics. In other words British national identity has been centrally constructed since the Act of Union. Empire, the Crown and Parliament have become salient 'objects of identification' and promoted as national heritage.

Gellner identified the 'will' to form a nation and 'culture' as the main factors for the social cohesion of nations. Industrial society is anonymous and impersonal, making it even more vulnerable to disintegration. Its members are held together by historical values and elements of culture that were abstracted to form symbols and to enforce a sense of communal belonging.



Centrally organised and standardised education becomes necessary to reproduce fully socialised and intellectually flexible individuals, with a universal education, able to adapt to the changing occupational structure in order to perpetuate economic growth. This system of education itself becomes part of the division of labour. "Work, in the main, is no longer the manipulation of things, but of meanings."<sup>95</sup> Therefore it was in the interest of Britain to make school attendance compulsory in 1880 and to provide free elementary education in 1891. Gellner argued that it was not nationalism that imposed homogeneity, but rather industrial society's desire for homogeneity to secure progress and growth, which produced nationalism.

### 2.6.1. The Twentieth Century: Identity at Stake

By the twentieth century British society has become varied and volatile. The daily social interaction has become more anonymous in a rapidly urbanising environment. The great Depression between 1873-96 posed a threat to the sense of optimism that prevailed among Victorian society. Although British exports continued to rise, other countries such as the USA and Germany followed the British example of industrialisation and began to overtake the level of British production. Consequently the newly industrialised nations wanted their own empire for resources and as a market. These long-standing imperialist rivalries of the great powers eventually culminated in the First World War.

Nationalism spread in both Ireland and throughout the British Empire. Although a series of Home Rule Bills were introduced into the British Parliament beginning in 1886, Ireland's demand for self-government was not realised until after the First World War. Territories that were largely settled by UK emigrants, were formally recognised as self-governing Dominions within the Empire in 1907. Such were the four Australian colonies, New Zealand, the Cape Colony and the dominion of Canada.

However, Britain itself was not spared from a revival of national consciousness. In response to an increasing wave of immigration, in particular of East European Jews, the Aliens Act of 1905 restricted the number of foreigners able to settle in the country. Between 1880 and 1914 over 120,000 Jews settled in Britain, primarily in London, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Birmingham. Roughly the same number settled temporally on their way to the United States.<sup>96</sup> However, the largest group of immigrants at the turn of the century were Irish. Strictly speaking the Irish were not immigrants within the framework of the Union. Nevertheless, their settlement in industrial and urbanised areas such as Lancashire, London, Glasgow, York and Cardiff caused social tensions, although migration of Irish was in decline since the 1860's. In 1901, there were 426,565 Irish immigrants in England and Wales and 205,064 in Scotland.<sup>97</sup> The Irish offered cheap labour, which generated hostility towards them among the communities.

Patriotism and national consciousness also expressed themselves in a constructive way. As much as the military setbacks of the Boer War (1899-

1902) were a blow to British identity and pride, it made the government aware of the poor physical health of the urban masses. The government not only had to show concern about military efficiency, but also had to focus on whether the nation was fit for its imperial task. It was a Quaker pacifist, Seebohm Rowntree, who pointed in 1901 to the high poverty in urban areas and the resulting physical deterioration. He appealed to the national self-interest as he called for political action. In 1904, the government responded to such concern with the appointment of the Inter-departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. On the basis of its report the government recognised the need for school meals and regular medical inspections in the Education Acts of 1906 and 1907 respectively. To provide relief for the temporarily unemployed and old age pensions, the National Insurance Act (1911) introduced compulsory Health Insurance and the provision of payment during unemployment.<sup>98</sup>

The years following the Boer War also witnessed the establishment of a number of patriotic leagues. The National Service League, the Tariff Reform League, the British Brothers League, the Union Defence League and the Anti-Socialist League, only to name a few, all sought to contribute to the 'national cause'. This entailed reviving Britain's economic and military supremacy abroad, as well as fostering social unity and a sense of patriotic duty at home.

Based on the same motives new youth movements such as the Boys Brigade, the Boy Scouts, the Church Lads Brigade and the British Girl's Patriotic League were created. These movements actively nurture



patriotism and a sense of national identity among children. The virtues propagated by such youth movements is best illustrated by a quote from the manual 'Scouting for Boys' written by the founder of the Boy Scouts, Baden Powell:

Remember, whether rich or poor, from castle or from slum, you are all Britons first, and you've got to keep Britain up against outside enemies, you have to stand shoulder to shoulder to do it. If you are doing harm to yourselves you are doing harm to your country. You must sink your differences.<sup>99</sup>

Due to colonial rivalries Britain anticipated conflict. Patriotism and national identity were encouraged to ensure popular and broad support in defence of the Empire. As Britain engaged in what was to become the First World War in August 1914, popular opinion held that war would be over by Christmas. The Britons revealed an astonishing idealism and a remarkable sense of national unity as the government called them to arms. Only few people could comprehend the scale that this war was to assume. The First World War traumatised a whole generation. Britain counted nearly two-and-a-half million casualties, including over 700,000 killed. At the Armistice in November 1918 Britain had to re-integrate over five million servicemen into civilian life.<sup>100</sup>

Although Britain emerged from the First World War triumphant, the atrocious reality of the war made it impossible to romanticise it in the traditional manner. Air bombardment on British civilians produced a considerable psychological shock and discredited the common belief that the British Isles were invulnerable to direct attack. After the British desire for justice was satisfied in the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the desire for peace

manifested itself in the foundation of the League of Nations and the support of disarmament across the whole British political spectrum.

The inter-war period was marked by unemployment, heightened industrial unrest and economic decline that had followed from the initial post-war boom. Indicative for British identity was that it was the only significant country in Europe that was not consumed by totalitarianism during any stage of the inter-war period despite economic crisis. Why? For the explanation three general factors can be isolated: economic, political and social. Firstly, the depression in Britain was relatively mild compared to other industrialised European nations. As the world's largest importer of food and raw materials, Britain did not experience a financial collapse. Unlike other industrial countries Britain did not respond to the fall of import prices with an immediate increase in tariffs. Therefore as the prices of imported food (and raw materials) fell and the real income of consumers rose as a consequence, the purchasing power was not hampered by tariffs, which helped investments. The depression primarily affected the unemployed and the rich entrepreneurs (due to a sharp decline in profits).<sup>101</sup>

Secondly, the greatest political phenomenon during the inter-war period was the meteoric rise of the Labour Party. In the general elections of 1922, Labour became the official opposition party, in what was a Conservative victory, and in 1924 King George V called on James Ramsay MacDonald (leader of the Labour Party) to form a government. He only held office for ten months but returned to power in 1929. The most important aspect of

Labour's party policy was to distance itself from Bolshevist extremism, which prevented political marginalisation. The newly born Independent Labour Party (1893) was strongly linked to armchair visionaries such as the Fabians. Embedded in a deeply rooted tradition of a democratic political culture, the party was driven by ideology and sought to bring about social change, within the framework of a democratic culture and not revolution.

Thirdly, British society has come to identify with relative political continuity. The presence of three distinct political parties allowed the population to express its discontent and desire for political change in democratic terms. Compared to Germany's short lived Weimar Republic (1919-33), the long history of democratic culture and the slow successive introduction of a wider electorate, raised democratic awareness and prevented mass experimentation with newly won rights. A politically mature Labour Party and a patriotic Conservative Party provided democratic alternatives.

The inter-war period was also marked by the desire to escape from the social reality of economic depression by engaging in leisure activity and consumerism. One positive consequence was the introduction of paid holiday in the early 1920's. The formation of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1922 and the expansion of the cinema industry provided for such escapism. Adverts targeted primarily women. Domestic electric appliances designed to alleviate the housework, as well as cars, were mass-produced for those who could afford it - for the middle classes. But women also received new opportunities as a result of their indispensable



participation in industry during the war. By 1928 women gained the full voting rights after the Franchise Act (1918) had only granted the vote to women over twenty-eight, and the Acts in 1919 and 1923 equipped women with equal rights with men in cases of divorce. The ideal image of women changed to that of an emancipated career girl with an element of classlessness.<sup>102</sup> However, the optimism that prevailed among British society after the economy finally recovered by the mid-30's, was shattered as the policy of appeasement could not prevent the Second World War.

The Second World War changed both the international political climate and Western societies as such. Security was a collective desire. The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco and came into force on 24 October 1945. In Britain it had become increasingly difficult to justify the idea of Empire even though it had been re-labelled Commonwealth. Granting former colonies independence was not only a moral gesture on behalf of Britain, but was also an economic necessity. The disintegration of Empire represented the decline of an international predominance that had evolved since the sixteenth century.

Britain proved great diplomatic skill in the course of dissolving the Empire. National humiliation was avoided by handing over power in a pompous ritual to a pro British 'democratic system', which had been set up. Britain compensated the loss of direct power over her former colonies by casting herself on the level of a major power with Russia and the USA. As the world became polarised in the Cold War, Britain actively participated in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in 1949. In her struggle to

maintain her international status as a major power Britain sought to nurture political ties with the USA and to assert her economic relationship with the Commonwealth.

With the loss of its colonies Great Britain also lost its predominant economic position. From the beginning of the twentieth century Britain had to cope with a continuous economic decline. On the macro-economic level the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fell behind France, Germany, Japan and the USA. Although the US and UK economies cannot really be compared due to different conditions for the access to and endowment of economic resources, the UK may be set against other European countries with comparable resource endowments and natural constraints on growth. Even in the 1950's and 1960's, as unemployment was only at the level of 1-2 per cent and Britain achieved its highest ever rate of recorded economic growth, its growth of GDP per capita was only 2.5 per cent compared to France, Germany, and Japan with a growth of GDP of 4.0, 4.9, 8.0 per cent per annum respectively. By 1989 Britain not only lagged behind France and Germany, but also Switzerland and several Scandinavian countries.<sup>103</sup>

Nevertheless, Britain refused to participate in the formation of a United Europe. Too strong was the identification with its global role and a too difficult a concept to swallow were the political and economic restrictions involved in joining the European project (in which Britain would have just been another middle-ranked European state). For Britain it was unacceptable to adopt a single uniform tariff against all non-EEC imports

(based on the Treaty of Rome, 1957) including all members of the Commonwealth from where Britain obtained cheap goods. Therefore Paris and Bonn became the focus of the new Europe. Britain's physical division from the mainland reflected in her distanced stance towards the European Community. Although Britain eventually did join the EC in 1973, a sense of true commitment and belonging has been lacking up to the present day.

English people tend to be quite isolationist, they seem sort of separate from the rest of Europe although we are supposedly now a part of Europe, but there is still the feeling that we are different from everybody else. There is still a very strong feeling that that should be protected ... against an 'invasion'. And a single currency, if it went to a referendum, that would not be a popular move because there is still a strong sense of nationalism here.<sup>104</sup>

As if the loss of the Empire and the self-imposed marginalisation within the European Community had not put enough strain on national pride, the revival of ancient historic identities within Britain also threatened to fragment the nation.<sup>105</sup> In 1967, the Scottish National Party won a seat in the House of Commons and during the same period Plaid Cymru gained grounds in Wales. In the years to follow more MP's of these two parties were elected who encouraged the introduction of devolution bills during the late 1970's to establish regional assemblies. The referendum in 1979 did not reveal mass support for this notion.<sup>106</sup> It was not until 1998 that Scotland re-established a Parliament and Wales formed a National Assembly. Linda Colley's argument that British identity was forged by Empire, Protestantism and French threat, seemed to be confirmed by the gradual national fragmentation after the Second World War. It does not seem like a coincidence that regional national identities have re-emerged as soon as both Empire was on decline and immediate continental enemies



could no longer threaten Britain. Protestantism had also lost its influence over the people. Although the Church of Scotland could register a more continuous commitment until the 1960's, the Church of England witnessed a continuous decline of its members from 1900 onwards (except during the inter-war period).<sup>107</sup>

Economically Britain experienced a decade of rapid growth after the Second World War. After an initial period of austerity, the Labour government battled the repayment of the war debts. The economic situation demanded price controls and the assurance that industry worked in the interest of the country. After 1947 the Labour government pursued its agenda on the nationalisation of industry. The industries concerned were in the utilities and fuel sector. In 1949, the pound was devalued by 30 per cent. The Korean War put further restraints on the British economy and hampered its normalisation. It was claimed that the costs of maintaining the parity of the sterling and excessive investments to support Britain's interests overseas posed a drain on the economy. The economic boom was finally to come in the 1950's: high growth, low unemployment, and low inflation allowed Britain to prosper. The GDP grew at a rate of 2.8 per cent per annum between 1951 and 1973 and the living standards of the population improved significantly.<sup>108</sup> By 1951 the Labour government had successfully implemented the 'welfare state'.

In 1979, Mrs Thatcher won the general elections and had the advantage of a working parliamentary majority that was bolstered in the following elections of 1983 and 1987. Margaret Thatcher came to epitomise an era. She

became internationally and nationally renowned for her 'iron' policy of a radical free-market economy: privatisation of a wide range of nationalised industries, cutbacks in industrial subsidies, the sale of council houses to their tenants and limiting the trade union's legal immunities. As the Conservatives came to power at the end of the 1970's, they refrained from clamping down on the welfare system, but rather chose to change its nature by transforming the 'welfare state' into an 'opportunity state', by encouraging and rewarding initiative with tax relief. The final attack came after their third election in 1987. The 'dependency culture' was eroded by transforming Supplementary Benefits into Income Support and 'additional payments' for exceptional needs into Social Funds, yet 70 per cent of their grants had to be repaid by the claimants. Powers of the local governments were transferred to smaller accountable bodies in order to erode local democracy and to increase the power of central government both as a regulator and a paymaster. By 1985, 2.5 million people lived below, and 7 million people, on the poverty line. The State dismantled the welfare system in a time when there is nothing to take its place. Focusing on the control of inflation, macro-economic objectives were neglected. After a short boom during the 1980's, the worst post-war slump followed in 1990 and 1991, with more than three million unemployed and a negative GDP growth.<sup>109</sup>

Unity among British society. Not really, I think it is quite fragmented. I think that is probably part of what New Labour is theoretically about. It is trying to bring back some sort of feeling of social identity. During the Thatcher years it was very much individualistic and everybody was fighting for themselves, so I think that fragmented a lot of the structures that have been in place ... and made people really just out to get what they could and a big gap opened up between the rich and the poor. And I also think that over the past twenty, twenty-five years a lot more mobility within the country (job wise) tended to fragment families. I mean I originally come from Sheffield where everybody ... all the relations were there, everybody lived within a small area,



but I went to university and moved away. A lot of people that I know around here are in a similar position. They have lived away from their families and you have to form new networks of friends to replace that family structure.<sup>110</sup>

In less than a decade Britain declined from the most powerful Empire in the World to a middle-ranked European nation. Those generations that grew up with the self-concept of being world's most powerful political and economic nation, could probably never part from this idea completely. Although a sense of superiority may remain, the Empire can only nurture identity as a memory.

It still makes people feel that they are superior, particularly if they are abroad. That reflects in the fact that we are not particularly good at learning foreign languages. So that when we go abroad we tend to expect people to speak English rather than making the effort to learn the language. That has to do with having gone out and colonised places like India and expected everyone to speak English.<sup>111</sup>

Today society is also composed of generations that did not consciously witness the glory of Empire and its subsequent decline. Everyone born after 1945 grew up in a historic period of peace, stability, and unprecedented general wealth. Also religion was marginalised in the public consciousness, ousted by the desire to improve the living standard. Consequently it is of interest what British identity is composed of today and whether the classic objects of identification (Empire and Protestantism) and external threat to promote social cohesion are still of any significance to the population. David Miller has expressed doubt whether traditional aspects of British identity are still relevant today. The post-war experience destroyed the self-perception of Great Britain both on the geographical and economic level. Today Britain primarily advertises what David Miller referred to as 'cultural Englishness' such as drinking tea, etc.<sup>112</sup>



## 2.7. Do the English have a National Identity?

Bernard Crick observed that in contrast to the Scots, Irish and Welsh, the English did not develop a specific English identity. He suggested that English nationalism and self-consciousness were deliberately suppressed to safeguard the unity of Britain. Particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth century nationalism would have been counter-productive because it would have antagonised and frustrated reconciliation with Scotland.<sup>113</sup> Thus what is Englishness associated with today? Which values are equated with Englishness and Britishness?

The Scottish, the Welsh and the Irish probably have an even greater sense of national identity and pride, whereas the English, it's more that they don't want to mix with outsiders but there isn't the same sort of central cohesion within English people. There is a lot of division within the North-South divide. Southern English people see themselves as quite different from Northern English, whereas the Scots and the Welsh probably see themselves as Welsh primarily, belonging to a particular area.<sup>114</sup>

It has been observed that the English interviewees found it difficult to produce spontaneous associations with Englishness. Some interviewees asserted: 'We are very proud'<sup>115</sup>. But what they were proud of or which values to equate with their nation was a far more difficult question to answer.

I don't really know, you are born English aren't you. *What are you proud of?* My country most of all I suppose. At one time I would have said the Royal Family but I'm a bit anti-Royal family now. Well, I suppose the Royal Family is part of our heritage and we have a lot of foreigners who come mainly to see them.<sup>116</sup>

Frequently aspects of identity have been mentioned which are not unique to the English but apply to the whole of Britain.

The only thing I can think of is being an Island. I think however much England is associated with Europe, however much, it is still slightly more separate than the others because it is an island. I think there is a psychological thing about being an island. It has a very low subliminally affect on everybody.<sup>117</sup>

To escape an answer an interviewee attributed Englishness to those English living in the country and therefore detached herself from being a 'real English' based on the argument that London is a cosmopolitan area. This would imply that Englishness is rather equated to the English countryside than to cosmopolitan London.

This is a very cosmopolitan area of London, if you want to find real English you need to go to perhaps Devon, or Yorkshire, or Cornwall, or out of London. ... I think we are a bit stand-offish sometimes. As a race we are a bit private, sometimes, and reserved if that is a value.<sup>118</sup>

The older generation still seems to identify more strongly with Empire. While a 40 year old woman stated that the Empire doesn't really have an impact today. Her mother interrupted: "I'm proud of it. The upbringing I had, my mother was very old fashioned and I'm proud of it and I have brought up my children the same."<sup>119</sup>

Other interviewees have also mentioned 'upbringing'. The nature of their upbringing is reflected by their answers, particularly if identity is investigated *via* the individual's value-structure. It is what Freud called the super-ego that was nurtured with a basic value-system during childhood and adolescence by parents and will guide an individual in his or her decision-making process. The elderly generation was subjected to a far more authoritarian up bringing. The way the following interviewee referred to his associations reflects both upbringing and a strong identification.

Our heredity, our Parliament and our Royalty. And freedom of speech and freedom of expression, loyalty and gentlemanly conduct. .... Basically we've started freedom of speech, our monarchy, our equal opportunity system, ... we have got poor people but there is no one starving to death like they are in some of the other countries. No doubt we have our poor but we see our way out, there are poor but nobody should starve to death.<sup>120</sup>

The fact that we have the Royal Family and history. I think it is the heritage we are proud of. I think each nation of Great Britain is proud of its heritage. ... It is respect and respect for the elderly or this society. When we were young, we had a lot more respect for our elderly than most youngster got.<sup>121</sup>

By contrast, some youth find it difficult to identify particularly with their historic past. Judged from the contemporary perspective, Empire has received a negative connotation.

*What are you proud of as an English?* Well that's really hard. Like almost impossible. Well, especially at SOAS people aren't really proud of being English it's kind of a minority thing, you get a complex. People are like, uhh, you've ruined the world. What is it? Colonisation, yea. I don't know what I'm proud of ... English humour, that amuses me. Pub culture, you don't get that anywhere else.<sup>122</sup>

Quite a few interviewees referred to tradition and their upbringing, but have remained vague about what it entailed, as this 35 year old woman has.

It basically is all tradition isn't it. It is the way you are brought up, it goes back for centuries: the English attitude, stiff upper lip. I really don't know what to make it. About values, I think they are probably the same as everybody else's. In some way the English people are very reserved.<sup>123</sup>

Among the younger generation aspects of traditional values related to conduct have never been mentioned with reference to themselves. Only one interviewee has attributed some to 'a minority' among the English.

They are perceived to be very polite, very chivalrous I suppose, all stiff upper-lip, unemotional and detached. I'm not a 100% sure if they're all like that, it is only ever a small population. Those that go to Eton.<sup>124</sup>

Sarcasm, queuing, I'm not aware of it I don't know.<sup>125</sup>



I think in reality there is no such thing as Englishness.<sup>126</sup>

Englishness is a dragon, because of St George's dragon, and Britishness - pride. Not where I come from, but for other people it's pride. ... There you have to look at regions. Ideally now it should be multiculturalism, I mean that is what should be happening, whether that is a value I still doubt it. I think values change according to what political system you're in. ... Perhaps liberalism is a value. ... England is much more central, the way government works England gets a lot more focus on it. ... Centralisation is a huge thing.<sup>127</sup>

How salient upbringing and class-consciousness can be, is best illustrated by an interview with a young aristocrat.

Basically English society, ... I would say English society is still extremely class fragmented probably more than any other society in Europe. Maybe not any other society in Europe but it's because we had our revolution in the 17th century and a revival ... the British class structure stayed intact with a far greater sense of continuity than it has in any other European country certainly that I've been to or lived in. And I think that's probably one of the defining features of British society. I think that probably is the defining feature of British society. It's the class system, which everyone rambles on about so much. British identity itself is very clearly defined, not to say that French, German, or Italian isn't, and I think that is probably because we are an island. And I think there is an island mentality, notice the same with the Japanese, I mean Japanese history. And islands tend to have very strong senses of cultural identity, although our society is as diverse or comes from as many diverse racial groups as any other in Europe. It's because we are cut off by a very easily definable boundary from the rest of Europe, I think British people do see themselves as being something other than European and that's ... I think is probably the defining aspect of the British, certainly the English. I'm English so although I say British because we are a part of the British Isles, but technically I'm English.

Also this interviewee found it difficult to separate British attributes from the English ones. Although emotionally he emphasises his Englishness he expresses his national identifications in British terms.

*(English values)* There is a great difference between what they actually are, and I don't think that I can tell you what they actually are, and what we would like them to be, we as the British would like them to be. I suspect that you could do a lot worse than to look back to say, the 1930's in India, the Indian colonial regime. I think the British regard themselves as superior. I think every nation regards herself superior, whatever. The British just do it with such confidence that they annoy everybody else so much. I mean you go to America and you get people saying gosh you British are so fucking arrogant. And it's true. I think we would like them to be honour, duty. I tell you what I think is the most significant English trait is: absolute abhorable stupidity in the face

of all logical reasoning. That is the thing that crops up more than anything else in... . The British have this element of admiring people who do something utterly stupid and often they do something so utterly stupid that they actually succeed because no-one expects them to be so ridiculously insane. I think that is probably the most continuous trend in British history, is this absolute trait of controlled insanity. I think that is the most significant British value, ... would be: never do anything the simple way if you can do it arse backwards.<sup>128</sup>

In order to establish a more detailed picture of what Englishness is all about, the interviewees have been asked to explain how the English differ from the Scots and the Welsh. It was found that the majority of the interviewees did not recognise any major differences.

I don't think they are different. Again, it is a different cultural background, the Scottish have a long history as the English have obviously in the past. And the Welsh are probably more English than the Scottish are.<sup>129</sup>

Well, I don't think there is a big difference. Probably one, we are not so nationalistic. I think the Welsh are more, and the Scots, tend to be more nationalistic. They are proud to be Scottish. The English are probably much more lower key about it. If you take the English, and the Scottish, and the Welsh you get an enormous mix, you get a lot of Welsh living in England and a lot of Scotsmen living in England more than the other way round. So you don't think of a Scotsman being any different and there is normally a sense of humour, they are a bit jokey about sport and their national teams, but I think normally they all get on very well.<sup>130</sup>

I think a lot of people like the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish, with regard to the English, they've a bit of a chip on their shoulders if I'm quite honest. You just have to watch international football or rugby and they raise their game just because they play against England. By us it is a bit different because when we play Wales or Scotland, it doesn't really matter. We get more up-set playing Geordies, rather than... . We can understand that some of them get up-set because let's say a hundred years ago we've conquered them and now control them, their Parliament, their government from London, so I suppose there is some historical ... devolution ... that's why.<sup>131</sup>

I don't think so, we don't drink as much as the Scottish. I would think we are all alike. It's a different religion, they tend to separate people but on the whole we are alike.<sup>132</sup>

However, there were also interviewees who thought differently. Nevertheless, they primarily stated the difference but could not explain what the actual difference is. The only additional English traits that could be

filtered from these interviews were: a different way of life, English arrogance and superiority.

A tricky question. I think the English are ... the English see themselves as different, almost as different from the Scots and the Welsh as we do from the French or Germans even though we speak the same language, which is quite a continuity. And a lot of English people can claim Scottish, Welsh, Irish decent. I think English people see themselves as different to Welsh or Scottish people but it is a difficult question. It is difficult to define a cultural identity for the English. Within the section of society I grew up in, was born into, they are very ... they tend to be very arrogant, very class possessed.<sup>133</sup>

We are superior. Lawfully we are all one nation, we are all individuals but we like to think that we are all one nation. Yes, there is a unity at this stage, but as you know we are currently debating about devolution. The Scottish and the Welsh are debating devolution. We've got Northern Ireland, which is a bit of a problem also, but in the main we are all the same. There are some peculiar laws with these which is different to our legal system and our bill system.<sup>134</sup>

The Scottish people, I think are very nationalistic and proud of being Scottish and Welsh, especially in view of the English. If they compare themselves they are always very derogatory about the English. Whenever I've been to Scotland it seems a lot more laid back but that's because I've always been in the country. I don't know it just seems to be a totally different way of life.<sup>135</sup>

To check whether the general perception of a lack of difference between the Scots and the English was consistent, it was asked whether the interviewees feel that there is a unity among British society. In the light of Labour's promise to consider Scottish and Welsh demand for devolution.

Yes, I think so, on the whole. Based on a number of things. Unitedly the majority of the people stand together. I always find that people stick together during big tragedies, they all unite together.<sup>136</sup>

I do think there is a unity among British society, but I think that probably ... I wouldn't know why. Yes, I think there's a unity but people see themselves as British but there's also a very significant move towards ... the Scottish now have their own nation effectively, and I'm sure that the Welsh will soon. I think it won't be long until Britain becomes a federal state rather than a single political unit. Because I think the Scottish see themselves as different from the English and so do the Welsh. The Northern Irish I think cling to England or to Britain simply as a way to get away from the Southern Irish.<sup>137</sup>



I don't, I mean I know I'm British but I don't feel any sense of pride towards it or any kind of affinity for it. But I can see, just read the publications of the Sun, that there is definitely a British unity among certain sections of the population. But there is a lot, I think, ... a fringe kind of areas where people don't feel it, where they don't affiliate to it. The kind of nationalistic jingoistic bollocks that goes on there doesn't apply anymore to the majority of the population, at least not to my circle of friends. If you take Diana's funeral, that tells it all, enormous nationalism.<sup>138</sup>

Not really. Well, no, it depends if you ask people whether ... you can tell whether they say I'm English or whether they say I'm British. You see, I would say I was English because ... I don't know. I know nice Scotsmen, I know nice Welshmen, I know nice Irishmen, I have got nothing against them... you know just because they are Welsh or Scots. I've got no affinity for their country because it's not my country. ...I would say I was English more than I was British.<sup>139</sup>

Well, I think really we are united but there is obviously a percentage who like to back things which you get in any society but I think when the chips are down then we all pull together. Whether in the future all the different groups will do that, I don't know. In fact devolution could spoil everything.<sup>140</sup>

The majority of all interviewees were in favour of devolution and some would even accept Scottish independence.

I think they should. As long as they all agree, we just don't want the same problem as in Northern Ireland.<sup>141</sup>

I think they should have some independence. I mean they already have a different education system and a slightly different legal system. And I can understand their feeling that they want more control over what they are doing.<sup>142</sup>

### 2.7.1. The Monarchy

It was a surprise that only a few interviewees have immediately mentioned the monarchy or the Royal Family (despite Diana's recent death) as an aspect of English identity. Nevertheless, once the topic was brought up responses did become emotional from time to time.

I think other countries are jealous of our monarchy.<sup>143</sup>

It is what we base our freedom on, because at the end of the day, although she would never agree, she could over rule the Parliament. The powers are there but it wouldn't be used. She is also, how would you say, a great tourist attraction. The monarchy will change and that is basically because of the problems we've had with Diana and the change is for the better. Whether the monarchy will continue in the future years no one knows.<sup>144</sup>

That is loads of crap, but good for tourism, that's about it. It's a bit antiquated.<sup>145</sup>

We got to have it, I mean they can fiddle with it a bit and adjust it if they want to, but I think, again it is a part of our system and our governmental system. It has evolved over a long period and I think it works. I think they could fine-tune it perhaps if they want to be proper.<sup>146</sup>

I personally think they should get rid of it, I think it's outdated, it shouldn't be here.<sup>147</sup>

A complete waste of time and money frankly, that is all that needs to be said. OK, let her keep her palace if you reckon that she is like heritage, but heritage isn't heritage unless people get to see it. There is no point of having heritage if it only belongs to one person, then it is their house.<sup>148</sup>

I'm a big fan of the monarchy. It is something, which sets us apart from other countries, really. It is brilliant. She has done an awful lot of good work, especially the queen. I'm a big fan of the queen, I just wish her children were a bit more.... I just hope that the next generation William and Harry turn out to be ... a bit more spine.<sup>149</sup>

Monarchy, it is very expensive and I object to a lot of the money that the sort of minor Royal get. I can see that we probably benefit tourist-wise from having a clean Buckingham Palace, but I think there are a lot of hangers-on, who do very well out of the monarchy without actually putting any effort in. I would restrict it to a very few at the top and every body else would have to pay their way.<sup>150</sup>

### 2.7.2. The House of Lords

Also rarely Parliament was mentioned. As the new Labour government has proposed the reformation of the House of Lords it was of interest how the English respond to this intention. The majority of the interviewees supported reforms but emphasised that a second chamber must be maintained. Only a few were content with the House of Lords the way is presently organised.

Personally I'm all for it (*the monarchy*). I think it is a good idea. I believe in the monarchy and I believe in the House of Lords, which is possibly a more important point. Because the House of Lords is ... partly because I get to sit in it one day, if I'm lucky and they don't abolish it, and personally I want my 30 Pounds a day to sit in there and do nothing. Secondly because it is a very good idea to have a legislative..., it's the highest law court in the country, and it also legislates, and it is a very good idea to have a legislative body which is not bound to answer to an electorate. You can't accuse the Law Lords to, or the Lords in general of trying to pander to public opinion by amending or rejecting a law. I do believe in the veto. The Commons have veto over the Lords and can push the bill through if necessary. I believe in that but I do think it's a good idea not to go for the American system, where every Senator in the States is covertly looking towards his next election and covertly worrying about whether his action concerning a certain law or bill will affect his chances of re-election. I mean it has enormous disadvantages in the respect that the Lords are entrenched, ... are a group of people entrenched in privilege and money. Not so much as they were, but certainly still and will cling to some ideas that people consider to be out-dated and out-moded, but I think that that also in some respect is a good thing because the Commons is drawn predominantly from population centres which means cities. Fair enough, there are members for the counties as well, ... the Lords are almost entirely drawn from country seats. The fact that the Lords are drawn from the country and the Commons from the Towns is to a certain extent a good idea.<sup>151</sup>

Why change it when it isn't broke. I think that the British parliamentary system has worked quite well for a lot of years. Everyone needs an older House to quieten down the younger House to make them think again. I don't think that necessarily it has to be elective. I mean, if it is as it is, senior churchmen ... it should be a mix, it should be part hereditary, part life peer, part... . I mean I don't think it does any harm. I don't feel strongly that we should change it. You get senior judges ... when they have completed their careers, they end up, let's say many of them, in the House of Lords and it is exactly what we want, we want them to temper the younger House. That is what it is for, to make them think twice sometimes.<sup>152</sup>

The idea that people who just happened to have been born into a certain family can make decisions, which affect everybody isn't representative the way it should be. I think there should be a second house so that there is some check on ... particularly if you get a situation like we've got at the moment with a large Labour Party with a large majority, so that they can't do what ever they want to. But I think there should be ... I don't know, I have never really thought about how it should be organised. There should be a way of making them all representative and not just by right of birth.<sup>153</sup>

Hereditary peers shouldn't exist, life peers isn't such a bad idea but they should be voted for.<sup>154</sup>

They are just realising that they are coming into the twentieth century.<sup>155</sup>

I'm not a 100% happy about the great, great, great, great, great grand son bloke who basically bought his title having a say in how the country is run. OK, may be life peers, well people who have been knighted in their life and just for their life time sure they might have some say but equally Elton John who has just been made a peer, why should I value his opinion on legislation. So it is probably nice to have a House of Lords but I'm not a 100% sure I want it to do the job it's doing.<sup>156</sup>



It seems silly because the whole point of the Parliament, they are elected to run the country so I don't see why you have to have a second chamber checking on them. They should get it right the first time. These people are in there and aren't really accountable to anybody.<sup>157</sup>

### 2.7.3. Beneath the Threshold of Consciousness

Generally speaking the responses demonstrated that English national identity is not salient, which confirms Crick's observation. However, this does not imply that it does not exist. On the contrary it has only evolved in a different form. As a matter of fact English identity emerges in disguise as a strong British identity. Britain seems to be perceived as 'Great England' because of the awareness that Scotland is 'ruled' from, and that British politics are determined in, Westminster. The majority of the interviewees found it difficult to describe Englishness and there was commonly an interchange between the terms English and British.

Among the older generations a sense of superiority was either expressed blatantly, or in a more subliminal way. This was less obvious when the interviewees spoke about England, but it became most apparent when issues such as minority integration and the Salman Rushdie affair were raised. Particularly in response to the Salman Rushdie affair interviewees remembered that it was freedom of speech and the freedom society provides for the individual which they are proud of.

Basically living in England and being English is about having freedom of expression, to be yourself. I love living in England, I travelled and lived in many countries but I like living here. I would not want to live anywhere else. ... We don't want to be taken over by anybody ... , but it's freedom of expression. In other countries you're so restricted that

it makes you private, you know, .. you're pushed into a hole and I don't agree with that, I'm terribly English in that way.<sup>158</sup>

A central component of English identity seems to be 'the way of life' as such. This entails freedoms and social rituals, as well as the way the political system is organised. That monarchy and Parliament were not mentioned as frequently as expected, has much to do with the fact that it is taken for granted. As soon as these issues were raised it became apparent that there is a strong desire to maintain these traditional institutions, possibly modified and adapted to a twentieth century society.

The English way of life was also central to the younger generations. Among these interviewees, pubs, beer, as well as fish and chips were the first components of English lifestyle that were raised. This is very much a reflection of their preoccupation, but not so much of their national identity. Youth tends to learn from mistakes, rather than self-analysis. Therefore it is rare that individuals (in their twenties) have thought about national or cultural identity unless they grew up in social or political tension which has forced such an awareness upon them.

It was found that many students, who had more contact with members of a minority or foreign students, felt a sense of shame or guilt with regard to the impact of Britain's imperial past. Among those who did not reveal an insight into the consequences of colonisation (which were the majority) a sense of pride and superiority became evident.

Fish and chips, lager and getting drunk, pubs, history, people being scared of the English. Patriotism ... I suppose it's because we are, like, an island, sort of separate

from the rest of Europe ... we are definitely superior. We've invented football, we have better beer than the rest of the world, ... democracy, .. we are the birth place of democracy. We are still quite individual, we've got our own lives, our own personalities. It's a different sense of humour to everybody else. ... We are a very musical kind of nation, like, British music tends to sort of dominates the rest of the Western world.<sup>159</sup>

To be proud of one's nation is one way to raises one's self-worth because one is a part of that nation. It does not make a difference whether one's nation dominates the world on the grounds of politics, football or music. Instead it is far more important to be a part of something grander, which is also recognised by others as such. Especially adolescents and young adults like to feel embedded in a strong nation particularly as long as acknowledgement through personal achievements has not yet substituted acknowledgement on the grounds of descent and family.

Among the English aristocracy a strong class-consciousness has not been eroded. No evidence was found which could support the 'decline of class' thesis or help identify 'post-industrial' and 'post-capitalist' features in British class structure. Britain is still largely a class-divided society, as also recent research by Marshall *et al.* revealed.<sup>160</sup>

It was observed however, that English identity is primarily equated with mentality, way of life and government. This entails English humour, an air of self-containment frequently referred to as 'stiff upper lip', as well as freedom of speech and the safe-guarded freedom of the individual that are based on democracy and the way the government is organised. A strong sense of tradition prevailed among the interviewees, although quite a few could not immediately associate any particular objects of identification with



it. At the core of all the identifications named above is the subliminally awareness of 'being' an island. Britain is an island that has dominated the world and despite its size, has maintained its powerful position in international politics. This awareness nurtures pride and a sense of superiority, frequently expressed in terms of British identity that nevertheless has been shaped by the predominance of English government. English nationalism may have been suppressed to safeguard the union of the United Kingdom, but beneath the threshold of consciousness.

## 2.8. How Strong is Scottish National Identity?

Many English interviewees pointed to the fact that the Scots and Welsh are more nationalistic than the English. On the grounds of the political trend towards devolution it can be assumed that a Scottish national identity is more salient than perhaps the English. Therefore it was of interest to rationalise what Scottish identity is based on and whether different generations define Scottishness from different perspectives.

*Are there any distinct Scottish values?* No, not anymore. You know, they have all been eroded. *Which values have been eroded?* The Protestant work morality. In the South of Europe it is all more *andiamo*, but in the North we work harder. The Scots used to be very hard working, got up at four, work, work, work, for little pay. But now that is all over. Now it is like anywhere else. We used to have a lot of famous inventors. A lot has been invented by Scots, but that's all over too. We don't even have a good engineering department at Glasgow University. But we do have good doctors, health and so, yes. *Is there anything cultural which distinguishes the Scots from the rest of British?* No, not when they are here, but when they go to Canada or America, then they pull out their bag-pipes and kilts and drink their whisky. And then they start crying when they hear their bag-pipes. Then they remember the history, you know, when the Scots got slaughtered, slaughtered by the English. Yea, the Scots had a hard time. But the Scots here don't care about all that. You don't see anybody wearing a kilt here.

Where do you live? *With a friend.* Is she Scottish? *No, she is ...* ...don't say English! *(He spat at the seat next to him)* No, French. Ah, vive la France! I know, ha.<sup>161</sup>

Pride in national achievements was only expressed once (with regard to inventions). Otherwise an air of melancholy accompanied the interviews as the Scots thought and spoke about their nation. During all interviews the historic plight of the Scots was brought up at some point or another. Particularly the older generation, even when they claimed not to care for 'all that', as the taxi-driver quoted above, became resentful towards the English. With regard to associations, descriptions of Scottish mentality immediately followed the obvious: the kilt.

We've got our heritage, we're more laid back, we're more passionate, we've got our passion. We're wearing a kilt and are no Anglo-Saxons. We are very generous, we are more welcome to strangers like yourself, we are more like the Irish, being Celts as we say. I think that's what makes us different. We're all open to people coming up, other races.<sup>162</sup>

The Scots define themselves primarily in demarcation to the English and *via* their resentments against English domination.

Very much like the Irish, of subservient background. We used to be the underdogs, I suppose, in Britain. So we'll fight, the same as the Irish. The English have been like, their Empire and all this rubbish.<sup>163</sup>

A strong sense of distinction was also observed among those interviewees who were in their early thirties. Yet these responses were not as aggressive. What has been emphasised was the difference in mentality, particularly on friendliness.

Apart from just the language itself, what about tartan as a national dress. The politics is different in Scotland too. It's all about left wing political values. ...We like to socialise more than others I think, particularly in the pub we like a drink. ...There is a very marked distinction between Scots and English, no question. We've got our own culture, it's a different culture. I don't know how to explain that. We've got our own sense of humour which is quite different to the English sense of humour, Scottish characters, particularly in the cities, you know, which you would probably not find anywhere else. The people particularly in Glasgow and in some of the big cities tend to be very friendly. If you were to ask somebody where or how to get from one place to



another, they'll walk with you for half a mile to show you how to get there rather than to try to explain it.<sup>164</sup>

To quite a few respondents it was of importance how others think of Scotland and the Scots. Many answers revealed a subliminally inferiority complex which automatically coerced the interviewees to take a defensive stance. The desire to be acknowledged and accepted as well as the need for self-respect becomes most obvious in some of the answers.

I was watching a television program and they were saying that Glasgow is seen now as one of the most fashionable cities in the world. And people are seen to have their own character, their own fashion, their own style, and it is becoming a very trendy thing now as well, it's not just ... It is one of the first times that Scotland is feeling sort of a superiority thing. I do really think that when you go abroad and you say that you are Scottish, you get quite a good reception. 'Oh, you're Scottish brilliant', rather than when you say your English they say 'ah, all right another tourist'.<sup>165</sup>

To be perceived as backward and not being treated as equals seems to be a salient issue for quite a few Scots.

When Scotland and England came together with the Union in 1707, most people thought that, you know, that was a really bad thing but actual fact, as far as the Scottish economy was concerned, it was the best thing that happened in Scotland. It opened up huge areas to Scotland. But, you know that aspect has been lost and when people start to think about how well they might do and soon they are going to do better with their own parliament. But well, that is not necessarily the case. ...It is part of the United Kingdom but it's different. People think of themselves as being Scottish as opposed to being British. That's because we are being suppressed and people think that they are being dominated. If you interview people down south, I mean a lot of people down south they don't actually see Scotland as being a place they would necessarily want to come to. Most of them, you know, have this idea that we are running around with wooden clubs in our hand, we don't have TV or central heating, that we're really roughing it. It's just ... they've actually established Glasgow as being a kind of trendy cultural place now.<sup>166</sup>

The religious difference between the Scots and the English was not top of the agenda. Only a few interviewees referred to it.

Religion is different in Scotland as well, ...in England the Church of England has got Bishops and so on, they've got a hierarchy, in Scotland there is more equality.<sup>167</sup>



How deeply rooted resentments against the English really are, became apparent as the interviewees were questioned about ethnic minorities in Scotland. An overwhelming majority not only passively accepted the situation but also welcomed the idea of a multicultural society in Scotland. The general trend was that ethnic minorities from abroad were more welcome than the English.

There is an irony, just because of the history of Scotland and England and the pitch battles and everything that went on before, people you know, from further afield almost going to be accepted quicker than an English person. I mean it has been in the news just recently that someone was beaten to death in Edinburgh, that was an English person. ...Just because of this Scottish-English thing. Maybe that's an exaggeration if you're an Indian, you came, you'd be accepted fully, but there's no question that Scots have always had this thing about the English, they are always suspicious of them. You've only got to be at a Scotland-England football match to appreciate how intense that feeling is, it really is.<sup>168</sup>

The Scottish experience of marginalisation seems to have an impact on the way attitude is shaped and foreigners are viewed.

That's good. We are from a different culture, we are the Celts, our families go back to when Ireland has split, the potato famine, a lot of immigrants came from Ireland and that's where we're from, our background. The Catholic community in Scotland has been looked down on for years and years and years, so it's better when it's more multi.<sup>169</sup>

Among the younger generation none of the interviewees seemed to have any aggressions against the English as such, but the issues such as history, political neglect and lack of respect was also brought up by the majority of these respondents.

They are more aware of their history and where they come from. Yea, because Scotland is a smaller country ... but it has more of an identity than the English do. The Scottish accent, that is what Scottishness means to me.<sup>170</sup>

I think Scotland itself has a much better sense of community and a much friendlier atmosphere. I think people know more about their neighbours.<sup>171</sup>

It's because Scotland is so much smaller but yet we still compete on the same scale. Like at sports, in events for the start, I mean how much respect does Scotland get, especially for their rugby teams and football teams so we just shout that little bit louder to try and get more recognised.<sup>172</sup>

I think as well that Scotland hasn't any political representation in Britain, its only got the London government. And I think that's why a lot of people resent...<sup>173</sup>

I do feel that we are shoved into the background. The government focuses on England much more than it focuses on Scotland. We don't have control over what we want. Which is why people stand up for Scotland more than they stand up for England, because there is more to stand up for.<sup>174</sup>

### 2.8.1. A Parliament as an Identity Anchor

It was surprising to hear that although the majority of the interviewees wanted a Scottish parliament they were not sure what advantages it would actually bring. The interviewees gave the impression that a Scottish parliament represented national self-respect rather than an institution that will bring self-determination. It seems that the Scottish parliament symbolises the end of English 'imperialism', no matter whether things will come to the better or worse.

I mean, I think the Scots love to be able to blame everything on the English and once we get a parliament, if things ... we can't blame anybody anymore. I mean Scotland does have security by being part of Britain but maybe the parliament will work for Scotland's people, maybe Scotland will be better off, but I don't really know until we get going.<sup>175</sup>

I think it's good because we've been wanting it for so long. I don't know how it is going to be in reality, but it is an improvement.<sup>176</sup>

It has been inevitable for quite some time, but not necessarily for reasons of national sentiment. It's simply in response to practical needs because the Scottish office, just one of the London Ministries, administered all the money spent in Scotland and it was unaccountable to the popular sentiment in Scotland because there is no legislative body

to scrutinise this kind of thing. And there is certainly not enough time for it to be scrutinised effectively in the Westminster Parliament. And so it was simply a recognition of the need to have something which was necessary, which we didn't have before.<sup>177</sup>

### 2.8.2. No Monarchy for Scotland

The interviewees made it rather obvious that the monarchy does not enjoy a lot of support in Scotland. The circumstance that Scotland does not directly profit from the monarchy may contribute to its general rejection. That Scotland supplied King James VI of Scotland (James I) and that the House of Stuart ruled Britain for more than a hundred years was only mentioned by a historian.

We're anti monarchy, anti monarchy, it's a waste of money.<sup>178</sup>

They have no bidding in my life whatsoever.<sup>179</sup>

I'm not really bothered about it. People will argue that it is bringing a lot of money into the country and that they are doing a lot of good but, you know, to Scotland I'm not sure.<sup>180</sup>

I don't think they do a lot for their country, the government runs the country. I don't see the point.<sup>181</sup>

I mean I don't give a shit about the monarchy.<sup>182</sup>

### 2.8.3. History can Hurt

It was observed that Scottish national identity is primarily based on the memory of historic humiliation and the rejection of English domination. For the majority Scottish participation in Empire building was of no significance. Only three interviewees referred to the Act of Union and the



subsequent economic advantages and therefore only spoke of the Empire indirectly. One Scotsman associated it directly with the English and thus devalued it immediately. From this it can be concluded that Empire could only temporarily weaken but not obliterate Scottish nationalism. The majority of the interviewees would primarily refer to themselves as Scottish rather than as British and not a single one of them ever confused Scottishness with Britishness.

The Scots still perceive themselves as Celts as opposed to Anglo-Saxons and value their friendly and helpful mentality. Although the Scots insist on a stronger national identity they are aware of the regional differences within Scotland; it was frequently mentioned that the Scots in Edinburgh are more anglicised than they are in Glasgow. The Scottish accent and dialect is of particular significance. It marks identity and signifies distinctiveness although the Scots and English speak the same language.

The desire for self-respect and acknowledgement has manifested itself in the demand for a Parliament and some self-determination. However, complete national independence was not an appealing perspective for the majority. The Scots are aware that English and Scottish society has grown together to a certain extent.

I mean there are so many English in Scotland and so many Scots in England and same in Wales, that I think there is some kind of unity.<sup>183</sup>

External threat definitely seems to be a binding element. A sense of solidarity in the case of external threat has not been eroded by the aspiration of devolution.

If there was a war, if Scotland, England, and Wales, if they all had separate parliaments, they would come to some agreement to come together. ...I would definitely say I was Scottish before I would say I was British.<sup>184</sup>

When identity is bruised by humiliation it seeks healing. Everyone wants to feel proud of who or what s/he is. Therefore pride (not arrogance) and identity are intertwined. If a nation is dominated in such a way that it loses self-respect, aggression and conflict becomes inevitable. Past national humiliations are deeply ingrained in Scottish minds. The establishment of a Scottish parliament and more self-determination would finally allow the Scots to identify less with the past and to build their identity on their own achievements.

## 2.9. Welsh Identity

Welsh identity is frequently described as primarily cultural compared to Scottish national identity.

Leeks and dragons, rugby and the countryside, that's it. The Welsh culture, the language, our literature.<sup>185</sup>

Among the Welsh interviewees national pride was more frequently referred to as an aspect of national identity than by the Scots.

Heritage, history, national pride. I think because it's such a small country ... insular is the wrong word, but....<sup>186</sup>

Those interviewees who, from a political perspective, looked beyond Welsh and even British borders found it more difficult to describe Welsh identity. They rather referred to what 'home' means to them.

Language, ...that's a difficult one, countryside, the coast-line, the culture basically I think, music, sport, it's industrial past, that's about it. I think it attempts to have a national identity, I don't know whether it actually succeeds in having a national identity though. There is a big divide between south and north Wales, there tends to be a big divide between north and south Wales. I don't think, to be honest, I don't think it's actually got an identity which is different or as much as say Scotland has or Ireland has, although it sort of attempts to regain one with the national assembly here. Nationally we are not that different although we like to think that we are different. We're not that different.<sup>187</sup>

Others associated community values such as friendship and loyalty with Welsh identity. A strong solidarity with the Scots and Irish particularly in disassociation from the English was also observed.

Rugby, singing and sheep. Loyalty, honesty and friendship. The rest of Britain hates the English. We are very friendly people, accommodating people. ...We're not Welsh nationalists.<sup>188</sup>

Quite a few Welsh have associated Welshness with working class, industry or coal-mining and some of them declared the English responsible for closing the mines. Historic injustice and economic 'discrimination' seem to be the most important issues for those interviewees who claim to be nationalists.

Leeks and daffodils, rugby, and working class, nice people. Not the usual stuff, all coal-miners singing everywhere ... they are friendly people, down to earth. ...Nationalistic very, based on heritage. Proud of what we are and who we are, we are proud of our rugby team although they are not very good at the moment. We are also anti-English. ...No disrespect, but the Welsh will always be the Welsh and there will be nothing that will ever change it because of the fact that we are proud of who we are



and where we come from. ...There is a divide because of a language difference. People who are Welsh speaking, don't think of people who are English speaking, who can't speak Welsh, who are Welsh, I don't know if they think of us as less Welsh ... or English. ... Another analogy, it was an Englishman who killed our last dragon. It is an analogy, but if you think about it, it's pretty true to what happened. It was an Englishman who's killed our last dragon, St. George, he's the patron saint of England.<sup>189</sup>

I've learnt history and I know how the English shit on us basically, in years gone by. 1536, I know that stuff. A lot of Welsh think that they are looked down upon. I mean a lot of Welsh people think that the English look down on us. They do. We're ruled by outsiders, we're left out. For the time being. *Independence?* Totally. ... (In America half of the people who signed the Treaty of Independence were Welsh or of Welsh ancestry. Abraham Lincoln his parents were Welsh, Hillary Clinton's grandfather is Welsh, Elvis' grandfather, Welsh. ... So they migrated because the jobs were taken away, there was nothing here, so they migrated to America.)<sup>190</sup>

The Scots are very much the same. The Scots and the Welsh people get on very well. They all hate the English. You will never see a Welsh person carrying the Union Jack. At a football match, Welsh people carry the Welsh flag, the English take the Union Jack never the English flag with the plane white and the red cross, the English always take the Union Jack, they see that as English. We don't, we take the Welsh flag.<sup>191</sup>

The majority of the interviewees however, indicated at one point or another that they were not nationalists. Mostly women but also men related Welshness with communal feelings and the country as well as the countryside.

Family atmosphere, friendliness between people in villages, especially in villages. Family and friends will look after you, no matter what goes wrong. Welsh people have a communal feeling, if something goes wrong then they all come running. It's called *hewrieth*, you can't explain it in English, it's a Welsh word. It's the same feeling for what I feel for my nationality. It means longing, but it's more like belonging, you can't translate it into English. You know where you belong, language, ways of dealing with people, spirit.<sup>192</sup>

As the interviewees were asked whether they think that there is unity among British society, the Welsh came up with the most 'categorical no' replies. None of the Scottish interviewees responded to this question with such determination as some of the Welsh have.

No, no chance, not at all.<sup>193</sup>

No, well as a whole country? No. Well, the Celts yes, Wales, Scotland, Ireland. The Celts have a lot of history and we've always been oppressed by the English. But we're better than them, so it doesn't matter.<sup>194</sup>

There is definitely a divide between the English and the rest.<sup>195</sup>

The Celts there is a unity there. I mean the English look at it: we don't care about the Welsh we don't care about the Scots. But we care, we care for us, we are treated differently. It makes a difference to us. There is a massive unity there. The largest part is England, that's why we have a problem, that's where the problem is.<sup>196</sup>

Those interviewees who were generally satisfied with the political situation believe in the silent majority who feel that there is also a social unity with England.

Oh yea, I think so, generally. There is a silent majority. And there is a loud minority, all stirred up this sort of nationalism sometimes. But there is still this feeling of pride in the Welsh, in being Welsh.<sup>197</sup>

Personally I would look to the region, basically because I think our future is within Europe. Things are basically down to the fact that we'd like to see ourselves as like: the Scottish are different, the Welsh are different, the Irish are different, the English are different. You know, because when I go abroad, if somebody says: oh you are from England. You say: no from Wales. I probably think of myself as Welsh first, British, then European. But if somebody accuses me of being English it's like: Aaaar.<sup>198</sup>

### 2.9.1. The Monarchy

Generally speaking the Welsh thought about the monarchy in a similar way as the English did. The interviewees supported the idea of maintaining the monarchy but thought that some reform is necessary.

Too many hangers-on. As long as they pay their way, I'm happy with it. I'm not an anti-monarchist and I'm not particularly pro.<sup>199</sup>

Yea, okay, I'm quite fine quite happy with that. They're good for the economy of the country.<sup>200</sup>

I'm pro monarchy. It makes us very different from the rest of Europe. I think they contribute a awful lot towards the UK, in a lot of ways.<sup>201</sup>

However, those who think in more nationalistic terms were rather aroused by the memory of how the crown prince received the title 'Prince of Wales'.

Waste of time, we've got a Prince of Wales who is not Welsh, who's got nothing to do with Wales. The whole thing came about by taking our real Prince of Wales and making the Queen's son Prince of Wales. It doesn't relate to us at all. There should be a head of state but not the Royal Family. There should be a President not a monarchy.<sup>202</sup>

### 2.9.2. The Non-Assimilative Welsh

To claim that Welsh identity was primarily based on culture would distort the picture. Certainly the demand for independence is not as loud among the Welsh as compared with the Scots. The majority of the interviewees did not support Welsh independence, but at the same time they based their stance on the argument that it was economically not feasible. However, this does not mean that the Welsh are less nationalistic than the Scots. The Welsh emphasise cultural differences and support the re-introduction of the Welsh language because it is the only way to maintain Welsh identity. National independence is impossible because of economic dependency.

Compared to the Scots, the Welsh were more aware of their cultural heritage and compared to the English they never exchanged Britishness with Welshness, without making a clear distinction between the two.

British values are classified from outside as English values. British values are decided by the English. If you went to London, they would say the Union Jack, the flag.<sup>203</sup>



Although the Welsh still seem to reject cultural and national incorporation by the English, their historic destiny did not erode their national self-confidence in the same way as that of the Scots. Possibly, this can be related to the fact that the Welsh were conquered nearly two hundred years before the Scots entered the Union and have therefore experienced less military friction during that period.

Welsh identity seems to be country-bound and is strongly influenced by community feelings, in the sense that the interviewees expressed their attachment to the area of Wales where they grew up. The Welsh language has both a cohesive, as well as divisive impact on the Welsh population. It provides identity and a sense of unity particularly among those who speak it. However, a few interviewees mentioned that Welsh speakers consider Welsh non-Welsh speakers as anglicised. These interviewees gave the impression that they felt hurt by this categorisation.

The Welsh, like the Scots were very aware of their Celtic heritage and shared the sense of unity with the Scots and Irish. They also referred to friendliness and community oriented helpfulness as an important Welsh trait. An awareness of the industrial past and references to Wales as a poor area were unique among the Welsh. The former Empire was no topic at all.

It was observed that those interviewees who have established themselves on an economic level are less nationalistic. However, all interviewees expressed pride in being Welsh; pride in who they are, what they are and where they come from.

## 2.10. British Identity

British identity was constructed, as Colley suggested with the Act of Union (1707), as an 'umbrella identity' which was intended to unify the kingdom. It was never designed to replace regional or national identities, but to serve as a unifying factor between the English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish. Now, nearly three hundred years after the Act of Union, devolution is loosening the legal ties between the contractors. Empire, Protestantism and the Catholic threat have been forgotten. What remained are a political and economic dissatisfaction among the Celts and an internalised British identity among the English. It has become clear that neither the Scots, nor the Welsh, have absorbed the idea of a British identity in the same way as the English have done. Nevertheless both Scots and Welsh do not seem to support total national independence. There is a strong indication that once the Scots and Welsh have more say in their own affairs a British identity will become more appealing as it is no longer equated with English 'suppression', but with partnership.

Contrary to Scottish expectations the majority of the English interviewees thought of the Scottish as equals and were very much in favour of devolution. The English were not completely oblivious to Scottish resentments and did indicate an understanding for the disadvantaged Scots. A few thought that in future Britain will be transformed into a federation. The awareness of inhabiting an island and to provide mutual support during times of hardship signifies the core of British identity. Although

Scottish and Welsh nationalists may demand more acknowledgements for who they are, this psychological bond cannot be broken.

From a historic perspective British identity was determined by English values as well as governmental and administrative structures. Patriotism, loyalty and law and order were based on the Crown and Empire (both originally English). Britain and its Empire were governed from London, which had turned into the centre of all political attention. Thus the observation made by one Welsh interviewee, who rejected British values as English ones, was correct. Collective identity is based on a selective process, on the choice, interpretation and advocacy of historical material. The question of ethnic and national identity has become especially important with the creation of nation states. Generally, no nation state is ethnically and culturally homogeneous. The national identity that was created together with the nation state is dominated by the cultural identity of the dominant ethnic group at the time of its creation<sup>204</sup>. Accordingly, historic events will be emphasised which reflect the victory and success of this particular ethnic group, in the case of Britain, that of the English.

Since the 1950's Britain developed into a multicultural society. Immigration from the Commonwealth introduced Afro-Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Chinese to British society. In this context British identity is bound to change its meaning to a restructured society. Tony Benn MP believes that British national identity is based on ethnic and cultural diversity:



Britain is already a melting pot of Celts, Romans, French, Saxon, Danish + Irish.<sup>205</sup>

The future development of British identity has to be based on

Diversity + self-confidence + pride in tradition ...<sup>206</sup>

...which are important to us all. Among the British population the idea of a multicultural society is already widely accepted. The majority of interviewees ascertained that British society is multicultural and always was. It is seen as a continuation of a social development just in a different form. Lord Tebbit CH stated that justice is the most important British value on the grounds of which a coherent society can flourish.

Above all, they have to be shared values by everybody within this society. So you can have a decent and coherent society in any part of the world, with almost any set of values, Hindu, Christian, Muslim, whatever you like, as long as they are shared by everybody. In our particular case I think those values have to be based on Judaic-Christian ethics. Because all the assumptions of law, family, are on that basis, and it seems to have worked pretty well. Then if you add to that the concept of justice, I think you have most of what is necessary for a society to function. ...A specific British value? Well, I think certainly that of justice.<sup>207</sup>

Although Tony Benn MP and Lord Tebbit represent completely different political perspectives, both have indirectly touched the most phenomenal aspect of British identity: the (perceived) continuity of British history. Whilst Tony Benn MP referred to the continuity of multiculturalism throughout British history, Lord Tebbit emphasised the continuity of the Judaic-Christian ethics and justice.

To what degree there was or was not continuity in British history is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it can be argued that history and political

actions have always been presented in the framework of political tradition. Therefore it depends on which historic period is highlighted to create a sense of continuity. For example, the majority of British interviewees were aware of both multiculturalism and justice (particularly with regard to the protection of individual freedom) as British features. Based on their political predominance, the English were prepared to provide more political and legal justice for the Scots and Welsh, the latter were more focused on receiving it.

Natural geographical borders determine British identity. It is based on 'being an island'. The English are more attached to this 'umbrella identity' than the Welsh and the Scots. The former, equate their political institutions and expansion with it, whilst for the Celts it represents a geographical and political definition, yet all of them are aware of the multicultural nature of British society. Although devolution is on the political agenda, a subliminally sense of unity based on geographic constraints does exist nevertheless. The Empire may no longer be a salient factor for political cohesion and national pride, nevertheless it still shapes British identity in a subliminal way. The circumstance that Australia, Canada and the United States are English speaking opens up a huge market for English literature and allows Britons to migrate for jobs without major adaptation problems. English has become the international language because of colonisation, which enables Britons to travel the world without ever learning a foreign language. The whole world economy has grown from Western Imperial commerce and present British multiculturalism is part of its colonial heritage.

### 2.10.1. Is British Society in Crisis?

The question of 'fragmentation' or 'crisis' of identity is being vigorously debated in social theory. Therefore it is of interest to explore whether this phenomenon can be observed among British society. On the political level it became clear that devolution will bring about substantial change in terms of what Britishness will mean to the Scots, the English and the Welsh. Although devolution seems to be an indication for the political fragmentation of Britain, the interviews demonstrated that national independence is not an appealing option. Therefore devolution may possibly entail the opportunity for an intensification of Welsh and Scottish identification with Britishness in the future, as they will then participate in the union as an equal party.

On the social level the condition of a society can be analysed by exploring a number of factors: divorce rate, unemployment, crime rate, church attendance, etc.. However, the interpretations of such quantitative research results are controversial. For example, statistics on rates of divorce have shown that the proportion of children born to single or unmarried parents has risen sharply since the early 1970's. Whilst some deplore this fact as harmful to child development others argue that there is no evidence that children are being neglected more or less today than at the beginning of the century. Some speak in favour of smaller families, as fewer children receive more attention.<sup>208</sup>



Another indicator for social problems is the crime rate. The number of offences reported to the police has risen inexorably since the beginning of the century. This phenomenon is explained by a rising propensity to report crimes, more people owning valuable possessions and more opportunity to commit crime.<sup>209</sup> Youth delinquency and the circumstance that juvenile and young adult males commit most of the crimes are not new phenomena either. During times of recession crimes due to unemployment have always increased. In the past century attempts to counteract such juvenile waywardness and delinquency were made by establishing youth organisations such as the Boy Scouts.<sup>210</sup>

An actual crisis of identity cannot be determined from the interviews on British identity. With regard to the decline of religious observance it was suggested that although less than one-fifth of the population are practising Christians, "personal attachment to Christian moral teaching remains high, particularly as expressed in the moral commandments of the Decalogue"<sup>211</sup>.

An interviewee from Birmingham has also supported this position:

I think Christianity is perceived as a safety net. I'd like to think that, if you look at church attendance Christianity is in a pretty dull state really. ...They believe in some sort of God and if they have to relate it, then they would relate it to the Christian God. Our culture is completely, our political culture our socio-economic culture is dominated by Christianity in that ... the way that we talk, in very religious terms, .. like Blair has done in the Labour Party he speaks in very messianic terms. The whole of our political system is based on those kind of things. I think it has become a little less inherent than it has been. I think acceptance has become a value in this society now, not as much as I would like it to be but it is.<sup>212</sup>

If the effects of such isolated social facts on society are so difficult to determine, either a more focused study would be necessary to highlight correlation or a broader approach must be taken.

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from Birmingham spoke about their family values than Londoners did. To what degree the size, or the nature of a city, is proportional to social cohesion remains open. But generally speaking in big cities people are not integrated into communal life in the same way as in smaller towns and villages, where social cohesion, communal spirit and peer pressure encourage and nurtures cultural traditions as well as religious practice. The urban environment rather fosters individualisation and isolation. Social mobility separates the family and high competition on the job market leaves little time to maintain ties with wider family. The artificial rhythm of office work, or monotone and alienating factory work, also discourages the maintenance of traditions and religious life, which in turn entail social rituals to foster community cohesion.

Industrial mass society also developed an unprecedented variety of leisure accessible to the masses. The cinema, radio, television, professional sport and motor vehicles led to a preoccupation with escapism to the exclusion of spiritual and communal concerns. Industrial society has been organised towards maximising economic profit. The family structure has adjusted to the needs of a mobile society. Fewer children receive more education and material support to prevail in a society, which is more focused on the manipulation of information, rather than on the manipulation of objects. Even leisure has been directed towards consumerism to profit the economy. Within this socio-economic framework the pace of life is constantly increased, so that time for oneself, for family, friends and community becomes scarce.



To optimise efficiency the State has participated in 'division of labour', for example by taking control of education. Gellner observed that a highly industrialised society has to standardise the education system to maximise efficiency.<sup>213</sup> Such standardisation ensures basic common knowledge and a sense of social cohesion on the grounds of cultural reproduction. The institutionalised education of children was paralleled by an increasing tendency of parents to neglect their duty to convey behavioural and moral patterns. This phenomenon was enforced by the promotion of anti-authoritarian education in the light of emancipation. A. S. Neill, founder of Summerhill, promoted the idea that children should grow-up free of fear and physical violence in order to develop a healthy ego and a sense of self-worth. They should learn by understanding the purpose and reason for their individual limits instead of facing unexplained prohibition. Children should explore their own abilities and enjoy education rather than perceive it as an obligation. Like this they are able to explore their own abilities and will thus find their niche in society.<sup>214</sup>

Unfortunately the concepts of anti-authoritarian education were misunderstood or applied incorrectly by many parents due to ignorance. Parents simply eliminated authoritarian measures and failed to apply alternative educational strategies. Instead of investing more time into explaining to their children why certain behaviour is inappropriate for a successful integration into society, to substitute for authoritarian measures, children were left to themselves and they no longer learned to accept limits and how to deal with authority. Yet it is part of the learning process and the role-play of childhood to try and test limits. Children want to know how far

they can go and where they will face resistance. In the course of this process children are taught behavioural norms and moral as well as ethic values.

It has been observed that the phase of childhood has shortened while the phase of adolescence has been prolonged. Partly due to the mass media, children are burdened with the facts of life too soon. They lose their innocent view of the world and have to process information that their great grand parents were ignorant of throughout a lifetime. Once adolescents, these youngsters try to suppress their powerlessness *via* the dilemmas of this world and escape into a world of excessive entertainment that sometimes is accompanied by an air of infantility. The prolonged phase of education, during which the individual does not have to take on any responsibilities, is an additional factor for a prolonged adolescence.

The younger generations (born during the 1970's and after) have received only limited orientation from the Church, parents and school. However, the dilemma is that humans seek to act and feel according to adopted values. In a modern secular and industrial society, with a democratic political system, a variety of values are offered. A multitude of churches, religious sects, non-governmental organisations, societies and movements offer ideals and orientations. Therefore problems are not related to lack of values but to the difficult task of choosing the right ones. Ideally a young individual should have been equipped during their educational years with a frame of orientation based on a value system.

The increasing violence and destructiveness within British society are a result of hopelessness and lack of orientation. An insufficiently developed identity, due to parental neglect and a missing value system, makes the search for a suitable orientation more difficult for an individual. Identity is an important aspect of human nature both on the individual and collective level. The confidence in one's identity is based on the confidence in one's 'I', which is the belief in one's 'self' and in the core of one's personality. If there is no belief in the continuity of the 'self', then the feeling of identity is jeopardised. In order to maintain the feeling of identity, a dependency on the acknowledgement of others develops. The belief in one's 'self' is the precondition for the ability to make a promise.<sup>215</sup>

Unemployed youth, who feel that society has no need for their productivity, will slowly lose their faith in their potential and their future. They will search for security and support from groups or gangs that will give them a new feeling of powerfulness and integration. The decline of conviction in one's own reason and strength will lead to the irrational belief that submitting to a power perceived as overpowering, strong, all knowing and almighty can substitute for one's own insecurities and weaknesses. Rational belief is based on the observation of one's potential and productivity. The belief in an existing, all-controlling power is identical with the disbelief in the possibility to realise one's potentials, which are not yet actualised.<sup>216</sup>

Self-actualisation is best achieved by overcoming one's passive existence by being creative. By giving expression to his creativity man can transcend his passive existence and become 'creator'. The need to transcend is the basis for



love, artistic endeavours, religion and material productivity. The requirements for creative productivity are activity and care for what is done. Yet there is still another way to experience transcendence. If an individual cannot create life, s/he can nevertheless destroy it. Also by destroying life the individual can experience a sense of 'transcendence', because s/he then places himself above life. When driven by the desire to transcend, the individual has the choice between creating or destroying. The will to destroy usually emerges when the will to create cannot be experienced with satisfaction.<sup>217</sup> The degree of destructiveness seems to be proportional to the degree to which the expansion of emotional, physical and intellectual abilities cannot be spontaneously expressed and their realisation is hampered. If the individual's natural tendency to expand and to live is suppressed, then these suppressed energies will be transformed into destructive ones. Destructiveness is the result of suppressed life energy.<sup>218</sup>

Present day youth especially have to cope with high competition and a materialist society in which creative liveliness was substituted with rational functionalism. Youth entertainment no longer consists of sports and the enjoyment of self-made or self-renovated toys, bicycles or motorcycles (depending on age), but of playing computer games, watching television and drinking in pubs. Consumerism has become the main focus of youth. Objects are bought in response to set trends and gotten rid of with the next trend. Quality is no longer a criteria for choice, only what is trendy is desirable. The Enlightenment created the foundation for the advancement of individualism in Western society. By the political and economic emancipation of the individual, by the education towards independent

thinking and the liberation from suppressive authorities, the individual was supposed to experience their 'I' as the centre of their forces and activity. Instead society has subjugated itself to the dictate of the free market economy.<sup>219</sup>

Excessive escapism, whether in the form of entertainment or consumerism, is generally speaking the result of lack of stability and orientation. Usually the family, the community, the Church or government provide orientation. If such orientation was not provided, the individual is exposed to the manipulation of mass media within the urbanised mass marketing-oriented society that seeks to create new demands in order to keep the economy going. The diversity and the multiplicity of 'objects of identification' available in a democratic-industrial society presupposes that individuals are able to make the right choices for themselves. Thus the individual should have a stable value structure that provides sufficient orientation. According to Fromm, industrial society influences modern man in two essential ways: the individual becomes more independent, can rely on his own judgement and critical observations, whilst becoming more isolated, lonely and fearful.<sup>220</sup> The system does not impose a rigid structure on the individual and a supply of pre-defined values for orientation. Although democracies are based on some generally accepted principal values in order to allow for the system to function, individuals have to rely on themselves to make sense of their lives and to search for an appropriate niche in society. For adolescents this lack of orientation presents greater complexity in their search for a more stable identity. Provided that a system of values and a

frame of orientation are not home nurtured, society will offer little support for the adolescent.

In politics subliminally manipulation is also taking place. Political passiveness is the result of the feeling that one's political will cannot be enforced. With the introduction of universal suffrage, the Chartists expected social change brought about by the will of responsible and independent individuals. Their ideals remained a utopia. Although political participation is no longer limited by restricted franchise, the way it is practised, does not give expression to the actual will of the people. People cannot express 'their' will if they don't have one. In an alienated society people express their will in the same way as they decide on a purchase. Very much dependent on external influences, they decide according to repetitive and suggestive advertisement. The democratic process is nothing but the manipulation of public opinion (or will) to come to the same conclusion that politicians had already reached. As far as most political issues are concerned, the majority of the people feel indifferent as long as their private and economic interests are not affected. Any connected dangers are considered removed and maybe not as threatening as they may initially seem. This attitude reveals signs of a limited sense of reality. A limited sense or awareness of reality reduces the individual's responsibility and has an impact on the individual's ability to enforce their will. The will is the psychological counterpart of a well-targeted responsible action. The average citizen does not have any influence on economic or international affairs. The individual has no task to fulfil and therefore no opportunity to enforce his will. As the individual has no power over this decision-making process,



they will not feel responsible. This also explains why many people have only limited knowledge concerning political issues.<sup>221</sup>

Insecure individuals with no orientation will tend to support strong leadership. The desire to overcome one's own powerlessness with regard to the social and political complexity, of which the individual does not seem to be able to make any sense, can express itself in a radical counteraction - to seek control.<sup>222</sup> The individual will avoid admitting their weakness to themselves and direct anger outwards, in other words, project resentments and exasperation onto the establishment and society.

In the light of these developments that are the consequences of the industrialisation of society, the 'electronic revolution' is demanding new social sacrifices. With the technological advancement the process of globalisation that has been initiated by colonialism was unbound. It penetrates cultural and national boundaries and exposes the individual to the world, with all the consequences this entails. Every part of the world becomes accessible to a relatively large number of people. The mass media and the internet provide an unprecedented access to world-wide information, leaving the selection process to the individual. This process will open new areas of employment as much as it will sacrifice traditional jobs. Careers will depend even more on the luxury of a highly specialised education and social isolation could provoke neurosis among society.

During the past two hundred years Britain has been at the forefront of social revolution. Its society has constantly adjusted to the demands of economic

progress. British society is based on progress that brings about structural changes. During the Industrial Revolution the pace of change has increased tremendously. It appears that the need for further change has become a coping strategy in itself, to veil the fact that society has not yet developed any serious long-term solutions for the negative consequences of its industrialisation, which are mass urbanisation and unemployment. Certainly the National Health Service, housing schemes and unemployment aim to help, but they do not provide solutions for the psychological damage.

The consequences of industrialisation have culturally and socially up-rooted the majority of modern society. Psychologically, humans seek continuity in their life history to develop and maintain a coherent sense of identity. Yet modern society demands flexibility so that people can adjust to economic changes. Adjustment to change such as engaging in retraining programmes, unemployment or social mobility complicates the maintenance of a coherent identity. Additional personal problems such as serious accidents, unexpected pregnancies or divorce can amplify such an inconsistency. Consequently, individuals adhere to selecting events from their life-story to produce a coherent picture of their self. For the younger generations, for which the environment has provided only little orientation, the search for a coherent identity becomes even more problematic.

Since the Industrial Revolution only one ideological concept has been developed to cope with the subsequent social crisis: communism. However, communism was defeated by one of the most fundamental human traits,

that of innate individualism. Once basic human needs such as housing, clothing and food have been satisfied, the desire to strive for something higher and to emphasise one's uniqueness suddenly emerges. If this motivating energy is suppressed the individual will become passive. Consequently the tremendous enthusiasm among communists soon withered away.

Radical ideology cannot offer long term solutions to an increasingly complex society. As a matter of fact, the 'electronic revolution' now provides the basis for the solution to the social problems that the Industrial Revolution created, because it reduces the need for social mobility. Depending on how the process is channelled it may become possible that 'work will come to the employee' rather than the employee having to 'go to work'. Like this a trend towards communal, family and rural life would be possible again.

## 2.11. Preliminary Conclusions

Historically British identity was formed from multicultural influences on both a political level (Roman, French, and Hanovarian Rulers) and on the popular level (immigration, settlement and invasion). To ensure that the foreign kings ruled in the interest of their English subjects the idea of a contract between the king and the 'community of the realm' was released with the Magna Carta. The circumstance that the Crown was always in financial difficulties made the kings dependent on their aristocratic subjects and therefore more co-operative. The heightened awareness for a just



government may have derived from the constant tension between the foreign kings and English subjects.

The limitation of the Crown's power was a slow process but nevertheless made the monarchy an integral part of a check-and-balance government. By the time William of Orange was invited to assume the throne, Parliament had established its power and made the monarchy subject to condition on the grounds of the Bill of Rights. Thus today's Parliament and constitutional monarchy are deeply rooted in the English political tradition and still constitute a central component of English national identity.

Henry VIII's religious emancipation from Rome protected England from foreign influence, but also provoked an external Catholic threat. The internal Catholic and Protestant power struggle for control over the Anglican Church led to unresolved Catholic discrimination right to the present day, as can still be observed in Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent in Scotland.

With the Act of Union (1707) Scots, Welsh and the English constructed a British identity based on Protestantism, imperial interests and the defence of realm against primarily Catholic and non-Christian enemies. Scottish, Welsh and English elite merged, leading the way to unity and to co-operation in policy-making. With the emergence of revolutionary ideology and war with Napoleonic France, the British ruling elite allowed for just sufficient political change to appease the population. Their propagation of patriotism and conversion to modesty saved them from social upheavals.

The continuity of monarchy also meant security and a stronger faith in the ruling elite. Adopting a British identity was related to career opportunities in the British colonies. The construction of a British identity was successful. Protestantism provided all three nations with a common frame of orientation and united the English, Welsh and Scots against their enemies.

Although the established churches eventually lost their influence, Protestant dissenters and sects replaced them. The industrialisation alienated many members of the working classes from religion and thus became more susceptible for socialist ideas. The physical deterioration of the population and the socialist pressure groups forced the government to introduce health care and pension schemes and thereby accepted responsibilities that were previously taken on by the church and the communities. The consequences of industrialisation were not only physical deterioration, but also spiritual impoverishment and social isolation. The inner emptiness was compensated by consumerism.

Protestantism, warfare and empire-building were the cement of British identity in eighteenth century. In the twentieth century the Empire was lost, Protestantism is in decline and since the Second World War Britain was no longer engaged in seriously threatening warfare. All three pillars of British identity have been eroded. What is there to substitute them?

Today, due to the dispute over the full membership of the European Community Britain can no longer afford to perceive any of the continental European states as a threat to British interests. Apart from that more and

more Scottish and Welsh voices call for devolution. Protestantism as Christianity itself, is no longer as influential on British culture as it used to be. With the loss of the Empire, both the commercial supremacy and imperial hegemony have ended. Britons no longer feel the same compulsion to remain united as they did before, as neither economic profit nor external threat provides motivation for union. For Scotland, independence and membership of a federal Europe could be a profitable alternative to the United Kingdom. During recent years the profit of British identity was forgotten by many Scots because of regional neglect, particularly during the Thatcher years. However, the Empire created a strong enough bond for Scots to prefer to maintain the union, but under different terms. In times of transformation it is more difficult to build 'an umbrella of solidarity by a symbolic construction of similarity' for large collectives. Nevertheless the successful repatriation of the Falkland Islands is a recent example of conflict which consolidated society. British identity will certainly continue to evolve the way it was intended to. British identity will continue to represent an 'umbrella identity' for the Scots, Welsh and Irish, but also for the Chinese, Pakistanis, Afro-Caribbeans and many other ethnic minorities who have settled in Britain. This identity has been and will be perceived as a multicultural one, providing orientation for how the juridical, social and political system is organised.

Crick's observation that the English did not develop such a specific English national identity as the Scots, Irish and Welsh can only be given partial support. English national identity may not be as specific as that of the Celtic nations, but it is certainly equally strong. Evidence suggests that English



self-consciousness is even stronger because English identity is very much equated with British identity. In contrast English nationalism is certainly less developed because the English nation is neither threatened, nor suppressed. With the emergence of imperialism the English dominated and economically exploited large parts of the world. In the past there was no need to boost the ethnic consciousness with national ideology. This, however, may change rapidly as devolution proceeds and England may have to make more concessions to the European Union. Assuming a new identity in the realm of a new Europe is still being vigorously rejected. It remains an open question how English identity will develop in the future particularly in the light of an increasing settlement of ethnic minorities.

Western industrial society is transforming into a globally accessible technological society. Any transformation and change creates instability and anxiety, due to the insecurity and unpredictability that it generates. The social crisis, as a result of globalisation, is enforced by the fact that the social consequences of the transformation from the agrarian society to the industrial society have not yet been successfully coped with.

The Industrial Revolution was preceded by the intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment, which emancipated man from the rigid and overpowering religious institution - the individual became the centre of intellectual attention. This ideological revolution however, developed out of an ideological stability with regard to a set value system and a rigid class structure. As religious values lost importance, the human intellect became the standard for all criteria. Economic progress, technological advancement

and the liberalisation of society became the main focus of modern time. Individualism also facilitated the creation of a mobile society, which allowed for unlimited economic growth.

After the Second World War the hope for a better future was unchallenged. It could hardly get worse and the flourishing British economy in the 1950's allowed for optimism. Never before, in the history of mankind, had such general wealth among whole of Western society been observed as during the period between the 1950's and mid 1980's. The increasing focus on materialism and social status pushed aside most of the religious values. Thus many forget that values are preserved in different forms. The social welfare state for example is one expression of taking responsibility for the well being of other members of society.

Western society as a whole has not yet come to terms with the effects of modernity as both the First and the Second World War have successfully veiled social crisis with destructive means, but not obliterated its cause. The first two decades of the post-war era were marked by the reconstruction of Europe, leaving little time to reflect on the wider historical and social correlations. The post-war era was and still is marked by another essential aspect: the focus on materialism. Materialism based on the economic principle of capitalism, unaccompanied by 'moral' and political ideology, is a result of industrialisation paralleled by the moral insecurities after the experience with the atrocious impact of fascist ideology. In Germany for example, a detailed public debate on the past was avoided immediately after the war, as extensive accusations could have triggered a collective

depression and hindered the reconstruction of the country. The introduction of ethics, based on traditional values that paved the way for such collective megalomania, would have been met with distrust. In East Germany (DDR) the dialectic materialism, Marxism-Leninism, was introduced from Moscow and in West Germany (BRD) the 'capitalist' materialism established itself. In the DDR the population oriented itself according to the theoretical, and in the BRD according to real, materialism.

The question may now arise why the societies of the Allied Nations have not developed a substantial social value system either. Well, as far as Britain and France were concerned both nations were preoccupied with the normalisation of their economies after the war and the management of the disintegration of their Empires. It became essential to secure markets and the supply of raw material. Socially both societies had to overcome the loss of prestige with the loss of their Empires and to redefine their national pride in terms of economic growth. During the 1950's and 60's existentialism emerged in France which was rather confined to the intellectual and artisan classes. During the end of the 60's the Flower Power Movement emerged in Britain and developed out of protest against the predominant materialism and the establishment. Yet the political programmes outlined by the young Flower Power Generation were met with hostility by the ruling elite.

The Cold War facilitated the definition of good and bad, right and wrong. The USSR was depicted as a barbaric and authoritarian regime, which threatened all Western values. In contrast the West, headed by the United States, defined itself as the defender of freedom and Human Rights.



Righteousness, prosperity and peace marked Western identity. The concept of individual freedom received more significance within the conflict with communist Russia. The Cold War seemed to unite Western society in defence of freedom and capitalism and to provide this society with a positive identity. Yet such an identity is too vague to supply a moral and ethical code to provide orientation for everyday life. Prosperity and freedom produced a self-satisfied, supersaturated society, in which the lack of orientation resurfaced. The two World Wars, the Cold War and the tremendous effort to provide for the economic growth on which this society is based, has veiled the symptoms of social crisis which industrialisation had triggered for decades. The growing demand for a mobile work force was the first step towards impairment of family ties and of the perpetuation of regional cultural heritage. The modernisation of society (which entails individualisation, technological progress and the creation of the welfare state) fostered a trend towards fewer children, who receive more training for skilled and professional work.

British society is facing substantial transformation both on a social and political level. On the social level densely populated cities create anonymity. This condition isolates individuals and creates loneliness. Therefore people began to compensate these deficits. Some transform themselves into workaholics to counter their emptiness by increasing their activities, whereas others indulge in consumerism and a materialistic lifestyle. Yet no one seems to be really satisfied.

The search for spirituality and the reassertion of rigid religious identities seem to be a consequence of the late modernisation process of Western societies. After the Second World War the desire to improve the economic situation prevailed among Western societies. Religious affiliations and a sense of spirituality gave way to the pursuit of progress and success. However, the desire to add spirituality and a purpose to one's otherwise rather empty and materialistic lifestyle seems to remain a significant component, which contributes to the equilibrium of the human psyche. Thus an increasing number of Christians, dissatisfied with the established churches convert to Buddhism, Sects, New Age movements and Islam.

The present social, political and economic system of this society does little to support individual identity development, leading to many unstable and disorientated individuals, primarily motivated to function in society in order to acquire wealth and status. They lack the feeling of responsibility towards society, as they seek to exclusively promote their own progress. A society with no sense of solidarity and compassion is in danger of gradually disintegrate as a whole. This crisis is not an exclusively British phenomenon, but can be observed among most Western societies.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with an English photographer (late 50s, male), London, 6th March 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Roy Strong, *The Story of Britain, A People's History*, London, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup> Roy Baumeister, *Identity, Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self*, Oxford, 1986, p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Rainer Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe, Analytische Sozialpsychologie*, Vol. I, Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 241-243.

<sup>6</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe, Gesellschaftstheorie*, Vol. IV, 1980, p. 68.

<sup>7</sup> This issue was raised by two interviews in Cardiff as they discussed what Welshness means to them.

<sup>8</sup> R. Strong, op. cit, pp. 86-89.

<sup>9</sup> See diagram in E. Gellner, *Nations And Nationalism*, Oxford, 1983, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 85.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 76.

<sup>12</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. I, 1980, pp. 248-250.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p.254.



- <sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp.258-65.
- <sup>15</sup> R. Strong, op. cit, p. 184.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid. pp. 198-205.
- <sup>17</sup> R. Baumeister, op. cit, p. 34.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 35.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 37.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid. pp. 43-44.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid. pp. 37-40.
- <sup>22</sup> Sir Isaac Newton, *Principia*, 1687.
- <sup>23</sup> R. Baumeister, op. cit, pp. 46-50.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid. p. 49. Also see P. Greven, *The Protestant Temperament*, New York, 1977.
- <sup>25</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. I, 1980, pp. 261-277.
- <sup>26</sup> R. Strong, op. cit, pp. 259-260.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid. pp. 266-267.
- <sup>28</sup> For the discussion of British identity between 1707 and 1837, Linda Colley, '*Britons, Forging the Nation*', is used as the primary reference. Although some critics such as Bernard Crick hold against her that she has been very selective in the way she uses historical material to support her thesis, her conclusions are plausible and match with theoretical assumptions about collective identity.
- <sup>29</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, 1992, p. 5.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid. pp. 1-5.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid. pp. 11-12.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid. p. 13.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid. pp. 14-15.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid. pp. 72-85.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 18.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 43.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 19.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid. pp. 19-23.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 39.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 371.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 55.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 97.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 102.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 105.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 117.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid. pp. 123-129.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid. pp. 140-143.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid. pp. 155-168, also compare R. Strong, *The Story of Britain*, p. 377.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid. pp. 184-187, also compare R. Strong, *The Story of Britain*, p. 377.
- <sup>50</sup> Linda Colley, op. cit, pp. 283-319.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid. pp. 192-3.
- <sup>52</sup> Stuart Brown (eds), *British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment*, 1996, p.8.
- <sup>53</sup> Carl Andresen (eds), *Handbuch der Dogmen-und Theologiegeschichte*, 1989, p.392.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 390.
- <sup>55</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848*, 1962, pp. 286-287.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid. pp. 266-272.
- <sup>57</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe, Gesellschaftstheorie*, Vol. IV, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 127.
- <sup>58</sup> C.W. Mills, *White Collar*, NY, 1951, p. 220, quoted by Erich Fromm in: *Gesamtausgabe, Gesellschaftstheorie*, Vol. IV, 1980, p. 127.
- <sup>59</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, p. 272-280.
- <sup>60</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. IV, 1980, p. 49.
- <sup>61</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, p. 280.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid. pp. 294-97.
- <sup>63</sup> R. Strong, op. cit, p. 387.
- <sup>64</sup> Linda Colley, op. cit, pp. 347-350.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid. pp. 350-360.
- <sup>66</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, 1987, pp.84-7.



- <sup>67</sup> Peter Wardley, 'Edwardian Britain: Empire, Income and Political Discontent' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain, Economic, Social and Cultural Change*, London, 1994, p. 61.
- <sup>68</sup> E.P. Hennock, 'Poverty and Social Reform' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, 1994, pp.79-82.
- <sup>69</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West*, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 87-89.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid. pp. 93-96.
- <sup>71</sup> Ron Geaves, *Sectarian Influences within Islam in Britain*, University of Leeds, 1996, p.147.
- <sup>72</sup> Compare G. Kepel, *Allah in the West*, p. 90. And R. Geaves, *Sectarian Influences within Islam in Britain*, p. 149.
- <sup>73</sup> R. Geaves, op. cit, p. 152.
- <sup>74</sup> Compare R. Geaves, *Sectarian Influences within Islam in Britain*, pp. 95-7. And G. Kepel, *Allah in the West*, p. 91.
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- <sup>76</sup> John King, 'Tablighi Jamaat and the Deobandi Mosques in Britain', in: S. Vertovec and C. Peach (eds), *Islam in Europe*, London, 1997, p. 129.
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- <sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 186.
- <sup>82</sup> Alexander Murdoch, *British History, 1660-1832*, London, 1998, p. 143.
- <sup>83</sup> R. Strong, *The Story of Britain*, pp.421-2.
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- <sup>86</sup> R. Strong, op. cit, p. 452.
- <sup>87</sup> J.F.C. Harrison, *Late Victorian Britain, 1875-1901*, London, 1991, pp. 120-21.
- <sup>88</sup> Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The De-moralization of Society*, London, 1995, p. 26.
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- <sup>90</sup> Ibid. p. 470.
- <sup>91</sup> G. Himmelfarb, *The De-moralization of Society*, p.3.
- <sup>92</sup> A. Murdoch, op. cit, pp.138-152.
- <sup>93</sup> J.H. Grainger, *Patriotisms, Britain 1900-1939*, London, 1986, pp. 48-55.
- <sup>94</sup> E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, 1996, p. 55.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid. p. 32.
- <sup>96</sup> David Feldman, 'Nationality and Ethnicity' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, 1994, p. 128.
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- <sup>98</sup> E.P. Hennock, 'Poverty and Social Reforms' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, 1994, pp. 79-82.
- <sup>99</sup> Quoted in J. Springhall, *Youth, Empire and Society: British Youth Movements 1883-1940*, London, 1976, p. 42.
- <sup>100</sup> John Lawrence, 'The First World War and its Aftermath' in P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, 1994, p. 151.
- <sup>101</sup> R. Strong, op. cit, p. 190.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid. pp. 481-92.
- <sup>103</sup> P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, pp. 2-5.
- <sup>104</sup> Interview with an English accountant (over 35, female), London, 13<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>105</sup> At this point nationalism in Ireland and the Northern Ireland conflict are not mentioned because it would exceed the scope of this thesis.
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- <sup>107</sup> John Wolfe, 'Religion and 'Secularization'' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, pp. 427-29.
- <sup>108</sup> Catherine Schenk, 'Austerity and Boom' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, pp. 309-321.
- <sup>109</sup> Leslie Hannah, 'Crisis and Turnaround? 1973-1993', and Rodney Lowe, 'Postwar Welfare' in: P. Johnson (eds), *20th Century Britain*, pp. 342-362.
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- <sup>114</sup> Interview with an English accountant (over 35, female), London, 13<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>115</sup> Interview with an English house keeper (45, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>116</sup> Interview with an English house keeper in a hotel (40, female), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>117</sup> Interview with an English photographer (late 50s, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>118</sup> Interview with an English secretary and tour-guide (Turkey), (over 40, female), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>119</sup> Interview with an English woman, retired (over 70), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>120</sup> Interview with an English fire-security advisor (over 52, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>121</sup> Interview with an English working in retail fashion (over 50, female), Birmingham, 6<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>122</sup> Interview with an English student (20, female), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>123</sup> Interview with an English manager of a retail shop (35, female), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>124</sup> Interview with an English student, Masters (23, male), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>125</sup> Interview with an English student (20, female), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>126</sup> Interview with an English Catholic, charitywork (20, female), Birmingham, 4<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>127</sup> Interview with an English Catholic group project worker for a small charity (22, male), Birmingham, 4<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>128</sup> Interview with an English student (20, male), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>129</sup> Interview with an English manager of a retail shop (35, female), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>130</sup> Interview with an English photographer (late 50s, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>131</sup> Interview with an English student, Masters (23, male), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>132</sup> Interview with an English House keeper in a hotel (40, female), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>133</sup> Interview with an English student (20, male), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>134</sup> Interview with an English fire-security advisor (over 52, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>135</sup> Interview with an English student (20, female), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>136</sup> Interview with an English woman (70, retired), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>137</sup> Interview with an English Catholic, charitywork (20, female), Birmingham, 4<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>138</sup> Interview with an English student (20, female), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>139</sup> Interview with an English student, Masters (23, male), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>140</sup> Interview with an English window cleaner (60, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>141</sup> Interview with an English House keeper in a hotel (40, female), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>142</sup> Interview with an English accountant (over 35, female), London, 13<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>143</sup> Interview with an English student (21, male), Birmingham, 4<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>144</sup> Interview with an English fire-security advisor (over 52, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>145</sup> Interview with an English bar-maid (18, female), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>146</sup> Interview with an English window cleaner (60, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>147</sup> Interview with an English bar-maid (18, female), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
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- <sup>150</sup> Interview with an English accountant (over 35, female), London, 13<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
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- <sup>152</sup> Interview with an English window cleaner (60, male), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>153</sup> Interview with an English student (20, female), London, 11<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>154</sup> Interview with an English accountant (over 35, female), London, 13<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>155</sup> Interview with an English manager of a retail shop (35, female), London, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>156</sup> Interview with an English student, Masters (23, male), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>157</sup> Interview with an English accountant (25, male), London, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>158</sup> Interview with an English secretary and tour-guide (Turkey), (over 40, female), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
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- <sup>160</sup> G. Marshall, D. Rose, H. Newby and C. Vogler, *Social Class in Modern Britain*, London 1988.
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- <sup>162</sup> Interview with a Scot, unemployed (52, male), Glasgow, 29<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>163</sup> Interview with a Scot, unemployed (47, male), Glasgow, 29<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>164</sup> Interview with a Scot (26, male), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>165</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (22, female), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>166</sup> Interview with a Scot (26, male), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>167</sup> Interview with a Scot (24, male), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>168</sup> Interview with a Scot (26, male), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>169</sup> Interview with a Scot, unemployed (47, male) Glasgow, 29<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>170</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (21, female) Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>171</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (21, female) Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>172</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (20, female) Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>173</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (22, female) Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>174</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (20, female) Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>175</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (20, female) Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>176</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (22, female), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>177</sup> Interview with a Scottish history lecturer (32, male) Glasgow, 1<sup>st</sup> December 1997.
- <sup>178</sup> Interview with a Scot, unemployed (47, male) Glasgow, 29<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>179</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (22, female), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>180</sup> Interview with a Scot (26, male), Glasgow, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>181</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (20, female), Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>182</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (21, female), Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>183</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (21, female), Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>184</sup> Interview with a Scottish student (20, female), Glasgow, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>185</sup> Interview with a Welsh civil engineer (42, male), Cardiff, 19<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>186</sup> Interview with a Welshman (50), Cardiff, 19<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>187</sup> Interview with a Welsh accountant (43, female), Cardiff, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>188</sup> Interview with a Welsh accountant (29, male), Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>189</sup> Interview with a Welshman, National Rail inquiry (26), Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>190</sup> Interview with a Welshman, National Rails (25), Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>191</sup> Interview with a Welshman, National Rails (21), Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>192</sup> Interview with a Welsh senior research fellow (medical school), (37, female), Cardiff, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>193</sup> Interview with a Welsh civil engineer (42, male), Cardiff, 19<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>194</sup> Interview with a Welsh accountant (29, male), Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
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- <sup>198</sup> Interview with a Welsh accountant (female, 43), Cardiff, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>199</sup> Interview with a Welsh accountant (female, 43), Cardiff, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>200</sup> Interview with a Welshman (50), Cardiff, 19<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>201</sup> Interview with a Welsh accountant (male, 29), Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
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<sup>216</sup> Ibid. p. 131.

<sup>217</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. IV, 1980, pp. 30-1.

<sup>218</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. II, 1980, pp. 136-7.

<sup>219</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. IV, 1980, p. 47.

<sup>220</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. I, 1980, p. 278.

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## **PART III**

### **Muslims in Britain**

### 3. Muslims in Britain

This chapter aims to examine Muslim identity in Britain. It begins with a short overview of Muslim settlement in Britain and a case study in Cardiff, where the Yemeni community has a long history of settlement in Britain. British women who married Yemeni seafarers before the Second World War provide an insight into the way of life in Butetown earlier this century. The younger interviewees belong to the second or third generation who already had to struggle for opportunities and can serve as examples of what the second and third generations of South Asians may have to cope with in the course of integration.

The Cardiff case study is followed by a detailed study of the South Asian community in Britain. The identity of the first generation of Muslim immigrants is discussed in order to illustrate the type of environment the second generation is growing up in and to create an understanding of the conflicts and tensions these young people have to address. The responses in London, Birmingham and Glasgow have not revealed significant differences to necessitate a separate analysis. Therefore the interviews of South Asian Muslims will not be discussed with reference to the region in which they have been made, i.e. Scotland or England. Originally interviews were conducted in London, Birmingham, Cardiff and Glasgow in order to determine any regional differences in identity development, which possibly concur with native identifications. However, only the well-established Yemeni community revealed significant differences in identification, largely



based on their Yemeni origin and seafarer heritage. The South Asian communities did not indicate any strong regional identifications other than that the second generation considered their place of residence to be their home.

The chapter will conclude with an analysis of how young Muslims cope with the inner tensions and conflicts created by the sometimes mutually exclusive expectations of family and the wider social environment.

### **3.1. The Geography of Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain**

The main document for demographic data is the 1991 Census, which also serves as the primary source for this analysis. Demographic characteristics of ethnic minorities other than 'Muslims' will also be taken into consideration. This should put the presence of South Asians and other Muslim minorities into context of wider society.

According to the 1991 Census ethnic minority groups constitute 5.5 per cent of the British population (3,015,051 people). South Asians represent half of the ethnic minority population of which Indians are the largest single ethnic minority group, with 840,255 people (2.7 per cent of the population). In comparison, Black ethnic groups form 1.5 per cent of the population. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis constitute 0.9 and 0.3 per cent of the population respectively.

The 'Other-Asian' category largely comprises Asian people (144,800) who do not form a substantial minority group (e.g. Vietnamese or Filipino people). Also 45,300 people, with ethnic origins in the Indian subcontinent, such as Sri Lankan, Indo-Caribbean and East African Asian people, who do not identify with the three main groups, fall into that category. It must be considered that people of such ethnic origins may also have attributed themselves to the categories Black-Caribbean or Indian.

The 'Other-Other' category contains 290,000 people (0.5 per cent of the population). This category is comprised of ethnic groups such as North Africans, Arabs and Iranians and is more significant in localities containing higher education establishments. The census data has severe limitations for the detailed study of the ethnic mix in cities such as Cardiff and Liverpool, where ethnic minority communities have long been established and have intermarried with members of the local population.

Locally significant groups, such as Greeks, Cypriots and Turks (total of 36,858 people) are allocated to the White ethnic group. However, the census also asks for the country of birth, which allows for the identification of these groups.

The 1991 Census has shown that the majority of ethnic minority groups settled in the most populous areas of England. Compared to White ethnic groups, ethnic minorities are also more concentrated within these regions. In Table 1 (see appendix VIII), the 1991 population of each ethnic group is expressed as a percentage of the Great Britain total for each region and

metropolitan county. The region's share of the total national population can be compared to the regional population share for each ethnic group.

Whilst less than a third of those from the White ethnic group live in the South East standard region, more than half of all people from ethnic minority groups populate the area. Greater London alone contains 44.8 per cent of all people from ethnic minority groups in Britain compared to 10.3 per cent of the White ethnic population.

The West Midlands accounts for more than 14 per cent of the minority population compared to 9 per cent of the White ethnic group. The next relatively high concentration of people from ethnic minority groups was found in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester. In comparison Wales, Scotland and the more peripheral regions of England are least populated by members of ethnic minority groups.

The 1991 Census revealed marked differences in settlement patterns between the South Asian ethnic groups: Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Table 2 (see appendix IX) highlights the relative concentrations of ethnic minorities in each region.

In 1991 more than half of all Bangladeshis, two fifths of Indians and one fifth of Pakistanis lived in Greater London. The major concentrations of Pakistanis are in the West Midlands, the North West and West Yorkshire. In West Yorkshire Pakistanis constitute the largest ethnic minority group (4



per cent of all ethnic minorities). In Greater Manchester Pakistanis and Indians form the largest minority group.

The main concentrations of Pakistanis within the South East standard region are in North East London, West London, Slough, Buckinghamshire and Luton. In the Midlands their representation is highest in Birmingham, Stafford and Peterborough. However, most notable is their presence in 'textile towns' stretching through south Lancashire into Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire. Local concentrations of Pakistanis also occur in Middlesbrough, Newcastle, Lanarkshire, Newport and Cardiff.

Bangladeshis are strongly represented in North Central London (notably Tower Hamlets), Luton and Oldham. Concentrations of Bangladeshis also occur in the West Midlands Metropolitan County, areas to the north and west of London, Newcastle, Scunthorpe, some Pennine mill towns and in the major cities of South Wales.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.2. Historic Overview of Muslim Settlement in Britain

Muslim residence in England can be traced back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the number of Muslim settlers was small. During the late nineteenth century various Arab immigrants arrived in Britain. In the 1860's Lebanese traders travelled to North and South America, Australia, West Africa and Europe. Only a small number eventually settled in Britain, one such a community is resident in Manchester. Later on, the 1975 civil war in Lebanon added to this number.

Around the 1890's thousands of Yemenis, primarily from the north, were recruited at Aden by merchant ships such as the East Indian Company. They were searching for work on ships and in foreign countries. Gradually some of them came to Britain.<sup>2</sup>

Mosques were already established in the nineteenth century, such as the mosque in Woking built in 1889. In such early days most of the Muslim mission was organised by British converts. For example, Liverpool solicitor, W.H. Quilliam, who embraced Islam in 1887, produced a weekly called 'The Crescent' between 1893-1903. Lord Headley and Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din had close ties with the mosque in Woking, of which the latter came to England to challenge misconceptions of Islam. Islamic apologist, Syed Ameer Ali (d. 1928) and Qur'an translator Marmaduke Pickthall (d. 1936) were members of the Muslim Literary Society which was sponsored by the mosque in Woking. Further Islamic centres were in Liverpool and London prior to 1914. Woking is the oldest mosque, but the Central Mosque in Regents Park is the most prestigious. It was opened in 1977; its trustees drawn from ambassadors and high commissioners of thirteen Muslim countries, who had collected donations for its erection.<sup>3</sup> The Islamic Cultural Centre was inaugurated by King George VI in November 1944.<sup>4</sup>

The major influx of Muslim immigrants occurred with the labour shortage after the Second World War. Due to the rapid economic expansion during the late 1940's and early 1950's Britain had a high demand for cheap labour in order to fuel its economy. Both the Polish Resettlement Programme and

the European Volunteer Workers scheme did not supply enough manpower to compensate Britain's labour shortage. Consequently additional labour immigrants from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as from Africa and the West Indies were welcomed.

Britain struggled with the integration of Jews, Poles and Ukrainians, who had immigrated between the end of the last century and the Second World War. With the arrival of immigrants from the New Commonwealth in the 1950's and 1960's, ethnic minorities became more visible and changed the colour of life in Britain. Britain has become irrevocably multi-racial and can no longer be regarded a purely 'white society'.<sup>5</sup>

Further immigration to Britain occurred due to upheavals in the Indian subcontinent, the Arab world and other regions such as Cyprus and Africa. The revolution in Egypt in 1952 and in Iraq in 1958 forced political refugees to find a new home in Britain and other parts of the world. The Iranian community in Britain increased due to the Iranian revolution. Those who came to Britain settled primarily in and around London. Some continued their political activities with respect to their home countries from the British capital.<sup>6</sup> With the oil boom of the 1970's a large number of Arab entrepreneurs established their companies as well as a second residence in Britain. It was calculated that by the end of the 1980's up to half a million Arabs lived most or part of the year in Britain. Their main country of residence and work remained in the Middle East; therefore they did not constitute immigrant status.



A number of North Africans from Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria were also among the labour migrants. They came to Britain during the early 1970's to work in the service sector in and around London. Most of them stayed only for short periods. Substantial communities of Moroccans and Egyptians were present in Britain by the mid-1980's, although the majority of the North African migrants settled in France. Due to political circumstances a small number of Palestinians settled in Britain. It should be noted that Arab Christians and Jews exist within these Arab communities.

### 3.3. Cardiff: A Case Study

While most Arab immigrants settled in and around London, Yemenis did not.<sup>7</sup> There is only a small Yemeni settlement in London. The majority of the early Yemeni settlements were at the ports of Cardiff, Liverpool, South Shields and Hull. From the 1880's onwards, foreign sailors from West India, West Africa, China and Yemen began to settle by the main trading ports in Britain. With the low wages they had earned as seafarers many were left discharged in British ports, waiting to join new ships. Unemployed, some looked for new jobs at the dockyards or newly founded peripheral industries. During the First World War the demand for seafarers and land-based workforce increased. New jobs were also available in the war industries. These closed down with the end of the war and many seamen were discharged again; Consequently unemployment forced these ex-sailors to search for new occupations. By 1919 there were an estimated twelve hundred unemployed 'coloured' sailors in Cardiff.<sup>8</sup>

The first sailors who arrived lived in lodging houses for men, run by former sailors of the same nationality. Some sailors who repeatedly returned to Cardiff eventually got jobs in the docks. It was common for several men to joined together to buy cheap houses. Some also married Welsh women. From these mixed marriages a generation of part Welsh and part Yemeni or West Indian emerged.<sup>9</sup> In 1942 it was estimated that approximately 1500 Yemenis and 1000 Somalis lived in Cardiff.

In the course of research in Cardiff, Mrs. Ali, eighty-four years old, and Mrs. Mohammad, seventy-six years old described the atmosphere of Butetown when they married their Yemeni husbands as young girls. Mrs. Ali's marriage to an Yemeni seafarer was unproblematic with regard to parental response. She met her husband in the house of her mother's second husband, who was also an Yemeni seaman. Mrs Ali's mother had converted to Islam. Her mother regularly cooked for her husband's friends, who were unmarried lodgers. Friends often came to visit and it was normal to help each other in every way possible.

In contrast Mrs. Mohammad's parents were hostile towards their daughter's spouse. The family was of religious Methodist background. They were convinced that Muslims did not believe in God. The community priest responded with disgust to her conversion to Islam and her father threatened to disown her. However, after the death of her father, her mother took a positive stance towards this unusual alliance. Mrs. Muhammad and her husband ran an Arab boarding house in the docks. Most seafarers could not speak English; therefore the people who ran the boarding houses would

look after them when they were sick and acted as translators when necessary. At that time the Welsh thought that the docks were a dangerous place. Mrs. Mohammad emphasises that she only got to know wonderful people and that she lived a happy life with her Yemeni husband. Her husband was a trained cook, who not only ran the boarding house but also opened a Muslim school and a small mosque. Their ten children were all raised as Muslims but only one of the girls married one.

Community life was close knit. Although money was scarce, mutual support provided comfort and security. Nobody in that community possessed much but people managed the best they could. Mrs. Ali married her Yemeni husband in a registry office but did not convert to Islam. Her husband always respected her beliefs, yet sometimes his friends tried to pressure him to divorce his wife if she refused to convert. Nevertheless her husband stood by her. However, Mrs. Ali lived very much like a Muslim woman with regard to the duties she fulfilled, how she cooked and behaved to the other Yemeni men. Out of respect for her husband she only went to Church for Christmas mass once a year. Other Welsh wives did convert to Islam, some in response to pressure and others out of conviction. When children married, and two of the daughters chose to marry Welsh men, their Yemeni father did not object to a Roman Catholic wedding. He considered it his duty as a father to present his daughter to her husband to be and insisted on walking her down the aisle. When one of the daughters died, all Yemeni friends attended the funeral at Church to pay their last respect.



Mrs. Ali feels that she has lived between two religions but the tolerance and mutual respect among the community made this possible. Not all Yemeni seamen who lived with Welsh women married them. Yemeni community leaders were not in favour of cross-cultural marriages. It occasionally did happen that seamen left their Welsh women as they returned to their home countries. However, soon new seafarers arrived who were happy to take care of these deserted young women. Others continued to live together without ever marrying.

The men were usually at sea for months. When the men did return they were very caring. During their absence however, Yemeni friends and their wives (usually English or Welsh) were supportive, particularly when a child was born or when someone in the family was ill. The children received religious education and Arabic lessons from the Yemeni seamen after school. At that time Children did not have the opportunity to travel to Saudi Arabia to receive proper religious education. When Islamic feasts were due the children were allowed to take time off school for the celebrations. Sheep were still slaughtered in the streets and all the Yemenis gathered together to celebrate.

To build a mosque the Yemeni seamen regularly contributed financially to the purchase of a row of houses. Others bought a shop and started a business. When one of the Yemenis died in Cardiff, relatives or friends would bury him. The men washed him and ordered a plain coffin. A group of men would then pray for the deceased all night.

Both Mrs. Ali and Mrs. Mohammad confirmed that it was not problematic to live an Islamic way of life in the midst of British society. In their time Muslims have integrated well into Welsh society. The city council was always prepared to provide Muslim schools with equipment. The social cohesion went beyond ethnic boundaries despite ignorance towards Islam among wider society. Mrs. Mohammad's husband always referred to himself as a 'Welsh Arab'. While amongst wider society ignorance and prejudice did exist, the atmosphere in Butetown seemed to have been tolerant. Neither Mrs. Mohammad nor Mrs. Ali could recall explicitly racist events. The area was multi-racial and everyone respected each other.

We lived as if we were an ordinary English family, as if there was no colour or anything in it. But nobody took no notice, nobody bothered us, you know. We didn't face racism or anything like that. No, I've never faced it in my life, never. Nor my children. If they've faced it in school they didn't tell me. But then, the school days were entirely different to now. It's like you are talking about another world.<sup>10</sup>

The son of Mrs. Ali attested that the community spirit in Butetown was similar to that of communities in Yemen.

Wales is my homeland, I was born there, I believe it is my home. Also my father is from Arabia, so I tend to favour Yemen as well as my homeland. I've spent a few years there when I was younger. And the lifestyle in Yemen is very similar to the lifestyle in Wales. Just the language differences ...<sup>11</sup>

He neither feels torn between two cultures nor does he consider integration to be a problem for Muslims in Cardiff. The multi-racial nature of the dock area prevented the development of a minority - majority relationship. Everyone was different and therefore everyone shared the same sense of tolerance and respect.

*So you didn't have the feeling that you grew up between two cultures? No. I was always ... we were brought up in the docks area of Cardiff and that area was multi-racial and multi-religious. But we grew up with people of other religions and other races, everybody accepted one another, there were no problems as far as religion or race was concerned.<sup>12</sup>*

From the perspective of the elderly generation, those who came to settle in Cardiff after the Second World War seem to have had a different attitude. The 'old' Arabs were polite and helpful, whereas the new generations keep themselves to themselves. The community spirit has died. The new generations are no longer respectful in their conduct and no longer content with what they have. From the perspective of the elderly, the atmosphere of Butetown and the docks has changed substantially. Before the war there was more solidarity among the community and people were more open to each other. Today the members of the community are more isolated and less co-operative. Before social security was introduced, priests and nuns collected for the needy: Muslims also donated for that purpose, they were more integrated. People had less but were more generous. At present, even among the Muslims, cohesion is not as strong any more. One explanation for this development is that the community has expanded and many have moved to other areas of Cardiff.

*Do you have the feeling that Muslims have successfully integrated into Welsh society? The older ones integrated a lot better than these new refugee-type Somalis that are coming now. Because they ... to be honest I've never seen anything like this ... they don't conform to anything, they have no values. The older Somalis were a different race of people, they conformed and integrated. But there seems to be a problem with the younger generation.*

*Why is that? A lot of them, I think, that come over here as refugees from Somalia, ... and the freedom that they've got here and access to money .... and ... you cannot even talk to them, reason with them.*

*So what kind of problems do they make? They make all sorts of problems; they've got problems with crime, problems with neighbours. They don't want to conform with this society here; they only do things the way they want to do them.<sup>13</sup>*



The generation difference in integration observed by Mrs. Mohammad's son is related to the change in immigration patterns. Until the late 1960's the majority of Muslim labour immigrants arrived without their families and passively adapted to the social reality of the host community. The personal approach to the experience of the cross-cultural passage was simple: these men lived a modest and quiet life, only relying on self-sufficiency and hard work to maintain their families.

They seem to breed apart from what I was brought up with. All ours wanted to do was work, look after their families and their praying. Should I tell you something? When the war was over lots more came in. And you know what our men called them? Fish and Chips. As a breed apart from them. Even they themselves felt that they were different. There was something different.<sup>14</sup>

The generation of immigrants who arrived before the Second World War encountered a host society not that different from their homeland in terms of family values and concepts of personal virtues. Although the new environment was culturally different, the lives and the social status of these labour immigrants were determined by the employment they received in the docks. They did not seek entry into the social and economic circles beyond the dock community, therefore rejection or discrimination was not part of their spectrum of experiences. As these men arrived they relied on the opportunities which the host community made available. Family networks neither served as support nor represent a burden during the process of integration. Consequently many Muslim men married Welsh women and built their lives on a cultural compromise. It became apparent from the interviews that none of the Yemeni immigrants assimilated to their environment, but practised their cultural and religious values in privacy.

Mutual tolerance was the foundation for a constructive cohabitation among this multi-ethnic and religious community.

However, such harmonious cohabitation as described by Mrs. Ali and Mrs. Mohammad (as well as by other elderly inhabitants of Butetown) was made possible by the relative social isolation of this area. Harbours have always been perceived as areas with a '*status ex patria*' among wider society. The development of multi-ethnic communities was accepted as part of the socio-economic process in such areas. Conventional society regarded dock areas as dangerous and immoral places from which children and young women were kept away. Therefore assimilation was not really expected of seafarers that passed through. In turn, the children in these areas who were born from mixed marriages, felt part of both cultures and grew up within an environment where such multi-ethnic marriages were more common than elsewhere in the country.

This situation changed as the port of Cardiff could no longer provide enough employment for its inhabitants. After 1945, less immigrants came to this region. In the 1970's the Merchant Navy recruited more seamen from India and Pakistan rather than from the Yemen, so that in general the Yemeni influx decreased. Over the past four decades governmental policies have restricted immigration to such an extent that most immigrants now enter the country on the grounds of family reunion or political asylum. Consequently single male labour immigrants no longer arrive in Britain. Instead family units and community networks were established. The dynamics of the integration process is thus bound to change. In many cases

children arrived with their mothers or have been born into an ethnically homogeneous family. Their mother tongue is neither English, nor are the early ego ideals conveyed to them partially British.

It's a different generation; the younger generation is different. Like I believe that the best Muslims was in my time, when I was younger. The Yemeni, the young ones are not like the older ones, its because the times have changed.<sup>15</sup>

Since 1945 Western societies have experienced tremendous social change, which emphasised the difference between values/virtues of the host and that of the immigrant community. The greater the difference between the new community and that of origin, the more must an immigrant temporarily give up part of his/her individuality in order to integrate into the new community.<sup>16</sup> The cross-cultural passage involves the search for a new identity for both the individual and for the ethnic group to which she/he belongs.<sup>17</sup> The psychological predisposition to integrate into a host society is determined by a number of factors.<sup>18</sup>

The dynamics of cross-cultural passage differs according to whether immigration is temporary or permanent. Labour immigrants did not originally intend to settle in the new land, whilst refugees have little control over their departure and return. Therefore reasons for leaving one's country are essential in determining the process of adaptation to the new environment. Migration always involves a loss of past certainties and an insecure future. Depending on the emotions with which the host culture receives the migrant, the feeling of loss is either intensified or eased. If a migrant is able to find a niche in the new community then his/her search for a new place in this society has been successful. The individual is then



more inclined to adapt to that environment and to adopt new ego identifications.

The process of cross-cultural transformation is different for single labour immigrants than for children and family units. Whilst single labour migrants are under greater pressure to adapt to the new environment in order to succeed, they consider any identity changes as a temporary sacrifice, whereas family units are less flexible. When families migrate they intend to settle in the new environment for a longer period of time. Parents face more responsibility during the process of cross-cultural passage and are thus inclined to adopt more conservative behaviour because they have now become representative for their culture of origin. Within family units and minority communities the culture of origin is perpetuated in daily life. In contrast to the parents, children have no choice whether they want to migrate or not. Depending on the individual's age and stage of identity development the cultural relocation generates substantial changes in internalised structures as a result of new group interactions.<sup>19</sup> As young children find it more difficult to rationalise reasons for migration, the loss of the old environment and possible rejection in the new one are therefore more threatening to the emotional world of the individual.

Several Yemeni interviewees complained about Somali reluctance to integrate. The Somalis they referred to are refugees who arrived with their families. Some of these refugees left their homeland under pressure. Many of them experienced physical and/or psychological violence or at least the threat of it. Political activists or intellectuals usually continue their

activities in their country of refuge; this provides them with a purpose in life and facilitates integration as they interact with, and seek support from, British organisations and the media. All those refugees of poor background who were driven out of their countries because of their race or religious affiliation are once more confronted with marginalisation. The loss of home and the lack of perspectives in the new society can lead to isolation and the attempt to build one's world on communal self-sufficiency. For refugees there is no immediate possibility to return to their countries of origin, therefore their strategy to cope with the relocation can express itself in a devaluation of the country of refuge and an idealisation of their country of origin. - The new environment can therefore become the catalyst for the frustration about personal plight. When unemployment and lack of perspectives threaten an individual's self-worth, the individual will search for personal or specific community traits that compensate for the feeling of devaluation. It is thus common among minorities to emphasise moral superiority towards the majority. As a consequence parents seek to prevent their children from developing close ties with children of wider society in order to maintain their strongest pillar of identity - that of moral superiority.

Readiness to adapt to the new environment also depends on the expectations immigrants have of their future in the host society. The older generation of immigrants were more modest with regard to the socio-economic development they could expect within their new environment. Modesty and self-restraint were virtues also highly regarded among British society at the time. At the beginning of this century people did not

anticipate major social climbing throughout their lifetime. The majority had to struggle to make a decent living. The living standard among the broad population was modest and mutual support was the most reliable safety net.

The so-called post-war generations had the benefit of growing into a socially mobile and wealthy society. The advertisement of luxuries and the building of a society with equal opportunities for everybody created discontent amongst those who were unable to improve their socio-economic position. The struggle for a place among the middle classes has become more competitive. However, not everyone can succeed. To live a life of deprivation in a society which advertises wealth for everyone, is a more difficult burden to bear than if deprivation is a collective destiny. This is particularly so when deprivation is the result of racism and xenophobia.

British society has also changed in terms of how children are raised. When Mrs. Ali and Mrs. Mohammad were young the values and virtues among British society were similar to that of the Muslim communities. Thus modesty and self-restraint determined the mode of human interaction in the past. Dependency on communal support as well as responsibility towards the community was usual. However, within a mobile society individualism and independence have become necessary personality traits in order for individuals to adapt to the mechanisms of this society. Two young Somali women described how this development has influenced the relationship between the sexes among Muslim immigrants.



The only problem I would say with Islam or Muslim religion is like, ... you can, like, ... man and wife, they live together, like, Western people, and then they decide to get married. With Somalis, a person can be all nice and everything, like my ex-husband was all nice to me and everything, but like, as soon as I went to live with him I realised it was a mistake. When you go to live with that person, that real person comes out and everything. Saying that really, our parents had arranged marriages, I mean years and years ago in the Muslim world ... and that worked.<sup>20</sup>

Things were more stricter then so the men, you know, the men were more religious and the women were more concerned with religion. And women, if the man would be angry, she wouldn't, you know, go crazy, or,... you know. But with us now, we won't take anything. We're a lot different to our parents; it's just changed. *Is it the same in Somalia?* In Somalia things change from our parents' days. In Somalia itself women are starting to change.<sup>21</sup>

Self-representation in a new environment where ideals differ from those of the country of origin is a difficult task for both males and females. The increasing pressure on men to provide for a better living standard in the light of unemployment can cause stress and friction in the family. The traditional hierarchical gender divisions have to be reaffirmed and justified anew in an environment that no longer shares the same concepts of such family patterns. For women, relocation into an alien environment frequently results in a greater dependency on the nuclear family, as other female siblings are no longer around. Anxiety and isolation increase the pressure on family life. In order to compensate ego losses immigrants seek to restore familiar ego support by symbolic restitution of the homeland.<sup>22</sup>

Some older Somali interviewees (both men and women) were not able to describe how they viewed the Welsh people because they have no contact with them. Their social interaction is restricted to the Somali community and it was necessary to employ a translator in order to conduct the interviews. Their priorities are to maintain family cohesion and to practice

Islam. Their sense of British identity is very limited, as not even basic communication is possible due to language barriers.

The majority of Somalis who were interviewed in Butetown were unemployed. Most of these unemployed Somalis had difficulties with the English language. They also lacked appropriate training for basic employment. Both of these factors decrease the opportunity to improve their immediate outlook on life and perspectives for the future. The lack of opportunities, whether on the grounds of racism or due to shortcomings in education or training, produces a sense of powerlessness because the individual does not have the ability to change these factors. Aggressions that build up can be either directed against the self or against the 'discriminating' or 'careless' environment. The most common and preferable option is the latter. It is part of a natural self-protecting mechanism to project hatred and aggression onto an external object of desire (usually unattainable) to deflect potential damage to the self. Only in a serious psychological crisis does an individual resort to self-destructive actions as a cry for help or as the last possible solution for crisis management. Therefore isolation from, and hostility towards, a rejecting society are the first signals which indicate that attempts to integrate have failed.

Those elderly Somalis are content with the isolation they live. All necessary facilities are available to live self-sufficiently among the Somali community and the identification with the country of origin is too strong for elderly

people to let go of deeply rooted ego ideals or to change identity components.

There are still people here who like Somalia, from their memories when they were young. It is difficult here these days, you know. It's hard to learn English and .... It's different in Somalia; you don't have bills and so on.

*Do you have the feeling that you can maintain your culture here?* Now I can, yea. When Somalis come from Somalia they bring the culture back to us, if they wouldn't come then our culture wouldn't be as strong as it is now. Before they have come I used to hang around with a lot of Welsh girls and I used to like their culture. Whereas when my cousins come they got me interested in our culture and slowly I got to know my culture. I used to hate Somali music; I hate Somali videotapes. Somali music, I used to take it out and I used to try to hide the tapes. And now I really love it, I do.<sup>23</sup>

As mentioned above, integration entails the sacrifice of ego ideals (at least those that interfere with a complete identification process). The process of giving up ego ideals and therefore identity components makes an individual vulnerable. It creates disorientation and anxiety. If the individual does not experience positive affirmation from the new environment during this phase of identity development then self-protectionism will lead to a revival of former identifications and ego ideals. The process of developing a coherent identity, in which identifications of both native and new culture provide a framework for self-acceptance, can be long and painful. The individual can move between the extremes of total assimilation to absolute rejection several times before the most suitable ego ideals have been found.

Unlike the Somali community the Yemeni community can provide examples of third and fourth generations. Two sisters, whose mother was the daughter of a first generation labour immigrant from Yemen and a 'Geordie' mother from South Shields, were prepared to talk about the



problems they had as they sought to adapt their Muslim background to the British way of life.

It is really hard to follow this religion in a Western country, very hard. You're not supposed to drink, take any drugs, you're supposed to cover the arms and the ankles. You're supposed to cover the head, you know, and it's difficult to keep that up at in this country at least when you were born here anyway. You know, you find that the people who really do stick to it are people who either come from the Yemen or from an Arab country. You know, because that's the way they were brought up so they just carry on living the same way. But, ahm, I feel like I'm a Muslim within, as long as you don't mention my name, I drink you see. Don't mention my name, I drink and what I did, ehm, I was very bad about two years ago and before that I had started to settle in to get back into my religion and not drink and everything, when I was really young, and then I've never gone back to it, you know. Right now it's Ramadan, but usually during the month of Ramadan I never drink alcohol or anything, you know I stick to it in that way. But this year because it fell over new year I went off drinking so now I have the feeling I haven't stuck to it this year. But it's all about charity - Islam, you know. Nobody is saying it's a good religion because I feel it's a true religion anyway and it all comes from the heart when you're charitable and kind, you know, and not wishing any bad on anybody. So although I do drink, I'm a Muslim. A lot of people are saying, well you're not a practising Muslim then, are you. I try to take it light-heartedly, but I do believe in my religion. It's just I find it really hard to follow the religion properly because of the way we live.<sup>24</sup>

Lila lived in the Yemen for a year when her father married her off at the age of fourteen. When her father asked her whether she wanted to get married, she said no. Nevertheless he insisted, saying that she would if she loved him. After one year she came back to Cardiff and did not return to the Yemen. She would like to marry a Muslim man again but she would like him to be Westernised.

A few years after Lila returned to Cardiff her mother died and her father left Cardiff to return to his first wife. As Lila was the oldest daughter she had to take care of her sisters. She had to work hard to maintain the rest of the family and felt that in the course of her fight for survival she eventually has succumbed to the Western way of life.

*Do you think that your cultural and religious values are compatible with the Western way of life? No. So how do you accommodate that? Well, I'm more Westernised. So you really should be asking that someone who has not succumb to the Western society. If you talk to somebody, say now, who prays every day and goes to the mosque, they would tell you straight no, no. Because it's to do with religion. Although I can say that, you know how I am, so my views shouldn't really count there, I feel like a hypocrite. ... I don't really agree with the Western way of living though. Although I drink, you know, I think that, when I speak to my own people, that the way the Arabs are running their lives is a lot better than the Westerners, because like, the Westerners don't seem to have any values at all, you know. If you look at like ... maybe not so much Cardiff but like say London or places like that, you know, their freedom, their parties, and I don't agree with that at all. The way they live is they don't care about anybody and when they should be caring about themselves, they don't. It's just another way of living and looking at life and I don't like it, to be honest. But I can't change it, can I, by myself. And this is a Western country, if we don't like it, we should leave it.<sup>25</sup>*

For Muslim women the integration process is more difficult than for their male counterparts. Whilst Islam does not prohibit marriages with women from the 'Ahl al Kitab' for men, Muslim women are only supposed to marry Muslim men. The access to the public sphere is limited for women or subject to conditions (such as dress code, etc.) and the ego ideals are more precisely delineated than for men. Therefore women are more in danger to offend against Islamic regulations in the course of integration than men are. Since it is easier to detect whether women offend against Islamic regulations, they are more conscious of their behaviour.

Most of the female Muslim interviewees wanted to marry a Muslim man. The ideals varied between English converts to Westernised Muslim men of the same ethnic origin. Nevertheless these women have to take care of their reputation according to Islamic criteria and when they fail to do so, perhaps during an attempt to adapt to wider society, the consequences are often guilt feelings and a loss of self-respect. The result is ambivalent feelings toward British society. Whilst the individual lives an assimilated lifestyle, resentments for this way of life and a yearning for the culture of

origin accompany him/her when the individual's dreams and life plans were not realised. In comparison the men of the third generation of Muslims in Cardiff did not feel that practising Islam in this society was a problem. Even those interviewees who also neglected their religious obligations did not share any feelings of guilt.

Hala, also a third generation Yemeni, was born in South Shields before her mother moved to Cardiff to live with her second husband, a Yemeni seafarer. Before Hala and John (half-Welsh, half-Yemeni) married, they both went to Clubs and enjoyed their drinks, as any Western/British citizen would. It was not until their son was born that they decided to practice their religion and gradually gave up clubbing and drinking. Hala and John do not feel that they are a part of Welsh society because they feel that they are different. In comparison to other Yemenis, they did detect hostility amongst the Welsh population during the Gulf War.

The fact that John is half Welsh does not have an impact on his increasingly strong identification with his Islamic and Arab background. John interprets his Western lifestyle in the past as disoriented. When he was younger he had difficulties with respect for authorities. That he now adheres to Islam, which demands discipline and respect for authorities, is not perceived as a contradiction. The guidance and orientation that Islam now offers John, provides him with the security and self-certainty which he was always seeking.

*What does Islam mean to you personally? Well, for me..., it's given me spiritual guidance, I'm at ease with myself now, whereas before I wasn't, I was a bit turbulent.*



I'm more of a calm person now. I was never in trouble with the police, you know like stupid things, you know drinking, like I said I was drinking at the time, I stopped now. Not because .... It was the right time for me to stop, you know, not because I thought I'm going with religion now, blah, blah, blah, and stop like that (he snapped his fingers). It didn't work that. It was the right time for me to do it and that's the way I've done it. Like I said don't go too deep into it, it'll make you nuts, you go crazy.<sup>26</sup>

That's what I've done.

Such guys become fanatics.

*Was that after your mother died?* No it was ... I was ... I went to Arab school, I was learning, you know, I felt in my heart that I wanted to become a proper Arab, you know. What I did, was I went to school, I dressed the same, I wore a head thing, I wore the right clothes, everything. I used to go to the mosque and I used to do my prayers five times a day in the mosque and ... Then I found myself sometimes, if I wanted to go somewhere or other, I'd find the mosque and sit there on my own ... and I started thinking, everyday things, oh, that's wrong, and it wasn't, that's wrong and I can't do this and I can't do that ... and my mind was taken. So I went to my uncle and I said look this is what's happening to me. And he said to me: Allah doesn't expect you to eat, sleep and drink Islam all the time. That's what I found myself doing. I wasn't caring about nothing; all my mind was focused on was Islam, all the time through the day,...<sup>27</sup>

Hala's relatives noticed the change in her personality as she desperately sought to adhere to Islam. Her aunt complained that the change was not for the better. Hala noticed that her character was changing for the worse. She neglected her friendships, particularly with non-Muslims, and became increasingly isolated. The reason why she forced herself into such compulsive religious observance was because she felt that she did not have enough opportunity to grow into the religion as a young girl.

I was starved of Islam, as I was growing up, and I wanted to take it all in as fast as I could, but that wasn't the right way to do it. And like my uncle said, you take it day by day, by day. I couldn't even ... how should I explain, be the way I wanted to be and then I just broke down.<sup>28</sup>

Hala had to fight a long battle with her 'self' until she found the right balance between adjusting to Western society and adhering to Islam. She experienced both extremes during her search for a coherent identity. Both Hala and her husband consider themselves to be observant Muslims whilst

maintaining their friendships and contacts with non-Muslims. For their son they want to be a good example of how to integrate both cultures.

### 3.4. The South Asian Community in Britain

The increasing immigration from India began with the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947. The exchange of the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh populations of East and West Punjab and the additional exchange of population between East (now Bangladesh) and West Bengal caused mass migration. The resettlement forced hundreds of thousands of families to search for new homes. Many men chose to migrate to Britain to earn a better living for their families. Those who were already resident in Britain became anxious about their relatives and sent for their kinsmen and friends. In the early 1960's the construction of the Mangla Dam displaced approximately 100,000 people, primarily from Mirpur.<sup>29</sup> The admission of labour immigrants into Britain was arranged at Government level.<sup>30</sup>

A large proportion of migration from the Caribbean occurred during the 1950's. Within ten years that population had grown eleven times. This and the Notting Hill riots of 1958, motivated the British government to introduce immigration control.<sup>31</sup> As the news reached Pakistan that the British government was planning to introduce the first Commonwealth Immigration Act, a major rush to enter Britain began. On the 1st of July 1962 the Immigration Act came into effect, which the Conservative government had passed about eighteen months before. Since the

is equally difficult to determine. Anwar estimates their number at approximately 45,000. After estimating the number of Muslims among the Indian population Anwar made to the following conclusions:

Table 3

Country/Region of Origin	Numbers (000s)
Pakistani/Bangladeshi/Indian	770
Other Asians	80
'Other Others'	29
Turkish Cypriots	45
Other Muslim Countries	367
African Muslims	115
(New Commonwealth)	
Total	1406

(Source: Muhammad Anwar, 'Muslims in Britain: 1991 Census and other Statistical Sources', Europe, CSIC Papers, No. 9, September 1993.)

It has to be taken into consideration that these numbers do not include Muslims from non-Muslim countries such as the Caribbean, Singapore, Philippines or Indonesia. Nor are white Muslims and converts considered in these calculations. It was not possible to avoid including Christian minorities from the above mentioned Muslim countries. Their numbers are very small though and should not influence the overall estimations. According to Anwar the Muslim population in Britain in 1993 could be estimated at 1.5 million.<sup>34</sup>

An important demographic aspect of the Muslim population in Britain is the age distribution. Among ethnic minorities in general and among Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in particular, the population age structure is much younger than among the rest of the population. In 1991 just under half of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani group were under the age of 16 and



around three-quarters were under 35. Consequently Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have one of the highest child dependency ratio (in proportion to the number of people of working age).<sup>35</sup> The fact that the majority of the population is young has political implications with regard to education, employment and service facilities for ethnic minorities. In contrast to the rest of the population, males outnumber females among the South Asian group. This fact together with the younger age structure is rooted in the migration history described above. Nevertheless the gender ratio is expected to converge in coming generations.

The Labour Force Survey of Spring 1995 shows that according to the social class division, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are most concentrated in the skilled manual and partly skilled classes, and women are also found in the partly skilled class.<sup>36</sup>

The Black and Ethnic Minority Health and Lifestyle Survey from 1992 asked questions related to languages spoken and read by minority groups. These questions were primarily directed towards the South Asian minority because English is generally one of the main languages of the 'Black' groups in Britain. The table below shows that people of Indian origin are more likely than Bangladeshis to be literate in English. A very high percentage of youngsters, who were most probably educated in Britain, speak English, while the older generations are less inclined to master the language. Fewer old women than men are literate in the English language due to less exposure to their British environment.

Table 4 English literacy among Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis<sup>37</sup>

England		Percentages		
Males	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	
16-29	96	95	92	
30-49	93	94	72	
50-74	86	66	51	
<i>All males aged 16 - 74</i>	92	88	74	
Females				
16-29	89	78	68	
30-49	80	42	21	
50-74	47	15	10	
<i>All females aged 16 - 74</i>	77	54	42	
<b>All aged 16-74</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>59</b>	

(Source: Black and Ethnic Minority Health and Lifestyle Survey, Health Education Authority, Question asked: "Which languages do you speak including English".)

Similar results were found when asked about their ability to read English. While three quarters of the Indian group said they could read English, only little over half of the Bangladeshi group claimed the same. Again there was a decline in literacy in English with age, and women of the immigrant generation would be less acquainted with the English language.<sup>38</sup>

The survey of English Housing of 1994 shows that 63 per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi live in Council estates and in low income areas, and 68 per cent of Pakistanis live in private houses. Around forty per cent of the Bangladeshi and twenty per cent of the Pakistani households said they are partly, or very, dissatisfied with their accommodation.<sup>39</sup> According to the 1991 Census Bangladeshi and Pakistani have the largest households. The average Bangladeshi household would consist of more than five people and that of Pakistanis between four to five people.<sup>40</sup>

The Labour Force Survey shows that unemployment affects the Black group the hardest as well as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. From all males aged 16 to 64, 21 per cent of the Black group are unemployed, 22 per cent are 'economically inactive', and 8 per cent have part time work. Among the Pakistani and Bangladeshi group 18 per cent are unemployed 33 per cent are inactive, and 8 per cent have part time work. Consequently only two thirds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were economically active at the time of the survey. In comparison the Indian group has 10 per cent unemployment, with 18 per cent of its members being inactive and the White group has the lowest unemployment rate at 8 per cent with 15 per cent of its members being inactive.<sup>41</sup> The same survey shows that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have the highest number of self-employment, which is around 22 per cent, compared to 12 per cent of the White group, 13 per cent of the Indian group and 8 per cent of the Black group.<sup>42</sup>

### 3.4.2. The First Generation and their Identity

The majority of immigrants from the Indian Subcontinent were illiterate. They were usually offered badly paid jobs and consequently were associated with the lower working class. In comparison the first generation of Arab immigrants from Iraq or Lebanon interviewed for this study, arrived as students. As they grew into the British professional classes and experienced professional respect in their work, these individuals were able to support themselves. Therefore they were less inclined to isolate themselves from



wider society. Most of the educated Arab minority settled in London, although a few have moved to other big cities in the Midlands and Scotland.

Most South Asians settled around industrial areas, where they worked predominantly in newly established industries and textiles. As the first immigrants were men who had left their families behind, they accepted shift work and permanent night-shift work. Usually several men joined together to share the purchase of a house. The areas which Pakistanis and Bangladeshis moved to were usually poor and therefore inexpensive to obtain. Initially the orientation of the pioneer immigrants was home rooted. They came to work here to improve the socio-economic situation of their families back home. Both the host society and the Muslim immigrants themselves considered their residence in Britain to be temporary. Consequently neither made a substantial effort to create facilities for extended cultural and religious links between the communities.

With the family reunion process during the 1960's and 1970's this situation changed drastically. As the immigrants decided to settle in Britain, and to bring their families into the country, the new communities began to establish facilities to accommodate their social, cultural and religious needs. Nielson described this process in 1984 in the following way:

The focus of economic activity and social and cultural identity gradually moves from the villages of the Punjab and Sylhet to the inner city of London, Birmingham and Bradford. With the family moves also the focus of religious identity. We see the appearance of Muslim worship and action relating to the context of Britain.<sup>43</sup>

With the arrival of the families the immigrants were confronted with the need to pass on cultural and religious values to the next generation. To a large extent women fulfil this function in their role as mothers. Nevertheless, to preserve and transmit these values an appropriate environment had to be created. No longer did a small number of men have to cope with a temporary situation of living in an alien environment. The settlement of the family demanded appropriate conditions and living space in order to accommodate basic cultural needs. Religious education, mother-tongue classes, and an appropriate halal diet are only examples of the needs of resident Muslim communities. Traditional patriarchal family structures were re-established and a social network created for support. A family is a responsibility. Apart from the provision of economic security, the head of a family is obliged to secure the safety and morality of the family.

While grandparents and older generations were absent in the immigrant community, adults along the 'horizontal line' were numerous. South Asian households are, due to the family structure, larger than those of British society.

For the first generation the settlement into British society was particularly difficult. While in the traditional Islamic world there is a division of the public sphere, dominated by men and the private sphere, dominated by women, the Western public sphere is accessible for both sexes. The institution that enforces the segregation of the sexes outside the family in Pakistan is called *purdah*. As South Asian families are extensive and society is structured according to the codes of *purdah*, women have their own space

in which they can move freely amongst each other and in which the burden of complex codes of dress and behaviour is alleviated. This rather isolating but certainly sphere for women does not exist in Western societies. Consequently the concept of *purdah* became a burden for women in Britain. Separated from the majority of their family, many are isolated in small British homes. The environment outside is even more of a threat, as it is alien and even basic communication with the outside world is impossible because most women are likely to be illiterate.<sup>44</sup>

The older Pakistani generation appreciate that their children receive a much better education in Britain, have the opportunity to go to university, and have a better chance of receiving a well-paid job. One forty-year-old Pakistani woman declared that she is happier back home because her friends and extended family are there. When the husband leaves for work and the children for school there are neither other women to talk to, nor parents, brothers or sisters to provide support or to help in the household. Like most Pakistani and Bangladeshi women of that age group, she never received an education back home. The emphasis on, and withdrawal into, ones own cultural and religious life is a logical consequence of such isolation. The fulfilment of religious obligations becomes a 'Lebensinhalt'<sup>45</sup>. Family ties become more important than ever, to serve as support and to provide 'Geborgenheit'<sup>46</sup>. The interviewee admitted that the reason for her loneliness in Glasgow is that she does not speak English. Nevertheless she spoke very fondly of Britain and emphasised the high quality of the childcare that her daughter received when she gave birth to her twenty years



ago. The facilities ranging from transport and health care to education are appreciated by the first generation.<sup>47</sup>

Of interest was one complaint that was mentioned by second-generation interviewees. She stated that she would like to see more Asians in the media, particularly in the adverts. What was expressed, was the obvious desire to become socially accepted by visual representation in the media. It is also the innate craving for acknowledgement by being addressed directly on one's own terms. To find one's ethnic and cultural traits reflected in the mass media of a society, not only conveys acceptance but also supports the individual's identity. Everybody needs objects of identification. It is easier to identify with images of the same ethnic and cultural background than with foreign faces. Since the media and particularly the advertising industry seek to stimulate consumerism, ethnic minorities want to feel directly addressed as any other potential consumer. Now that Asians shape the image of British society, they feel marginalised and under-represented in the media, which is still dominated by white society.

The first generation is still predominantly home oriented. All the interviewees of that generation have maintained their extended families in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Some managed to build beautiful houses in their villages of origin and are proud to show pictures and videos of their homes.

And when they see my house back home they could not believe it. They say what the hell you're doing in Scotland when you have a place like that? Well, if I was not here I most probably would not have that place. You know they don't realise that. So I make life very comfortable for my children, so up to them what they make for their children.<sup>48</sup>

One of the biggest ego-satisfactions among this generation is their economic achievement. To improve the living standard of their family back home and in Britain demanded a lot of discipline and personal sacrifice. The rewards are the satisfaction of having successfully provided for their families and the respect they receive from their family members in return. Women express their respect by obeying the head of the family. The male family members aim to improve the family status. The honour of the family is a well-protected value. First generation Muslim identity is thus based on their well-situated and honourable family.

#### 3.4.2.1. Kinship and Biraderi

Kinship is a set of ties socially recognised as existing between persons because of their genealogical connections. It includes affinal relations created by marriage as well as those of descent.<sup>49</sup>

Kinship determines the co-operation between kin in business and family maintenance. The structure is patriarchal and the whole family respects the authority of the male head of the household. Strong ties with the family in Pakistan are maintained and parental authority, even when the father remained in Pakistan, will extend to Britain. Every member of the family has responsibilities and obligations towards the rest of the family.

The obligations to relatives and non-relatives are regulated by the institution of *Biraderi* (*Biradar* - brother) in Pakistani society. *Biraderi* provides mutual support in times of hardship and is maintained by the exchange of gifts. The exchange of gifts, also known as *Vartan Bhanji* (dealing with sweets) is also used to establish relationships with people

outside the *Biraderi*. This term is also applied to relationships in which every party can feel free to ask favours of each other.<sup>50</sup> Based on this kin network newcomers from Pakistan can rely on their kin to help them settle in Britain.

Close ties with kin and friends alleviate the struggle of every day life. Early immigrants obtained houses close to each other, renting spare rooms to friends and kin at nominal rent. As family members started to arrive they joined their siblings, fathers, or husbands. When the accommodation became too crowded new houses were bought near by, for which money was usually borrowed from kin. Soon the lifestyle became similar to that of a Pakistani village. This environment provided the possibility for mutual aid and physical and emotional support when needed. The fact that most immigrants were not fluent in English, made them more dependent on each other.

The kin network served another important purpose. The majority of South Asian immigrants came from underdeveloped areas of India and Pakistan. With their arrival in the United Kingdom they faced a culture shock. They had to cope with the sudden confrontation with Western City life and people of a different race, with a different mentality, speaking a different language. So not only did they have to adjust to the city 'mentality', but also to the Western 'mentality' and way of life. In such an alien environment the first immigrant pioneers could only rely on each other for support. Consequently they moved together, supported each other and their kin which followed on later, to establish a well functioning social network.



Those who arrived later were able to integrate quickly into this communal life and to build their future on already well established social networks.<sup>51</sup>

Shops, other ethnic facilities, and services became meeting points where information and news was exchanged. Shopkeepers usually spoke English and could also be drawn upon as interpreters. The English language as well as contacts within and outside of the community gave entrepreneurs an advantage over the rest of the community and enabled them to act as community leaders. In response to new problems and challenges such community leaders quickly realised that they could only expect support from local governmental institutions if they speak and act in the name of an institution. Soon numerous organisations, led by one or two men, were created with the intention to make wider society aware of, and to accommodate, the Muslim communities' needs. Pnina Werbner pointed out that

...increasingly, much Pakistani voluntary activity has as its aim the achievement of greater and more elaborate 'institutional completeness' ...<sup>52</sup>

#### 3.4.2.2. Cultural, Sectarian and Class Divisions

As has become evident above, the Muslim community in Britain is far from homogeneous. Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Arabs, North Africans, Iranians, Turks, Malaysians, Africans, etc., all have their own communal life. Their different cultural background has to be distinguished from Islamic culture itself. Most of these ethnic groups have formed their own ethnic organisations. These ethnic divisions are as such un-Islamic. The first

generation of immigrants does not differ much between Islam and cultural traditions. Instead religion is frequently employed to legitimise cultural traditions. Therefore a threat to cultural values is often perceived as a threat to Islam.

Both in the Muslim world and in Britain many of these ethnic communities are again subdivided into 'sectarian groupings'. Examples of such groups include the Barelvis, the Deobandis, the Tablighi Jamaat (centre in Dewsbury), the Ahl-e-Hadith, the Pervaizi, the Modernists, the Revivalists, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Shi' ite Muslims. The majority of Muslims in Britain are Barelvis. However, until today these divisions have made it virtually impossible for the Muslim minorities to create a unity among the Islamic community. The strong interdependency within the communities makes it very difficult, especially for the first generation, to penetrate sectarian boundaries. The competitive spirit between the sectarian groups hampers the formation of a community.

Apart from cultural and sectarian divisions the Muslim community is also divided according to the class structure. The British social class stratification according to occupation (professional, intermediate, skilled non-manual, skilled manual, partly skilled and unskilled), differs completely from the Asian class structure, which is determined by income (wealth-business elite, professional status-elite) and religious family background (familial pedigree relating them to the Prophet's family or a family of religious elite). The British class system has upset the traditional Asian structures. The religious elite no longer receives the respect it did in its home country and those

Asians who have acquired wealth are still not accepted as equals among British society. Those Asians (and Arabs) who managed to acquire wealth were able to do so because they adjusted to the British society. They limited their religious practice to the private sphere and their ties to the rest of the community have weakened. The poor members of the community maintained strong adherence to their religion. Mohammad Raza attributed the lack of motivation among British Muslims to donate money to Islamic institutions, to the absence of community spirit, which was never able to evolve due to the national/ethnic/class and status divisions. He further argued that this is the reason why Muslim organisations accept donations from Middle Eastern countries and are subsequently exposed to their influence.<sup>53</sup>

#### 3.4.2.3. The Islamic Identity of the First Generation

The sectarian influences on the first generation of Asian immigrants fostered the establishment of community networks in Britain. Nevertheless, it has now become a source of conflict between the generations. As illustrated in part two, most South Asian Islamic movements have developed in response to British influence in India and as a self-protecting mechanism for a Muslim minority among a Hindu majority. That is to say, the first generation of South Asian Muslims was well prepared for their minority status in Britain. This circumstance contributed to the rapid establishment of religious institutions in Britain and to a reliable self-sufficiency in this context.



As this generation settled in Britain they drew upon their experiences with British India. Withdrawn from wider society, these Muslims built on family support and also brought their imams from their region of origin for support and spiritual guidance. The imams were imported from the country of origin, mostly the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and often from the villages and biraderies. These imams continued to preach and teach Islam the way they always did at home. By transplanting these imams to Britain, South Asian Muslims have institutionalised their traditional, culturally blemished religious practices.

For most of the members of the first generation, migration from rural to urban areas caused social disruption in traditional life. Having been transplanted into an environment where it has become an intellectual pleasure to question all existing orders, to face all traditional orthodoxy with scepticism and to look for multiple interpretations of all phenomena including religion, and where the loss of faith and the celebration of pluralism have become the norm, most Muslim immigrants try to counter their feeling of powerlessness (Ohnmacht) by retreating into their cultural and religious traditions. Lacking sufficient knowledge of the English language and preoccupied with the battle of economic survival, holding onto that which provides most reassurance is the easiest coping strategy. Since Islam always has been the frame of orientation for these Muslims in their home countries, it should not surprise that Islam has become the focal point and primary source of orientation in the West.

The majority of South Asian Muslims in Britain belong to the Barelwis, who adhere to the "custom-laden style of *Sufism* and closely allied themselves to the teachings of the medieval *pirs*"<sup>54</sup>. Nevertheless it is difficult to quantify the Barelwis in numbers because not all Muslims who adhere to this approach to Islam would necessarily define themselves as such. This kind of Islam is primarily practiced by people who have their origin in the rural areas of the subcontinent. It follows that there are also regional differences among the Barelwis, as each community perpetuates its own local customs by oral tradition. In Britain, these regional differences were maintained due to chain migration and the pattern of settlement. Since South Asian immigrants usually settled close to family members and friends, and as the imams were recruited from the same villages or districts, the disruption of religious practice was only temporarily. Usually not well acquainted with the English language, these imams perpetuate local rituals and customs.<sup>55</sup> For the first generation, which is home oriented, these traditional imams provide spiritual shelter from an alien environment. Thus the personal nature of the small mosques allow these Muslims to retreat into a symbolic reconstruction of home, where kinship and ethnic ties are reinforced and where their problems and concerns are understood.

In their mosques, which were established to serve only a small congregation, the congregation reasserts characteristic communal customs. The identification with the particularities of every communal mosque is very strong. Mosques serve the religious needs of the community as much as they serve as meeting points for the older generation, in particular men. Members of other mosques are usually not well received. Religious



observance and attendance at the mosque does not only serve the purpose of religious observance, but also reinforces a very particular custom-laden ritualisation of life. It is an isolated environment where individuals who share the same belief and cultural background assemble and are able to escape the alien reality outside. The sectarian and ethnic divisions among the mosques reinforce this feeling of belonging to a particular group and strengthen the bond within it. These sectarian and cultural differences have made it difficult to combat the fragmentation of the Muslim community.

Since the sixties an increasing number of mosques were registered. In 1966, 18 mosques were registered, whilst the number had risen from 136 in 1977, to 338 in 1985 and to 487 in 1993 (in the same year the Multi-Faith Directory lists 650 mosques in the UK) and at present it is estimated that there are approximately 950 mosques in Britain.

These numbers do not include unofficial prayer houses. The ethnic and religious divisions among Muslims and the fact that mosques should be established close to residence or the working place of Muslims have lead to an explosive increase in mosques over the past thirty to forty years. Although the Pakistani community has built the majority of the mosques and the subcontinental Muslims dominate religious life, it contributes little to a sense of unity among the community.

Other Islamic movements from the subcontinent which have also contributed to the diversity of religious institutions, are primarily reformation movements. In Britain reform groups such as the Deobandis,



Ahl-Hadith and Tabligh-i Jamaat, could build on already tight-knit organisations back home. The reformation movements were committed to *dawah* activity among Muslims in the subcontinent and the rest of the world. In Britain they quickly responded to the 'new community's' dilemma of lacking religious institutional organisation.

The Deobandi together with the Barelwis have the widest support among the South Asian Muslim community.<sup>56</sup> Frequently conflicts have arisen over the control of mosques between the two movements. The Deobandi supporters tend to be of urban background and more educated members of the community. In response to their minority situation under colonial rule in India, the Deobandis always stressed correct ritual and practice as an important criterion for Muslim life. Their approach also appealed to Barelwis in Britain. The Deobandi *ulema* quickly responded to the need for effective religious guidance. By 1967, they had founded the Majilis Ulema UK in order to increase the efficiency of their activities. The *ulema* issue *fatwas* to ensure correct practice of Islam in Britain; they establish the correct time for prayers and the beginning and end of Ramadan. They also organise the supply of *halal* food and campaign for separate Muslim schools for girls as well as the acceptance of Muslim family law by Parliament.<sup>57</sup>

Although the programme of the Deobandi movement intends to promote the orthodoxy of universal Islam and seeks to unite the *Ummah* they are not free from ethnic and class influences. Maulana Muhammad Raza, a theologian of Barelwi background and head of the Muslim Shariah Council, believes that although leaders will always emerge who seek to unite the

Muslims and who will preach the universality of Islam, such divisions among Muslims will always continue to exist.

I know many, many Muslims who are advocating the global main of Islam in the West. They are concerned about this sectarian image of the Muslim community in this country. But personally I do not subscribe to their approach at all. It may be an idealistic approach of those leaders who are advocating a global Islam in this country, but if you have a realistic approach then we have to admit that these divisions are going to remain in this community and these divisions have been in this community for the last thirteen hundred years. So always there have been leaders who have been advocating the universal character of Islam and unity and global major of Islam, but ... everybody who knows the history of Islam and the history of the Muslim community from the last thirteen hundred years, knows that we had so many great politicians, leaders, kings, and Sufis, and scholars, but despite of their best efforts it had not been possible for any of the rulers or politicians or philosophers or Muslim scholars to get Muslims together and eliminate these sectarian trends or currents of the Muslim community at all. So what is the realistic solution of this problem for me: let us recognise all of them, let us allow all of them to flourish and to access their own capacity according to their own resources; and at the same time accept the challenge and try to formulate a minimum formula or a minimum programme of bringing all of them together on certain common issues. That is the realistic approach that may be successful in the future.<sup>58</sup>

A young imam from the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK admits that the divisions among the Muslim community have caused a lot of problems in the past. However, the second generation tend to search for the universal elements of the teachings, rather than to focus on the divisions.

In the 80's I can remember, when I used to go to school here, at that time it was very difficult among the Muslims, or in the sects. Like they were saying that these are so and so group, that belongs to so and so group, we shouldn't talk to each other or we shouldn't listen to those people. We had with that a lot of problems, but *hamdu-l allah*, the things are going better now. ... The younger generation plus the older people now they thought that it's time to give up. We shouldn't fight now and we shouldn't attack each other, we shouldn't do these things. The young generation and the new Muslims or the new comers into Islam, they realised that these sect fights are ... that that's all nonsense. We should base on Qur'an and Sunna.<sup>59</sup>

In the past the Ahl-i Hadith propagated a policy of separation from non-Muslim society.<sup>60</sup> This policy is slowly changing as British converts change the ethnic reality of the Muslim communities in Britain. Despite the fact that the members of the Ahl-i Hadith seek to maintain their strict



observance of Islam concurrent with the Qur'an and Sunna, the young imam, who arrived in Britain at the age of ten, reassured that the imams of his generation have a less rigid approach to their pupils and congregation.

Children ask a lot of questions and I think that's a great thing to do. The Qur'an itself says that the Qur'an is not just to read, Qur'an is to read and understand. Islam itself says that we should read and understand, not to just read, and here the young children or young peoples, before they do anything they ask, and that's brilliant, I think. That's one of the best things I've learned from here, from this country. Even if they ask you awkward questions. ... *Did You find that some imams of the old tradition* ... Well, as I told you earlier, the imams we had while I went to school and the mosque back in Sheffield, that's where I'm from, those imams they couldn't speak English, they couldn't answer questions. We had lots of problems, yes. They used to say to us keep quiet, and do this, this. Well, I could speak our language, but the majority of most pupils, in those days even, they couldn't. So we didn't know what the imam was saying. We were just reading Qur'an and that's it, not understanding it.<sup>61</sup>

Younger imams have partly received their religious education in Saudi Arabia. Although they may not be born in Britain, they have spent most of their youth in this country. They have received much of their general education in Britain and are acquainted with the less authoritarian teaching methods. Nevertheless, the older imams still have an influence on their congregation and continue to hold on to the old traditions.<sup>62</sup>

A factor which has motivated organisations like the UK Islamic Mission to refrain from emphasising its affiliation to the Jamaat-i Islami seems to be the struggle for support and the competition among the South Asian Islamic movements. The Jamaat-i Islami propagates Maulana Mawdudi's ideas and thus seeks to lead the Ummah back to its original purity of faith and political greatness. As Mawdudi's concept of an Islamic state is less relevant in an environment where Muslims are a minority, the sympathisers of Jamaat-i Islami focus on *dawah* instead. Although the Jamaat-i Islami has not established itself in Britain as an official



organisation, it does exist as a movement. The UK Islamic Mission, Young Muslims UK, The Islamic Foundation and The Muslim Educational Trust were identified by Jorgen Nielsen as Jamaat related.<sup>63</sup> All these organisations employ the ideas of Mawdudi but work in different areas concurrent with the perceived needs of the community. Nevertheless, they all claim to be independent from the Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent and of each other. This trend was encouraged by the second generation that seeks to strip their religious adherence from ethnic and cultural bonds and emphasise their loyalty to the *Ummah* and the 'Islamic Movement' rather than to the Islamic movements of the subcontinent.

Representatives of the South Asian movements all share in common that they have responded to the individual needs of their congregations. They provide the Muslim communities with guidance and religious orientation concurrent with the traditions of their regions of origin. Since the main Islamic sources, the Qur'an and the Hadith, do not elaborate on regulations for Muslims living outside of *dar al-Islam*, Muslims in Britain frequently search for reassurance from their imams. *Fatwas* give advice on how to live and behave in a non-Muslim environment to ensure Muslims do not err from their religious course. The obsession with the details of religious observance is characteristic for South Asian Muslims who traditionally countered the threat of deviation among a non-Muslim majority in this way. The isolationism, most commonly applied by Deobandis, is a self-protecting mechanism that complicates the process of integration.

One can observe a slow change in approach to sectarian divisions, which cannot be directly categorised into the first and second generation of immigrants. The younger generation of imams, who belong to the first generation of immigrants but have arrived at a younger age in Britain, are the first to generate a change in approach. The education they have received in Saudi Arabia enable them to identify cultural rituals that were added to the religion by their South Asian ancestors. In spite of the tendency toward 'scripturalism' among these younger imams they still adhere to the various movements they belong to. Among the reformation movements particularly the idea of reforming and purifying religious practice among the Muslim community in Britain remains the highest goal, which they follow according to the teachings of their subcontinental theologians. To ensure the perpetuation of their movements, the Deobandi's, for example, founded their own colleges, the Dar al-Ulums, for the religious education of new generations of imams. An example of the difficulties involved in establishing an Islamic institution for education, independent of sectarian and political influences, is best illustrated by the founding history of the Muslim College.

#### **3.4.2.4. The Muslim College: An Example**

The Muslim College was established in order to provide a better training for the new generation of imams and to teach them how to convey Islam in a Western environment. The founding history of the Muslim College is exemplar for the struggle involved in establishing new institutions for the Muslim community. Dr. Zaki Badawi, the founder of the Muslim College

was previously director of the Islamic Centre of Regents Park. During the course of his work he developed contacts with many mosques and their imams in Britain. The standard of qualification of these imams was inadequate. Not only did these imams lack sufficient knowledge of Islam they were also ignorant of the English culture and language. Consequently Dr. Badawi suggested to the Council of the Regent's Park Mosque (constituted of the ambassadors of twenty-eight Muslim countries) to establish a college for the education of imams in Britain. The proposition was poorly received. A shortage of money and disputes over the location of such a college caused tension. As Dr. Badawi finished his contract at the end of 1981 he founded a company called the Muslim College Limited. He sent his plans to the various governments that could afford to fund the college.

My vision was quite simple. First it'll have to be independent; that is to say you have a fund to be always there. If a coup happens in the country or the ruler changes his mind the fund remains. This is one condition. And the fund will be invested and the associates would meet the essential needs of the college. The second is that the college should remain completely outside politics. They have nothing to do with politics, particularly with politics amongst the Muslim states. Third, the college should remain outside fractions, you know sectarian divide. It should be open to all the sects. And finally the college should not discriminate against women that women are discriminated against. These were my conditions. And clearly the insistence that the academic freedom of the college be maintained, totally and without reserve, was something some of the donors were not very happy about. The people from the ambassador of Saudi Arabia spoke to me, but he said at the time, he said that his people would not agree with the independence of the college, they would like to have it follow the Saudi Arabian line.<sup>64</sup>

Other countries were showing little interest because Dr. Badawi demanded a minimum investment of five million pounds. Dr. Badawi wanted to establish a Muslim college in Britain because he believed that only outside of the Muslim world such a college could be free of sectarian and political culture. He rejected generous financial contributions from Saudi Arabia, which twice exceeded the Libyan support offered in order to insure the



independence of the college. His aim was to prepare a new generation of imams for their work in Britain. Consequently this could best be achieved if they are educated in a Western country. The project also had to be realised quickly. Apart from the fact that the religious qualification of most imams was insufficient, they too were unable to communicate with wider society and the authorities. Therefore the Muslim communities remained in isolation which was frequently encouraged by the ideology of the movements some of the imams adhered to. The first generation of Muslim immigrants respected their imams as the most educated in the community. In Britain however, their education was too limited to accommodate all the needs of the community. Particularly, the second generation quickly recognised the inadequacy of these imams and were reluctant to go to the mosque.<sup>65</sup>

The education of the new generation of imams should therefore reach beyond sectarianism and inner communal power struggles. The students are made aware of the perspectives of the various Islamic movements, the world religions, the values and mechanisms of Western and other societies in the course of their studies. The aim of this education is to prevent intolerance toward other societies and their religions. One precaution which should prevent the future young imams from becoming dependent and thus corruptible, is that students are expected to apply to the Muslim College after their first degree so that they are also able to maintain themselves by working in different professions.

In this spirit Dr. Badawi also re-established the Shariah Council under the imams and Mosques Council in order to provide religious guidance for the community.

According to the Shariah, if a Muslim community exists outside of the Land of Islam they should refer their problems to the most knowledgeable person or persons within their community. So we happened to be the most knowledgeable and therefore we do that. So we started the Shariah Council. ... And one characteristic of the Shariah Council, it does not exist anywhere else, is that it combines all the schools of thought, so we have the Sunni, the Shi'a, and everybody. Later on every community now has its own Shariah council.<sup>66</sup>

Particularly the Saudi government tends to finance institutions that parallel organisations whose founders refused to follow the Saudi line.

### 3.4.3. Muslim Organisations and the Institutionalisation of Islam

Dr. Raza identified four types of Muslim organisations: agent, sectarian, service, and independent. Divisions and competition between Muslim organisations complicate effective organisation and make them vulnerable to external influences and manipulation. They also become ineffective in countering the increasing 'Islamophobia' in Western countries.

Most Muslim organisations in Britain were originally established to organise the provision of praying facilities and religious education for Muslim children. They also sought to accommodate other needs such as *halal* food and to lobby for girls' schools and the introduction of Islamic holidays.

The organisations' effectiveness depends on the external support received, because divisions among the community prevent an effective distribution of donations. Those organisations, which could build on the facilities of sister organisations on the subcontinent or those that received funding from Saudi Arabia and Iran, grew very quickly. Other organisations were founded on the grounds of private initiative of educated members of the community and in many cases the lack of funds has made it very difficult to achieve the set aims. Due to the reactionary nature of some of the South Asian movements and the ineffectiveness of many organisations, the Muslim community experienced a swamp of 'leaders'. The traditional leaders have received competition from the professional classes, which have taken the initiative to accommodate the needs of the community.

According to Dr. Raza, Saudi Arabia funds over 800 organisations and many imams are directly funded by the Saudi embassy. An estimated 50 million pounds were invested in Britain over the past decade. The Islamic revolution in Iran proved that a revolution could be initiated from abroad. Therefore the investment in Muslim communities all over the world is intended to win sympathy for the Wahabi school of law and to propagate it as the 'official and universal' Islam. A broad acceptance by Muslims all over the world should protect the 'Westernised elite' from major criticism and attacks by Islamists abroad and in the Middle East.

The Jamaat-i Islami for example, is said to receive financial support from Saudi Arabia for their political activity in Pakistan. Dr. Badawi assumes that the Jamaat-i Islami related organisations in Britain use their bases in this



country to influence the political situation in Pakistan. Although they represent only two percent of the Muslim community in Britain, they receive approximately eighty percent of the Saudi money.<sup>67</sup>

Dr. Sidiqqi from the Islamic Foundation rejected direct association with the Jamaat-i Islami. He explained that the founder of the Islamic Foundation adhered to the Jamaat-i Islami, as most first generation immigrants adhere to one of the South Asian movements. However, the Islamic Foundation as it is now, has developed in its own right and is purely financed by the sale of publications and community donations. Nevertheless, Dr. Sidiqqi admitted that individual Saudi citizens who do not intend to influence the organisation have funded some projects. He also declared that the foreign policy of other countries does not have any effect on the institution. The focus of the organisation is directed on research, publication and training for the younger generations. The training is primarily concerned with religious education, Arabic classes and preparation for a life in a plural society.<sup>68</sup>

The UK Islamic Mission also focuses on education of children, charity and the arrangements of marriages. All their activities evolve around their aim to establish an Islamic social order in the United Kingdom.

The Mission seeks to observe and establish Islam fully in its original purity, based on the teachings of the Holy Qur'an. ... We are also doing dawah, the invitation to Islam ... last year there were four hundred and forty, who converted to Islam. They were all British people.<sup>69</sup>

The Islamic Mission organises training sessions for their activists and also for the police, nursing staff and social services, lectures at Islamic schools,

colleges and universities, encourages meetings with other organisations and distributes Islamic literature.<sup>70</sup> The nature of these activities is similar to those of the Islamic Foundation. Although the members of the UK Islamic Mission insisted that they are not related to the Jamaat-i Islami, the literature they distribute most, are translated publications from Maulana Mawdudi. The funding for all these projects is raised by organising charities and from contributions from the six thousand members of the Islamic Mission. The branches of the UK Islamic Mission have to finance themselves so that the communities concerned support the projects in their own region.<sup>71</sup>

The UK Islamic Mission is very traditional in its approach to the Muslim community. Headed by traditional religious leadership, the organisation perpetuates a very pious and community centred life in Britain. Although S. T. H. Shah emphasised that the UK Islamic Mission encourages its members and supporters to participate as active members of British society and to avoid isolation, there is a strong indication that this participation should not lead to major social adaptation.

The leadership's primary focus on religion led to the promotion of an exclusively Islamic identity among the community. Due to the nature of South Asian Islamic movements one of the primary strategies to win support for the Islamic cause in the West is by *dawah*, the invitation to Islam.

We should only find an Islamic identity, only, we should call ourselves the Muslims, but we can't keep your cultural way at all, that's a part of it. At the same time if we

just keep our culture and follow the Qur'an, then ... *Do you see some Western values as a threat to Islamic identity?* I do only on one topic and that is the Holy War. That the Westerns, they try to block the Muslims, those who are fighting for Islam in the Muslim countries. ... How do you see the future of Islam in Great Britain? Well, the future of Islam in Great Britain I think looks bright, yes, and from my less experience, I've got friends, brothers here in the UK, the future of Islam is very, very bright, and you know, lots of people coming to Islam. And Islam is growing faster but it's not as it's supposed to be. ... *Do you think that Islamic life in Western society will change?* Yes, it definitely will. *In which way?* Well, not Islamic life, but Western life will change into Islamic.<sup>72</sup>

The sectarian organisations predominantly focus on the Muslim community. They lack sufficient knowledge of the social and political mechanisms of the society they live in. In order to compensate for this deficit, the professional members of the Muslim community have established umbrella organisations which seek to unite all the organisations and leaders of mosques to work as pressure groups and to lobby. The leaders of such organisations are usually well acquainted with the mechanisms of British society as they have established themselves within their professions as journalists, doctors, barristers, businessmen, etc.

#### 3.4.3.1. Muslim Umbrella Organisations and their Political Aims

The Muslim leadership in Britain was pre-occupied with internal differences among the leadership. The strong strive for individualism hampered the dynamics of developing a strong representative body for the Muslim community in Britain. The attempts to exert influence on British public politics have lacked impact due to the divisions and differences among the Muslim leadership. A consolidation of forces is nevertheless slowly evolving. Political participation at national level is necessary to promote interests of the community, but at present the Muslim community



is still struggling from isolation that arose through the controversy over the Rushdie Affair.

At the moment Muslim leaders are trying to convince the British government to grant Muslims the status of a religious minority opposed to that of ethnic minorities. The Race Relations Act of 1976 only refers to the rights of ethnic minorities but does not consider issues such as incitement to religious hatred. Therefore leaders like Dr. Pasha from the Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO) lobby the government to acknowledge the need for legal religious protection. Such a law, whether in the form of a separate law or as an extension of the Race Relations Act, should cover issues such as blasphemy and discrimination of Muslims by their employers with regard to religious holidays and dress code. Also state funded Muslims schools were the subject of political initiative. Here Muslim pressure groups were successful. The new Labour Government responded to their large Muslim electorate by accepting the application of two Muslim schools in Birmingham for state support in 1998. Although this has only been a small step forward, Muslim organisations have proven that their initiative and persistence do lead to improvements. In order for the Muslim community to fully manifest its Islamic identity Dr. Pasha also campaigns for the implementation of Muslim family law.

Anyhow, one intention is that there is a special law for religion for the Scottish people and the laws are different for the English people, so if it is possible to have two laws for religion for two separate British citizens, so certainly it is possible to have a law for religion for the Muslim people. The government says, well look these are on the geographical lines not on the religious lines. That is not really a sound proposition. So on the whole we are lobbying the Members of Parliament. And some political parties are trying to seriously talk about what we are proposing - the Labour Party. The Conservatives are very much against, I don't know why. Although they are the people who we are expecting very much support. You see they are conservatives, we are

conservatives. In a sense we are trying to conserve our value system. So we talk to the Conservatives and the Home Secretary but they are less supporting. But still we are putting pressure, we have begged the Home Secretary several times, not only this Home Secretary, all his predecessors, we had delegations wearing them ... and we've put forward all these proposals and we said: look we are law abiding citizens, we are peaceful citizens, we are asking for certain rights within the framework of your constitution, although it's an unwritten constitution, but we are accepting freedom of religion, we are asking for certain facilities for us to practice our religious values, our religious tenures and laws. Without disturbing the general law here. We are asking for example, for separate criminal law for us, law of property. Constitutional law, there are so many, the whole range of laws they are so huge, but we are just asking one speciality, personal laws: married, divorce, and not adoption because we don't have legal adoption, maintenance, wills, gifts, you see, so limited scope. So we are still putting pressure, we went to the Chancellors office, we had a meeting with some officials, and the latest situation is, we are trying to harmonise the law to recognise the Muslim law of marriage. Although it is performed under the Islamic law they are willing to accept to give it equal status along with the marriage performed in civil law here. But just by name, by implication there is not much consequence.

*Epecially, what happens when somebody wants to marry four women or two women? Yea, that's what I'm saying, they are rejecting this. They are just accepting one marriage.*<sup>73</sup>

The UMO was the only umbrella organisation for over fifteen years. The fact that little has been achieved in that time has encouraged other leading members of the community to establish organisations which should fulfil such a role. The Muslim parliament for example, works as an umbrella organisation and a pressure group. Also Mr. Iqbal Sacranie head of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs has founded a new umbrella organisation to increase the effectiveness of Muslim organisation. He believes that it is the duty of every Muslim to contribute to the community. By encouraging the sense of unity, the Muslim community in Britain will be able to draw from enormous resources. The diversity of the new generation born in Britain represents a capacity that must be co-ordinated so that the whole of the community can benefit. To help the next generation succeed in their profession, while at the same time creating an environment in which they can maintain their identity and accommodate their cultural and social needs, is an important task ahead.



Mr. Iqbal Sacranie considers Muslim response to the Rushdie Affair to be one of the most important experiences the community has made. As the founder and head of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, which he established to take more effective measures against the Satanic Verses, Mr. Sacranie experienced first hand the unity of, and the consensus among, the Muslim community. The Rushdie Affair has taught the community how to overcome the divisions between the movements and classes and to work together for a common aim. He believes that the unity Muslims have demonstrated in response to this issue has brought respect from the whole *Ummah* for the efforts British Muslims have made to protect Islam.<sup>74</sup>

To found an organisation that will unite all British Muslims and create consensus on important issues concerning Muslims is "an expression of maturity and identity, bearing in mind the progress, which has been taking place over the years"<sup>75</sup>.

So the claim of being an umbrella organisation by several organisations is quite apparent. I think that the judgement will be given only by the community. Leadership is not claimed it is earned. So whether it will be Sacrani or any other body, the community is going to judge it only within the next five years. The opportunity is for everybody who is going to do something, who wishes to do something, equal opportunity is there but if somebody does something for the community it will be them.<sup>76</sup>

Dr. Raza confirmed that the majority of Muslims and leaders of mosques or organisations recognise the need of a platform that will function in a similar way to the Jewish Boards of Deputies. However, even Dr. Kalim Siddiqui's (Muslim Parliament) attempt to create such a platform has lost support over the years. At first the Muslim Institute was very successful and over three



hundred leaders and speakers of the community attended their meetings, whereas at present not more than fifty attend.<sup>77</sup>

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, the founder of the Muslim Institute was a journalist by profession. He was well acquainted with the British media and knew how to draw attention to the needs of the Muslim community. He employed all means available in a democratic Western country. Opposed to simply searching for dialogue with British politicians, the Muslim Parliament employs pressure.

*When it comes to the methods to achieve your aims, you have said they vary from fundraising to sort of media work...*

It is fundraising, media work and campaigning, I mean for example, recently on Lebanon, we wrote a letter, I could get you a copy of it, to every single member of these two thousand, and we asked them to do a number of things or one of the number of things:

1. to help fundraising for emergency relief;
2. to put pressure on the government, by writing to their MP's, writing to the Prime Minister, we even put the phone number of the Prime Minister, Downing Street number 10, and we said dial this number and ask them why is it that our government is supporting a terrorist state and terrorism. And you know ...
3. and we asked them to contact every media, local or national and put them under pressure.

Now that to us, that is more effective than sending 2000 people in the street ... shouting, 2000 people calling 10 Downing Street, you know, it is much more effective than 2000 people going in the street and holding placards.

*And especially it doesn't give you a bad media ...*

Yes, with the telephone, you phone and put the ... and you know, the idea is that jam the phone lines of 10 Downing Street, jam the phone lines of BBC, ITV, you know, when they do something, make life difficult for them. And this is a better way of campaigning, and this is the sort of thing we prefer to do. And also we do press releases into media, we put ... there is not a .. if there are days that goes without us being involved with some work with media, there is not a week that goes by without three or four involvements of different aspect of media, and these all range from our own projects or helping the media to reflect better what the needs of our community are, and what perspective of different things are.<sup>78</sup>

Their activities are not restricted to the representation of the Muslim community in Britain, but are extended to the *Ummah*. The Human Rights committee raises funds for the Muslim struggle against oppression in

Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya and for the families and orphans whose kin died in course of this struggle.

The Muslim Parliament, we were talking about the Human Rights committee. The Muslim Parliament has been involved in a number of things, for example, we have just done a major thing on the Home Office strategy regarding Muslims, I don't know if you have received that, now that probably came out after your last visit, that is quite a major document which is how we see that Islam and Muslims are being dealt with by not just the British government but also European government, how they are trying to manipulate the Muslim organisations, and so forth. It is quite a major work that has been done. And also we do have the tutorial colleges which is going ahead, we do have the war crime watch, this sort of project, we do have the Bosnian orphans and how we are going to expand it to elsewhere. We have set up a project which is supporting the families of those who have died in the cause of Islam, right across the board, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, we have got this project, we are going to extend it to Lebanon and to Palestine. This, you know, is our major work, we match up families, so one family here supports another family over there, and ... so they become more closer to one another, and this is a way of actually linking our community together and also making people here feel responsible for people there, this is quite important.<sup>79</sup>

The Muslim Parliament seeks to maintain links with the global Islamic Movement and aims to foster a strong Islamic identity in Britain and other EU countries. The Muslim Parliament perceives Muslim identity to be under threat in Europe. Dr. Kalim Siddiqui stated in *The Muslim Manifesto - a strategy for survival*:

Of all the major religions of the world, Islam is the most 'pliticized'. At its inception Islam created a political platform from which Muslims were to launch themselves on a global role as founders of great States, empires and a world civilization and culture. Political and cultural subservience goes against their grain. Yet in Britain today Muslims are being asked to accept subservience and the total disintegration of their identity, culture and religion, as the only real options open to them.<sup>80</sup>

To counter this threat to Muslim identity Dr. Siddiqui called on the Muslim community to resist integration or assimilation and to secure itself an honourable place in British society. Muslims can resist subservience and the disintegration of their identity, culture and religion, despite being a



minority by creating institutions and mobilising resources to pursue their goals that are concurrent with the goals of the global *Ummah*.<sup>81</sup>

*I generally want to know, and you can talk about your personal ideas now, how would you describe Muslim identity at present in Britain?*

Well, Muslim identity has been, there is an attempt always to dilute Muslim identity and this is being done under the umbrella of integration. I don't think someone needs to, you know, you would never ask a Black person to become a white because to be integrated into the community. You equally don't ask a Communist to become a Capitalist to integrate into the community. You don't ask a Muslim to, sort of, give up their belief so they will become integrated, what you do, you actually say that this society is for all of us, and this society ... each one of us have got a contribution to make, even if some of our ideology is a conflicting one. That in itself is not something one should destroy, cleans the other group. And Muslim identity is very important because we are considering ourselves living in a society which is a multicultural, multi-religious ... for us to sort of be able to get the benefit of all the ... our efforts, our taxes, etc., etc., we've got to have our identity recognised before our need could be addressed. If I am looked upon as Asian then, you know, what is Asian, there is no such thing as Asian culture, Asian need, you know, there is no such thing. It is a whole thing, what, where is Asia, China is in Asia, Central Asia is in Asia, you know. So you really need to address the identity of people as they see their own identity. I see that I have got more in common with a black or white or even an oriental Muslim than I have with another person who happened to be from the same race as myself, but from a different religion. And I see my need, be it a place of worship, be it the diet that I eat, be it the, sort of social need, or be it a cultural need. Even things like my fun time will be more identifiable with another Muslim than another non-Muslim. So all these things actually makes me and my identity what it is. And if that is not recognised then I am being oppressed in this society. My children at the school won't get their needs addressed or in the hospital, or in social services, etc., etc., so that is very important. I see my identity as Muslim and I think on this that identity for all of us Muslims is being recognised officially and addressed, we are basically oppressed community.<sup>82</sup>

Part of the justification for the call to resist integration is based on a deep mistrust toward British and Western societies. It is based on the belief that no matter whether Muslims will integrate or assimilate, British society will remain hostile, and the reward could even be persecution. The examples Muslims refer to are: Jewish persecution during the Second World War and the plight of the Bosnian Muslims in Ex-Yugoslavia.

*How do you see the problems of the second generation? Do they sit between two chairs?*

Well they are ... I feel sorry for an overwhelming majority of people who have come here or have been born in this society. And their families still consider themselves on an ethnic-nationalistic, sort of basis. They, the children don't see themselves on those basis, because they have never seen so called back home, you know what it is. They are not ... in some ways they might not even be able to identify and go or live in ... if they go down, lets say Pakistan or Middle East or anywhere, they will be looked upon more as a



tourist than somebody from there. So they will not be accepted on that sort of basis, and also that society here does not accept them. They become... they end up having some sort of identity crisis and that is a very harmful and damaging thing for a teenager to go through, on the top of everything else a teenager goes through. You see the youth are going through that dilemma and they will, you see, they get to a point where they recognise that they would never be accepted by society at large. This is a very old fashioned thing in this society that people say that you should become integrated. This is something that we are always told that you should become integrated. You know, no matter how much you become integrated the fact of the matter is that this society is very xenophobic and will never accept anything other than that, that is the bottom line. What we have to change is the attitude of that society rather than changing the colour of our hair and the... going back to Michael Jackson, having a cream tan making it lighter, wearing contact lenses and this sort of thing. That is not the way to do it. The way to do it is actually change this society and also to equipped yourself with sort of confidence that you could withstand this sort of society which is far from perfect. And we have to live in it, you know.

*Do you think that the Muslim identity of the second and third generation is under threat through Western influences?*

Actually I don't think so, I actually think that ... yes there are bound to be some casualties of people losing themselves completely and I feel sorry for those people because I look at what happened in Bosnia. And I see that no matter how integrated you become eventually you are going to be ... you are not going to be accepted in any case, and this is a lesson that ... a very harsh lesson and unfortunately a lot of us have to learn.<sup>83</sup>

Dr. Ghaissuden explained that the ultimate aim of the Muslim Parliament is to achieve long term political representation of Muslims in Britain. He admitted that the Muslim community is too young to expect political participation to develop quickly.<sup>84</sup> Such political participation is not automatically fulfilled by the election of a Muslim MP. The experiences of the Afro-Caribbean community has shown that MP's like Bernie Grant are not necessarily able to defend the interests of the community, but become a tool of the system themselves. Therefore Dr. Ghaissuden believes that the work of pressure groups toward receiving rights and protection as a religious minority is more effective at present. The political parties are aware of the impact of Muslim votes at local and national level. To resolve conflicts with local authorities on the issues of burial, slaughter, worship, education, voluntary schools and planning permissions, Muslims have to mobilise manpower to act as pressure groups. Until Muslims grow into the British political system, the Muslim Parliament is lobbying for state funded

Muslim schools to protect the Muslim identity of children. In response to the question whether Muslim schools will lead to the segregation of Muslim youth and a development toward isolation of the Muslim community, Dr. Ghaissuden clarified that such schools are intended to strengthen the Muslim identity of children and prevent them from drifting away from the community. Then when they move on to higher education or enter the British job market, the young generation will have received a strong enough religious and cultural foundation, not to lose touch with their roots. For the same reason the Muslim Parliament also provides student loans and training for teachers. In order to foster Muslim representation in the media, scholarships for media studies are provided.<sup>85</sup>

The British government repeatedly confirms that the Muslim community is an integral part of British society and that the government is committed to ensure that Muslims maintain their own identity. However, leaders of pressure groups like Iqbal Sacranie have critically observed that the government is reluctant to turn these promises into practice. The reluctance of the British government to grant Muslims the same rights as the Jewish and Catholic communities is perceived as unjust.

Dr. Ghaissuden believes that due to the colonial past, Muslims suffer from low self-esteem in Britain. Muslim organisations like the Muslim Parliament fostered political awareness and generated more confidence among the Muslim community. The first generation among the Muslim community lacks the political experience and education. One of the consequences of such inexperience was the response Muslims generated by



burning the Satanic Verses in Public. The immediate association with fascism in Germany backlashed on the activists. The Muslim community has learned that it has to fight for its rights but that it also has to adjust to the British political culture. Therefore the community invests a lot of hope in the younger generations which were raised in Britain. Their education and experience with this society should help the community to flourish.

#### **3.4.3.2. Identity and Politics**

Political orientation is subjected to many stimuli, which makes assumptions about their origin and development difficult. Nevertheless, some assumptions about political attitudes of the Muslim minority can be made. In general, assimilative Muslims spoke favourable of the British political system. Observant Muslims perceived democracy as too weak, which became apparent in the way social liberties and crime control were discussed. The social-Darwinist attitude that the stronger one survives, which is functional for the dynamics of modern industrial society, prevails among many Muslims. As most Muslims had to succeed in British society without social or state support, self-reliance and self-sufficiency are a source of pride. Another element is the devaluation of other minorities. This hostility towards other minority groups is partly based on economic competition and partly on Asian culture. Hostility and racism is a common experience for most members of ethnic minorities.

The survey on 'Attitudes towards Race' undertaken by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in February 1997<sup>86</sup>, revealed that the young,



educated generation, especially of different ethnic background, constitute the majority of the 'young optimists' (a category created by the researchers, labelling individuals with a positive and optimistic attitude towards race-relations). Their responses indicated that they are weary of racism. They try to reflect on the topic and to find constructive solutions to the problem. The subjects suggested that education and parental tolerance can erode racism in society.

Among the native British population the well-educated professionals are strongly ant-racist. Their group was categorised as the 'comfortable liberals'. They argued that with increasing education individuals become more liberal, as it is possible to understand the complexity of race-relations and to see through the fallacy of racist arguments.

In contrast to the two positive groups, this survey also identified the 'I'm Not Racist Buts...' and the 'die hard' groups. The latter group belonged to the lower strata of the social class system and they openly expressed their resentments and racism. Frustration about their situation, their economic fear and their feeling of powerlessness are the main causes for their attitudes. More complex is the 'I'm not racist but...' group, which denied racism. This group tried to rationalise these feelings by employing one-sided facts to support their arguments and to present their reactions as common sense. Their experience with other ethnic groups was limited and they tend to belong to the working or middle classes. Among this group are a lot of white females but also first generation Asians.

Many of the Muslim interviewees held strong views on the limitation of freedoms. Their criticism was directed against the moral and social freedom of native British individuals and against the limitation of freedom for Muslims to practice Islam publicly.

...When I was in school, at least people would have a degree of shame, from what I can see because now, since I've become practicing and observing my own religion, as one of the key characteristics I have recognise in non-Muslim people, not just English people, just non-Muslim people, that they are very, very promiscuous, and it's OK. And the other thing is that, when I,... since I, I was always brought up with this idea and the people that I was around, while I was young, I was brought up with this idea that the reason why a person works is so they can live, OK. And now, in this society, because I do work now, and my colleges and the people that I see, their concept it seems is so obvious from their behaviour and attitude, that they live to work. And I find that very disturbing, that someone can base their whole world, their whole life around their work. For example, they'll go to work and they'll earn their money, they'll associate with the people at work, after work they'll mix with them, after that they will try to have some sort of relationship with them. Then after that, from the money they earn from that work they are doing their best to spend that money on themselves, (I'm just talking primarily about women because those are people I'm having contact with and those are people that I see) with that money that they have, they go and spend it so that they can look beautiful and blah, blah, blah and everything, so that they can go back to work and present themselves. It's like really the most vicious circle, that you earn your money to spend it on yourself so you can prepare for work, rather than spend it on yourself so you can prepare yourself for the other things you want to do in life. I've got to say something here, when I was little OK, I used to do Thatcherism when I was doing my A-levels, but Thatcherism isn't so bad, she had her own political thing, she was OK.<sup>87</sup>

Principally, Muslims hold very conservative views and are proud of being a law-abiding community. Although they can best identify with the values represented by the Conservative Party, New Labour offers political participation, and has a more tolerant approach to the demands made by Muslims for their community. With regard to voting preference Muslims reveal the same degree of inconsistency as the rest of society. Political orientation does not always correspond to voting preferences, as the latter is made dependent on temporary advantages. As New Labour won most the Muslim community's votes, it can be assumed that opportunity had priority over compatibility of values.



As Muslims were asked about their views on Labour's suggestion to introduce parliamentary reforms, the majority declared that they were happy with the way it was. Some respondents explicitly declared that this was a matter on which the native British should decide themselves. Those Muslims, who also apply Islamic criteria to British politics, prefer a passive stance all together.

I can't really answer that question because it firmly contradicts with my beliefs. The whole parliamentary system contradicts my belief entirely so I can't... But if you had to vote..? I wouldn't vote, I don't vote.<sup>88</sup>

Occasionally some extraordinary suggestions were made as well.

You see, you are asking me as a Muslim person being in a non-Muslim country, so I have to look at the question within that context. First of all as you know, I obviously would prefer this country to be a Muslim county. Besides that, I am a minority here, and my views on that is that at the moment it's quite democratic and I prefer first past the post rather than the other, you know was it proportional representation. Because at least first past the post means that minority groups, very big minority groups cannot... For example, lets take the XXX, you can't say that all the XXX, who constitute about one Million of the population, if they would have equal representation in Parliament then they get about five people. Now I could just say well, that could be the same for a Muslim person, but that is not the point really because Islamically all the Muslims, see we are economic migrants, when we came to this country we came here not seeking religion, we came here seeking economic prosperity. If we were to seek some sort of representation in this Parliament, what we would have to do is form our own Muslim community in an area, which would be represented of us. Because being scattered all over the country it's going to be much more harder. For example, even if we did have proportional representation and we had a few Muslim MPs, for them to be directly answerable to us would be difficult because we'd be all over the country. Rather than if we were in an area OK, and that area we could by first past the post, nominate someone who is Muslim, understood Islamic terms and stuff, could apply what ever he did in Parliament to us.<sup>89</sup>

#### 3.4.4. The Identity of the Second Generation

The identity development of the second generation of Muslim immigrants has to be understood in the context of British society. As British history has



revealed, most of the English and British alliances (whether imposed or willingly contracted) were established to protect Britain and to aid economic growth. Compared to France, Britain did not impose British culture on its imperial subjects but sought to organise these societies in order to maximise economic efficiency to the benefit of the Empire. The union with Scotland was based on mutual advantages and political concessions were usually made in response to social and economic pressure.

The first generation of labour immigrants arrived on the basis of a mutual economic advantage. The second generation, born as British citizens, had not been a part of this calculation. This generation has to struggle to find its own place in British society. The main conflict these youngsters have to resolve, derive from the fact that they were raised according to South Asian traditions, but have to succeed in Western British society. At school they were confronted with the English language and British native children for the first time. Most South Asian children could not expect much academic support from their parents. Most children of ethnic minorities do not do well at compulsory education because of their poor social background and the fact that their parents do not have the same educational background themselves.

#### **3.4.4.1. Education**

The Youth Cohort Study of Spring 1994 investigated the number of pupils achieving five or more GCSE grades A to C at the end of compulsory education. Only black pupils were academically less successful than

Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Twenty-one per cent of the black pupils and 23 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis gained five or more GCSEs at grades A to C, compared to 51 percent of Other Asians (including Chinese) and around 45 percent of the Indian and White groups. Nevertheless, there is a trend for pupils of ethnic minorities to stay on for further education. In August 1993, 95 per cent of the Indian group, 89 per cent of Other Asians, 86 per cent of the Black group, 80 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and 71 per cent of the White group continued their education at the age of sixteen. The study has shown that in the years from 1993 to 1995, 31 percent Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, 40 per cent Blacks, 43 per cent Whites, 49 per cent Other Asians and 61 per cent of Indians, had two GCE A levels or equivalent among the 21 to 23 year olds. Nearly 30 per cent of the Indian group were studying for a degree in spring 1995 compared to approximately 15 per cent of the White and Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups.<sup>90</sup>

The middle classes of the South Asian Muslims understand how important the education of their children is and therefore support and encourage them. Some parents even preferred to send their children to Roman Catholic schools to ensure that their children will receive a good education within a pious environment.

We went to Roman Catholic school because our parents thought we need a better education. Because in those days, when my Dad came over, Roman Catholic schools had a good reputation.<sup>91</sup>

Whereas the middle classes are aware of how the education system in Britain works, the working classes fail to provide additional support at home, partly because they feel helpless towards the system. Within working



class families children are not encouraged to speak English at home or to read to improve their language skills. Therefore these children also lack confidence at school. Academic ability has to be combined with confidence in order to improve academic achievements in school. Teachers who work in schools located in poor South Asian dominated areas of Birmingham, have observed that the social and academic deprivation of the parents reflects on the academic achievements of the children.<sup>92</sup>

Muslims have not only become concerned with the low educational standards of their children but also with the lack of Islamic education at state schools. At present Muslim children receive their Islamic education in mosques and *madrasahs* established by the Muslim communities. This is an additional burden on the children as their education continues after school or during weekends. The Muslim community is also concerned about other important areas such as the dress code for girls uniforms at school, the separation of gender at puberty, the sex education of Muslim children in state schools, religious holidays, and prayer facilities.

In the late seventies associations were established which informed parents of their rights and how to pursue them. The 1944 Education Act, made religious education and a collective act of worship compulsory. Modifications, such as the invitation of an imam to lead morning prayers twice a week, are possible. Such decisions to modify are left to the individual schools as local authorities and head teachers have enough powers for this purpose.<sup>93</sup> In many cases concessions were made concerning



the school uniforms as long as school colours are respected. Some schools permitted long skirts, headscarves and national dress.

In 1983 for example, Muslim associations established the Muslim Liaison Committee (MLC) which directly approached the Birmingham LEA with its requests. Together they formulated Guidelines for national schools concerning the needs of Muslim children. The 1944 Education Act also allowed for 'occasional holidays' which could be used to make the two festivals of *Id* a religious holiday for schools with a high percentage of Muslim students. Several schools in Birmingham make use of this possibility until the 1988 Education Act made such agreements impossible.<sup>94</sup> Requests for separate showers and changing rooms for Muslim children, as they are not allowed to undress in front of others and the need for separate swimming classes with female instructors proved to be most problematic. Schools in Birmingham, Bradford and other regions with a high percentage of Muslim students try to accommodate these demands as far as is financially viable.<sup>95</sup>

Other requests such as separate classes for drama, dance and music could not be accommodated. Whilst some Muslims believe that these subjects are forbidden by Islam altogether, others have a more moderate approach to this topic. Certainly sex education in the school curriculum is an offence to most Muslim parents who believe that this is entirely a parental responsibility. The Guidelines of the 'Birmingham Working Party' have suggested including sex education into the subjects of Biology and Ethics.

A major concern of Muslims is the provision of *halal* food for their children at school. Schools try to meet this request by offering a balanced vegetarian diet. The possible provision of *halal* meat is more difficult as the provision of meals is centrally organised and therefore the responsibility of the City Councils.<sup>96</sup>

Although compromises are possible in some of the areas of demand, British national schools cannot satisfy substantial religious needs. Only Islamic schools, as far as many Muslims are concerned, can incorporate Islamic *Din* into the whole school curriculum. Some Muslims feel that the secular school environment itself is in conflict with the values of Islam. They fear that the lack of Islamic education also with respect to the Islamic code of life will estrange the youngsters from their faith in God.<sup>97</sup> The fear of de-Islamisation of Muslim children in state schools is also related to their exposure to peer group pressure. Efforts were made by the Muslim community to establish private Muslim schools, yet these have to struggle with fund-raising. It follows that the demand for state funded schools is a logical consequence. Although such requests were granted to the Jewish and Catholic communities, the British government was reluctant to accept such applications from Muslim schools for a long time.

Khurram Murad pointed out in his work *Muslim Youth in the West, Towards a New Education Strategy*, that "obviously, we are not prepared to be assimilated and become 'lost'"<sup>98</sup>. This remark is representative of what the majority of interviewees mentioned in the course of this fieldwork. It has become apparent that Muslims do not feel that their children receive an

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Islamic identity. Only if Islamic rules are incorporated into the everyday life from early youth onwards, an Islamic identity can be maintained.

Information may evaporate, and dies evaporate, but living by Islamic rules, day in and day out, will engrave Islamic identity indelibly on consciousness.<sup>101</sup>

The struggle for state funded Muslim schools is the struggle for Muslim identity. Attempts to compensate for the lack of religious education revealed to be problematic because the children had to cope with an additional workload. As mentioned before, the knowledge of the imams, who are responsible for religious education of the children is limited to the sectarian parameters of the sect they belong to. They neither speak English nor are they acquainted with socio-political context of the dominating British culture. Therefore they are unable to offer to the young, constructive solutions to their problems in Britain. Whilst British education encourages children to think independently, these imams are unable to adopt these teaching methods. Imams with a dogmatic attitude and literal understanding of their faith also fail to promote an interest in Islam. Therefore it is no surprise that these imams are not highly regarded among the second generation.

K: Another thing that is most probably worth adding as well is that they, on the whole, have a very poor opinion of the imams. Because the imam's position within Asian society is that he is the village idiot who is not able to do anything else, so he was made imam.

*What?*

F: Yes that is the heritage within Asian society, that the village idiot became imam.

K: This is not always the case.

*In Pakistan?*

F: In Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in India...

K: This is no joke, this is serious. This is not all the cases, I mean, surely, you can have some Asian imams who are very knowledgeable and very wise, but this is the joke, and this is the cultural ideas that they have been brought up with. In the village,

the person who is not going to achieve anything he will become the imam. You know, you can teach him a few lines from the Qur'an, teach him Arabic ...

F: ... teach him how to lead the prayer...

K: ... and off he goes. That is the way it is.

F: Trust me, I know from personal experience. When I was taught Arabic as a young person, the imam that came to our house to teach, told us that drinking Coke was haram because it was from America and America is a Godless country. And we should drink Muslim drinks like water, milk and wasla, is a Pakistani drink, which is made from roses.

*Rosewater?*

F: Rosewater and drinks like that. Can you imagine, this is the low level of intellectual discussion that Islam in Asia has come to. I mean any child who has a bit of brains is going to think, well this religion is a bit stupid, I am not going to follow this.<sup>102</sup>

#### 3.4.4.2. The Second Generation and their Social Identity

Second generation youths may feel different to the white community but at the same time they feel that they fit into and belong to both societies. None of them wanted to return permanently to their home countries. They considered Britain as their 'home'.

Many of them had achieved a healthy level of adjustment without a loss of their ethnic identity ... and achieved a creative synthesis of the two, sometimes very disparate, cultures.<sup>103</sup>

The second generation does not want to be identified with the immigrant status of their parents; they were born and bred in Britain. They mingle and interact with English, Welsh and Scottish youth at school, university and work. Many have a higher proportion of white to Asian friends, however most of them feel that their Asian friends are closer to them. Rarely do Asian boys and girls join their native counter parts when these plan their leisure activities for the evening. The majority of the native British interviewees complained that the Asians 'keep themselves to themselves' and do not encourage closer contact with the rest of the social environment.



The culture clash between South Asians and the British becomes most apparent with regard to the choice of leisure activities. The majority of all Muslim interviewees deplore the British drinking culture. Also the free interaction between males and females makes it difficult for young Muslims to implement the segregation between the sexes and to maintain their idea of morality. From the perspective of young Muslims, the fact that they do not join their British friends in the Pub does not indicate refusal to integrate. For them this is a cultural matter in which they differ from the rest of the British. All the Muslim interviewees of the second generation have emphasised that they feel a part of this society and that they appreciate their friendships with their British counterparts.. Many of them substantiated their line of reasoning with religious arguments.

There are pockets of people who are trying to, you know, ... because as we are supposed to in Islam, we are supposed to carry on our daily lives, we are supposed to live a full life, you're not supposed to hide yourself away. ... You go out there living your life. You're supposed to lead by example and how on earth are you going to do that if you're not living so that others can see you, and take part, and ask you, and talk to you. So I think there are people out there in the country who are trying to do that. But there are great many a people who are culturally bound, socially bound, who cannot seem to get onto that next step in their thought, so they are going back there, you know. They haven't seen that. The first seed of doubt is fundamentalism, in a way. They are so scared of losing what they do have, that they can't move on.<sup>104</sup>

This attitude dominated among the educated members of the second generation. The criticism of the 'culturally and socially bound' is primarily directed to the first generation and those British born Muslims who did not strip off the ethnic chauvinism and caste system that is so deeply rooted in South Asian culture.

Nevertheless, the closest relationships continue to be established among South Asians themselves, also among the second generation. One of the



most significant reasons is that they were raised to prefer an Asian environment. Collective or group identity is influenced by the experiences made with the social environment. There was only little contact with native British children after school to intensify relationships and at home Asian kin dominated the social world of these children. In the course of personal development children quickly learn what social behaviour is appreciated and accepted by parents. Parental sanctions are the first source of orientation for children. Friendships with children who belong to the wider family or family friends are least problematic. Interaction within this close-knit social environment, determines the role-play and self-experience of the individual. The interaction and role-play perpetuates cultural symbols, common convictions, beliefs, criteria for classification and value attribution, which determines the gradual process of self-definition and group identity. Acceptance and acknowledgement by the family as well as the group gives the individual a feeling of security, which in turn strengthens the feeling of uniqueness.

We are a minority without a doubt, but we are not that much of a minority because we have quite a lot of Asian friends. There are so many of us, so many Asian families. There were Asians and Asians at every sight, but we loved it because when you're younger and growing up, you don't care.<sup>105</sup>

Not only are South Asian friends acceptable for the family they also understand the culture related problems. Shared concerns about the future and perceptions of the environment foster the preference for their own kind.

You see here we are treated as aliens just because we are Asians, right, but then when we go to Pakistan, right, we are treated like aliens there too, because we're not from there either.<sup>106</sup>

The second generation of South Asians and native British youth have little in common. Once the next generations develop more interest-related identifications with members of wider society and native British convert to Islam, the ties between the communities will become stronger.

#### 3.4.4.3. The Islamic Identity of the Second Generation

I don't think there is patriotism in our part of the community. I'm just like, yea I'm born Scottish, but me personally, I think there is a lot of religion more than anything. If someone would ask me for my day to day identity I would not say I'm British, I'm Scottish, I would say I'm Muslim. Scottishness to me is a lot of drinking, kilts, the Highlands. You see I don't drink, I don't wear kilts, I don't go to the Highlands. That's what I mean, I don't really think that we are very patriotic. I know I'm Scottish, I was born in Glasgow, I was raised here, but that's what Scottishness is to me. It's not us, it's not me, it's not my identity.<sup>107</sup>

Religious identity is based on a set system of beliefs and hierarchy of values, which determine personal behaviour and socialisation. Identity is expressed by the way people think and on what their perceptions of the world as well as their social constructions are based. If man only consisted of intellect without a body then a comprehensive system to rationalise the environment would be totally sufficient. The dichotomy of mind and body, forces man to respond to his environment on an emotional as well as on a rational level. Therefore a satisfactory system of orientation must encompass not only an intellectual but also an emotional element, in the form of an object of devotion. After the satisfaction of the basic human drives and needs, man desires to be in relation with others, seeks

transcendence, rootedness, an experience of identity and a frame of orientation.<sup>108</sup>

Compared to youngsters of the host community, there is a greater danger for identity diffusions and crisis to occur among adolescents of immigrant communities. They face a continued struggle by trying to gain acknowledgement of both communities. Seeking acceptance by British society and at the same time accommodating the culturally and socially different demands of the family is difficult. Everyone desires completeness by experiencing security as part of a collective but at the same time to unique as an individual. Personal identity is the product of personal experiences and expectations of the future. The inability to believe in one's future (whether due to insufficient education or marginalisation) is cause for anxiety and identity crisis. The assumption of identity crisis as a result of culture conflict is based on the observation that young people of different ethnic backgrounds are more in danger of having to cope with a shattered future because of racism, cultural tension and social deprivation.

#### 3.4.4.4. Cultural verses Religious Identifications

When studying relevant questions to identification and self-identification, it is important to look at questions such as 'why it is worth living' and 'what is valuable to the individual'. Part of the value orientation is transmitted by the way the individual is raised. During this phase of education the individual develops a sense of cultural self-evidence, which when under attack can lead to a crisis of identity. This process of cultural identity



development starts in the family and will continue to develop during interaction with the environment.<sup>109</sup> Cultural identity among minority groups is both a source of comfort when the individual is among the in-group, as well as a source of conflict when the individual is among wider society.

Cultural identity is the basis for national identity and it is inter-linked with religious identity. Both national and religious identities are essential tools for the mobilisation of emotions and feelings of belonging. Cultural differences also occur within nation states and can serve as indicators for communal differences.

Early literature suggested that the second generation may face identity-diffusion due to culture conflict. However, the result of more recent studies undertaken by Hutnik (1991) on the identity of minority youth in Britain and by Heitmeyer *et al.* (1997) on youth identity and potential radicalisation among Turkish adolescents in Germany, supported the conclusions of Boos-Nünning/Nieke (1982)<sup>110</sup> which postulated that the identity and orientation problems of second generation minority youth are not nearly as serious as the hypotheses of culture-conflict and identity-diffusion suggest.

The study of Heitmeyer *et al.* has shown that Turkish youths develop strategies to achieve a balance between the different norms, values as well as regulations of behaviour, and create their own freedom within the traditional and authoritarian sphere of influence of their fathers. They develop patterns of interpretation with which they can make their objective

difficulties, sometimes caused by socially scandalous situations, subjectively bearable.<sup>111</sup>

An indication of a healthy identity is the development of constructive coping techniques designed for the individual's subjective situation. Contentment (*Lebensgefühl*) is expressed in the degree of satisfaction with one's situation. Satisfaction with one's private life, culture/religion and school/job are three such essential areas.<sup>112</sup> The degree of contentment is dependent on the individual's sense of self-worth. Tesser (1988) focused on the process of social comparison and its effect on the sense of self-worth. He based his theory on the assumption that there is a motive to maintain and expand one's feeling of self-worth. Thus when an individual compares all his or her areas of life with that of others, including contentment, this process will influence the person's feeling of self-worth and comfort. The tendency related to this process of comparison is to compare oneself with those who are worse off. This is why it is possible to achieve a positive sense of contentment although objectively the individual may face a difficult situation such as discrimination. To maintain a positive sense of self-worth is essential for a positive identity and psychological equilibrium.

In general enthusiastic participation in competition, a positive approach to challenges and high aspiration are expressions of a healthy identity and positive sense of self-worth. High aspirations in the area of education and employment reveals readiness to face the challenges of Western society and a higher degree of integration. Low aspirations in that field reveals difficulties in integration, as the challenges of wider society may be

considered as unmanageable and the individual has too little faith in his/her own abilities. This deficiency is usually compensated by a higher degree of contentment with culture and religion, as contentment with, and over-integration into, the cultural community is independent from accomplishments at work.<sup>113</sup>

Much literature suggested that youth with low educational and occupational aspirations develop stronger identifications with Islam than educated young Muslims. However, the results of this study revealed that individuals with high aspirations in education and employment, with a high degree of integration indicate a low degree of contentment with culture, but a strong identification with their religion. It was found that the majority of educated young people turn against the cultural values of their parents, whilst searching for a personal approach to Islam.

I suppose because a lot of the culture I feel quite negative about. I've always found it easy to talk about what I dislike rather than what I like.<sup>114</sup>

The second generation has found its own way of defusing the tension created by parental expectations and the pressure to assimilate. Identity entails a rational choice within the limits of one's value system. An individual can choose to emphasise certain values and neglect others without risking a crisis of identity. As the majority of young South Asians have grown up in a tight-knit and caring family network, these young people are aware of the fact that if they chose to assimilate to Western culture thus abandoning their South Asian traditions as well as their religion, they would become subject to attack from their own community.



When subjected to racist attack from wider society the community would no longer provide shelter and refuge. Total assimilation is the most risky form of integration and there is no guarantee that wider society will accept the young people fully. Therefore it has to be acknowledged that the priority of young Muslims is not to lose the support of their family and community.

At the same time these young people have come to realise that many components of parental culture are restrictive and unjustifiable even by a respected 'authority' such as Islam. Whilst the first generation focused on social comparison with their native society rather than with British society the second generation does engage in social comparison with wider society. For their parents it was preferable to derive their feeling of self-worth from being the maintainers of their family back home, than to reflect on the working class and minority status in Britain. The second generation no longer has this dual national identity but a dual communal one. In order to participate in British society they have to move forward and build their feeling of self-worth on both communal and societal achievements.

They can't see that they would only gain by giving, by going forward, and going back is cultural, you know, it's not a religious thing, it's they are clinging onto their culture. ... The boys in my school were asking me: are you Muslim? I said yes. So where are you from? I'm like Birmingham. What they really meant was what town do I come from in India or Pakistan, where do I come from, where are my roots, which is the Hindu cast system if you like. I was like, what are you talking about, this is not relevant, this is not an issue. But it is, in their world, in their eyes, it's the values they have. It's so sad. And you try to talk to them about it, but it's all they've ever heard. ...But I hope they will see otherwise.<sup>115</sup>

Parental cultural values are increasingly perceived as regressive and isolating. The cultural values are associated with the oppressive components of South Asian social life. It is not the dress, food or language

which is subjected to criticism, but the way parents are trying to determine their children's lives, according to the criteria of social status and family pride. As the second generation engages in social comparison, they find that (from their perspective) total freedom is coupled with immorality. They are now searching for a way to determine their lives themselves, very much like their British counterparts, but within the framework of their own value system.

Asian families do not usually work with immediate pressure but with emotional blackmail and the pressure of community expectation. During a dinner given by one of the Pakistani interviewees in Glasgow, the head of the family showed the video of his daughter's wedding in Pakistan. It became apparent that the bride looked very sad and also the way the girl watched the video of her wedding did not reveal a change of mood. Despite the presence of her father it did not seem inappropriate to ask her whether she wanted to marry at the time. The body language expressed more than words could ever say. The father exclaimed with euphoria, conveying happiness and pride, that he had asked his daughter beforehand whether she wanted to marry her cousin and she agreed. Simultaneously the girl shrugged her shoulders and whispered with a sad face: I knew it was expected of me. Obedience toward anticipated expectations of parents is the most common response of South Asian youth. This behaviour can be observed among the first and second generation as well as the professional and working classes.

There was, not necessarily pressure, but certainly, ... no one would pressure them into that situation. And this is widespread, this is, you know ... I have heard this story in



different ways many times. No one pressured them, it was family obligation, not pressure, you know. It was what they felt obliged to do, as opposed to someone saying you must do this, this would help, you know. So there is a difference.<sup>116</sup>

The feeling of obligation derives from the respect for parents, gratefulness for their care and fear that they will withdraw their love and support. Additional pressure comes from the community, which reinforces the child's consciousness. By insinuating that disobedience is equated with ungratefulness, that it is perceived as disgraceful and that the young person cannot expect support unless s/he conforms, the community exerts enormous pressure on the second generation.

Having grown up in a society where adolescents can choose their lifestyle, can leave and return home whenever they want, and do not have to fear disgrace when they change their partners, young Muslims also want to determine their lives without risking expulsion from their family and community. The second generation of Muslims has converted the community's tool of oppression into their tool with which to achieve personal liberty. Many young Muslims have rediscovered Islam for themselves.

And so living in the culture that I was brought up in, my culture I suppose is an Asian culture. India, although there are a lot of Muslims, there is ... it is hard to find any real Muslims here. So my interest was let's not upset the community, you know, let's not rock the boat. Let's marry someone who is from the continent, with whom I have much more in common and where there is more to look. But what I found was that they do not have any real interest in their religion. One thing within the Asian community is that do as you are told. You know, it is very much like the Buddhists, and like the Hindu religion, which focus very much on the worship of the elders. Even to the extent that when the husband is older than his wife is, the wife has to worship her husband like a God. This was bound to have an influence on the Asian Muslim culture. And the children which were born here, their parents were brought up in this way. So this generation which was brought up in the West, where you have your own freedom, where you are your own person, they started to question what their parents were brought up with. Because it is only a cultural, a cultural icon, you know, you do this because it is a cultural icon and so a lot of them chose to throw all this out of the



window. So the other section of the second generation would say, ok, well although this is all wrong, religion as such is right, so what does religion really say. They have come to go the opposite way. I have kind of gone that way, but before I could not really make up my mind which way to go. I could not really feel comfortable with my religion being secular, then again I was not that comfortable with the way my religion was. It did not quite fit with my ideas of...

*What was...?*

Things like listen to your parents, do this if you do not you will be punished, and everything is about punishment. It has nothing to do with the love of God, more to do with the fear of God, more to do with the fear of authority. It is a very, .. still a feudal system. It is still a cast system within India, within the Hindu society. If someone is older than you, earns more money than you, if someone has a better background than you, these things make them a better person. And fortunately within the Muslim society that sort of thing does not exist.<sup>117</sup>

The second generation is observing the first, and there is little mercy in their criticism. Those young Muslims learn Arabic and study the original sources rather than adopting the interpretations of their parents. For many the confusion was great because a lot of religious practices, which they have associated with Islam have proved incorrect. They find that their parents are practising traditions as religious ones, which are actually cultural and additions although this is explicitly forbidden by Islam. Parental religious practice has come under scrutiny.

... They want to keep religion where it suits them. If it suits them to be a certain way, it suits their community to be a certain way, they will stick to community rules. If the community norm is to do something wrong, they will do that wrong, rather than follow their religion. The community norm is to have 'bravhani'. 'Bravhani' is something that is developed within the Asians for some strange reasons. It is an invention, it is something that has been invented within the religion. It is what happens if someone dies, and all the people come round into a place and they start reading the Qur'an. Now that is an invention. It is called Bivrat. It is something that you are not supposed to do. You are not supposed to innovate your religion. You are not supposed to bring things into it that never existed. That is wrong. It can lead to very, very bad things, and they know this. Their children say: listen this is bidda, this is wrong. And the children who have become practising Muslims have a huge problem with it. If they see something wrong happening within their own household, there is nothing they can do about it.<sup>118</sup>

Particularly among the more educated and wealthy elite, parents are criticised for their inconsistent religious observance. Not in all households do children dare to criticise their parents, but occasionally it does happen.

So they get angry with their parents, they are like, ... you know, they lose respect for their parents. And so the parents see: Ahh, this boy or this girl goes to the Islamic Society, mixes with Muslims, they come back, and they are rude to us and they lose respect for us. Stop them going. This boy, this girl, wants to marry a black person, wants to marry someone who is a non Asian, they have met these people at some society, they have met them at the mosque, they have met them ... stop them going. And this will not happen. You know, this is what parents said, you know, my mother said this, just came back from ... People sitting down and saying: we should stop our children going to the mosque. We should stop them going to Islamic Society meetings, because they come back with new ideas and then these ideas are problems for us.<sup>119</sup>

The problems parents have to struggle with in such cases is not how to prevent their children from adopting a purely Western way of life, but how to maintain parental authority over the definition of values. The multicultural environment in Britain enables young South Asians to meet Muslims of different cultural backgrounds. Multi-ethnicity among the Muslim community is a new phenomenon for South Asians. Although South Asian Muslims are acquainted with the minority situation, their ethnic environment has usually been of their own kind. In Britain Arab, African, Asian, South Asian and European Muslims all constitute the Muslim community. Young Muslims passionately attack the chauvinistic trait of South Asian culture, which partly stems from the Hindu caste system.

That is right, within Asian culture, everyone is not equal, they still look down on a lot of people, on the whole, you know. They will go on and glorify, saying: Hattu ul-Alaah, the first guy to give the Alzah, you know, companion of the Prophet, blah, blah,blah. The second black guy to walk through the house and say, 'hey can I marry your daughter', would be thrown out. So it is a dichotomy, it is not, it is not, it is hypocrisy, and I could not stand that. I did not like that. I did not want to marry anyone who believes in that. So of course I started looking outside of my culture.<sup>120</sup>

The contact with Arab Muslims makes young South Asians aware of the cultural mores, which have been woven into the traditions of religious practice. In many cases the young South Asians not only had to learn what



Islam is really about, but also had to 'unlearn' everything that was added. In a way those young Muslims who have rediscovered Islam for themselves can be described as 'converts of the special kind'. Although they are born and raised Muslims, they reconfirmed their faith and have to struggle to acquire their knowledge of Islam. They approach their religion with the same compassion converts are known to do. In the multi-ethnic Islamic Societies, they are made aware of their role within the global *Ummah*, which puts their relationship with the South Asian community on relative terms. The relationships or *biradieries* their parents and generations before them have established are of little importance to young British Muslims. So although South Asian parents have not lost their children to Western society, they have difficulties to integrate them into their native social structures. It has become clear that on many occasions parents have used religion as means of control. Some parents may find it less problematic to turn a blind eye to occasional alcohol consumption as long as the rest of the community is not aware of it, than to know that their children will refuse to perpetuate their cultural values.

If I can just correct something, you said that their parents would rather want them to be seculars. I do not think, that is actually what their parents intention was. Their parents would rather that their kids were Asian.

*Obedient?*

Obedient. Follow their idea of what Islam was, rather than this ...<sup>121</sup>

Whilst the first generation perceived their culture as a natural supplement of their religious traditions, the second generation begins to divide these two identity components apart. Being an observant Muslim can no longer be directly equated with being an obedient South Asian child. The second



generation of South Asian Muslims are in the process of redefining Asian culture within British society by means of reviving Islam.

#### 3.4.4.5. Islam as the Source of Orientation

You can know a lot more about religion but we are more real about religion because we are different. We have realised that we are different and we want to know why. What used to happen in our parent's days was that parents would set up a box with jewels in it, and hand it to their kids and say look after this, and they would take it inside of them but not know what it is. But what we've been taught now-a-days from our parents is, because they realise that we ask a lot more, because we're living here, we're different, we see we're different, it's so evident, so we're always gonna ask more. Whereas people in Pakistan they accept it. We're not doing this, taking this jewellery box or what ever, and putting it away. We're saying OK, what is it? Why am I different from that Christian over here. So we open it and of course because we're opening it we get to see the jewels, we get to see the gold, pearls and everything.<sup>122</sup>

Most of the respondents among the second generation were in the stage of transition between adolescence and young adulthood. It is the stage during which a young person re-evaluates earlier identifications. The individual has to reflect on social demands by the environment and define his or her future. During this phase of development, young people search for an appropriate environment, partnership, ideological and political orientation. It is the stage of personal development, in which a young person should develop an identity that will equip him/her with enough self-worth to participate within society as a responsible adult. This situation can create instability and lead to a crisis of identity. The Muslim respondents have found in Islam what they were looking for.

Jessica Jacobson stipulated in *Islam in Transition* that not only does the religion provide universal rules and regulations, it also "acts as a resource which can be openly called upon on efforts to resolve conflicts which arise

as a result of the differing demands of family and wider society"<sup>123</sup>. By searching for orientation in Islam young South Asians do not move contrary to what their parents adhere to. Indeed they reaffirm parental rejection of the faults of British society. Nevertheless, they study Islam with enthusiasm to find justification for breaking through community boundaries.

The Asian community is perceived as both a place of refuge and a burden. The way a Muslim girl described her community in the East End of London is representative of what was said by interviewees about Muslim communities in Birmingham, Glasgow, and other areas of London.

A really tight community, that you can belong to. ...There is so much picking and bitchiness, if you go round the corner with a white man the whole community will find out sooner or later.<sup>124</sup>

During adolescence it is common for young people to resist authority and all those who represent traditional values. Moral, religious and political values, which the child has adopted unquestioningly are then re-evaluated and sometimes abandoned. Some South Asian Muslims have coped with their threatened identity by focusing their resistance exclusively against parental cultural values. Parents have to face criticism for not practising Islam properly and public scandals are created by inviting parents and their friends to prayer, rather than by returning home drunk.

That situation is false, it is a false situation. And within the next generation you will be finding that with my generation of kinds they are making a choice. Either they are finding out what is real and are practicing wholeheartedly or they are finding out what is false ... or not bothering to find out, not believing what their parents say, and just going off and drinking and having affairs and stuff ... and so forth. There is a definite, within this generation, a split ... we, in fact, ... the majority of the parents



prefer it, to be of the second, seculars, because then we do not think properly, we do not question their deeds. It is the ones that decide to be more religious, the ones that decide to follow Islam as a religion, that really humble the parents. To the extent that they have stopped their kids going to Islamic meetings, stopped them mixing with other Muslims, you know, ...

*Is this true?*

It is true, it is in Birmingham.

*Do you know anybody of ...?*

Yes, yes, we do.

*Sorry, have you ever talked to the parents who do not allow their kids to go ...*

Yes.

*And what have they said?*

They should be concentrating on their studies, you know, ... that they spend too much time studying Islam, where are they going to go with their studies. Where is their studies leading to? They way I see, you know, ... all they do is come back and be rude to their parents. They go there and they say so and so, and they come back and they accuse us of being this and that and the other, and ...

*What this, that, and the other?*

You are not praying five times a day, their kids have a problem with this, you know. If you are a Muslim, why are you not praying five times a day. If you are a Muslim, why do you not behave in a certain way? If you are a Muslim, why are you doing when you know this is wrong? You know that kind of stuff.

*And those kind of parents are religious though, according to ...*

... According to their kind of culture, yes. According to their society that they live in, yes.<sup>125</sup>

Power struggles and self-actualisation can take place in Islamic terms. For that purpose even parental concern about education can be exploited. In the case of the interviewee above, the mother had to agree to wear a scarf and the father to engage in regular prayers in order to receive the reassurance that their child will finish her university studies.

Young adults also search for recognition by the environment.

There are certain people, I've been surprised by this, I mean despite being born and raised in Britain they are very Islamic and they follow everything. They pray five times a day, observe all the rules of Islam and despite living in a British Western society they are more Islamic than someone who could be else where, which is like a contradiction. And that is probably, in my opinion, that's a reaction to living in the West. To the other extreme you will have people, probably like myself, who like, we do have that Muslim, Islamic identity at the same time we do claim that we are British as well. Like you know, we are born here and you know, we are probably gonna be living here, you know settle down and what ever. At the end of that spectrum you see that people are never gonna accept you for what you are. You might you know just go to the mosque once a week, or you might just believe in the basics but due to that fact you are persecuted, like having a Muslim name or observing some festivals. It does go on.<sup>126</sup>



Within Islamic Societies these young people can interact with others, who share the same convictions and aims. The position acquired within this environment becomes part of the individual's self-definition. These societies also welcome native British converts and Muslims of different ethnic background. In this environment young South Asian Muslims can overcome their community boundaries without breaching the ethic code of the community. It serves as an additional security net, when the native British environment threatens the new Islamic identity. One of the respondents admitted that she felt insecure about conveying her belief to non-Muslims. She was scared that she would immediately be associated with fanatic fundamentalists.

Perhaps not have the confidence in what they believe. I mean that was a fact with me, I think. I mean, I knew what I believed, what was right and what was wrong. But I didn't believe that any body else would want to hear about it. I was scared to get down peoples throats, not wanting to be seen as a fundamentalist. Well, that is how Islam is viewed in the minds of people because of how it's been in Islamic society. That is how it is viewed and they immediately say ehhhh, these mad people, nutters. A lot of people do have that reaction and I didn't want to perpetuate that and make them think that I was one of them. So instead I was talking about that in a rational manner, to show them the other side of it, which was wrong.<sup>127</sup>

Islamic societies provide the environment where shared convictions can be discussed and where young Muslims are at least temporarily sheltered from criticism and attack. For those young people whose parents have no understanding for their religious enthusiasm, such societies are the only places where they can find moral support.

By trying to guide their parents along the religious path, young Muslims are trying to convey to their parents that they have found their own coping strategy other than communal isolation. They are fighting for respect and

authority in their chosen field. It is one way to develop a positive sense of self-worth, respect and independence. The results of this study concur with the findings of Jacobson that in particular, girls turn to the teachings of Islam to support their quest for personal liberation.

The battle against chauvinism among Asian society can be interpreted as compensatory for the powerlessness *via* racism among wider society. The feeling of powerlessness regarding racism among wider society is overcome by fighting chauvinism within their community. The issue most frequently referred to by young Muslims, in order to illustrate the tolerance of Islam, was the concept of the global *Ummah*. They repeatedly emphasised that racism and nationalism does not exist in Islam and that Muslims wherever they live and whatever ethnic background they have, belong to the *Ummah*.

There is no racism in Islam, because we are the descendants of ...<sup>128</sup>

The threat to ethnic identity is countered with a strong religious identity, which promises a society free of racism. It is the aim to set an example for wider society and to show that Islam is not as Western media portrays it. When questioned about ethnic and religious intolerance in Islamic societies, the Muslim interviewees explained that the injustice occurring there originated from people who are not real Muslims.

Marginalisation in British society poses a threat to two identity components. First, to the ethnic self-identification and second, to a positive sense of



personal achievement. On many occasions young Muslims criticise the economic system in Britain. The fact that British society is preoccupied with economic growth and subsequently abandoned religion from the public sphere, is subject of major concern. Particularly, that the lives of British people can evolve primarily around their work is not only perceived as an empty way of life but also as a threat. Very much like their British counterparts, young Muslims fear that if they cannot compete within this system they will find themselves in the bottom strata of British society. The awareness and experience of racism amplifies this fear of competition. By rejecting the socio-economic (and sometimes also the political) system, the individual pre-empts the rejection s/he anticipates. Among the Islamic community it is reaffirmed that spiritual values are more important than material ones, which reassures the individual that competition is not a necessary option.

However, the pressure to compete for a career does not always come from the British environment. Some young South Asians are put under pressure to achieve a professional career by their parents and the community.

K: I don't know, this may be interesting because you are not only dealing with Birmingham society which is very Asian. But you are also dealing with this community, the Muslim Doctor and Dentist Association, OK. So they are mostly professional, they are mostly educated. Their kids go to the private schools, they have generally ...

F: ... a huge over achievement level, I mean, everyone goes to medical school, everyone tries on Cambridge and Oxford, you know, it gets ridiculous...

K: ... it gets ridiculous, the kids are under a lot of pressure.

F: You know, you get a kid who is not so bright, it is very tough on them. They have to compete on that level. Immense over-achievement.<sup>129</sup>

Depending on the personality of the individual such pressure can be perceived as an unbearable burden. A lot of the young people from this



very successful community in Birmingham have turned to their religion. It is possible that their search for deeper religious values was triggered by the desire to escape from this pressure to achieve. By adopting spiritual values they chose a completely different criteria according to which a person is judged. No longer is the university a young person attends of any importance, neither the grades s/he gets, nor the amount of money earned. On the contrary, modesty and a pious lifestyle are highly regarded and Yuppies are looked upon as disoriented and misguided.

Religion provides justification for rejecting participation in competition but at the same time bears new options. It can be described as a moratorium that allows the young person to make up his/her mind. Religious values are employed to argue against parents who exert pressure. In particular girls choose to marry and have children rather than to start a career. The founding of a family is thus perceived as a refuge and a way to escape the pressure to achieve. The mothers of these young women cannot understand why their daughters refuse to choose the careers they themselves always dreamt of. The mothers identify strongly with their daughters and express their love by trying to give their children the opportunity they never had. The misunderstanding between the two generations is that both seek self-actualisation by searching for the ultimate form of happiness. The mothers associate self-actualisation with a professional career, for which they never had the opportunity. The daughters by contrast have all the opportunities but want to live in happiness without the pressure of a professional career.

This phenomenon of escaping parental pressure to follow up a career can also be observed among wider society and is not restricted to ethnic or religious minorities. The only difference is the way young people cope with their subjective situation. Whilst young Westerners try to move away from parental influence, break with family tradition or at the worst abuse drugs, young Muslims turn to their religion to justify their choice.

Nevertheless, the successful Birmingham community is not representative for the fate of young Muslims in Britain. The majority do not have the financial backing of their parents to access private schools and Oxbridge. Their success within wider society is not only dependent on their own ability but also on whether their environment accepts them. A young Muslim respondent from London has indicated that she reduces interaction with members of British society to the minimum. Her comment revealed that she assumes that she is not accepted by society. However, with the same token she believes that there is a unity among British society and that Muslims feel part of it.

*Do you think there's unity among British society?*

I think there is. Let me tell you why. You see when it comes to the European question, whether we should join the European Community or not. I think a lot of British Muslims would prefer not to join the European Community, and there are a lot of... *why?* That is a nationalistic thing, not because they are looking at the economic factors but because they are British nationals and they don't want to be called European nationals. And I think they are quite nationalistic, British nationalistic, if you know what I mean. I mean I know I was, I am telling you from my own... because I do, even if British people don't see me as one of their own, cause I live here I still sort of feel the need to be independent.<sup>130</sup>

The ambivalence over the sense of belonging seems to be a problematic issue for quite a few young Muslims. The insecurity and discomfort created by the feeling of not belonging to wider society, in which they are expected to

integrate to make a living, is countered by the search for clear orientation and the sense of belonging to an even greater community, the *Ummah*. It was found that the majority of the young interviewees strongly identified with the plight of Muslims in the rest of the world. The solidarity of Muslims across the world suddenly places Muslim identity into a different light. The young Muslims no longer belong to a minority in Britain, but to a large *Ummah*, which is constantly growing to the size of the Christian world community. Young South Asians who feel neither accepted by British nor by South Asian society bridge the lack of belonging by identifying with a larger and anonymous *Ummah*. Like this, it is possible to criticise the country of origin without betraying one's beliefs and the group of identification.

See, what really annoys us, I think is that in Pakistan, a Muslim country, that those in government destroy the basis that it's made on. It doesn't work right because Islam says give charity, help the poor. What really annoys us the whole purpose of Pakistan was for us Muslims, but what have we done to it. It quite annoys us because they are representing ours and people are looking at them. I think Pakistan is the second corruptest nation in the whole world. It just annoys us that they think they're Muslims.<sup>131</sup>

#### 3.4.4.6. Self-Actualisation and Islam

In the course of debate, which was stimulated by the conviction and sentencing of British Muslims in Yemen, it was suggested that the second and third generations of Muslims in Britain have become 'fundamentalistic' in response to 'Islamophobia' among wider society. This assumption, although partly true, turns a blind eye to the most natural phenomenon: youths always were the most radical idealists, seeking to change the world for the better. Young people seek ideals, which they can adopt and fight for,



thus revolutions were always dependent on the fanatic idealism of young people. Israel was built by young Jews, who adopted Hertzels ideas, the Cultural Revolution in China was carried through by young enthusiasts and the Cuban revolution (Fidel Castro and Che Guevara) won the sympathy of a whole generation of young people in Europe and the USA. Terrorist organisations such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) (Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof) in Germany also depend on the fanaticism of young people.

Western society does not fail to be astonished by the fact that some Muslims seek to express themselves in Islamic terms. Until the Age of Enlightenment Western society fought wars with the help of God and scientists sought to discover God's laws of nature. The Quakers in Britain and the USA still express themselves in religious terms.

It is now common for observant Muslims to travel to the Middle East to learn Arabic and to study their religion.<sup>132</sup> It can be expected that some young Muslims aim for self-actualisation in Islamic terms and also want to change the world according to Islamic ideals. The fact that Western societies meet Muslims with distrust and scepticism also invites young Muslims to employ fanatic behaviour to provoke wider society. Members of radical groups like the Hizb ut-Tahrir usually take such actions. It is the aim of Hizb ut-Tahrir to re-establish the Caliphate and to lead Muslims back to past glory. During research there were several occasions during which members of this organisation behaved in a very patronising and aggressive manner. However, such extreme expressions of Islamic identity are rare and do not

represent the second generation of young Muslims. The strong convictions of some young Muslims can sometimes also become a burden for those among them who want to go further in their integration process. One respondent indicated that he is frequently criticised by other Muslims for his assimilative behaviour. The criticism that he received was particularly severe during the second Gulf War and the Rushdie affair.

I would be viewed as liberal, to the extent that other Muslims will say: hold on, your confused, you don't know... At the same time I do know because I've lived six years in Pakistan, I've studied, like, Islamic Studies and Religious Studies, so I do know. And that's the thing, it's difficult, you can never talk for everyone.<sup>133</sup>

#### 3.4.4.7. An Islamic Solution to Social Problems

Most organisation and community leaders try to avoid public discussion of social problems of the Muslim communities. In particular the elderly generation does not see or does not want to see that the Muslim communities have not been spared from violence, drugs and prostitution. The Young Muslim Organisation UK has accepted this challenge. The organisation shares the ideas of the global Islamic Movement and is open to Muslims of every ethnic background. Originally the Young Muslim Organisation was a South Asian institution but adjusted to the ethnic change within the Muslim community. The mother organisation is the Islamic Forum, Europe. The Young Muslim Organisation co-operates with the central mosque in Regents Park, regional mosques, The UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, Dawatul Islam, and various educational organisations. The organisation claims to have about three hundred active members nation-wide who participate in the local organisation of seminars,



training and summer camps, as well as educational, social, cultural and sports programmes. Active members receive training as social workers to improve their leadership skills. Active members elect executive members as representatives of the organisation. They have to be observant Muslims, exhibit problem solving skills and be innovative. The organisation is focusing on social work to address violence and drug abuse among young Muslims.

We are not obsessed with recruitment. What we are concerned about are the problems of the community. For example, I don't know how much you know about this, but the drugs, the use of drugs concern us so much. Young Muslims are taking drugs these days, violence, crime. We are more focused on resolving these issues than recruitment. So we have people, who go on the streets, many of whom are youth workers, working with the community, set up youth clubs. And what happens is that they work with the youth and try to keep them away from drugs, crimes, and violence; and give them an alternative. This is what we do mainly. If after that these youth think, you know, that they want to be a part of that group, or do something similar like social or community work, then they got to become members. So we do not force them, 'you have to become a member', no! This is from their own consciousness that they say 'yes, we want to work for the community'. So that is our main focus when we are talking about work with youth. Same in schools and colleges, we just provide a service.<sup>134</sup>

It is the aim of the organisation to provide an alternative for those young Muslims who have gone astray. Leading them back to their religion should give them new perspectives in life. On a local level social workers try to control crime and drug abuse by approaching drug dealers and gang leaders. By inviting these young Muslims to Islam and to complimentary youth activities the gangs lose support. The social workers consider it to be their duty as Muslims to help their brothers and sisters. Also non-Muslims can turn to these social workers for help.

The Young Muslim Organisation was able to reduce some of the violence and drug trade in parts of their environment. Some of the former gang



members who understand the dynamics of street crime participate in the social work of the organisation.

Drugs used to be quite a big problem in this area. Brick Lane is just around the corner and there used to be big fights between the areas. So some time ago I could not walk to Brick Lane, they would have picked me up. ...Whereas now people from this organisation can walk around in this area, so that is no problem, people respect us. So now, because of our work, that has gone away now more or less. They can respect each other and they can talk to each other, and many of them come to the mosque praying, and they have become community workers themselves. So they go to the community, they have influence, and they change youth away from drugs and these sort of things.<sup>135</sup>

Some of the former gang members who have not joined the organisation, returned to education or found a job and contribute to the organisation financially.

The kind of strategy applied by the Young Muslim Organisation contains every element necessary to combat street crime. First, the youth are approached in their natural environment. The initiation of change is not left to the youngster in the street. Initial rejection is not accepted but bypassed so that the individual has to reflect on the new options presented to him. Second, the youth on the street is offered a change in environment and associates. They are physically and mentally confronted with a different way of life and are drawn away from the sphere of criminal influence. Third, a different value system is offered to them so that they reappraise their past lifestyle. By conveying to these young people the values of Islam, they are offered community spirit and clear orientation to determine right from wrong, how to behave and how to structure their day. In an environment where competition and opportunity are essential for personal success but where clear orientation is not given, Islam provides a certain degree of authoritarian regulation, which serves as reliable guidance for

young people who have strayed. Islam responds to the search for a purpose in life, which is fundamental to the maturing process and the acceptance of responsibility. Finally the organisation also offers training and therefore hope and perspectives for the future.

#### 3.4.4.8. The Second Generation and the Dilemma of Integration

Seidel-Pielen pointed out that in a multi-ethnic nation 'nobody is an island', every change in self-perception among a social and ethnic collective has an impact on the whole community.<sup>136</sup> The question of integration is of concern to both wider society and the Muslim community. Among the native British respondents one third declared that they knew too little about Islam and the Muslim community to comment on the issue of Muslim integration. In contrast seven respondents from Birmingham have made clear 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do'. One of these interviewees, a woman indicated that she feels that Islam is being imposed on this society and that the Muslims in Birmingham refuse to integrate.

*Do you think that the Muslim community is integrating into British society?*

No. I don't think they ever will. No they won't they are on their own and probably if anything I feel they would like to take over.<sup>137</sup>

The rest of the interviewees thought that the first generation has not integrated but that the second generation speak English well and will eventually integrate. However, most of them added that South Asians tend to isolate and do not mix with the rest of society.



Although the first generation hardly make an effort to establish contact with members of wider society, they themselves feel integrated into British society. They are so entrenched in their daily routine and concerned with family issues that they do not feel isolated. Many respondents expressed their appreciation for what British society offers and some respondents of the second generation have confirmed this.

I think, it is to a certain extent, I think for example I can speak because it's my parents, they believe that they owe a great deal to British society because they came here and they got housing, and what ever. So in that sense yea... But I think our generation...<sup>138</sup>

Among the English respondents there seemed to be some concern that 'parallel societies' could evolve. One being a de-traditionalised, secular, functionally differentiated majority, and the other being re-traditionalised, religious-politically oriented minority groups. Thus a dispute could arise over 'cultural capital'<sup>139</sup>. Some interviewees suggested that there is a subliminal struggle for the definition of values. With reference to the Salman Rushdie affair one woman declared:

London in the apex, everybody comes here whose been somewhere else, they come back and we can clean their eyes out, their ideas and we can sift them through and take ideas from them. And we don't want to be taken over by anybody, but... and they absorb our ideas too. And I think that's what's interesting. But it's freedom of expression, like our press is not... of course it has some restrictions, but mainly we can say anything, you can write articles in any newspaper, you can go on television, and I agree with that, freedom of expression, I really do.<sup>140</sup>

In contrast, many young Muslims believe that British society has to change before Muslims can fully integrate. (It must be emphasised here that the term 'integration' was not defined for the interviewees.) The natural response was that full integration was directly associated with assimilation.



*Do you think that the Muslim community is integrating into British society?*  
 I think that is a danger, if it does then I think it's a danger.<sup>141</sup>

All the young respondents mentioned that their generation integrated to a certain extent in that they speak fluent English, have attended British schools and work among wider society, which could best be circumscribed by partial acculturation. Seven interviewees could be described as assimilative. They seek interaction with their British counterparts but reveal a preference for their own ethnic group as close friends.

The stereotypes, the images people come from. It's hard, women as soon as they realise we're Muslims they're like, oh shit. They are there on guard. And it is a two way process but I myself, I probably make a bigger effort to integrate. I wanna probably work for the government finally.<sup>142</sup>

Some people just don't accept other religions, they just don't accept them. And they just say, you know, you'll go to hell. And that's not what it says in the Qur'an at all. The most important thing is that you are a good person, isn't it? And as far as living in the West, if you want to be accepted you will be, but if you start, you know, looking, sort of criticising or rejecting Western society, then you won't be. That is natural. You know, it's hard, just like if a Westerner went to the Islamic World or anywhere in the East or Africa. You are gonna have to adapt, you can't criticise what they eat, or how they behave, or what they wear, you have to fit in if you want to live there, otherwise you shouldn't go there in the first place. You know a lot of people who are here because, I don't know, they have to be and they seem to reject it a lot. But my opinion about people like that is if they don't like it, they shouldn't be here.<sup>143</sup>

Ten respondents in turn expressed a strong desire to observe their religion but do not feel that the interaction with wider society is problematic. Although the majority feel that Islamic values are not compatible with the British way of life, they hope that their values will also be adopted by wider society one day.

*Do you think Islamic values are compatible with the English way of life?* No! I think they could be if Western society changed. *In which way?* Well, they've got to change ...if they did take on board some Islamic value, you know, ...such as ... such as, the women, the role of women, you know, I cannot believe that women are happy in the role that they have today in society, you know. ...Their heart is broken, it's bleeding, they are aching. Everybody wants something, their souls, they are crying out for something and they turn to all these different Gods, if you like, to worship. It's so sad. The children my God, the children, if there was just more respect and more realisation of

what we are as human beings and what we have been given, you know, our limitations and understanding of God. ...Then this society could heal itself, be more constructive, and use guidance.<sup>144</sup>

Another girl explained the problem of integration for Muslims:

You see as society changes, and you define society as changing norms, of course it's a dangerous thing because it contradicts with Islam, it's a way of life not a... Islam is society how can Islam change to British society. I rather if British society was an Islamic society, then hey we're coming, ha, ha!<sup>145</sup>

The basic characteristics of Western modernity are pluralism of value-orientations and lifestyles, secularity of the State and liberal attitudes on democratic regulations of social cohabitation. Rapid social change as a result of constant progress, the extension of individual spheres of freedom and access to knowledge are part of the foundation of cultural modernity. A general feature of development of these foundations is the 'de-traditionalisation' of all spheres of life<sup>146</sup>, which becomes visible in the disintegration of religious views, the abandonment of predetermined paths of life and in the liberation of the individual from the collective. Consequently the individual is more dependent on his own ability to work on the question of his *raison d'être*, to search for orientation and to optimise his career within unequal structures. This is why part of the process of growing up is to master disorientation and to be successful in education in order to achieve material security and social status.<sup>147</sup>

The price that individuals pay for the liberty of modernity appears as manifold ambivalence. De-traditionalisation was accepted to release society from ties that hinder its progress. The disintegration of traditions is associated with insecurity, anarchy, rootlessness, despair and the challenge



of an increasingly complex environment. This can lead to anxiety, disintegration and disorientation. In times of insecurity individuals search for undifferentiated and clear orientations. Muslims in particular observed that Christian norms were bent towards society rather than the other way round and that this adjustment has not prevented its decline. Therefore Muslims fear that Islam would have to face the same destiny if Muslims tolerate the relaxation of religious observance.

For example, a lot of the time people will say, well we don't agree with technological change and we cannot adapt to modern society. That's not true, that's not true at all, because this isn't an innovation in religion. We are fundamentally opposed to any innovation in religion because that means that you're going astray. And anything that goes astray, we believe leads into the hell fire. So in order to maintain the basic concepts that we were used to then, we have to, like sort of, you know, we have to sort of maintain them. And we cannot therefore adjust to these values because they are constantly subjected to change.<sup>148</sup>

The demand for 're-traditionalisation' can be interpreted as a reaction to 'de-traditionalised' modernity in order to maintain orientation and direction in life. Islam promises integration into a group of equal minded people within a foreign nation. Therefore the

- rejection of Western lifestyle,
- criticism of the extent of individual liberties,
- rejection of coeducation,
- and a sense of moral superiority

can be interpreted as a consequence of modern developments.

S. Ahmed pointed out that Muslims respond to post-modernity by reasserting ethnic or Islamic identity. Muslims reject modernity as a past



era, which has failed. Postmodernism is perceived as a phase of cultural schizophrenia, and an apocalyptic moment in history.<sup>149</sup> Muslims all over the world, have lost their faith in modernity and prefer to hold onto their intrinsic certainty – Islam. As postmodernism is associated with the rejection of the view of the world as a universal totality, the questioning and multiple interpretation of religion, and scepticism toward all traditional orthodoxy, Muslims respond with hostility. Ahmed described fundamentalism as “the attempt to resolve how to live in a world of radical doubt”<sup>150</sup>. Muslims now have to resolve:

...how to participate in the global civilisation without their identity being obliterated. It is an apocalyptic test, the most severe examination. Muslims stand at the crossroad.<sup>151</sup>

Although authors such as Ahmed occasionally suggest that Islam and modernity are in a state of competition, exactly the opposite is true, at least for Muslims in Britain. The second generation of Muslims adopt modernity and integrate it into their view of the world, but reject the subsequent ill developments. The reassertion of religious identity has to be perceived as a coping strategy in the course of integration.

However, it would be a mistake to immediately equate integration with assimilation. K. O. Hondrich suggested that it is impossible to circumvent origin-related attachments. His theory stipulated that the more future oriented attachments an individual develops, the more important origin-related attachments become. He therefore contradicted the assumption that highly educated and progress-oriented individuals will automatically substitute origin-related attachments with chosen ones. The reason being

that origin-related attachments will always serve as refuge when chosen attachments lead to disappointment.<sup>152</sup> This reassertion of origin-related attachments, be it ethnic and/or religious, will always accompany the process of integration.

The findings of this study seem to confirm the observation made by previous researchers that the second generation adopted the framework of British identity. Beneath it Muslims can mobilise different collective identifications depending on desirability and external stimulation.<sup>153</sup> The religious identity promises more opportunity for integration than the racial one because its communal boundaries are more permeable. It encompasses identifications with Muslims of different ethnic background, British converts and it provides a basis for a positive relationship with Christians and Jews (*Ahl al-Kitab*). It thus keeps a door open for all those 'Westerners' who share the same or similar ethical and moral values.

That assimilation is not always an option is based on the fact that South Asian Muslims have to cope with discrimination on the grounds of both race and religion.<sup>154</sup> The process of integration moves along the line of gradual acculturation. The second generation is partially acculturated due to the fact that they were raised within the British school system and are acquainted with the structures of British society. The degree of acculturation will be related to the opportunity and personal acknowledgement Muslims find in British society.

### 3.5. Preliminary Conclusions

The first generation of Muslims arrived in Britain in order to improve the economic situation of their families. In an alien and sometimes hostile environment, minority groups became more aware of those features, which mark their difference from the rest of society. Whilst Hinduism and Buddhism became subject to romanticism and idealisation with the Hippie generation, the Western population remained relatively ignorant of Islam. Consequently immigrants of Buddhist or Hindu faith are perceived as exotic and interesting rather than as a threat. Much of Buddhist belief was integrated into New Age philosophies, which became very popular in the Western World. In contrast to the popularity of Buddhism, Islam is associated with violence and perceived as a threat, not least because of its political instrumentalisation in the Arab World. This hostile attitude towards Islam is deeply rooted in European history. Such hostility towards Muslims has an impact on the identity development of Muslims in Britain.

In an environment where all established norms are under attack and where Islam has become object of suspicion, Muslims rebuilt their communal structures in Britain and sought guidance as well as stability by reasserting their religious-cultural heritage. For the first generation of Muslim immigrants religious observance is deeply rooted in their cultural heritage. Cultural identity comprises language, dress, norms for social behaviour, concept of time and truth as well as social obligations and rights. Islam's contribution to identity formation includes their system of belief, the



ritualisation of life, strategies to cope with every-day life, and the authority to sanction.

The observation that one of the main effects of modern liberalism on Western societies is a general ethno-religious revivalism, has puzzled many scholars in recent years. The spirit of modernity produced a lot of freedom for individuals unprecedented in human history. Nevertheless it provides only limited orientation and guidance, because it belongs to the conceptionalisation of freedom to choose one's own frame of orientation. The trend towards reviving ethno-religious identities represents the return to the most obvious and basic identifications. People search for orientation and shelter among those who reveal most similarities. These people may be of the same race, of the same cultural background or share the same beliefs. As this trend towards ethno-religious identification occurs within Western societies, there is also a tendency to emphasise difference and to exclude others.

Young Muslims were not prepared for the discrimination they could face when seeking acknowledgement as employees from wider society, neither within the British school system nor the close-knit structures of minority communities.<sup>155</sup> The community, entrenched in its cultural heritage, aims to maintain the communal security based on mutual loyalty. The fear to lose their children to Western society is great.

Whilst the first generation of immigrants derive their self-esteem from their economic achievement and the acknowledgement based on

hierarchical family structures, the second generation has to fight for acceptance from both its own community and wider society. Being torn between two sides is an indication of being 'dependent', because there is an increased danger of giving in to either, temporarily more influential side, on which the individual will depend for guidance and orientation. If this way of dealing with tension is interpreted as pragmatic, then another problem arises according to the theory of identity. It is the choice of values and norms according to 'desirability' and according to the utilitarian calculation of situational advantage.<sup>156</sup> To develop a uniform identity there is a need for consistency of orientation, in order to avoid dependencies on interchanging orientations that will leave the individual in a state of instability.

Identity entails a choice in emphasising identifications according to situational advantage and personal comfort. Since being a Muslim in Britain is one of the factors for social discrimination, it has consequently also become a salient aspect of self-definition. To avoid the dependency created by the tension of growing up between two cultures, young Muslims discovered the fundamental values of Islam for themselves. How Islamic identity is expressed depends on the subjective situation of the individual. J. S. Nielsen developed a six-point typology<sup>157</sup> of different options.

1. The *random retaliation* option can be observed among Asian youth gangs, who sometimes mobilise Islamic symbols. The level of such gang activity appears to be proportional to the level of local racist activity.

2. The option of *collective isolation* is an expression of quiet retrenchment within the community networks in order to survive the unemployment rates of 35% or more. For the security derived from communal support the individual repays the community with loyalty to the collective norms.
3. Young people who have been successful in education and business frequently opt for *limited participation*. They actively participate in the wider economy but remain highly integrated in their community.
4. *High profile separation* is an option chosen by young Muslims, who became increasingly involved in organisational work since the Rushdie affair. They have little interest in wider society and actively campaign at local and national level for social and political space.
5. *High profile integration* is the way forward for a small but growing number of young Muslims. The majority of these young people are well educated and attempt to find ways of constructive participation in wider society, whilst maintaining their Islamic system of values.
6. *Aggressive action* is taken only by a small minority who adopted the programme of radical Islamic political movements.

Among the respondents of this study none could be attributed to the first or sixth option. Five girls and three males can be attributed to the collective isolation option, five girls and four males to the high profile integration option, three girls and one male to the high profile separation option and nineteen respondents to the limited participation option. Although the numbers are not representative, it is interesting to see, as the findings of this study have shown, that the majority of respondents, despite their different



attribution to the options above, have employed Islam to cope with their subjective situation.

The interviewees have made it apparent that their search for the fundamental values of Islam helps them to cope with the demands of both ethnic community and wider society. The study of Islam enabled many young people to modify the strict rules and obligations of their communities to subjectively bearable ones, without breaking from their families. Young people especially those well educated, emphasise the Islamic value of a non-racist society. Their belief encompasses the hope for a better future. The struggle against racism and chauvinism among the South Asian community can be interpreted as a compensation for the powerlessness they feel *via* racism among wider society. The majority of interviewees are already identifying with their first chosen and non origin-related attachments, be it their studies at university or their employment. Their belief nurtures self-esteem and their sense of belonging to their community, as well as the sense of security and solidarity provided from belonging to the global *Ummah*. Their Islamic identity provides enough security to bear disappointment and offers enough flexibility to seek integration.

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<sup>1</sup> D. Owen, 'Size, structure and growth of the ethnic minority populations', in: OPCS, *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census*, London, 1996, pp. 87-95.

<sup>2</sup> F. Halliday, *Arabs in Exile*, Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain, London, 1992, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> R. Geaves, 'Britain', in: D. Westerlund and I. Svanberg (eds), *Islam Outside the Arab World*, Surrey, 1999, pp. 357-359.

<sup>4</sup> P. Lewis, *Islamic Britain*, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims, London, 1994, pp. 11-13.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p.7.

<sup>6</sup> F. Halliday, op. cit, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p.23.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with a Welsh woman (84), Cardiff, 25<sup>th</sup> January 1998.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with a Muslim (half Welsh, half Yemeni) (over 50), Cardiff, 25<sup>th</sup> January 1998.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> Interview with a Welsh woman (84), Cardiff, 25<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>15</sup> Interview with a Welsh convert (76, female), Cardiff, 25<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>16</sup> L. Grinberg, and R. Grinberg, *Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile*, C.T., 1989, p. 90.
- <sup>17</sup> J. C. Antokoletz, 'A Psychoanalytic View of Cross-Cultural Passages', in: *The American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 53, 1993, p. 39.
- <sup>18</sup> Compare: Grinberg and Grinberg (1989); Waters (1990); Hertz (1993); Ritsner et al. (1993); Volkan (1993); Akhtar (1994).
- <sup>19</sup> Compare: S. Freud (1921); J.C. Antokoletz (1993).
- <sup>20</sup> Interview with a Somali girl (24, unemployed), Cardiff, 20<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>21</sup> Interview with a Somali girl (21, unemployed), Cardiff, 20<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>22</sup> S. Akhtar, 'A Third Individuation: Immigration, Identity, and the Psychoanalytical Process', in: *JAPA* 43/4, 1993, p. 1062.
- <sup>23</sup> Interview with a Somali girl (24, unemployed), Cardiff, 20<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>24</sup> Interview with a third generation Yemeni woman (42, Bar girl) Cardiff, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Interview with a Welsh man (half Welsh, half Yemeni) (40), Cardiff, 25<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>27</sup> Interview with a third generation Yemeni woman (45 years old), Cardiff, 25<sup>th</sup> January 1998.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> M. Anwar, *Pakistanis in Britain*, A Sociological Study, London, 1985, pp. 23-24.
- <sup>30</sup> S. Allen, P.32.
- <sup>31</sup> J. Nielsen, 'Muslim Immigration and Settlement in Britain', *Muslims in Europe*, CSIC Research Papers, No. 21, March 1984, p. 2.
- <sup>32</sup> Loc. cit.
- <sup>33</sup> M. Anwar, 'Muslims in Britain: 1991 Census and other Statistical Sources', *Europe*, CSIC Papers, No. 9, September 1993, p. 2.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid. p. 7.
- <sup>35</sup> Labour Force Survey of Spring 1995.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>37</sup> This table first appeared in the Black and Ethnic Minority Health and Lifestyle Survey from 1992 without a title. The title has here been inserted for the sake of clarity.
- <sup>38</sup> Black and Ethnic Minority Health and Lifestyle Survey from 1992, Health Education Authority, p. 13.
- <sup>39</sup> Op. cit, Labour Force Survey of Spring 1995, p. 28.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 19.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 40.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 45.
- <sup>43</sup> J. Nielsen, op. cit, p. 7.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid, pp. 7-8.
- <sup>45</sup> Purpose in life.
- <sup>46</sup> Emotional safety, protection; feeling of being sheltered.
- <sup>47</sup> Interview with a Pakistani woman, (40) Glasgow, 5<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>48</sup> Interview with a Pakistani shop owner, (45, male) Glasgow, 5<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>49</sup> M. Anwar, *Pakistanis in Britain*, A Sociological Study, London, 1985, p.50.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 68.
- <sup>51</sup> N. Hutnik, *Ethnic Minority Identity*, A Social Psychological Perspective, Oxford, 1991, p.8.
- <sup>52</sup> P. Werbner, *Black and Ethnic Leadership*, The Cultural Dimension of Political Action, London, 1991, p.
- <sup>53</sup> M. S. Raza, *Islam in Britain*, Past, Present and Future, Leicester, 1991.
- <sup>54</sup> Ron Geaves, *Sectarian Influences within Islam in Britain*, Leeds, 1996, p. 95.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid. pp. 101-2.
- <sup>56</sup> Interview with Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza (Imams and Mosques Council, UK), 13<sup>th</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>57</sup> Ron Geaves, op. cit, p.163.
- <sup>58</sup> Interview with Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza (Imams and Mosques Council, UK), 13<sup>th</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>59</sup> Interview with a young imam (Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK), 19<sup>th</sup> June 1996.
- <sup>60</sup> J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, Edinburgh, 1992, p. 46.



- <sup>61</sup> Interview with a young imam (Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK), 19<sup>th</sup> June 1996.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup> J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, p. 42.
- <sup>64</sup> Interview with Dr. Zaki Badawi (Muslim College), 13<sup>th</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>68</sup> Interview with Dr. Sidiqqi (Islamic Foundation), 17<sup>th</sup> June 1996.
- <sup>69</sup> Interview with a member of the UK Islamic Mission, 16<sup>th</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>72</sup> Interview with a young imam (Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK), 19<sup>th</sup> June 1996.
- <sup>73</sup> Interview with Dr. Pasha (UMO), 9<sup>th</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>74</sup> Iqbal Sacranie, speech to the 'Professional Asian Doctors and Dentist Association' in Birmingham on 7<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>76</sup> Interview with Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza (Imams and Mosques Council, UK), 13<sup>th</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>78</sup> Interview with Massoud Shadjareh (Muslim Parliament Human Rights Committee), 8<sup>th</sup> Mai 1996.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>80</sup> Kalim Siddiqui, *The Muslim Manifesto - a strategy for survival*, London, 1990, p. 2.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 2-3.
- <sup>82</sup> Interview with Massoud Shadjareh (Muslim Parliament Human Rights Committee), 8<sup>th</sup> Mai 1996.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>84</sup> Interview with Dr. Ghaissuden (Muslim Parliament), 8<sup>th</sup> Mai 1996.
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>86</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), Study Prepared for the IPPR on *Attitudes Towards Race*, Qualitative Research: February 1997.
- <sup>87</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>88</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (19), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>89</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>90</sup> B. Casey, *Truancy and youth transition*, *Youth cohort Report*, no. 34, 1995.
- <sup>91</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), Glasgow, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>92</sup> Interview with a South Asian teacher, Birmingham (Sparkhill), 6<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>93</sup> D. Joly, 'Ethnic Minorities and Education in Britain: Interaction between the Muslim Community and Birmingham Schools', *Muslims in Europe*, CSIC Research Papers, No. 41, March 1989, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid. p. 14.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid. pp. 15-16.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 16.
- <sup>97</sup> K. Murad, *Muslim Youth in the West*, Towards a New Education Strategy, Leicester, 1986, p. 5.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid. p. 6.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid. pp. 6-7.
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid. p. 7.
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid. p. 9.
- <sup>102</sup> Interview with F. and K. students (25 and 21 respectively) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>103</sup> N. Hutnik, op. cit. p.
- <sup>104</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, Birmingham, 7<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>105</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), Glasgow, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>106</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (19), Glasgow, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>107</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), Glasgow, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>108</sup> R. Funk (eds), *Erich Fromm, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. IV, Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 49-51.
- <sup>109</sup> W. Heitmeyer, et. al., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, Frankfurt/Main, 1997, p. 94.



- <sup>110</sup> U. Boos-Nünningen and W. Nieke, 'Orientierungs- und Handlungsmuster türkischer Jugendlicher zur Bewältigung der Lebenssituation in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in *psychosozial*, 16(1982), pp. 67-90.
- <sup>111</sup> W. Heitmeyer, et.al., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, p. 101.
- <sup>112</sup> Ibid. p. 102.
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid. p.105.
- <sup>114</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, Birmingham, 7<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>115</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, Birmingham, 7<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>116</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, (21) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>117</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, (21) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>118</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, (21) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>119</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, (21) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>120</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, (21) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>121</sup> Interview with a Welsh convert (25, male), Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>122</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), Glasgow, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>123</sup> Jessica Jacobson, *Islam in Tradition*, Religion and Identity among British Pakistani youth, London, 1998, p. 107.
- <sup>124</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (20) London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>125</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (21) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>126</sup> Interview with a Muslim (25), London 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>127</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, Birmingham, 7<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>128</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>129</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (21) and a Welsh convert (male, 25) Cardiff, 26<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>130</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (19), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>131</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (18), Glasgow, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1997.
- <sup>132</sup> Interview with a young imam (Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK), 19<sup>th</sup> June 1996.
- <sup>133</sup> Interview with a Muslim (25), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>134</sup> Interview with Abdullah Folik, (Young Muslim Organisation UK) 21<sup>st</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>135</sup> Interview with Abdullah Folik, (Young Muslim Organisation UK) 21<sup>st</sup> May 1996.
- <sup>136</sup> E. Seidel-Pielen, 'Keine falsche Rücksichtnahme mehr!', in: *die tageszeitung (taz)*, 29.5.1995.
- <sup>137</sup> Interview with an English working in retail fashion (over 50, female), Birmingham, 6<sup>th</sup> February, 1998.
- <sup>138</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (21), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>139</sup> H. Esser, 'Ethnische Konflikte als Auseinandersetzung um den Wert von kulturellem Kapital', in: W. Heitmeyer, R. Dollase (eds), *Die bedrängte Toleranz*, 1996, pp. 64-99.
- <sup>140</sup> Interview with an English secretary and tour-guide (Turkey), (over 40, female), London, 6<sup>th</sup> March, 1998.
- <sup>141</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (20), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>142</sup> Interview with a Muslim (25), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>143</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (half Iraqi, half English) (20), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>144</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl, Birmingham, 7<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
- <sup>145</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (20), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>146</sup> J. Habermas, 'Individualisierung durch Vergesellschaftung', in: U. Beck and E. Beck-Gernsheim (eds), *Riskante Freiheiten*, 1994, p.441.
- <sup>147</sup> W. Heitmeyer, et. al., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, 1997, p.167.
- <sup>148</sup> Interview with a Muslim girl (20), London, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1998.
- <sup>149</sup> A.S. Ahmed, *Postmodernism and Islam*, Predicament and Promise, London, 1992, p.32.
- <sup>150</sup> Ibid. p.13
- <sup>151</sup> Ibid. p.264
- <sup>152</sup> K. O. Hondrich, 'Die Nicht-Hintergebarkeit von Wir-Gefühlen' in: W. Heitmeyer and R. Dollase (eds), *Die bedrängte Toleranz*, 1996, pp.100-120.
- <sup>153</sup> Also compare J. S. Nielsen, 'Muslims in Britain: Ethnic minorities, community or Ummah?', unpublished manuscript.
- <sup>154</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>155</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>156</sup> W. Heitmeyer, et. al., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, 1997, p. 154.

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<sup>157</sup> J.S. Nielsen, 'Muslims in Europe: history revisited or a way forward?', in: *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1997, p. 139.

## Conclusion

We have seen how, in the course of history, both individual and collective identity has been subjected to change in Britain. With the Act of Union (1707), British identity was constructed to form an “umbrella of solidarity”<sup>1</sup>. Britishness was associated with opportunity and economic expansion. Protestantism, which used to serve as the emotional and cognitive tool to create consensus, was eventually substituted by a capitalist ideology. Ever since, multicultural Britishness, as an identity anchor, is offered to everyone who wishes to become a citizen of the United Kingdom. Labour immigrants have moved to Britain due to the economic opportunities available at the time and adopted a sense of Britishness as part of their self-definition.

British history revealed that social cohesion was strongest either during times of external threat or when all ethno-cultural groups were encouraged to participate in the building of a successful society. In times of socio-economic and political crisis the British elite had pre-empted an escalation of conflict by introducing small steps towards political liberalisation. Today devolution is an expression of both the political crisis management of Westminster as well as the lack of social cohesion due to the absence of opportunity and external threat. It is also an expression of how Welsh and Scottish national identities have survived over time.

Maintaining communal unity depends on the ‘symbolic construction’ of similarity<sup>2</sup>. It has been observed that the less people have in common with each other, the more problematic social cohesion becomes.<sup>3</sup> In times of



transformation and social insecurity the need for social cohesion, predictability, a feeling of belonging to and being protected by a collective becomes increasingly important.

Many social theorists have concluded that identity development has become problematic in modern societies, more so for ethnic minorities. Modernity has questioned and sometimes destroyed certainties and initiated a trend towards 'de-traditionalisation'. An increasing pace of change, culminating in the unpredictability of globalisation, produces anxiety and disorientation in many people.

This observation has led to a dispute over the validity of 'essentialising' notions of identity among social theorists. It is argued that identity is no longer unified and stable, but is becoming fragmented and composed of sometimes contradictory identities.<sup>4</sup> The findings of this study have shown that the Scots, Welsh and Muslims are overcoming this dilemma of contradictory identities by mobilising origin-oriented identifications, which in turn helps to maintain coherence and stability. The majority of identifications are chosen and sometimes imposed. When these fail or lead to disappointment an individual will fall back on origin-oriented identifications in order to cope with critical situations. It was also observed that whenever individuals hold on to, objectively seen, contradictory identifications while also tolerating ambiguity, they created a subjective synthesis based on progress- and future-oriented identifications.

The methodology of this study does not allow for conclusions on changes of identity or phases of identity development on an individual level. However, the manner in which individuals who had contradictory experiences, interpreted their personal history in order to maintain a sense of continuity, confirms the 'Eriksonian' theory of assimilation and accommodation processes. Additionally some of Weinreich's findings can be confirmed. In the course of this study it was found that young Muslims search among their own group for their significant other, who reflect their current beliefs: this nurtures self-esteem and a sense of security in the event of potential discrimination. Many young Muslims have exhibited salient conflicting identifications with people of their own ethnicity. To resolve such conflicts these young people search for ways to redefine ethnicity.

The majority of Muslim interviewees of the second generation also confirmed at least one of the three strategies of maintaining a positive sense of social identity, as stipulated by Tajfel. Not only do numerous Muslim organisations aim to change the values in the social system by acting as pressure groups, but young Muslims too seek to set examples by exhibiting a pious lifestyle in the hope to impact on society. By stripping their Islamic practice from cultural traditions and by reviving the fundamentals of their religion, they hope to change the image of Islam in Western society. This observation also confirms Modood's finding that Islam provides symbolic solidarity with other Muslims. In contrast, other young Muslims choose to distance themselves from their ethnic groups and try to assimilate as much as possible.



When discussing the culture laden religious perception of their peers some of the Muslim interviewees of the second generation exhibited what Goffman referred to as identity ambivalence. Identity ambivalence occurs when an individual adopts some of the perceptions of wider society and consequently feels repelled when observing members of his or her group behaving in the stereotyped manner, but cannot detach him or herself from their group. One of the 'assimilative' interviewees explicitly described experiences in which being a Muslim was a stigma.

The findings of this study can to some extent support the identity model of Breakwell. Those interviewees who reflected on their experiences produced stories of subjective continuity. Breakwell stated that the accommodation-assimilation process can be described as a memory system, which is susceptible to biases in information recall. Thus continuity is rather a result of how past experiences are interpreted and remembered. Identity is under threat when such continuity cannot be created. One of Breakwell's suggested coping strategies was repeatedly observed among second generation Muslim interviewees: the rearrangement of salience.

Freud's first psychosocial reference to the 'inner identity', which he based on deep feelings of communality and common mental as well as inner constructions, was vague. However, the Scots and Welsh revealed that their sense of Scottishness or Welshness is primarily based on the sense of belonging. The respondents found it difficult to define their identities, but emphasised communal feelings and their difference in mentalities. Historic experiences of oppression were salient. The interviews suggested that in



comparison to the English, the self-esteem of the Welsh and Scots is strongly eroded. The reassertion of national identity and pride is an attempt to gain acknowledgement for communal individuality, to strengthen self-esteem and to create a socio-economic basis for communal security and stability. A sense of Britishness has remained, not least because the Union was the best option in the absence of viable alternatives.

Muslim response to socio-economic insecurity differs according to the generation. Whilst the first generation sought refuge in their rebuilt social structures and culturally homogenous communities, the second generation is trying to find a way to create a synthesis between the two contradictory identities. For the majority of the first generation there was little need to develop a relationship to wider society in order to maintain their families. At the time of their arrival the British economy was in need of cheap labour, which they offered. The economic relationship was based on a symbiosis in which both parties received what they sought. The labour immigrants derived their self-esteem from their personal achievement, the gratefulness of their families and economic improvement. The community network provided security and a sense of belonging.

The second generation was raised within both the tight-knit communities and the British school system. They learnt how important and valuable the support of their community is and they are well acquainted with the mechanisms of British society. Parental and communal concern that their children could go astray puts much pressure on these young people. Young Muslims have partially acculturated by speaking fluent English and

participating in the British schools system. Conversely, they were raised with a subliminal rejection of the very society they are growing up in. However, in order to succeed within British society and build careers they have to create a synthesis between the two, sometimes even contradicting normative value systems. On the grounds of their education and willingness to work hard, a growing number of South Asians are striving for the middle classes, a socio-economic status that British natives are becoming increasingly defensive about in times of recession.

Many young Muslims have turned to Islam for guidance in order to cope with the tension created by the need to conform to wider society, to remain loyal to the community and to protect themselves from rejection. By rediscovering the fundamentals of their religion they can strip off some of the repressive elements of their culture without opposing their family and community. Young Muslims have chosen to emphasise their Islamic value system as opposed to their cultural one: this confirms the third hypothesis.

Initially this may seem exclusive and antagonising for Western societies. However, these young people have chosen the more inclusive option from the identity components available to them. These young Muslims emphasise the tolerance, peace and rejection of racism, which their religion entails. As such Islam respects the *Ahl al-Kitab*. Although most Muslims point to the lack of faith among Western societies, there is a common basis for mutual understanding.



In multi-ethnic Britain, South Asian Muslims are also confronted with Muslims of Arab, European and African background as well as converts. Islamic societies allow these young South Asians to break through their community boundaries without breaking from the basic value system of their parents. Hence, even those young people who dissociate themselves from wider society have opened up a new spectrum of associations by developing a sense of belonging to the global *Ummah*.

For a small but growing number of young Muslims Islam has become the essential tool to facilitate the process of acculturation. It links the community with British society in the sense that an Islamic identity has permeable boundaries opposed to an ethnic one and it provides the unambiguous orientation which cannot be found elsewhere. It nurtures self-esteem and makes alternative criteria available to the Western success-oriented evaluation system, by which human qualities can be judged. Islam has become the tool for personal liberation within an acceptable value system. It allows young people to make sense of their lives and provides ideals for a better world and future. The strong system of belief bolsters confidence to cope with potential rejection and racism in the course of acculturation.

Dr. Badawi explained that societies have similar problems all over the world, only the strategies chosen to resolve them differ. Many young Muslims have chosen Islam as their frame of orientation, they act according to Islamic regulations and express their anxieties and ideal concepts of society in that context.



In the course of research it became obvious that the friction which emerges as Muslims integrate into wider society, derives from the fear of conflict over the definition of values between a de-traditionalised, secular, functionally differentiated majority and a re-traditionalised, religious-politically oriented minority. Both parties feel that their cultural capital is not respected. This finding concurs with the second hypothesis.

It was also possible to illustrate that some native respondents mistrust Muslim demands for more religious freedom and protection because they feel that it limits the socio-political freedoms (such as freedom of speech) which this society took so long to develop. Muslims in turn argue that immorality among society threatens their spiritual well-being. It therefore can be argued that polemics over the issue of freedom impinge on the most fragile Western identity components; this illustrates the first hypothesis.

The process of mutual rejection is enforced in times of economic hardship. The escalation of ethno-cultural conflicts can be reduced, as long as disputes take place in form of cross-cutting-conflicts. This presupposes that members of the conflicting groups are integrated in most of the different levels of socio-economic status and their interests overlap. If the different ethnic groups do not share mutual interests, then there is a danger that ethnic minorities will withdraw to their in-group communities and focus on an identity (i.e. Muslim identity) which can bear no more violation.<sup>5</sup>

Identity allows individuals to emphasise different identity components without threatening continuity or stability. However, individuals usually face this choice when identity becomes an issue, that is in times of crisis. Both wider society and Muslim minorities hold rich recourses of valuable identity anchors. It remains a matter of 'will', which identifications both parties mobilise, to work towards a coherent society.

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<sup>1</sup>R. Jenkins, *Social Identity*, London, 1996, p. 105.

<sup>2</sup>A.P. Cohen (eds), *Symbolising Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures*, Manchester, 1986.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. p. 104.

<sup>4</sup> Stuart Hall, 'The Question of Cultural Identity', in: S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew (eds), *Modernity and its Futures*, 1992, pp. 276-7.

<sup>5</sup> W. Heitmeyer et al., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, 1997, p. 190.

Source: E. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, London, 1985, pp. 32-3

Stages	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
	Psycho-sexual Stages and Modes	Psycho-social Crises	Radius of Significant Relations	Basic Strengths	Core-pathology Basic Antipathies	Related Principles of Social Order	Binding Ritualizations	Ritualism
I Infancy	Oral-Respiratory, Sensory-Kinesthetic	Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust	Maternal Person	Hope	Withdrawal	Cosmic Order	Numinous	Idolism
II Early Childhood	Anal-Urethral, Muscular	Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt	Parental Persons	Will	Compulsion	'Law and Order'	Judicious	Legalism
III Play Age	Infantile-Genital, Locomotor	Initiative vs. Guilt	Basic Family	Purpose	Inhabitation	Ideal Prototypes	Dramatic	Moralism
IV School Age	'Latency'	Industry vs. Inferiority	'Neighborhood', School	Competence	Inertia	Technological Order	Formal (Technical)	Formalism
V Adolescence	Puberty	Identity vs. Confusion	Peer Groups & Outgroups; Models of Leadership	Fidelity	Repudiation	Ideological Worldview	Ideological	Totalism
VI Young Adulthood	Genitality	Intimacy vs. Isolation	Partners in friendships, sex, competition, cooperation	Love	Exclusivity	Pattern of Cooperation & Competition	Affiliative	Elitism
VII Adulthood	(Procreativity)	Generativity vs. Stagnation	Divided Labor & shared household	Care	Rejectivity	Currents of Education & Tradition	Generational	Authoritism
VIII Old Age	(Generalisation of Sensual Modes)	Integrity vs. Despair	'Mankind' 'My Kind'	Wisdom	Disdain	Wisdom	Philosophical	Dogmatism

Appendix I



## Appendix II

### LIST OF ORGANISATIONS

Association of Muslim Youth  
and Community Workers  
Mr Shams-uddeen Hassan  
81 Melbourne Road  
Spinney Hill North  
Leicester LE2 0GW

Council of Mosques (UK&Eire)  
46 Goodge Street  
London W1P 1FJ

Federation of Student Islamic  
Societies  
of the UK and Eire  
T. Othman  
38 Mapesbury Road  
London NW2 4JD

Imams and Mosques Council (UK)  
Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza  
20-22 Creffield Road  
London W5 3RP

Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs  
Hamid Ismail  
46 Goodge Street  
London W1P 1FJ

Islamic Council of Europe  
16 Grosvenor Crescent  
London SW1X 7EP

Islamic Foundation  
Mr S F Ahmad  
Markfield Conference Centre  
Ratby Lane  
Markfield  
Leicester LE6 0RN

Jamia't Ahl-e-Hadith UK  
Maulana Abdul Hadi Umta  
20 Green Lane  
Small Heath  
Birmingham B9 5DB

Muslim College  
Dr M A Zaki Badawi  
20-22 Creffield Road  
London W5 3RP

Muslim Educational Forum  
Mr Mohammad Khalid &  
Mr Yahya Yacob  
93 Court Road  
Balsall Heath  
Birmingham B12 9LQ

Muslim Law (Shariah) Council  
Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza  
20-22 Creffield Road  
London W5 3RP

Muslim Parliament of Great Britain  
Dr M Ghaissudden  
109 Fulham Palace Road  
London W6 8JA

Muslim Women's Helpline  
London

UK Islamic Mission  
S T H Shah  
202 North Gower Street  
London NW1 2LY

Islamic Propagation Centre  
International  
Mr S M Khan  
481 Coventry Road  
Small Heath  
Birmingham B10 0JS

Islamic Rights Movement  
Mr A Hussain  
P O Box 139  
Leicester LE2 2YH

Islamic Society for the Promotion of  
Religious Tolerance in the UK  
Hasham El Essawy  
20-22 Creffield Road  
London W5 3RP

Jama't Ahl-e-Sunnat UK  
(Association of Sunni Muslims UK)  
Maulana Syed Zahid Hussain  
106 Leslie Road  
Forestfield  
Nottingham NG7 6PR

Union of Muslim Organisations of  
UK  
and Eire (UMO)  
Dr Sayid Aziz Pasha  
109 Camden Hill Road  
London W8 7TL

Young Muslim Organisation UK -  
Central Office  
Mussadiq Ahmad  
54 Fieldgate Street  
London E1 1ES

Al-Khoei Foundation  
Imam Al-Khoei  
Chevening Road  
London NW6 6TN

International Centre for Islamic  
Studies  
Mr S A Moid  
ICIS House  
144-146 King's Cross Road  
London WC1X 9DH

## Appendix III

### INTERVIEW TOPICS FOR MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS

#### TOPICS:

Background of the interviewee

Structure of the organisation

Aims and values of the organisation

Methods of the organisation

Policies and achievements of the organisation

Question of Muslim identity in the UK

Future of Islam in the UK

#### SUB-TOPICS:

Background

Your background.

Your Motivation in working for your organisation.

Structure of the organisation

Structure of organisation ( hierarchy, size, decision-making process).

Structure of co-operation with other Muslim organisations in Britain and abroad.

Aims of the organisation

Values defended by the organisation.

The aims of your organisation.

Ideal Muslim participation in the British political system.

Methods of the organisation

Methods used to achieve aims.



**MISSING**

**PAGES**

**NOT**

**AVAILABLE**

## Appendix IV

### INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

What do you immediately associate with Wales?

What are you proud of?

What makes Wales different from the rest of Britain?

Do you think there is a unity among British society?

What do you think about the monarchy?

What do you think about the reformation of the House of Lords?

Do you think Wales should become independent?

What do you immediately associate with Islam?

What do you immediately associate with the Muslim community in Cardiff?

How would you describe it?

Do you think they are a part of this society?

Do you think they have integrated?

What do you think about the Rushdie Affair?

How much contact do you have with Muslims?

## QUESTIONS

Britain is already a melting pot of Celts, Romans, French, Saxon, Danish, Irish + Welsh - with benefit to all

1) Which political and social values constitute the pillars of British national identity and is there a danger that this British identity is segmented into regional and ethnic identities?

EVERYONE has to be themselves

2) Which strategies would you propose to integrate ethnic and Islamic identity into British society and which identifications can British society offer Muslims?

3) How do you envisage the development of British identity in the future?

British + self-identity  
+ pride in  
isolation



## Appendix VI

### Tape 2

#### Side A: Muslim Parliament

Q: How many people approximately work for you, in this organisation?

We, it is difficult say what you mean by work, paid employees or volunteers. This organisation is, basically the backbone of organisation is voluntary workers. We have got, we have got lets say hundreds of people actually up and down the country doing very valuable work. And the work that they do is anything from fundraising in to counseling, support of the community, teaching, setting up schools, etc., etc. And which are voluntary workers, but we do have some paid staff, which are mostly in this building, and their number is sort of around 5 at most, and, and. But major part of the work is done by the team of volunteers, who dedicate their time or part of their time.

Q: And what type of skill do these people have to have, at least those of the core of the organisation?

Well I think that sort of the first most important skill is actually being ideologically sort of motivated to work for the improvement of the situation of the Muslims in Britain. And then also being sort of religiously inclined. And then communication skills is important. I am going over sort of a wide range of, communication skills are important. And also then you go into different areas of work, where they have to have those specific skill. Like in fundraising you need certain skills, in counselling you need other skills, in administration you need other skills and setting up tutorial colleges you need different skills, so those are obviously, for those you need specific skills. But the general thing that we want out of people who are associated with us, be it volunteers or workers is to identify with our broad aims and objectives.

Q: And you work together with other organisations, Muslim organisations?

Yes, we work basically with anyone and by that definition we are more likely to work with Muslim organisations. We work with anyone over, to achieve our aim and objective. And yes because of that you end up working quite a lot with Muslim organisations. I mean the phone call I just had a few minutes ago is regarding a film which is going to be released. And Muslim organisations are calling us and asking us to respond because it is yet again demonising Muslims. And I will be ending up contacting a lot of other Muslim organisations and actually uniting over this issue. And we do that, it is project by project, rather than a structural sort of link between ourselves and others.

Q: Do you also have connections to Muslim organisations abroad?

Yes, we do have, again because of, I mean for example we are involved in a number of international arenas, being from the Human Rights committee, campaigning for prisoners of faith, who are people who have been imprisoned because of their belief. We campaign for abuse of Human Right, against war crimes and so forth, by that definition we actually have to involved with other groups. We also fund raise for Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria and now for Lebanon and by that definition we actually do have a very close working relationship with these groups, and Cashmere etc.

Q: When it comes to the decision-making process, who takes most of the decisions and who is consulted for the areas of special topics?

Our own structure is, we have got a committee, a vice committee where major decisions are, goes into that committee and they decide. Then that goes back into the structure of the Muslim Parliament before that becomes accepted eventually. But there is another way as well, I mean for example we are delegated certain things from the Muslim Parliament by campaigning on lets say prisoners of faith, and then the decision on which prisoners of faith we should go for at which particular time is actually left to the committee to decide. It does not have to go back and forth. So there is a level of a Muslim Parliament, the main body of the Muslim Parliament decides the direction, and then the GPC, which is the next structure, it decides the mechanism of how it is going to be done. But then it is actually left to the committees to actually decide for themselves on a day to day aspect of what ... it is actually



is a communication that needs to be kept open it is in the structure. But then we are sometimes from time to time, we deal with issues which have to be responded to very quickly, and then we sort of get the approval for these from the MP. If we want to do something and we are not certain that this is, needs clarification, we go to the leader and he has the authority to actually OK things on that needs to be done, on a emergency basis.

Q: How many people are on the committee?

The committee is presently is 17 people.

Q: Are there Shiah, Sunni ... ?

Oh yes, we have got different, Shiah, Sunni, Deobandi, so forth and so on. But also we have got male, female; we have got Pakistani, Bangladeshi, it is not really, it is a very mixed thing. We have got lawyers, we have got unemployed people, we have got barristers, it is, we have got doctors, it isss ... People have come together because they are interested and motivated to do something and they have got the skills to actually help. And you know be it that they are academic, or be it somebody who is presently are out of work and actually has a lot of time to give and this is ... there is no basis of saying you need qualification or a specific agenda or sort of a school of thought, there is none of that. We do not deal with those sorts of issues, we don't get involved in that sort of arenas, discuss that type of thing.

Q: When you address the community or you try to gain support for something, how do you overcome this sectarian and ethnic division within the community?

Well all the things that we, issues that we address are the issues that, the issues themselves, are across these boundaries.

Q: So it concerns everybody no matter what ...

Yes, that is, that is, we don't actually think unity comes in abstract of ... sitting at home and trying to merge different schools of thought of different cultures together. We think that, for example, there is no difference of opinion on the issue Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, on a issue of sectarian sort of divisions. Or on the issues of discrimination that is happening to our community, who are being put in prison overseas, and abuses of Human Rights and so forth. These are, these don't have theological boundaries, so we don't have any problem. We sort of, when we raise these issues, we are not raising sectarianism, so anyone could actually comment, identify, stand up, for this sort of thing. And historically that has been the case and it will continue to be the case.

Q: And which group do you focus at, at the community as a whole?

We go for the whole of the community. We sort of, our campaigning is always for the whole of the community, and. We do have a hard core of supporters who are, I mean, I am talking about the Human Rights Committee at the moment, hard core of supporters which are around two thousand people. And these are the people who actually are involved with us in a variety of campaigns that we have done and who are on our mailing list. We, when we lounge a project or when we do something major, all of these people will be informed. And then also we work through mosques, we work through newspapers, mainstream media and Muslim media. So we actually go very very wide.

Q: Do you find any obstacles through lets say through the European or British environment and maybe some Muslim groups which say no we don't think the work of the MP is good or constructive? What are the obstacles you generally face?

It is, there is, I don't think you can ever do anything that is worth while doing without having someone not agreeing with you, this is a fact of life. So we get our sort of groups or individuals who disagree with us. And this is something that you know, we accept if you don't want to get that you stay at home and do nothing. And so, but really we never have had any major sort of group or ....

Q: Also not from the western community, lets say administrative problems, that they try to hamper your work?

Yes they do but they again, you know, I've been sort of a campaigner for quite a long time not always within the Muslim community, before I used to go with the mainstream. You can't get the right campaign or do campaigns for the rights of people or groups without obstacles from the structures. And this is something that is almost if you don't get then your are not doing your job properly.

Q: So what kind of obstacles are there?

Well, for example you want to get rid of lets say, your campaigning for better rights for Muslim community to, for example what we are trying to do is to get the same rights for the Muslim community in Britain as is being described on both the International law, and discrimination on religious ground is unlawful, and on the European legislation, which again



Britain is a signature to. But we are being denied unlike the Jewish community and the Sikh community we are not recognised as a group, so the service (delivery or liberty) cannot be addressed towards our needs. And then there is discrimination, we can't have the right of the address. Now this is upon the (mental rivalry?) and the rights we want to get for our community. But governments as a whole never want to give rights to their people, if they got to be forced. You know the women, when they won their rights they had to force the governments ... Blacks, any group you know, the children, you could go through any section of community, to get their right they actually had to campaign and fight for that right. And we are no different, we are doing that and they put obstacles, they try to sort of say that OK if we give them this right, they are gonna do etceteras, etceteras, demonise us, give us half measures, take somebody from our community and say oh no, no we have given the right to them and what is conserved in the Black community is coca nuts, but people who are one of us but equally one of them, this is a blue print of what they do. And they are doing exactly the same thing with us at the moment, and this is part of the game that we have to actually go through, before we could force the rights, our rights on them.

Q: This is a very humorous approach. So how effective do you think your work has been until now?

It has been affective, it has been affective for the fact that, you know, if you compare Britain with France or Germany, Muslims here have got much more rights. They are less demonised, and the Muslims are taken as more powerful in Britain than Muslims in France. That has been partly because of the work that we have done. But we are not happy with that, we don't want to concern ourselves with what would have happened if we weren't here. We want to actually get the equal right for our community that has been granted to other communities.

Q: What has been the biggest success so far, were you would say uhh, that has been our best project?

Well, we have had sort of successes I suppose, the recent campaign we did, it was a play which was organised, this has been very recent so it is fresh in my mind. There was a play which was called "Paki Boy". It was a play which was done by a group of artists, the play writer was homosexual, and they were trying to, sort of, bring Islam into that. It was very controversial and we, sort of, did a campaign on the media. And within 24 hours the play, the section of the play was changed and they wrote a letter and apologised. Now I think, I don't say that that was just a success for our community, that was a success for common sense, of not, you know, not doing something which will be provoking the community and to create negative vibes and force all of us including us and them to spend a lot of negative energy on something which was not really any benefit to anyone. Now equally, I think, all the other campaigns we do, we don't just see it as us and them, we actually see it as a whole. You know, we want to create a society in which we will have equal rights, we will have rights as much as any other community, so we would improve the whole structure of the community, so we would actually ... our energies, our efforts, our work will be a positive one rather than a negative one, always as a conflict with the rest of the community.

Q: Does foreign policy of the UK or Muslim countries have an impact on your policy or topics you raise?

I mean yeas, you can't get away from politics as a human being these days. I mean yes, if Serbs sort of go and massacre large numbers of Muslims systematically, then that will affect what we are going to do about that, equally when Israelis deliberately target when civilians and when bases, we are going to respond and that is going to bring us into conflict with British policy and with the Zionist lobby within Britain. But this is not something we are looking for, we actually have to, we feel we have to actually stand up for the rights of those people who have got no voice.

Q: How do you raise your money?

We have got functions of fundraising. And we raise resources both within Britain, mostly within Britain, but also our fundraising activities goes overseas and we do have donors who come from North America, we've got donors in Hong Kong, you know, they support us. They see the work that we do is valuable and they support us.

Q: And you don't have any conflicts that some of the donators try to influence your policy?

We don't have major donors of that sort. We fundraise for projects, we don't fundraise for policy. You know, whoever gives us money identifies with the project that we are doing. They give us the money and we use it for that purpose, you know. We got for example, the war crime watch, we have got this campaign, which is prisoners of faith, whoever helps us knows what



we are doing, helps us of what we are doing. They don't give us money and force us into a policy.

Q: Who generally identifies the aims of this organisation?

I think a wide ranging group of people, we have had, I mean overwhelming majority of the people who identify are obviously Muslim, but we do have non Muslim who have actually identified. From time to time I receive donations and people write a letter and say I am not a Muslim but I do believe in what you are doing is right and can I send a donation. And they send a donation, we appreciate that, you know and that really touches our heart. But overwhelmingly a large number of them are Muslim and they come from all sorts of different backgrounds, I mean I have had people sending 50 pence because this is all they could afford. I have had cases of people writing a letter and saying look I've bought some new trousers for myself but I took these trousers back and I got my money back and because I thought that this money is more needed for the work that you do and here is, I am sending you 15 Pounds which was the cost of my trousers. And that sort of thing is very moving. And then we do have someone who is a business man and sends a view thousand.

Q: Can any one come up with ideas for projects?

Yes, I mean we do have different, anybody could join the group and come up with ideas, or even write to us and say look I think we should do such and such. One of the projects which is in the development right now, we have actually started, is the media monitoring. We have set up a media monitoring and well we would prefer to call it media response, because monitoring is ... seems to be a very negative thing, you just look at what is happening and you do nothing about it. We are actually now getting a large number of people, something in the region of two three hundred people, and we are going to be responding to the different media events, and we are doing we are actually in the process of, within the next few weeks, we will be doing a leaflet on how to make a complaint about different aspects of media, newspaper, radio, television, independent TV, BBC, etc., etc. .. and all the different avenues open for making a complaint and how it should be done, once you have made a complaint, how is it going to be dealt with, and all that is going to be put into one booklet. And also within that we are going to provide volunteers who will help those individuals to make those complaints if they need support. So you know, this is sort of a project which came from the people, they wrote to us and said look we've got to do something about this, and this is how we have developed it.

Q: When it comes to the methods to achieve your aims, you have said they vary from fundraising to sort of media work...

It is fundraising, media work and campaigning, I mean for example, recently on Lebanon, we wrote a letter, I could get you a copy of it, to every single member of these two thousand, and we asked them to do a number of things or one of the number of things:

1. to help fundraising for emergency relief;
  2. to put pressure on the government, by writing to their MP's, writing to the Prime Minister, we even put the phone number of the Prime Minister, Downing Street number 10, and we said dial this number and ask them why is it that our government is supporting a terrorist state and terrorism. And you know ...
  3. and we asked them to contact every media, local or national and put them under pressure.
- Now that to us, that is more effective than sending 2000 people in the street ... shouting, 2000 people calling 10 Downing Street, you know, it is much more effective than 2000 people going in the street and holding placards.

Q: And especially it doesn't give you a bad media ...

Yes, with the telephone, you phone and put the ... and you know, the idea is that jam the phone lines of 10 Downing Street, jam the phone lines of BBC, ITV, you know, when they do something, make life difficult for them. And this is a better way of campaigning, and this is the sort of thing we prefer to do. And also we do press releases into media, we put ... there is not a .. if there are days that goes without us being involved with some work with media, there is not a week that goes by without three or four involvements of different aspect of media, and these all range from our own projects or helping the media to reflect better what the needs of our community are, and what perspective of different things are.

Q: The material I have from you, ends in 93, what other topics did you address, apart from what you have just mentioned?

Are you talking about the Human Rights committee or the Muslim Parliament?

Q: The Muslim Parliament.



Well, the Muslim Parliament, we were talking about the HR committee. The Muslim P. has been involved in a number of things, for example, we have just done a major thing on the Home Office strategy regarding Muslims, I don't know if you have received that, now that probably came out after your last visit, that is quite a major document which is how we see that Islam and Muslims are being dealt with by not just the British government but also European government, how they are trying to manipulate the Muslim organisations, and so forth. It is quite a major work that has been done. And also we do have the tutorial colleges which is going ahead, we do have the war crime watch, this sort of project, we do have the Bosnian orphans and how we are going to expand it to elsewhere. We have set up a project which is supporting the families of those who have died in the cause of Islam, right across the board, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, we have got this project, we are going to extend it to Lebanon and to Palestine. This, you know, is our major work, we match up families, so one family here supports another family over there, and ... so they become more closer to one another, and this is a way of actually linking our community together and also making people here feel responsible for people there, this is quite important.

Q: Can you say that you act as a lobby?

Yes, we are a pressure group and we act as a lobby, yes.

Q: I generally want to know, and you can talk about your personal ideas now, how would you describe Muslim identity at present in Britain?

Well, Muslim identity has been, there is an attempt always to dilute Muslim identity and this is being done under the umbrella of integration. I don't think someone needs to, you know, you would never ask a Black person to become a white because to be integrated into the community. You equally don't ask a Communist to become a Capitalist to integrate into the community. You don't ask a Muslim to, sort of, give up their belief so they will become integrated, what you do, you actually say that this society is for all of us, and this society ... each one of us have got a contribution to make, even if some of our ideology is a conflicting one. That in itself is not something one should destroy, cleans the other group. And Muslim identity is very important because we are considering ourselves living in a society which is a multi cultural, multi religious ... for us to sort of be able to get the benefit of all the ... our efforts, our taxes, etc., etc., we've got to have our identity recognised before our need could be addressed. If I am looked upon as Asian then, you know, what is Asian, there is no such thing as Asian culture, Asian need, you know, there is no such thing. It is a whole thing, what, where is Asia, China is in Asia, Central Asia is in Asia, you know. So you really need to address the identity of people as they see their own identity. I see that I have got more in common with a black or white or even an oriental Muslim than I have with another person who happened to be from the same race as myself, but from a different religion. And I see my need be it a place of worship, be it the diet that I eat, be it the, sort of social need, or be it a cultural need. Even things like my fun time will be more identifiable with another Muslim than another non-Muslim. So all these things actually makes me and my identity what it is. And if that is not recognised then I am being oppressed in this society. My children at the school won't get their needs addressed or in the hospital, or in social services, etc., etc., so that is very important. I see my identity as Muslim and I think on this that identity for all of us Muslims is being recognised officially and addressed, we are basically oppressed community.

Q: How do you see the problems of the second generation? Do they sit between two chairs?

Well they are ... I feel sorry for an overwhelming majority of people who have come here or have been born in this society. And their families still consider themselves on an ethnic-nationalistic, sort of basis. They, the children don't see themselves on those basis, because they have never seen so called back home, you know what it is. They are not ... in some ways they might not even be able to identify and go or live in ... if they go down, lets say Pakistan or Middle East or anywhere, they will be looked upon more as a tourist than somebody from there. So they will not be accepted on that sort of basis, and also that society here does not accept them. They become... they end up having some sort of identity crisis and that is a very harmful and damaging thing for a teenager to go through, on the top of everything else a teenager go through. (interruption by telephone) You see the youth are going through that dilemma and they will, you see, they get to a point where they recognise that they would never be accepted by society at large. This is a very old fashioned thing in this society that people say that you should become integrated. This is something that we are always told that you should become integrated. You know, no matter how much you become integrated the fact of the matter is that this society is very xenophobic and will never accept anything other



than that, that is the bottom line. What we have to change is the attitude of that society rather than changing the colour of our hair and the... going back to Michael Jackson, having a cream tint making it lighter, wearing contact lenses and this sort of thing. That is not the way to do it. The way to do it is actually change this society and also to equipped yourself with sort of confidence that you could withstand this sort of society which is far from perfect. And we have to live in it, you know.

Q: Do you think that the Muslim identity of the second and third generation is under threat through western influences?

Actually I don't think so, I actually think that ... yes there are bound to be some casualties of people loosing themselves completely and I feel sorry for those people because I look at what happened in Bosnia. And I see that no matter how integrated you become eventually you are going to be ... you are not going to be accepted in any case, and this is a lesson that ... a very harsh lesson and unfortunately a lot of us have to learn.



## Appendix VII

### INTERVIEW – CARDIFF

F. and K.

Side A

F. started talking, without a question asked.

Muslims from the Middle East settled in Persia and various other countries. Whenever they settled there they adopted various cultural values, as you can see in India. As far as Western culture is concerned, Western culture is not so different. Say that they are in a culture which is predominantly pagan or one which is predominantly monotheistic, there is a huge difference. See there is a contradiction. We get a moulding of cultures, Muslims behaving like the wider society just to say: hey we are like you, we are not that different. And so living in the culture that I was brought up in, my culture I suppose is an Asian culture. India, although there are a lot of Muslims, there is ... it is hard to find any real Muslims here. So my interest was let's not upset the community, you know, let's not rock the boat. Let's marry someone who is from the continent, with whom I have much more in common and where there is more to look. But what I found was that they do not have any real interest in their religion. One thing within the Asian community is that do as you are told. You know it is very much like the Buddhists, and like the Hindu religion, which focus very much on the worship of the elders. Even to the extent that when the husband is older than his wife, the wife has to worship her husband like a God. This was bound to have an influence on the Asian Muslim culture. And the children which were born here, their parents were brought up in this way. So this generation which was brought up in the west, where you have your own freedom, where you are your own person, they started to question what their parents were brought up with. Because it is only a cultural, a cultural icon, you know, you do this because it is a cultural icon and so a lot of them chose to throw all this out of the window. So the other section of the second generation would say, ok, well although this is all wrong, religion as such is right, so what does religion really say. They have come to go the opposite way. I have kind of gone that way, but before I could not really make up my mind which way to go. I could not really feel comfortable with my religion being secular, then again I was not that comfortable with the way my religion was. It did not quite fit with my ideas of ...

I: What was ... ?

Things like listen to your parents, do this if you do not you will be punished, and everything is about punishment. It has nothing to do with the love of God, more to do with the fear of God, more to do with the fear of authority. It is a very, .. still a feudal system. It is still a cast system within India, within the Hindu society. If someone is older than you, earns more money than you, if someone has a better background than you, these things make them a better person. And fortunately within the Muslim society that sort of thing does not exist.

I: It did not?

Well, yes I tell you what it is. If they are earning more than you they are considered higher up, if they are more educated than you they are considered higher up. And that did not fit to my ideas, like things that background is so important. Like for me it was much more important that he is a good person. And especially with my grandmother, when I last saw her she died of cancer. And then I told her that I was having problems finding the right person within my community. She just said to me, look I had a husband from the right background, I had wealth, I had everything but I did not have happiness, but that is what counts. So that is what really matters and I do not believe in family background and wealth and the social standing, it does not really make you happy at the end of the day. So ok, ...

I: Was your grandma in India?

She was here when she was diagnosed with cancer. And she spent three or four months here.

I: But she lived in India?

Yes she lived in India.

I: So she came here for treatment.



That is right. But I was very close to my grandmother.

So that was the problem, I had to find someone who is religious. Because it was within the religion that I found what I was looking for. You should judge people by their motives but not by who they are, and so forth. You see the exact contradiction comes here, that although all Muslims will tell you this they will not necessarily believe this.

I: Well they may believe it, but may not act accordingly ...

That is right, within Asian culture, everyone is not equal, they still look down on a lot of people, on the whole, you know. They will go on and glorify, saying: Hattu ul-Alaah, the first guy to give the Alzah, you know, companion of the Prophet, blah, blah,blah. The second black guy to walk through the house and say hey can I marry your daughter, would be thrown out. So it is a dichotomy, it is not, it is not, it is hypocrisy, and I could not stand that. I did not like that. I did not want to marry anyone who believes in that. So of course I started looking outside of my culture.

I: Sorry were you already converted before you got to know her? (To K.)

K.: Ahh, Yes and no. I mean I had converted to Islam before I married, but it has to be said that one of the first Muslims that I did meet, was F.. And so, she did, she was there from the beginning. But I do not think that I thought that we would get married at that point, it was later on.

I: Wait, but, do you mind, you (F.) have lead us up to the marriage, so you (K.) lead us up to the marriage now.

F.: Your story.

K.: OK. My background.

I: Well, you do not have to tell us about, oh actually, yes, yes. You are half Welsh, half Greek, yes.

K.: Yes, my mother is Greek, my father is Welsh. My father is Welsh, half English. And so I almost had a, ... two different cultures running in my family. Unfortunately my father is Atheist and my mother is Greek-Orthodox. So actually I was confronted with different ideas of religion in the house, some were very conflicting and confusing.

I: There was a conflict?

K.: Mmmm, I think it was. I mean basically, when I was young, say I wanted to go to Church or something like that, my father would drop a comment like: what is the point, or this, or that. My father would be continuously trying to throw signs my way by saying: listen, you know, Darwin says this, so how can religion make sense. Always thinking that this was the conflict, between religion and science, you know, that these two are always biting each other. And my mother was always, she always tried to give me a good, you know, a Christian upbringing. She tried to take me to the Church and, but, in the end one had to give way. And, so they both, sort of, sat back and let me take a decision. I was 14, 15 then, I was almost old enough then to make these kind of decisions for myself. And I decided that science made more sense. And so that is where I decided to take my spirituality from at that age. Anyway then I went to university. Before I got to university, I had not met any Muslims before. There were no other Muslims in my school, because I was educated about 15 miles away from ... , there is no Asian community there, there is no Muslim community there. And the Asian that I did know, his father owned the corner shop. That was literally the way it was. But I had no contact with Muslims. When I came to university all that changed. Contact was increased in 10, 15 fold and I was always very out to get my opinions across, I was quite opinionated to say the least. And so I entered into a lot of discourses, especially with religious people. Because religion was the one thing I could not quite understand, you know, why? What is the point? Anyway, so I met F. and other people on my course. And that is when things started to change, with me anyway. And, I mean it is quite a long and complicated thing to talk about, you know, why I made such a decision, why I decided to change my faith. But I think the main aspect, for me at least, was this conflict that had always existed there between science and religion, no longer existed, as far as Islam is concerned. It almost lifted this agony. There was no conflict and this shocked me quite a lot and it provoked me to learn a lot more about Islam and about what it is saying about religion. Until I suppose second and third year and then we decided to marry.

I: And when did you convert?

K.: That was probably in first year at university, 1995, February.

F.: Strait after Ramadan.

K.: Yeah, strait after Ramadan.

I: And what was the reaction of your parents?



K.: Ha, ha, this was mixed. I mean my parents were very good to me. I can understand what F. says about the morals and the morality of this society. And if this society, Judaic-Christian, then morally it is not that different from what Islam is trying to say. I mean the ten commandments still hold, the teachings of Jesus still hold and so they could not complain with what I was doing morally. I mean, I still had the same morals, it was not as if I had become a Buddhist or something like this, and decided to twist things completely. You know I was still saying to my mother, you know, Jesus is still a good person, a good prophet. And everything that he has to say as far as we know that it is truthful, that is very good. I was still saying to my father, I have no problem with any of Darwin's theories. It is just what he says here, I mean, evolution yes, you know, as a concept I can handle evolution. But as far as creation was concerned, you know, this is where I differ. So, it was not as if I was coming into direct conflict with my parents. I was almost agreeing with almost everything that they have taught me anyway. But eventually this has lead to the situation where it was not talked about. There would be no discussion about religion. I would, you know, even if I, I, ... the example I would use, ... if I sneeze. I mean culturally, religiously a Muslims would say: Hamd ul-illah, OK. I would sneeze in front of my parents and say al-hamd ul-illah, just out of pure habit. And they would say stop preaching. And, you know, I'd take a step back from this and think, OK, right, and that is where is it, that is where the line has been drawn. And that is the way it has been until now. I mean my parents have been exceptionally good to me, but there is no discussion about religion in the house, what so ever.

I: May I know how old you two are?

F.: Cos is 21. I am 25.

I: So we are the same age, aha.

K.: I think the biggest conflict was with marriage.

I: Yes, I wanted to ask, this was a relative quick thing?

K. and F.: It was, it was very quick.

K.: I suppose, the decision had to be made, ... hastily ... because, well, religiously it is not easy. I mean, if you do not, ... if you are trying to agree with the system, where you do not have boyfriends, where you do not have girlfriends, and, you know, getting married is the right thing to do ... then it was right, considering that I had such a life before that I should think about getting married as soon as possible. And so I had a lot of help from a lot of people here and a lot of people in Birmingham. And F.s parents were not adverse to the idea of it, and so that is how it came about. And, I mean it is interesting how it came about because F. actually asked me, ... ha, ha, sorry to put you on the spot, ... but she actually asked me. And it was decided that it should be done as quickly as possible. That is how it came about. The only bad thing I suppose was the fact that my parents thought that it was too early. I mean they love F., and they think that she is the right person, I mean they have to agree with my choice, but they did not like how quickly it was done. And they did not like the fact that it was done before I have finished my studies.

I: That is the usual response.

K.: So that was the only difficulty. But in the end ... my parents still think that I should have waited, but they are not unhappy with the results either. Because they like the stability of the situation and they have accepted F., I would have thought, as one of the family. I mean I took her to Greece, in September to see a cousin of mine get married, and you know, even there my mothers family in Greece they are very acceptant towards F. and the situation.

I: I think the Greeks also appreciate marriage ...

F.: But I think things are changing ...

K.: Yes they are.

F.: I think there would be more resistance there because their associations are of course historically with the Turks. And I think it would be like a Serbian man marrying a Bosnian, you know that kind of thing. And also within a culture where everyone's business is everyone else's business, like in the Asian culture, I think his mother was very hesitant about what she is going to say now to her family about, you know, she is ashamed of that it happened. And how much was it her fault ... because, I mean there was a complex situation earlier on about us getting married where it was the case that she blamed the father: had you brought him up a Christian this never would have happened, you know. It was very ... Laila came up with a ...

K.: Laila is my sister. She has an interesting name choice, my parents liked the name.

I: Ha, it was prophetic ...



K.: But ah, you know, she is Christian, but she just happens to be called Laila. But, you know its nice ... go on (to F.) you can tell ...

F.: yeah, she made a plea that: hold on a second, when he did not want to believe in God and he did not want to believe in Jesus, you were fine with that, now he wants to believe in God and he wants to believe in Jesus, you have a problem with this? You know, I think that kind of brought a few things home for Cos' mother, which no matter what Cos has said would not help. But I think the next thing is that she may fear that Laila may convert and think: oh my God then I have lost both my children. Unfortunately she still feels that she has lost Cos.

F.: Oh, the only reason why I am still calling him Cos is out of pure habit, because his name is Constantinos, still is in his Passport, but his name he chose when he converted is K.. And the choice for that name is based on a story. It was that man who came up to the Prophet after he converted and he did not have a name, just a title, which is un-Islamic. He asked the Prophet what should my name be and the Prophet answered, K., which means friend. And there is nothing better for a man to be than a friend, so your name will be K.. And Cos chose that name because of that.

K.: Yes, I suppose the name is, I do not know, it is an interesting kind of thing, I suppose it is a question of recognition, it is a question of the way you are. Like for instance most of my colleges they would call me Costi or Constantin. I would still be known as Costi. I suppose it is interesting then, that when I go to the mosque and where ever else I would be called K.. And ... I do not know, it is not a dual reality, I mean people, ... my colleges still know that I am Muslim, but you know I have not changed my name to that extent, I have not taken that huge leap and changed my passport. Whether I will in the future is the next question.

I: But how does that make you feel?

K.: I am perfectly happy with it, because religiously there is no Muslim name, I mean there is no such thing as having a Muslim name. I mean you can have names, you can have names which would be quite bad, for instance if you would be called King or Lord of something, I mean that in Islam would be considered as wrong. But there are no un-Islamic names and there are plenty of Muslims who keep their names exactly the way they are. But it was just me, I think I like the name, and it was also ... I want to use it within ... as I entered the, I suppose the Asian society in Birmingham, if they heard something they were familiar with ... but ...

F.: See this is one side of the story, with his parents. The other side of the story is Islam in Birmingham. The society here, within Asian society, the rules and regulations are quite different depending on how educated you are. And the nationals who came from India and Pakistan are less aggressive but more religious, you know. I was the first person in the community of professional Asian doctors and dentists, that got married outside. No one else had. And the way that was viewed, and the way my family was looked at, ... it was a big thing. I mean for my family that was not unusual. My mums two aunts who married Russians and my own aunt is half Serbian, half Croatian, part of the family is Uspek, you know, my great grand mother was of Turkish decent, no confusion there, no problems, but within the Asian community there is definitely a problem. (The thing with the Chinese community and the Asian community is that they are incredibly racist, they think they are the best. White people have no morals, black people are below them, you know, they are the only ones who can ... and they have a strange problem with that. And so within the community it was like ... they did not know what to say and they did not know how to react. A lot of them said that it was wrong. No one openly said it to us, but we know that they said to each other: but this is wrong and I do not believe in it. Which is odd for people who refer to themselves as being Muslim. You know they will go into their prayers and they will go and sit down and say this is wrong and they are literally making up laws for themselves which are absolutely contrary to what they believe within their religion. And how can it possibly be wrong religiously? And, and just this though exists. My parents handled it very well, they showed the community they supported us a hundred percent, all the way, were very happy with the situation. And the community did not know how to react to that. Because usually, the worst thing is how could she have hurt her parents so, how could she have gone against her parents? But they could see that I was not going against my parents and they did not know how to handle that. They were, ... may said: oh it is a good thing, it is a good thing, more people should be like this, it is a good thing. But you knew when it came to them, it would never happen within their own household. And then take it a level further, some said: well, I do not believe in this, if our girls marry outside, who are our boys going to marry? You know, are they going to bring in white girls? I mean it is not going to be the same, you know and ... so



on and so forth. You know one of the doctors actually said: You know, if my son married a white girl she just would not fit into the family. She would not know how to make bread the way we make it, she would not know how to wear a sari, you know how would she fit into the family? And she was just ... . You know, I find it highly amusing because my generation of girls we do not tend to make bread, we do not tend to wear saris anyway, we tend to be doctors and, you know ... it is a very strange, ah, you know, it is worth writing a book about it. You know, the mentality of the people.

F. to K.: How did you find it when you first met my relatives and ... ?

K.: It was quite a culture shock, especially when you compare it to the Muslims in Cardiff. Because the community we have here is more of a multi-cultural one.

I: Here in Cardiff?

K.: Yes, here in Cardiff and the mosque I go to specifically. I mean if you go to the mosque over here it is mostly Yemeni. It is a mosque close to university. There are two actually, one of them is mostly, ehm, the Gulf Arabs and the other is more Palestinians, Syrians and this kind of thing. And they get on really well. And basically, being part of that mosque and society where everyone is just a bit more aware of their religion and aware about other peoples cultures and society, it is a lot ... it is a very open and very beautiful society. If you compare that to what you get in say Birmingham, in Asian society, or I suppose you would have found it in Bradford, where a lot of Asians live, ... just, just simple things ... . I do not know, I am just trying to think of a few examples, ... respect for people, respect for your elders, I mean, there is respect for piety, you know in this society here, OK. But simple things, like, let's say we sat round in a circle within the mosque, and some of us would come in, now everyone would shake hands and greet the person. But you see the same situation in Birmingham, everyone would be obliged to stand up if the person was elder, or if ... . And it is, it is kind of strange ...

I: So you would not greet a younger?

K.: Well, you would, but there is a Hadith, a saying of the Prophet, where, you know, it is not, it is not you should not do it, it is ... if someone enters the room, I mean yes you greet them, you say hello, but it is ... you know you do not get up and stand up as a sign of respect. It is just something that is not done, yet. Asian Muslims all pretend to do it as something as part of their ...

F.: ... respect your elders is a big thing among Asians, you know. If your elders are doing something wrong you still respect them, you know, it is, it is, your elders cannot do something wrong, it is ... but within Islam this does not exist. This respect for elders does not exist. It is a respect for everyone. Within Islam you can treat someone who is younger than you with the same respect as you would treat someone who is older than you. But in Asian society there is a hierarchy of age like there is in Chinese society ... and that is a strange thing. I do not necessarily believe in it ... I believe that respect should be earned or you should respect everybody, you know. I do not think that you should just respect somebody because they are older. And growing up in Asian society that is a very strange idea to have, you know, ... I am not quite with it.

K.: I think that there is also a difference in knowledge and in the amount of knowledge they have. It is not that the Asian community is too lazy, it is just that they tend not to be as, I suppose, I do not know, as religious I suppose, in a way. If you look at the spread of religious people to people who are just following it because that was their parents' religion, it tends to be greater in the Asian community than it did here within my community. And I am not saying at all that, sort of, non Asian communities are like this, I mean, that would probably be wrong to say. And so going back to the original question, it was quite a nerve entering, you know, this kind of arena, where people were saying that they were Muslims, yet they were not following it to the best of their ability. And it is difficult to get, or not to get frustrated, and start saying, you know: You do this wrong and you do this wrong. Or just to sit down and, you know, let it go by and think OK well, changes have to be made but maybe there is a better way to do it, you know, maybe there is a ... just to be slower, or to be more patient and see what happens. That is the biggest shock if you like.

F.: That situation is false, it is a false situation. And within the next generation you will be finding that with my generation of kids they are making a choice. Either they are finding out what is real and are practising whole heartedly or they are finding out what is false ... or not bothering to find out, not believing what their parents say, and just going off and drinking and having affairs and stuff ... and so forth. There is a definite, within this generation, a split ... we, in fact, ... the majority of the parents prefer it, to be of the second, seculars, because then we do not think properly, we do not question their deeds. It is the ones that



decide to be more religious, the ones that decide to follow Islam as a religion, that really humble the parents. To the extent that they have stopped their kids going to Islamic meetings, stopped them mixing with other Muslims, you know, ...

I: Is this true?

F.: It is true, it is in Birmingham.

K.: It is very strange, I mean, I am not sure I would agree with it.

I: Do you know anybody of ...?

F.: Yes, yes, we do.

K.: Of our generation, it is very interesting, this split ...

I: Sorry, have you ever talked to the parents who do not allow their kids to go ...

F.: Yes.

I: And what have they said?

F.: They should be concentrating on their studies, you know, ... that they spend too much time studying Islam, where are they going to go with their studies. Where is their studies leading to? They way I see, you know, ... all they do is come back and be rude to their parents. They go there and they say so and so, and they come back and they accuse us of being this and that and the other, and ...

I: What this, that, and the other?

F.: You are not praying five times a day, their kids have a problem with this, you know. If you are a Muslim, why are you not praying five times a day. If you are a Muslim, why do you not behave in a certain way? If you are a Muslim, why are you doing when you know this is wrong? You know, that kind of stuff.

I: And those kind of parents are religious though, according to ...

F.: ... according to their kind of culture, yes. According to their society that they live in, yes.

I: I mean these same parents would have a big problem if their daughter would marry a non-Muslim.

F.: Oh, oh, definitely, they would definitely have a problem with that.

I: So they are religious and they would be very unhappy if their children would go astray ...

F.: ... absolutely ...

I: ... but at the same time ...

F.: ... they want to keep religion where it suits them. If it suits them to be a certain way, it suits their community to be a certain way, they will stick to community rules. If the community norm is to do something wrong, they will do that wrong, rather than follow their religion. The community norm is to have "bravhani". "Bravhani" is something that is developed within the Asians for some strange reasons. It is an invention, it is something that has been invented within the religion. It is what happens if someone dies, and all the people come round into a place and they start reading the Qur'an. Now that is an invention. It is called Bivrat. It is something that you are not supposed to do. You are not supposed to innovate your religion. You are not supposed to bring things into it that never existed. That is wrong. It can lead to very, very bad things, and they know this. Their children say: listen this is bidda, this is wrong. And the children who have become practising Muslims have a huge problem with it. If they see something wrong happening within their own household, there is nothing they can do about it. So they get angry with their parents, they are like, ... you know, they lose respect for their parents. And so the parents see: Ahh, this boy or this girl goes to the Islamic society, mixes with Muslims, they come back, and they are rude to us and they lose respect for us. Stop them going. This boy, this girl, wants to marry a black person, wants to marry someone who is a non Asian, they have met these people at some society, they have met them at the mosque, they have met them ... stop them going. And this will not happen. You know, this is what parents said, you know, my mother said this, just came back from ... people sitting down and saying: we should stop our children going to the mosque, we should stop them going to Islamic society meetings, because they come back with new ideas and then these ideas are problems for us.

I: So you can really say that the way Islam is being practised does change. It changes away from this cultural heritage, which the parents have brought from abroad to a very purist, kind of back to what Islam really is about.

K.: Yes.

F.: Within the group that want to really follow it for what it is. Because these people are now mixing with Arabs and with Muslims from this country and with other Muslims. Now, and they stand up and say: Oh, so and so and so and so. And the other Muslims are going: What are you talking about? They go: Hold on isn't that Islam? And they are going: No! Then



they kind of get very confused. You know, it is like, hold on but I have learned this all my life. And although Cos is the official convert to Islam, I am as much a convert to it, as Cos is. He just had to learn what Islam is, I had to unlearn all the mistakes and learn it again. And it was even more complex for me.

K.: If I can just correct something, you said that their parents would rather want them to be seculars. I do not think, that is actually what their parents intention was. Their parents would rather that their kids were Asian.

I: Obedient?

K.: Obedient. Follow their idea of what Islam was, rather than this ...

F.: The reason I said secular was, just because if you take the children who drink alcohol, their parents are OK with this. You know as long as it is hidden, they do not mind ... . I mean they know their kids drink. You know, it is OK as long as nobody from the community knows this. That is what I mean. Where else, a kid who is going to stand up and say: Hey come on it is prayer time, everybody come and pray. This is going to be such a huge embarrassment for their parents. Look, can you imagine, you know, one of the kids walking into ... all the men, sitting in a room, going: come on, it is prayer time, get up, get up. You know, I mean the parents would be, oh my God, I do not know him, you know, who is he, he is not my child, you know.

K.: I don't know, this may be interesting because you are not only dealing with Birmingham society which is very Asian. But you are also dealing with this community, the Muslim doctor and dentist association, OK. So they are mostly professional, they are mostly educated. Their kids go to the private schools, they have generally ...

F.: ... a huge over achievement level, I mean, everyone goes to medical school, everyone tries on Cambridge and Oxford, you know, it gets ridiculous...

K.: ... it gets ridiculous, the kids are under a lot of pressure.

F.: You know, you get a kid who is not so bright, it is very tough on them. They have to compete on that level. Immense over-achievement.

K.: So maybe they are just a strange community.

F.: I will say one thing else, maybe this is where all this lies. The idea in India, of what religion is, is very much: you should wear your trousers a little higher because the prophet used to, you should grow a beard because the prophet used to, eat halal, halal means allowed, you should eat the beha meat, only the beha meat, you should, ... you know all these kind of things. Their religion revolves around customs and things like that. You know, their religion is not whether you smile at someone or whether you are kind to someone, whether you go and grow a plant and you water the plant in the gutter. You now it is not that, it is very much set rules and things like that. And there is no discourse, you do not discuss religion. It is the case of what your parents have said or it has been said, meaning it is said and therefore you should commend. It is like I have talked to a couple of people who have been Catholics, very much like that. You do no question religion, you just follow it. It is very much like that.

Because their parents have been educated, consultants or sergeants, they were too bright to just accept this, so they accepted it because it was easy to do, but they do not really believe in it, you know. They have trouble with a son when it does not suit them because it does not match.

K.: Another thing that is most probably worth adding as well is that they on the whole have a very poor opinion of the imams. Because the imams position within Asian society is that he is the village idiot who is not able to do anything else, so he was made imam.

I: What?

F.: Yes, that is the heritage within Asian society, that the village idiot became imam.

K.: This is not always the case.

I: In Pakistan?

F.: In Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in India ...

K.: This is no joke, this is serious. This is not all the cases, I mean, surely, you can have some Asian imams who are very knowledgeable and very wise, but this is the joke, and this is the cultural ideas that they have been brought up with. In the village, the person who is not going to achieve anything he will become the imam. You know, you can teach him a view lines from the Qur'an, teach him Arabic ...

F.: ... teach him how to lead the prayer ...

K.: ... and off he goes. That is the way it is.

F.: Trust me, I know from personal experience. When I was taught Arabic as a young person, the imam that came to our house to teach, told us that drinking Coke was haram because it



was from America and America is a Godless country. And we should drink Muslim drinks like water, milk and wasla, is a Pakistani drink which is made from roses.

I: Rosewater?

F.: Rosewater and drinks like that. Can you imagine, this is the low level of intellectual discussion that Islam in Asia has come to. I mean any child who has a bit of brains is going to think, well this religion is a bit stupid, I am not going to follow this. And that is what has happened the Asian culture, within working class culture, corner shops, you know. First generation, educated, first generation which went to university, that is not a problem, they have not come to that. The professional classes like my parents, they did not accept something like that as religion and this is why they stick to society as opposed to religion. They do not believe religion, they do not know what is right and wrong. They are not interested to find out, they have been too busy with their studies, getting their PhD or their Masters, or what ever.

K.: Yes, I suppose the good thing that you do take out of this though is that the next generation, ... yes OK you do have this big divide between those that are so disillusioned with their religion that they do not really believe it and those that are very interested in Islam and follow it, but, ... as you should I suppose, they know what they are getting into and they follow it as right as they can. That is the good thing. You know, there is still this group, you know. It does not matter how disillusioned their parents are, they are still going to get on the right path.

F.: I know within the group of my generation, which have chosen Islam as their way of life, how much problems they had with their parents and brothers and sisters. Friends of mine, I mean she is a doctor, when she decided to wear the headscarf, ... every time her brother would see her with it, he snatched it off her head. Problems where mothers, my mother too, ... there was one time when, you know ... why wear a headscarf. My friend especially ... you will never find a husband. You look so awful with it. You will never find a husband. And we just look at each other, you know. OK don't say anything, don't get into an argument here. And lots of things like this. The troubles we had as practising Muslims within our community have been greater than probably outside. And this is happening in a lot of places. We have been to a Turkish doctor, he would not employ a girl with a headscarf. This is happening all the time. Girls who decide to wear a headscarf within Turkish Medical School are being pushed in the corridors and spat at and all kinds of things. Because Turkey want to be in the EC and they feel that these girls bring them back to a past they would rather forget. Same in Algeria and even in France it is happening, but Algeria for Gods sake, that is like ninety percent Muslim. And it is happening everywhere, it really is. As a practising Muslim you are being abused, attacked and all kinds of things, this is very scary, ... by Muslims and non Muslims. It is like, I can really appreciate what the Jews have felt like during the Holocaust, everywhere you look, every news.

#### Side B

F.: Educated Pakistani women who were housewives. What they find now, especially with their children grown up, they tend to find careers. My mother for instance ...

I: Did they have to fight for it though?

F.: No not particularly.

I: No?

F.: Not particularly. But a lot of them got married within their education; a lot of them did not do what they wanted to have done what ever that was. My mother for instance wanted to become a doctor.

I: Why?

F.: For various reasons. Father died, you know, they had to get married, you know, time had come...

I: So there was family pressure behind it?

F.: There was, not necessarily pressure, but certainly, ... no one would pressure them into that situation. And this is widespread, this is, you know ... I have heard this story in different ways many times. No one pressured them, it was family obligation, not pressure, you know. It was what they felt obliged to do, as opposed to someone saying you must do this, this would help, you know. So there is a difference. So they did this and they did that. Now in our generation, our mothers thought, we get our education, so we can do what ever we wanted,



that is fine. But a lot of us, you know, we want to get married, want kids, want to sit down at home and be quite happy, you know, in our little, sort of, houses and our husbands and are not very ambitious, you know. A lot are, you know, but a lot aren't. But the response from our mothers to that: ... you can't do that. How can you be educated and not work? How can you be ... how can you want a kid now, when you could be going out and getting a career? How could you ... . And although my generation actually want kids, and want to settle down and want to be this, our mothers are the ones who are saying: No, no, no, you do not want to do that. You know. A friend, whose mother is caring said: I know you have been married for three years, but don't have a kid. You know. My mother, you know, as I said: Well, mum, you know, when I qualify, if I need to work when I am fifty maybe, when I am bored, I will start working. You know I will look after my kids and have a nice dinner, cook food and stuff. My mother is like, you know, an atom bomb: what? You have to have a career. You have to make lots of money. You have to ... you have to ... . Why? Why would I want to do that? You know, it is a case of ... but, but, but. And there is no why, it is just that all these emotions have pop up and may ideas have installed themselves. Like media has become global around that time, in our mothers generation, and good ideas have installed themselves but there was no outlet to them. And society has not changed, the outlets are now on their daughters, you know. Unfortunately they have not made us ambitious or feminist but they want us to be something. They want us to ... it is very odd. A friend of mine who is eighteen, you know, she is young, but she wants to start looking for a husband. Because she does not want to be twenty-five, alone and then start looking, and then find someone when she is thirty, you know. She wants to start looking, she feels if she looks young, she will find the best guy. And her mother is like: no way! You know, not for another five years. And her mother was married at that age, at that age, when this girl wants to start looking, she had already married. But her daughter, no way. And it is not so much that the daughters want the freedom and the mothers are not helping them. The mothers want something for their daughters which the daughters do not want themselves. Very strange. That is the way it is.

F.: "Being at home, looking after your child and keeping a house, you get no returns for it", you know. "And you bring up your children for twenty-five, thirty years of your life and there is nothing to show for it". I am like sitting here: how can you say that? Look at me, look at where we ... . And for her (F.'s mother) it does not mean anything. And these are not real ideas, these are ideas that, you know, put in her, surely she cannot naturally think that way, this is impossible, you know. I will say another thing that really worries me, I sit and watch TV, most recently, Coke advert, this is probably the most well known one, where this guy, who is a work man, walks in and all these women are looking him up and you know, it is like, two O'clock tea break ...

I: Oh, yes ...

F.: ... you know? And he is walking in and they are all, hey, you know. And I just thought reverse that. If there was a woman walking in, carrying something and these guys were like looking at her, people would be going crazy, you know. What is this? This is turning her into a piece of meat, you know. This is, you know, it is like a market, what is she selling the Coke or her body? ... and blah, blah, you can see what ... but that is fine to do that to a guy. You know, loads of adverts, ... all these men are in a hospital because they have stolen, or they have borrowed their girlfriends or wife's car and they have bandages here or they have bandages there. If you would turn that around, you know, women beaten up, how would that look? So why is it OK to do it to men?

I: Because they are the stronger ones anyway. Women are officially the weak ones, so if it is done to them, it is a strong element beating something that is weak anyway. But a woman beating up a man, i.e. someone much stronger, because they do not have little guys, 1,50 tall, you know, crippled, who are lying there. You have machos, cool doods, and you know they get beaten by a woman, which just shows how daring she is to even attack him.

F.: This is now, this is now. But where is it going to go.

I: Yes, that is unbelievable.

F.: What if I have sons? You know, in twenty years time, where is it going to go? You know, what is going to happen to my sons?

I: Oh, it is terrible, I already know households where women beat men. I mean beat, ...

F.: Yes, apparently that is going up like mad, because I saw a chat-show recently of the first time, Samaritans, that phone call, ... . For the first time men calling up because they have been beaten up by their wives, has reached an equal with women calling up. For the first time



it has reached an equal, you know. For the first time in London, three years ago, there were more male rapes than female rapes.

I: Excuse me how does this work, was it male by male or male by female?

F.: Male by male, male by female, guys ...

I: How can you rape a man?

F.: I do not know, I really do not know, I do not think about it.

K.: That may be difficult.

F.: As we have got married a lot of the people have started thinking about looking outside of the community. Kids who would not have otherwise considered it because it has never been done. Our wedding has set a precedence, sort of, for a preference. And this is, ... as a repercussion this guy Tarek, he is a fourth year medical student at Cambridge and he has been married to a girl called Suha, Sue, who is Egyptian. And she is a PhD student, so she is older than him, which is considered as bad, anyway, and she is also Egyptian, which is odd. So ... there we are ... which should be interesting, there should be, you know. I would like to see how much of the Arab culture prevails, how much of the Asian culture prevails.

I: But she is British Egyptian?

F.: She iiis ... British Egyptian, yes. She was bought up here.

All giggle.

F.: What? brought up here.

K.: You said bought up here.

I: No, it is just ...

K.: ... a very Welsh thing to say, ha, ha. She picks up my bad grammar, you see. Because I am from this part of the country, my English is not that good, my grammar is awful. F.'s grammar used to be impeccable, she would not say a word wrong. But since she has been married to me she always gets her grammar slightly mixed up.

F.: I would say Welsh colloquialisms, like bought up is a Welsh thing to say, brought up is the British thing to say.

K.: People get lazy.

I: What would you immediately associate with Wales in terms of cultural and social values?

K.: OK, immediately. OK.

I: I mean you can think about it.

K.: Certainly Christian, but it would be, ... I do not know ... they are old people. I mean, the Welsh are renowned for being very friendly, very down to earth people, a lot more spiritual, I would say, than English people in general. They seem to have clung on to a lot of the older values for a lot longer than English people have for instance. That is my opinion, but then I am half Welsh, so I would be very biased.

I: No, but that is important.

F.: I think it is very much a mining community, hard working down to earth people, low education. That is just in short. That is what I think of Welsh people.

I: And in terms of ... how is Wales different from the rest of Britain?

K.: I would say that the Welsh have a lot in common with the Irish people and the Scottish people but they are quite different, no not quite different, they are definitely different from the English people. But they have a lot more in common with the Scottish and the Irish people. They are all Celts, they are all Celtic nations or Celtic people. So they, ... the one thing that links these people is they feel a certain amount of animosity to the English. And ... but they also, ... they still have a bit of the old world still left in them, they still have a lot of the older values.

I: Which are?

K.: A lot more friendly, I mean, if you ask people who come here they feel it more because I do not feel it. I do not notice how much more friendly people are here compared to people in England. It is amazing, the responses you get, even if you walk into a shop ...

F.: Even if you are driving, they give way. They are much nicer.

K.: Generally nicer people. Even in Cardiff, which is a city, so people here are quite horrible compared to people further up the valleys. Just, you know, politeness and they still have a family kind of orientation. They are not so much swayed by the media into this modern globalisation type of thinking and all this.

F.: I think those ideas are gone. Because what I know of modern day Wales, I mean the mining thing is what the historical, sort of view. But what I see of modern day Wales, I do not know that much, but my sisters friends, they all have broken families, they are all drunk on



Saturday night and that is all they ever do. And frankly I think it is going to the dogs. Because there is just not that much of a future here, where as in England it is ... you know, still in the South it is booming. There are still places where everyone is working, where as here unemployment is getting higher and higher, education is getting less and less and they are all alcoholics.

K.: Probably. I could argue with you, but we do not have so much tape.

I: No, no please do actually.

K.: I think you are in danger here, because what you have seen of my sisters friends, I mean, my sisters friends all have a comprehensive education, OK. They are from a part of Wales which is notorious for its depression. All the work is gone, there is higher unemployment in South Wales. If you go to places like West Wales and North Wales, the people are very different, even if you go further up the valley to places like Brakan, the people are very different. So you are talking about highly depressed areas.

F.: I always had the view that most Wales is highly depressed.

K.: No, it is not. Depressed in what sense?

F.: You know, OK, OK, you know when you drive through England, and you kind of hit areas like Salford, which are nasty, and various other industrial areas like Sheffield which is scum, you know, nothing there. But then you also have areas like, sort of, Bath, you also have areas like Bristol and Chotnum, and things like that, which are very much still upwardly mobile. Where as with Wales, if we, say, drove here back from England. It was either rural or depressed, you know, there was no, sort of, up coming area.

K.: There again you are confused with, ... it is not always the rich people that are the nicer people. You see, I am talking about a wealth of spirit, of, of, you know, goodness. You are talking about a wealth in a monetary sense ...

F.: ... and education ...

K.: ... and education, but you see, the two are almost hand in hand. Now that is very different to what I am talking about at the minute.

F.: But surely if your education declined and your monetary system declined, it is only so long that your spirit can hold out, as a people.

K.: That is not always the case. You can be very content with very little.

F.: I think that, that is what it is with Wales, they are very content with very little.

K.: Because they always had very little. And I generally think that, yes, that must be it with some people. But you are right, I mean, parts of South Wales can be very depressed. Where there used to be, you know, a booming industry, it has all disappeared now. They are all living in Council estates and there, ... I know, because a lot of my friends are trapped in these places, you know what it is like to be kind of "normal" and living with some of these people who are really mindless, you know they do not give a dam. It is not a good situation, and you should not have this ...

F.: Having said that the university there is one of the best one in the country, no matter how much of those people are Welsh, you know.

K.: No, no, you are talking about Cardiff, and rural areas are very different, alright. You see one of the biggest things that shaped Wales, has been the Industrial Revolution, because before that Wales was a very poor country. And as the Industrial Revolution came along, Wales all of a sudden became one of the richest countries, not only in the UK, but one of the richest in the world. At one time Cardiff, this city, was one of the busiest ports in the world. Merther, was the largest city in this country. I think it was larger than Cardiff city and it was approaching some of the sizes of the English cities.

F.: And the Marquis of Bute was the richest man in the world.

K.: Yes, the Marquis de Bute, you know, you have been to Cardiff Castle, he was the richest man in the world, you know. That is, that is an amazing place to be. To have that much money and to be that renowned and he made it all from the Welsh Industrial Revolution. So, but of course that has gone, that has disappeared. As the coal and the iron had gone the jobs had gone and it has become a very depressed area. As far as money has gone, education has gone. But you see there are still things to be proud of, for instance the university. Cardiff University was built with coal miners money. It was not government subsidised and the coal miners had decided that they needed to educate their children. I am not sure what the miners called it but basically, they would give a small part of their pay. You know, just a small part, just to educate their children, because they knew that unless they concentrated on this, you know the coal was eventually going to run out and they would be left with nothing. So if you



look at a lot of the libraries in Wales, if you look at, I think the university was partly funded in this way, a lot of it was coal miners money, it went towards these institutions.

F.: That is what really struck me when I came, when I was there and went ohhh, the Welsh, they are all coal miners. And Cos just went: uhh! You know, see this before you ... that was coal miners money. And I was like wow, it really struck me, you know, that was good, that was good.

K.: There have been, you know, there have been a lot of great politicians that have actually come from Wales. Iron Bevan, is one, he, he set up the National Health Service. So if you happen to be Welsh and a doctor, then that is something to be proud of. And also David Lloyd George, who was the Prime Minister during the First World War, so he was also ... so I am quite proud to be Welsh. But there is one thing wrong with the Welsh people, and that is as they started getting their heritage and their culture back, you see, there has been a big drive to relearn the Welsh language and to grab a lot of what used to be Welsh culture. They have become very, almost over celous about it, and so there is this phenomenon of tafia. Where basically if you are not Welsh, then you are not going to get the job that you want. If you are Welsh speaking then you get better jobs.

F.: Tafia, that is from the river Taf which runs through, ... and the Mafia, which ... . So it is a large Mafia, but not Mafia in crime but Mafia in Welshness.

K.: So a large part of this has come about ...

F.: For instance, I mean, if you are at university they want to know if you can speak Welsh. That makes a difference.

I: Really? That is highly interesting.

K.: They give you this little slip of paper that says: Are you Welsh speaking? And you either tick yes or no. You see and this is not something that is going on direct hospital records because otherwise it would be on the records. It is actually on a little slip of paper and you are just wandering, OK, where is this going? Who is this for? And I do not actually know who it is going to, but it just makes you think.

I: Well, maybe it is somebody trying to find out and make a statistic. And they have asked the university to ...

K.: Possibly. But then my father works for the Welsh Development Agency, which is, they are a Quango. I do not know whether you are familiar with this term. It is a business term which means Quasa, autonomous, non governmental body, OK, so they are civil servants but they are not. They are responsible for inviting industry into to the country and so ... like a Japanese firm wants to move in. They go to the government and say a Japanese firm wants to move in we can give them so much in subsidy, can you help us with this, etc., etc. . That is how they work. So my father has a lot of dealings with Welsh business people, Welsh councillors, Welsh politicians and this is kind of the view he has come to. But there is this, you know ... this is shared by a lot of people, that there is an elite group of people in Wales who want nothing but Welsh speakers and true Welsh people forming their own little lobby, as it were. That is it, if you are not Welsh then you cannot participate.

F.: You can see the Welsh accent coming through now, can't you. A lobby as it were.

I: Would you say there is a unity among this society? British society?

K.: British society, yes, but I think it is disappearing.

I: Why?

K.: I think people feel very disillusioned with what has happened. I mean there used to be very strong things that would bind us. It is horrible to say but the War, war is an incredible binder of people. Because a war happens and you get all this sort of propaganda pulling people together. Sorry. But I think a lot of this is gone. And a lot of it has been governmental policy. For instance the Scottish have a lot to grit about. I mean if the government wants to try out something, they try it out on the Scottish. So I can understand the ...

I: Poll tax ...

K.: ... yes, exactly, poll tax, now it is child curfew, any new taxation schemes. You know, give it to the Scots, see what they think of it. You know they must be really upset. I mean I know you have been to Scotland for your trip, so you must know what it is like. But you know, you really have to feel ...

F.: I tell you one thing. The one thing that really binds the Welsh, the Scottish and the Irish people is the hatred of the English. One thing that would bind the English is they know that the Celts hate them. So you know, the English really get happy about England beating Wales, Scotland and Ireland in Rugby matches and that really binds them together and they really get happy about that. And the Welsh get really happy you know, when Mel Gibbson



wants to make a movie about the Scottish beating the English, you know, things like that. It is really not fair, but it is getting stronger and stronger, this hatred for the English.

K.: And devolution is going to make it worse. You know, recently they want the devolution, the Scottish want to be separate, the Welsh want to be separate.

F.: Now the Cornish hate the English and want to be separate.

K.: Yes, now this is going to create more problems because all it is going to create, and people are not looking ahead, is more nationalism, which is the last thing that Britain needs. And I do not know why the politicians, I mean the politicians are just doing it because they promised to do it. I do not think that it is a genuine necessity, but they do not need to do it. I do not think that it is going to have any advantage, advantages, none that I can see anyway, other than, you are going to create more nationalism and you are going to create more bureaucracy, which is just going to waste more money and it is a pointless exercise.

F.: There is a lot of danger in nationalism.

K.: But that is generally my inquiry.

F.: There is, you know, ... I strongly believe that you should stand up for what is right and what is wrong. But nationalism, there is a danger, you know, just to say that so and so deserves my allegiance just because we are from the same part of the world. I do not know, but there is a big danger about ... that breeds a lot of ... a lot of wars are based on nationalism.

I: Would you support a Welsh independence?

K.: Ahh, I have just answered the question, no I would not.

F.: I do not have the right to vote, I am not Welsh.

K.: There is no concept of being Welsh. I would not support a Welsh independence, unless it would be done properly, which I know it cannot be. You know I am very proud of being Welsh and I know a lot of Welsh people who would disagree with me on this point, but I would not support a Welsh independence. I would not.

I: What do you think of the monarchy?

K.: ha, ha, come on you start. OK shall I start? I, I think the monarchy as an institution, we should get rid of them, i.e. we should not be giving them anything as far as taxes are concerned. And I do not agree with a monarchy system. If they want to stay at Buckingham palace, then fine let them stay, but tax them the amount that they should be taxed, not some silly amount which they are taxed. If they want to stay as a tourist attraction, then let them stay, that is fine but I would have no problem with getting rid of the monarchy, full stop.

F.: I totally agree. I do not think that they are worth it, you know, I do not think they are worth what we pay. I mean recently, I do not know, how much, how much went into that fire?

K.: That fire, I cannot remember, I do not know.

F.: Huge amounts of tax payers money, you know, about 16 million, some thing like that, for the restoration for the palace, that they stay in for one month of the entire year. I mean 16 million, how many homeless people would that house? You know, how many persons do they, ... when you look at it from that way it is a social injustice. You know, I do not think that you should behead them, I do not think that they have committed any crime, it is not their fault, but then you got to stop this.

K.: They certainly should be run out of the country, as they have been in other parts of Europe.

F.: The Russians, you know, I do not believe what the French and the Russians did with their monarchy, that is not fair, it is not their fault, but then at the same time you know, stop them.

I: Do you think there is Islamophobia in Britain?

F.: Yes.

K.: Yes, there genuinely is. I mean if you look at the press, there is. If you look generally at what peoples views are of what Islam is, yes there are. I mean, the evidence is certainly pointing for it. And there for it to be enough governmental concern for them to put a committee together, it must be there. You know, that is just looking at it from outside of our realm, but even if you look at it from within our realm, you can see it. And especially myself, because I, I know what it was like before I came into Islam. I know what my feelings were about Muslims at this time. And so I definitely know that Islamophobia does exist. I definitely know that the preconceptions that people do have and how wrong they are.

F.: I am pretty much at the full end of it because ever since I started wearing a scarf and going out, people, ... things like going into a shop and asking for help, can be, ... you could be ignored. And then Cos would go in there and get a response. And things like that. There were many times I literally burst into tears because the people have pushed me in the street or looked at me in a certain way or behaved badly.

K.: But saying that you get very nice responses as well.



F.: That is very true.

K.: It seems to work two ways for some odd reason. People look at you and they are genuinely interested, you know, and so they will give you more attention, which is ...

F.: But all the nice responses I have got have been in return for something, like for instance, I will never cross by Big Issue sellers without buying something. Like if they have three copies and it is raining I will buy all three so they can go home, things like that. They know me, they know who I am, so when, when one of them went to London for instance, he said, you know, Muslims, what do you say to them? And I said, well you say salam alaykum, you know and they reply alaykum samlam. They basically ask some questions. So I saw someone when we went down to London and I saw some ... and they recognised me because they visited some friends in Cardiff and stuff, and they shouted out as-salam alaykum. It was so nice to get that, you know. You know, oh, alaykum salam, how do you know that? You know, this, that and the other and I talked to him. Oh, I was in Wales once and I saw you and, ... you know. And, they know me in Cardiff, they know who I am, they always smile and ... you know, and things like that. So, that is nice, ... if, if some nurses are collecting for a hospital I walk up to them and they will, ... oh, thank you and they will be really, ... probably nicer to me than they would be, say, to someone else. You know, I do not know why, but...

I: Well, they can associate more with you ...

F.: ... possibly ...

I: You are wearing the same dress.

F.: Yes, absolutely, you know. So, I mean, that is the whole point, it is a point of being associated with believing women. That is the only issue. A lot of people say: oh, it is for your own protection. It is not. I have been followed, I have been harassed, ... with hijab on, it is not what the Qur'an says. The Qur'an says that you are identified with believing women, and you are, you know. So, that is all there is. It is just an identity thing. The same way a lot of Christians wear a cross, but ...

I: Like Madonna, a believing woman.

F.: Absolutely. Actually you know, I sometimes I, I watch the way that Christianity made fun of and abused on TV. I just think, how can they do that? You know, I would not, ... as a non Christian, do that. You know, when you see Madonna wearing a cross or did you see pictures of, say, nun for the habit, wearing black strippers, ... I just, it really upsets me. I just, you know, I just think that is horrible, you know, if I was a Christian, I would feel so upset. Because if the Christians do that then who do you blame, you know. Then who do you shout at, if your own are people doing that?

I: At least not at others.

I: When you are looking at Britain becoming a multicultural society, where do you think it is going to?

K.: There is a danger and several people will point out that you are going to, ... there is a problem, OK. If, if you look at Asian business men, they are very successful of what they do, OK. If you look at the top ten business men in this country, six of them are Asian. Now that, that is an amazing statistic. In such a short time for them to be so successful is incredible. If you look at the university entry for Asians, and compare it to the population of Asians in the country, the total, ... more of them are getting into university, more of them are getting a better education, and more of them are getting better jobs, are more successful, etc, etc. And the danger of this is that there is going to be more and more nationalism on the part of the indigenous population. Where this leads, that is obviously quite worrying. But I think there are hopes that it could succeed, there are hopes, but it is still too soon to say.

F.: I would slightly disagree with that. I think it is becoming more multicultural. I think the reason that there is danger is that, I know where you are leading to, what happened to the Jews in Germany, how they were very successful, and therefore once things went bad they were easiest to blame ...

K.: That was the comparison that has been put across.

F.: Yes, the reason I disagree is because I think the British people are not like the German. I think they are, they are not that quick to react, they are a lot more ...

K.: It is a very fine balance ...

F.: ... you do what you do, I do what I do, type of thing. They do not bother as much ...

K.: ... there is a very fine balance and it has to be maintained. And this is why Islamophobia is on the increase. It has a lot to do with people feeling bothered.

F.: I do not think that they feel that bothered by Asians, not all Asians are Muslims. But they do not behave like Muslims, they drink, they go out, it is ... . You see if they were just racists



against Asians, that would be Hindu then and Sikhs as well. They are not, they are bothered about Muslims. You would still have a problem, you know, if you were to walk around wearing a Sufi garn. The fact is you do not, you know.

K.: Yes, I do think there is a long way to go yet, we will see what happens.

F.: I think technically, you know how colonial rule, and they ruled India for such a long time, well I think it is colonial rule and the Asians are rule here. I really think they are, from what I have seen.

I: What do you mean?

F.: The people who come to clean our house. The receptionists, the cleaners, within the people, Asians in Birmingham that I know, they are all English people. And it is like the masters over there, except the exact turn around of what it was fifty years ago in India. You know, Curry has become the most popular food, you know everything is becoming Asian. I think Asians will rule this place. I think that honestly, within two hundred years time they will, it will be an Asian culture, or certainly a mish-mash of Asian culture. The same way that the Turks ruled the Balkans and the Greeks and so much of their culture has become influenced by the Turkish culture, there will be exactly the same in England. England will lose a British culture and will have an Anglo-Asian culture in a hundred, maybe fifty years time, you can see it go so fast.

K.: I think that is very far fetched.

F.: You think so?

K.: We will see, we will see.

F.: OK, you know, in fifty years time I would not be surprised if they teach Hindu or Urdu as a second language here.

K.: Oh, no I can see that happening already, I can see Hindi becoming the second language at school, because ...

F.: Urdu in fact because there are more Pakistanis than Indians here.

K.: ... because there are a lot here.

F.: That is what I think is going to happen. Maybe I am Asian, I am an optimist.

I: Now, do you think that Islamic values and British values are compatible?

K.: To a certain extent they have to be, Yes. but certain values, I do not know, which values would you be talking about? That is the question. Isn't it ?

I: Well those you give me. You have to define them.

K.: The point is, if you consider Britain to be Judaic-Christian as far as its morals are concerned, then that is fine, you know, there is nothing wrong with us living here. If, ... the only problem I have come up against, the only problem that I have faced is that I could not fight for the British Army. That is just something I could not do. If there was a war situation and the aggressors were truly aggressors and they were doing wrong and this country was under threat, then yes, I would fight. But in a general situation, no, I could not do it. Because, I do not know, I do not feel that close to this country, I know the kind of things that this country has done before and I know too much about what war has done in the past and the politics that drives it, and I am sorry I ...

I: But you would defend the country if it were attacked?

K.: I would defend the country if it were attacked, and yes, I would. But ...

I: But are they compatible in that sense that you can live an Islamic life? And at the same time integrate ...

K.: Yes, you can. I tell you one thing, living here as a Muslim is probably easier to live here as a Muslim than anywhere else in the world.

I: Ah, why is that?

K.: Ah, that is the interesting point. OK, America, you are living in a society which is just as free, OK, you have the same rights you have the same freedom. But there is always this problem of it, maybe I am going completely up the wall here, being a police state, etc., etc., . You know, if something goes wrong in America, for instance have you heard of the bombing, the public, sort of, anger at Muslims is incredible. I mean, people were having bricks thrown through their windows and real hatred against Muslims and as soon as they have discovered that it was not a Muslim, you know, it was, oh, it was expected to be that way, but did not quite turn out that way. So you know, that is why America is a bit of a problem. Here that just would not happen, it just has not happened yet, it is not going to happen because the British are this way. It is better to live here, as a Muslim, than in other Muslim countries because other Muslim countries mostly, not all of them, are dictatorships. There are no two ways of looking at it, if you say something wrong against the government, that is it, you are in trouble.



In fact a lot of the people who live here and they say the things that they do, there is no way that they could say those things back in their own countries. Because they would be put into prison faster than they could say ...

F.: Masari is with us, out of Saudi ...

K.: Yes, so it is, it is possibly easier to live here than anywhere else, just the rights that we get. As far as ... I do not know, you see, as a Muslim I have to follow the laws of the country, and except the laws which are un-Islamic, and I do not think that there are any laws which are un-Islamic. So there is no problem with me living here what so ever. As regards to the way the culture is, for instance it is primarily a drinking culture, yes but it is not forcing me to do that. You know, so where? ... there is no real problem here, you know, so ... I do not have any problems with living here, I think it is fine.

F.: Especially, I think, in fact it has done Muslims a lot of good being here. They had to redefine themselves out of their cultural limitations ... (End of tape).

Tape 2

Side A

... which I think they needed to do. And there was something else I was coming to, but I really forgot.

I: Do you also turn out to be, as Muslims in the West, an example for Muslims in their home country?

F.: I think so. Very much so. I do not know what it is about being ..., oh, that is what I was about to say. That I do not know if I would have been this way, have I stayed in India. You know, if I would have come to this understanding of my religion and believed in it as a believer, not someone who was only brought up with it. I think that is vital. But sorry what were you saying, you have asked an important question, then and I have forgotten.

I: You have answered it. The last question was, whether you are an example for the rest of the Muslim world?

F.: This is what we have found when we went back to India. We found that we had a lot of work and we did not know where to start. That was scary. Yes very much, very much so. You know there is a study of religions that happens and basically they say that each religion goes through certain phases. Do you remember what the group phases were? (to K.)

K.: One of them was mythological.

F.: Yes, that, that was right at the end. OK, but the first stage was the purest phase, you know it is the phase where things are the way they it should be. Second phase is the cultural phase, where it becomes slightly differentiated depending on where in the world it is. Third phase is the mystical phase, yes that is right, mystical phase where it is something which is part of your life but it is you know only when you are feeling spiritual, it is not so much a whole of your life like culture is. And last phase is the mythical phase where it is really literally story telling and that is all it is, you know. And, I think, in India it is getting to the mystical/mythical phase where it is becoming like a mythology in the sense that they have, ... they have a special night during Ramadan (shark ab-badad) which is ... that one night is very special because God has said: That night is worth a thousand nights. It is, it is a very special night, it is a very truly spiritual night. Now that means you should try and be as close to God as possible, it is your one night to really, you know, be placed to him and to pray and whatever. But unfortunately in India what they do is they make Halvah. You know halvah? You like halvah? (I nodded) And that you know, ... they so pray over the halvah and everyone eats the blessed halvah and then they set a little aside for the Prophet and his wife. Now this is where it has got to from something which is so truly elevated to something so truly earthly, you know. And that is getting, ... and it is so nice that we ... it is nice that we have, still I think, the purest form here because we had to rediscover it. But the population is so huge coming back to India and those places that you really do not know where and when. You know one of the most fundamental beliefs of Islam or any monotheistic religions is the belief in one God. People were asking me there: You know when it says in translations of the Qur'an, we? We made the heavens, we made the earth. Does that not mean that God is more than one? Now this question, to even be asked, shows a lack of understanding of the most basic belief within the religion. I had to explained to them, no it is the royal we. The translation has said we because the royal we is showing respect to God, rather than saying I or ... . And, it is easily explained away but what scares me is that the question had to be asked, ... you know. And things like that. So yes, very much, very much so.



I: Do you think that the Muslim community is integrating into British society?

F.: Yes, definitely.

K.: Yes. I do not know, it is difficult.

F.: A list of conduct, more than anything.

K.: Yes, I think so. Yes, I think there are some things that a Muslim would not do. Muslims on the whole would not go to pubs but they will meet people here in other ways. I mean they will meet them at work, they will invite them to the house and this and that and so they are integrating in that sense. But there are certain things which for us are unacceptable, but that is fine with society. I think more and more people here, who do have their head screwed on, understand this.

F.: But, but ... You are a convert, there are three that we know, so four. We have friends in Greece, we have family in Greece, we have family, you know ... in all of Europe in that way. Now for each person who has converted repercussions and the integration of, i.e. Muslims because that is what he is, into a society which is non-Muslim is huge. And what the acceleration of conversions which is happening and everywhere you go, I mean, you walk into houses ... we went to someone's house just to look at it, these people had like, they were Welsh; I mean they had a Guinness rucksack, but they had a Qur'an by their bedside. And they had an "Understanding the Qur'an in Arabic" by their bedside. And so obviously there is something going on. Whilst it has become a joke within Eaton, which is one of the bastions of British culture and educational establishment, and Eaton is renowned for producing the leaders of this country. The last three head boys of Eaton have converted to Islam, so it has become a joke that if you become a head boy then you become a Muslim, you know. So obviously it is being integrated at every level. Laila wore Coses shamah. You know shamah? It is the traditional Palestinian black and white check scarf. And Cos, ... Laila borrowed it, because it is a very warm thing, and she went to school with it.

K.: This is very old. (showing his shamah)

I: I was just looking, because I have been to Jerusalem and I have not seen such a nice one.

K.: This was actually, this was Egyptian, this was, ...

F.: I have bought it in Jerusalem, at Al-Aksa, and when this was given to me it had the blood of someone on it. Someone who had actually died because of their beliefs of Islam. So it is quite special.

K.: Your uncle (to F.), he has not seen as nice a quality as this. Yes I had the difficulty because I like it and it is getting old, so I want to get a new one but it is difficult to find good quality because they only make them for the tourists now. And so we do not want the tourist quality, we want the good quality and that is so difficult to find because they keep them for themselves. So I have to get friendly with someone.

F.: What was I saying?

I: It was about the converts and Eaton.

F.: Ah, yes, and so it happened that Laila with the shamah on went to school and this, ... is the vibes, it is so insular that Cos has never met a Muslim, there were no Asians, no non-Welsh people that lived in this insular, value-tight-knit, Welsh society, this girl came up to here and said: where did you get this from? And Laila said: oh it is my brothers. This girl said: My brother is one of them too. And Laila said: what? A Muslim. You know, Cos used to work in a pub, when he converted to Islam he got this job. He had the shamah lying by his rucksack, and the landlady in the pub said: ... what did she say (to Cos)?

K.: ... so you are one of those, are you?

F.: He said: yes. And apparently here son has converted to Islam. And this is a very small power in a very small place in the world, you know. And when you think about it like this, then you think oh, oh, we need to accept Muslims there are a lot of Muslims. And it happens necessarily, but then as a Muslim you believe that that will happen anyway because before the day of judgement every house will have a Muslim. You know there will be one in every house. Now I do not know if house is literal or if house means one in every family, I mean they are big. You know, I think that is pretty much close now, you know, one in every family. I do not know, because I would guess, you know it is quite a collective climate.

K.: They get carried away.

F.: They get carried away.

K.: There are a view prophetic hadith, you cannot always take them ... for instance there is a ... this is a language, ... how Arabic is used. Strange in a way. There is a prophetic hadith were someone's thigh will talk to you. So you know, in the future peoples thighs will talk to them. Now everyone thinks, how is your thigh going to talk to you, it is just impossible. You



see, the Arabs have this compatible language where by, if you talk about one thing then you talk about something which is associated with it. For instance if you talk about your thigh then you could quite easily ...

F.: For instance in Arabic Coses waist is made out of leather, you know, but it is not, it just got a belt on.

K.: Yes, that is the way ...

F.: But that is the way Arabic works.

K.: So if your thigh is talking to you, then you see it could be that you have a cellular phone and you have it here, it is attached to a thigh, so your thigh is talking to you. That is the way the Arabic language would work. You know.

F.: So how do you explain that to someone who would not know what a cellular phone was? You know, how would the Prophet have said: oh, there is going to be cellular phones. And people would have said: What do you mean, what are cellular phones? You know.

K.: But then again it is a prophetic hadith.

F.: That is right.

K.: So you should not ...

F.: I mean that does not matter. You know, I mean what is going to happen, is going to happen, you cannot bribe on these things. yes, big deal.

K.: And also, you know, it could be talking about something completely different but you associate it with that.

F.: This I mean they, they, ... he is a very very good talker, you must really listen to him, he is called Hans Yusuf Hansen, he is a convert too. He is American, but do not hold that against him and ...

K.: If you go to America, you can do your research in America as well ...

F.: Good idea to go to St. ... is it Santa Fee?

K.: Something like that.

F.: Yes, he is powerful and he has said something. He said that the present faith in Islam is such that people slice a tomato and they see in Arabic written Allah. And they are all up in arms, it is a miracle, it is a miracle, you know, Allah written in a tomato. And he said what are you talking about so what it is a freak of nature. If your belief relays upon this then what is going to happen tomorrow when someone finds a cross in a tomato? You know, you are going to become a Christian? If your belief relays upon these things then your belief is very faint. That is why Cos is saying: ah but this is a prophetic hadith. As in oh my God the Prophet said this and therefore, you know ... and if your belief relays upon those things then that is not belief that is just mythology, that is just ... that is something else.

K.: That is the danger.

F.: That is the danger, and that is why he kept on stressing but it is a prophetic hadith, you know, so leave it alone, big deal, that does not mean there is one God. Your belief is that there is one God, that is all, you know.

I: And what do you think of the Rushdie Affair?

K.: Ahhh, that is interesting. OK, I cannot really say much about this because I have not read the Satanic Verses, but you have (to F.) so you can give your opinion. Because I would not mind to give, you see, one thing that I will say, which I think is very important is, I think that the Muslims here reacted to it in a very wrong way. I think when some of them were marching through the streets burning the Satanic Verses what they should have been doing is marching through the streets saying could we have some blasphemy laws please. Because the Christians have them, the Jews have them to some extent, so why cannot we have some. And, to be, to be honest, a lot of the people who were marching, were marching for a change in the blasphemy laws but there were just a view that would spoil it. You know what I mean?

I: Yes, sure.

K.: And this, this way of acting really shows a lack of faith. You know, they say this about belief and faith, the lower your faith is, the more ...

F.: ... fundamentalistic ...

K.: ... the more fundamental you become. The more these little things enflame you so much. You know, if you have true belief you can be very calm about it and say so what, you know. But I mean I have not read the Satanic Verses so go on (to F.) please.

F.: There is a lot in there, there is a lot about everything in there, you know. I mean it says stuff about like women and how they should be treated like whores, you know, because that is the way they are. You know and, it says a lot in there and how ... so I do not see why one group should have been more inflamed than another, you know. So there is a lot to be upset about.



But this is, this is ... within Islam there is freedom of speech. There is not a freedom of blasphemy, but then, was that real blasphemy. Was he saying: Oh this is the truth. You know. No he was not, he was saying, perhaps: This is the Verse of the Qur'an that the devil would write. And he was saying that this is the satanic verses, like for instance if Gods words were the Qur'an, the devils words would be this book. You know, that is what he was trying to ... in fact. I do not think that he is there, I think he is a bit of a weird guy anyway and there was a lot in there to be upset about. But there is nothing you can do about that, everyone has that right, OK. Only stupid people run to wave and throw a stone, real people have discussions, you know. People who have any intellectual stability have discussions about these things. I marched for that, but I marched for the equality. Because if Muslims are members of the British public then we also should have the same rights as everyone else. We should have the same rights as the Church of England, the Catholic Church, they have blasphemy laws for when something gets said against them or their religion, it can be banned because it is inciting, you know, hurt or religious prejudice or what ever. And we were just marching that it should be the same for the Muslims or for any other religion. And that is the thing. There were a group that were burning books but they were a small group. But what upsets me is that the media concentrated on them, you know. And I would like to reiterate what Cos said, yes. But the people who are fundamentalist about their beliefs they are trying to prove something to themselves. They have true lack of belief, were their belief relies upon these things, they have to almost prove it to themselves by getting angry and, and, ... but there is nothing to get angry about. He did not do anything by their ... and you do not have to protect God because God does not need your protection. The truth is the truth, you know. That is it. You must be truthfully weak if it makes you that angry. And I think Muslims have a lot to learn. But see again, they are only half Muslim, they have religion but they do not really have religion, they do not really know much about it. They know what they are supposed to do and not supposed to do, they know ... they would know how to be proud but not know what they are saying, they know how to read Arabic but not know what they are reading, they do not understand it. You know it is like, years and years of reading what is written on the ferrets? and not knowing it not understanding it just like that as Hansen said. And he is such a great speaker. It is just like a donkey carrying gold on his back, there is no real knowledge of the true value of what it has.

I: Now I only have one more question to you. I mean you can answer it from your perspective. Do you never have a problem, I mean that you feel that you are sitting between three cultures?

K.: hum

I: He is very interesting he has got three.

F.: Or even four.

I: Yes he is growing into the fourth one.

K.: I suppose so. Hem, No. I will say one thing, a lot of the things that I experienced when I entered the Asian culture, OK, were things that I experienced within the Greek culture. They had a lot of things in common and, you know I can see the good there and see here. And they are both good things. And even things about the British culture, I can see what is right there and what is good there. So no it does not bother me. But you see, I see myself as quite a tolerant person, I do not think that any, many cultures would bother me. I think I could walk in to almost any culture and be quite at home with it and quite happy with it, you know it interests me. As long as nothing wrong was being done, I mean, if it was a culture that involved child sacrifice I would be, I would be pretty worried, you know ...

I: Yes I understand.

K.: ... but otherwise, you know, I am quite, ... I was brought up with a lot of tolerance and so it was very easy.

F.: I have a big problem with Asian culture.

K.: Yes, F. has a big problem with Asian culture. But I do not, I do n... . I can understand the problems that she has with Asian culture ...

I: More so because she is a woman, I suppose.

K.: I suppose so, yes, yes, I really can understand.

F.: And also because I do not judge them the same way I judge other cultures, one because I know more about it, you know, so I mean, when you see other cultures, like I see Arab cultures then maybe I only see one side of it, you know. But Asian culture I can pretty much all sides of it. Too .... it is also I compare it to what it should be, you know, I do not kind of have the same demands on other cultures. You know, when I see British culture and they are drunk and stuff

then it is a shame. But within Asian culture, when I see something wrong it really makes me mad because maybe it is that I care a lot more or maybe it is because the people that are suffering are close to me, people I know, they are not some stranger on the road. And also I know where they should be mentally and morally and, and how low they have sunk, you know. How the mighty have fallen, you know, that kind of thing. And that I think is such a shame, and especially when I see young girls who could have been something, you know. Who could have been amazing mothers and stuff and what is right and teach their daughters and their families. If their parents are ignorant, OK, but they, that drives me up the wall.

K.: Yes, I think the only problems that I have had culturally have been when parts of the culture have been, as far as my religion was concerned, wrong. For instance, drinking or smoking, you know, both of them I see them as being religiously wrong so when I see someone drinking or smoking ..., well if I, I, I cannot enter a pub with my father, I just could not do it ...

I: But why? You can have an orange juice.

K.: Yea, I can but it is, it is more the atmosphere that is in the pub than actually doing something that is wrong. You see when I go to a Cafe Bar in Greece I feel fine, even if I go to a Cafe Bar here I am fine, or restaurants here I am fine. There is still alcohol served on these premises but it is the presence of people who are drunk, and that is the problem.

I: Where it is actually collective.

K.: Yes, yes.

F.: This exact issue is important, that ... it is ... that it does not matter if you are doing it, it is who you are around, you know. That even if, I mean, for instance within Islam, even if you are unacceptable of talking about good things, talking about morality and God and stuff, you as a Muslim still get the reward ... , you even as a non Muslim or anything like that still get the reward of the people who are discussing, whether you are participating, whether you agree or whether you do not agree, just the fact that you are in a collective which are morally higher you still get the benefit of that. You know, you still get the Sal(w)at which is, you know, the plus for you. Where as if you, no matter how good you are, if you are ... you are not allowed to, you know, whether you are the best of people and you can restrain from drinking or, or would never drink or anything like that, you to be in a situation where everyone is drunk or everyone is having an orgy whether you participate or not, is wrong. It is not allowed because you as a collective are, you know ... what ever the influence, whether you participate or not, like your mother said, how do you know the other person is not going to do something to you.

End of Interview



## Appendix VIII

Table 1 Regional ethnic group distribution of total population of Great Britain, 1991

Region or metropolitan county	Percentage of resident population											
	Entire Population	White	Minority Ethnic group	Caribbean	Black African	Other	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Asian Chinese	Other Asian	Other
South East	31.4	29.9	56.2	66.3	83.5	56.6	52.9	29.9	63.6	53.3	72.4	57.9
Greater London	12.2	10.3	44.6	58.2	77.1	45.2	41.3	18.4	52.7	36.1	57.1	41.7
East Anglia	3.7	3.8	1.4	1.0	1.1	4.0	0.8	1.2	1.0	2.4	1.9	2.6
South West	8.4	8.8	2.1	2.5	1.3	3.7	1.3	0.8	1.4	4.3	2.3	4.3
West Midl.	9.4	9.1	14.1	15.6	2.5	10.5	18.9	20.7	11.9	6.1	5.8	8.4
West Midl. MC	4.6	4.2	12.4	14.4	1.9	8.8	16.8	18.5	11.1	3.9	4.5	6.5
East Midl.	7.2	7.3	6.2	4.9	1.6	6.0	11.8	3.7	2.6	4.8	3.7	4.9
Yorks & Humber- side	8.8	8.9	7.1	4.3	2.3	5.7	4.8	19.9	5.1	5.2	3.7	6.2
South York- shire	2.3	2.4	1.2	1.2	0.6	1.4	0.4	2.8	0.7	1.4	0.7	1.6
West York- shire	3.7	3.6	5.4	3.0	1.2	3.7	4.1	16.9	3.7	2.5	2.3	3.6
North West	11.4	11.6	8.1	4.3	4.4	9.0	6.6	16.2	9.1	11.1	4.5	8.2
Greater Man- chester	4.6	4.5	4.9	3.4	2.5	5.2	3.5	10.4	7.0	5.3	2.5	4.4
Mersey- side	2.6	2.7	0.9	0.4	1.4	2.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	3.6	0.6	1.9
North	5.5	5.8	1.3	0.2	0.7	1.1	0.9	2.0	2.2	3.2	1.6	1.8
Tyne & Wear	2.0	2.1	0.7	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.7	1.8	0.8	0.9
Wales	5.2	5.4	1.4	0.7	1.3	1.9	0.8	1.2	2.3	3.1	1.9	2.6
Scotland	9.1	9.5	2.1	0.2	1.3	1.5	1.2	4.4	0.7	6.7	2.3	3.0

Source: 1991 Census Local Base Statistics within Great Britain.



## Appendix IX

Table 2 Regional variations in ethnic composition, within Great Britain 1991

county	Region or metropolitan	Percentage of resident population									
		All ethnic minorities	Black Caribbean	Black African	Other	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Other Asian	Other Other
South East		9.9	1.9	1.0	0.6	2.6	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.8	1.0
Greater London		20.2	4.4	2.4	1.2	5.2	1.3	1.3	0.8	1.7	1.8
East Anglia		2.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4
South West		1.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
West Midl.		8.2	1.5	0.1	0.4	3.1	1.9	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.5
West Midl. MC		14.6	2.8	0.2	0.6	5.5	3.5	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.7
East Midl.		4.8	0.6	0.1	0.3	2.5	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4
Yorks & Humber-side		4.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.8	2.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
South Yorkshire		2.9	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4
West York-shire		8.2	0.7	0.1	0.3	1.7	4.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5
North West		3.9	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.9	1.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.4
Greater Man-chester		5.9	0.7	0.2	0.4	1.2	2.0	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5
Mersey-side		1.8	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4
North		1.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2
Tyne & Wear		1.8	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2
Wales		1.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
Scotland		1.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2
Great Britain		5.5	0.9	0.4	0.3	1.5	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5

Source: 1991 Census Local Base Statistics within Great Britain.

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